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Abstract 
The doctrine of conversion is central to Christian community life. There are 
a number of issues that influence how one conceives the phenomenon of conversion. 
Among these are one's view of spirituality, human nature, and basic notions of the 
'self'. This thesis begins with the claim that contemporary views of Christian 
spirituality, particularly in the American Evangelical tradition, disproportionately 
emphasise the interior and individual nature of spiritual experience. This has a direct 
influence on doctrines of conversion in that their salient feature emerges as the 
redemption of an inner self or `salvation of the soul'. 
In order to promote a Christian community life that places discipleship at a 
premium, the author argues that a new model of conversion is needed within 
American Evangelicalism. Resources for such a model are found in the Wesleyan 
theological tradition as well as gathered from philosophical and scientific insights 
found in a nonreductive physicalist view of human nature. This thesis represents an 
integrated work in science and religion in that the author considers `data' from both 
theology and science. 
The author claims that Christian conversion is a process involving normal 
human biological capacities. It is characterised by a change in socio-moral attitude 
and behaviour, and is best understood as the acquisition of virtues intrinsic to 
Christian faith. Such acquisitions are facilitated through social interaction and 
participation in practices inherent to the Christian community. Furthermore, the 
conversion process should be viewed as the co-operant result of Divine grace and 
human participation. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Approaching the Issues 
For many of the churchly, the life of the spirit is reduced to a dull 
preoccupation with getting to heaven. At best, the world is no more 
than an embarrassment and a trial to the spirit which is otherwise 
radically separated from it... As far as this sort of `religion' is 
concerned, the body is no more than the lustreless container of the 
soul, a mere `package' that will nevertheless light up in eternity, 
forever cool and shiny as a neon cross. This separation of the soul 
from the body and from the world is no disease of the fringe, no 
aberration, but a fracture that runs through the mentality of 
institutionalized religion like a geologic fault. And this rift in the 
mentality of religion continues to characterize the modern mind, no 
matter how secular or worldly it becomes... And yet, what is the 
burden of the Bible if not a sense of the mutuality of influence, rising 
out of an essential unity, among soul and body and community and 
world? - Wendell Berry' 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the issues which will be addressed 
throughout the whole of this thesis. I identify the main problem as being an 
incomplete view of Christian spirituality within the Western religious traditions, 
particularly in American evangelicalism which claims nearly forty percent of the 
population of the United States. 2 Owen C. Thomas says that `In the tradition of 
writing about the Christian life or spirituality, commonly known as ascetical 
theology, down to the present burgeoning of this literature, a pervasive emphasis and 
I Recollected Essays, 1965-1980 (San Francisco, Ca.: North Point Press, 1981), pp. 283-284. 2 This statistic is provided by the Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals. See 
http: //www. wheaton. edu/isae/defining_evangelicalism. html (accessed 14 June 2006). My analysis is 
primarily concerned with American evangelicalism for two reasons: First, the Evangelical tradition in 
America has a substantial presence on the continent and with the dissemination of missionaries 
throughout the world, American Evangelical ideologies are having a global impact. Second, I am the 
product of an Evangelical heritage; thus, I speak from within the socio-historical tradition itself. In 
this sense, I am able to speak with more practical authority than I could of the state of spirituality in 
other religious traditions. 
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focus has been on the inner or interior life as distinct from the outer, bodily, and 
communal life'. 3 
This particular view of Christian spirituality has profound implications for 
how a tradition interprets and facilitates conversion, in both an individual and 
communal sense. It is this issue of Christian conversion that will be at the centre of 
my investigation. I submit that an incomplete view of Christian spirituality has 
naturally led to an equally short-sighted notion of conversion. What is needed is a 
new model of conversion that is faithful to the long-standing beliefs and practices of 
the Christian faith, yet critical of ideologies that compromise Christian community 
orthopraxis. 
The model of conversion that I will offer in this thesis will be presented in 
light of Wesleyan theology and a nonreductive physicalist view of human nature. 
John Wesley is often referred to as a practical theologian in that he was concerned 
not with the production of systematic theologies, but with the practice of theology in 
a transformative context. That is, Wesley was primarily concerned with the 
transformation of persons - the realisation of `holiness of life'. As such, Wesley 
offers a vital process-oriented language that will be central throughout this thesis. 
How one conceives human nature has an immense effect on issues 
concerning spirituality and conversion. 41 argue for a nonreductive physicalist view 
of human nature. Nonreductive physicalism is best viewed as a research programme 
that considers both scientific and metaphysical resources. In this way, a theory of 
3 Owen C. Thomas, `Interiority and Christian Spirituality', The Journal of Religion 80 no. 1 (2000), p. 
41. 
°I recognise that `human nature' is a broad concept discussed by a number of disciplines (psychology, 
anthropology, theology, etc. ); however, for the purpose of the present work, the term is meant to refer 
specifically to philosophical views dealing with the `substance' of humankind (a predicament usually 
addressed in philosophical anthropology). This concept is best captured by the question, 'what are 
humans made of? ' or `what are the constituent parts of the human species? ' For a comprehensive 
resource on the overall theme of human nature, see Louis P. Pojman, Who are We? Theories of 
Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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nonreductive physicalism can inform an investigation of a particular phenomenon in 
a more complete way than any single data source (cognitive science for example). 5 
Central to my argument is the relationship of the nonreductive physicalist view of 
human nature that I espouse and the process view of conversion that I argue for. I 
flatly claim that a nonreductive physicalist view of the human person requires a 
process view of conversion. Consequently, one of the goals of the present work will 
be to establish an operational description of conversion using both theology and 
science as vital resources; thus, throughout this work the terms `moral conversion', 
`moral transformation', and as I will argue, John Wesley's notion of `sanctification', 
can be used interchangeably. 
In what follows, I will offer a brief analysis of the `problem' of Christian 
spirituality as I have proposed it. This will be followed by a discussion of the notion 
of conversion that proceeds such a view of Christian spirituality. 6 In addition, I will 
cover some important presuppositions that must be considered through the length of 
this analysis. 
1.1 Christian Spirituality in Context 
The concept of `spirituality' is a generally elusive notion. Despite the 
difficulty of defining the term, it is a concept that permeates the whole of human 
culture. In an attempt to properly understand `spirituality', Brian J. Zinnbauer and 
colleagues performed a substantial analysis of the perceptual difference between 
`religiousness' and `spirituality'. Their research points out that religion and 
spirituality are polarised by three main themes - `organized religion versus personal 
S Data from cognitive science say nothing in and of themselves. It is only through philosophical 
analysis or other presuppositions that data can speak to a particular inquiry. 
6 To be clear, I do not claim to offer an exhaustive account of Christian spirituality, nor a complete 
chronicle of conversion within the Christian tradition; I only seek to establish the context in which I 
offer a nuanced model of conversion. 
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spirituality', `substantive religion versus functional spirituality', and `negative 
religiousness versus positive spirituality' 7 
While religion is concerned with groups and collective societal concerns, `the 
common perception is still that spirituality is primarily concerned with the life of the 
soul, the inner life, one's prayer life, one's spiritual life, as a separate compartment 
of the Christian life. The tendency to equate the spiritual life with the interior life is 
particularly prevalent in our own day'. 8 
Regarding the perceptual dichotomy between religion and spirituality, 
Thomas comments that `Along with this honorific [spirituality]/pejorative [religion] 
distinction goes the assumption that whereas religion deals with the outer life, that is, 
institutions, traditions, practices, doctrines, and moral codes, spirituality treats the 
inner life, which thus tends to be individualized and privatized' .9 Thomas concludes 
that these common assumptions have led to a damaging view of spirituality. He 
asserts that spirituality is a universally human trait - all people are spiritual. 
10 In this 
sense, neither religion nor spirituality can claim primacy over any particular domain, 
7 B. J. Zinnbauer, K. 1. Pargament, and A. B. Scott, 'The Emerging Meanings of Religiousness and 
Spirituality: Problems and Prospects', Journal of Personality 67 (1999), pp. 889-919. 8 Michael Downey, Understanding Christian Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 1992), p. 105. 
9 Thomas, 'Interiority and Christian Spirituality', p. 42. Thomas sees this interior emphasis in 
spirituality as 'mistaken both philosophically, theologically, and ethically'. He concludes that this 
situation needs to be 'redressed not only on a more balanced view of the inner/outer relation but also 
to an emphasis on the outer as primary and as a major source of the inner' (p. 42). 10 Thomas defines spirituality as 'the sum of all the uniquely human capacities and functions... all 
understood as embodied'. See Owen C. Thomas, `Some Problems in Contemporary Christian 
Spirituality', Anglican Theological Review 82, no. 2 (2000), p. 268. Extending from this assertion, I 
claim that 'spirituality' is best understood as the innate human capacity to understand oneself in 
relation to the world as a whole -a world consisting of both material and transcendent concepts. 
Spirituality emerges within the context of relationships and is characterized by particular cultural- 
linguistic systems which an individual deems to be of ultimate concern. For more on spirituality as an 
inherently anthropological concept see Sandra M. Schneiders, 'The Study of Christian Spirituality: 
The Contours and Dynamics of a Discipline', Christian Spirituality Bulletin 6 (1998), pp. 3-12; and 
Cynthia K. Chandler, J. M. Holden, and C. A. Kolander, 'Counselling for Spiritual Wellness: Theory 
and Practice', Journal of Counselling & Development 71 (1992), pp. 168-175. 
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inner or outer. In fact, Thomas claims that spirituality and religion are synonymous 
terms. l l 
Thomas's assessment highlights the state of Western spirituality with its 
heightened sense of the 'self'. One of the most salient features of selfhood in the 
West is the notion of `inwardness'; that is, we have the sense that mental states, 
emotions, feelings, etc. are things that dwell within us (or perhaps more particularly 
in our heads). 12 In his evaluation of the Western notion of selfhood, Robert Innes 
comments that 
We perceive ourselves as having inner depths. We talk of the 
possibility of expressing our inner selves. We commonly say that we 
have inner potentials and capacities that need to be developed. We 
may understand our conscious self to be merely the tip of an iceberg 
that conceals a vast personal or even cosmic unconscious. We readily 
distinguish between our `persona', or what people see of us on the 
outside, and our `real self' hat lies hidden and protected on the 
inside. 13 
This sentiment echoes the well-known account of the self given by Charles 
Taylor. He states that 
In our language of self-understanding, the opposition `inside-outside' 
plays an important role. We think of our thoughts, ideas, or feelings 
as being `within' us, while objects in the world which these mental 
states bear on are 'without'... But strong as this partitioning of the 
world appears to us, as solid as this localization may seem, and 
anchored in the very nature of the human agent, it is in large part a 
feature of our world, the world of modern, Western people. The 
localization is not a universal one, which human beings recognize as a 
matter of course, as they do for instance that their heads are above 
11 See Thomas, `Some Problems in Contemporary Christian Spirituality', p. 270. I depart from 
Thomas on one point: while I do agree that religion and spirituality are much more intimately related 
than some recognise (for example see Charles C. Ryrie, 'What is Spirituality? ', Bibliotheca Sacra 126 
(1969), pp. 204-213, where Ryrie equates 'spirituality' with `Christian maturity'), I do argue that they 
are indeed not synonymous. While I agree that spirituality is an innate human characteristic, religion 
should be viewed as a variety of cultural-linguistic modes in which spirituality can be embodied. 12 Thomas describes `interiority' not as physically inner but `psychologically or spiritually inner such 
that the self or soul is inner and the facial expression and gesture are outer; such that the mind is inner 
and the brain is outer; and such that the will or intention is inner and the bodily action and speech are 
outer' (Ibid., p. 57). Also, from the field of psychology, Jerome Bruner refers to our way of 
understanding this inner and outer distinction as a `preemptive metaphor' characterising the human 
erson. See Toward a Theory of Instruction (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990). 
3 Robert Inns, Discourses of the Self. - Seeking Wholeness in Theology and Psychology (Bern: Peter 
Lang, 1999), p. 29. 
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their torsos. Rather it is a function of a historically limited mode of 
self-interpretation, one which has become dominant in the modern 
West and which may indeed spread thence to other parts of the globe, 
but which had a beginning in time and space and may have an end. 14 
In Taylor's account, the possibility of achieving an integrated sense of self 
involves the unification of our sources of moral significance. Historically, Plato 
initiated the dominant Western moral tradition where the possibility of unifying the 
self is dependent upon the achievement of rational self-mastery. ls Taylor claims that 
people have traditionally derived their sense of self from a particular moral source 
(e. g. the Platonic Good). 
In this sense, one achieves a unified sense of self (or becomes a `whole 
person') to the extent that they are truly oriented toward this ultimate source of value 
or 'hypergood'. 16 Taylor argues that the most influential 'moral source' in the 
Western world is found in the Christian God as articulated in Augustinian 
theology. 17 Taylor states that 
Augustine's turn to the self was a turn to radical reflexivity, and that 
is what made the language of inwardness irresistible. The inner light 
is the one which shines in our presence to ourselves; it is the one 
inseparable from our being creatures with a first-person standpoint. 
What differentiates it from the outer light is just what makes the 
image of inwardness so compelling, that it illuminates the space 
where I am present to myself. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that 
it was Augustine who introduced the inwardness of radical reflexivity 
and bequeathed it to the Western tradition of thought. The step was a 
fateful one, because we have certainly made a big thing of the first- 
person standpoint. The modem epistemological tradition from 
Descartes, and all that flowed from it in modern culture, has made this 
standpoint fundamental - to the point of aberration, one might think. 
It has gone as far as generating the view that there is a special domain 
14 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self. " The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 111 (emphasis added). Taylor claims that `our modern notions of 
inner and outer are indeed strange and without precedent in other cultures and times' (p. 114). 15 Plato's ideal gave privileged position to a state of self-recollection in which one's expressive 
owers are united under the rational contemplation of the Good. 
6 See Taylor, Sources of the Self, pp. 62-75. 17 Taylor argues that, on the particular issue of interiority, Augustine was heavily influenced by 
Plotinus. For the present purposes, I note this influence, but will not pursue it further. For an 
additional source see Denys Turner, The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 75-79. 
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of `inner' objects available only from this standpoint; or the notion 
that the vantage point of the `I think' is somehow outside the world of 
things we experience. 18 
Augustine stands at the intersection between the ancient and medieval worlds. 
He is responsible for bequeathing a particular understanding of the self to the 
generations that followed him. Augustine's legacy is two-fold - not only did he 
offer a decisive description of the soul's relation to God (the `Godward self'), but, as 
Taylor points out, he also is responsible for initiating the Western tradition of 
interiority or introspective spirituality. 19 
It is important to note that the distinction between `inner' and `outer' is not 
equivalent to the distinction between soul and body. That these have come to be 
understood as equivalent is a fact of historical origin. Augustine's notion that one 
has an `inside' and that one can enter into that `inner' space arose within the context 
of his reflection on the problem of the location of the soul20 The combination of 
Augustine's metaphor of entering one's own self, together with the Neoplatonic 
emphasis on the care of the soul, has constituted a complex of ideas that has shaped 
the whole of Western spirituality. 
Augustine synthesised traditional Judeao-Christian faith and Neo-Platonic 
philosophy in light of his own experiences and religious convictions. The result was 
a remarkable emphasis on an inward notion of selfhood and the self's relation to God. 
In his Tracts on the Gospel of John, Augustine wrote 
t8 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 131. Emphasis added. 
19 For a helpful account of Augustine and the development of the notion of interior spirituality see 
Phillip Cary, Augustine's Invention of the Inner Self. The Legacy of a Christian Platonist (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000). 
20 Teresa of Avila exemplifies Augustine's metaphor by stating that 'we consider our soul to be like a 
castle made entirely out of a diamond or of very clear crystal, in which there are many rooms. " . some 
up above, others down below, others to the sides; and in the middle is the main dwelling place where 
the very secret exchanges between God and the soul take place'. See Teresa of Avila, `Interior 
Castle', in The Collected Works of St. Teresa of Avila: Vol. 2, Otilio Rodriguez and Kieran 
Kavanaugh (eds. ), (Washington DC: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 1980), pp. 283-284. 
12 
Recognize in yourself something which I want to call within, within 
you.. . Leave behind what lies outside, leave behind your clothing and 
your flesh. Descend into yourself; go to your secret place, your 
mind... If you are far from yourself, how can you draw near to 
God?... for not in the body but in the mind has human being been 
made after the image of God. In his own likeness let us seek God; in 
21 his own image let us recognize the creator. 
In Augustine's interpretation, the mode of access to the `moral source' was 
understood to be from within the self. 22 As the above passage makes clear, the self 
or soul, as an immaterial and eternal entity, should pursue God which is immaterial 
and eternal. While Plato emphasised the eternal/transient dichotomy, Augustine 
focused on the inner/outer distinction where the eternal is linked with the inner and 
the transient with the outer. 
This distinction continued in the practices of the Church. Spiritual teaching 
advised converts to flee from that which jeopardised union with the divine (sin) and 
focus instead on the cultivation of the soul's ascension to God. In their account of 
the history of moral theology, Daniel Harrington and James Keenan note that during 
the early medieval period 
moral theology was shaped predominately by a concern about the sins 
one should avoid, and not about the good to be pursued. Similarly, 
with emphasis on one's own moral state, the Christian's communal 
self-understanding was less important, and a long period of moral 
narcissism began, in which Christians became anxious not about the 
kingdom or the needs of the Church, but rather about the state of their 
individual souls23 
Fergus Kerr claims that this historical condition has an extended presence in 
contemporary Christian theology and spirituality. Kerr states that 
21 Augustine, Tractatus in Joannis evangelium (23.10), translated by Robert Meagher, Augustine on 
the Inner Life of the Mind (Indianapolis, In.: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), p. 29. 
22 This shift in language initiated by Augustine differed from Plato's understanding of the pursuit of 
the 'Good'. Although Plato located moral sources in the realm of thought, he did not equate access to 
such as a turn inward. In contrast to Augustine, Plato held that becoming rational involved a turning 
from that which is transient to the `light' (allegory of the cave). 
23 Jesus and Virtue Ethics: Building Bridges Between New Testament Studies and Moral Theology 
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), p. 3. 
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Spiritual writers in the last three centuries or so have driven many 
devout people into believing that the only real prayer is silent, 
worldless, `private' .... It is amazing how often 
devout people think 
that liturgical worship is not really prayer unless they have been 
injecting special `meaning' to make the words work. The inclination 
is to say that participation consists in private goings-on inside the 
head.... There is... a central strain in modem Christian piety which 
puts all the emphasis on people's secret thoughts and hidden sins. 24 
This amounts to no less that an implicit (or explicit) dualism in Christian 
spirituality. Obvious dichotomies exist between body and soul, and between 
church/kingdom of God and world. For many within the Christian tradition the goal 
of the church has been `to rescue souls from bodies, rescue the church from the 
world, and transport its passengers safely to the heavenly realms'. 25 
This dichotomy is obvious is on several levels of analysis. The area of 
missiology takes seriously how people groups are engaged for the sake of Christian 
mission. In his critique of Western Christian spirituality, Bryant L. Myers comments 
that 
As the foundational paradigm shift of the Enlightenment has worked 
itself out in Western culture, one of its most enduring features has 
been the assumption that we can consider the physical and spiritual 
realms as separate and distinct from one another. On the one hand, 
there is the spiritual or supernatural world where God lives and acts, 
along with other cosmic Gods like Allah. This is the world of 
religion. On the other hand, there is the real world: the material world 
where we hear, see, feel, touch, and smell.... This framework of 
separated areas of life is also deeply embedded in the Western part of 
the Christian church, in its theology, and in the daily life of its 
people. 26 
Bryant's notion of transformational development takes seriously the holistic 
nature of human beings and realises that transformation is no more about the 
24 Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 
1997), p. 50. 
u Glen H. Stassen and David P. Gushee, Kingdom Ethics: Following Jesus in Contemporary Context 
(Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2003), p. 115. Stassen and Gushee offer a helpful analysis 
of the negative impact that such `spirituality' has on the practice of Christian ethics. They baldly 
claim that 'To the extent that Christians adopt any kind of body/soul, earth/heaven dualism we simply 
do not understand the message of Scripture - or of Jesus' (p. 28-29). 26 Bryant L. Myers, Walking with the Poor: Principles and Practices of Transformational 
Development (Maryknoll, NY.: Orbis Books, 1999), p. 5. 
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changing condition of one's `soul' than it is about the changing of one's `mind'. 
Transformation is a thoroughly holistic process that cannot be understood as 
occurring in any way apart from physical embodiment. 
The dualistic interpretation of spirituality discussed above has far-reaching 
implications regarding Christian community orthopraxis. I claim that an important 
example can be seen in the understanding of conversion that pervades much of 
Evangelical thought in America. 
1.2 Conversion as an Interior Experience 
The view of spirituality discussed above has had a tremendous impact on 
how Christians conceive conversion, particularly within American Evangelicalism. 
For many Evangelicals, conversion is primarily presumed to occur instantaneously 
as God responds to prayerful petition. Conversion is then understood as receiving 
Jesus Christ as one's personal Lord and Saviour and is subsequently characterised as 
a `personal relationship with God'. 27 Conversion in this context is considered to be a 
change that occurs within the soul - hence the popular phrase `salvation of the soul'. 
In a sobering appraisal of ' North American evangelical Christianity, Mark D. 
Baker notes that evangelicals tend to read the Bible through an individualistic28 and 
spiritualised lens. This reading places the salvation of the soul at the centre of the 
27 See Larry Richards, Born to Grow (Wheaton, Ill.: Scripture Press, 1977), p. 11. 28 This individualism is best described by Dennis Hollinger as `a view of reality in which the 
individual is the most basic entity and the defining principle of all existence. it is an atomistic 
conception of reality in which a collective has no existence apart from its constituent parts.... The 
social whole is a composite of separate individuals'. See Individualism and Social Ethics: An 
Evangelical Syncretism (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1983), pp. 16-17. Sociologist 
Stephen Hart observes that the United States is 'probably the most individualistic nation the world has 
ever known. Our individualism is not only a set of value preferences sacralizing individual freedom, 
but also a cognitive framework blinding us to the supra-individual aspect of human life'. See Stephen 
Hart, 'Privatization in American Religion and Society', Sociological Analysis 47 (1987), p. 325. Roy 
F. Baumeister has produced an insightful historical analysis concerning the evolving notion of 'self' 
marked by a strong sense of individualism. Baumeister sees this self-contained individualism as the 
spiritual problem or our time. See 'How the Self Became a Problem', Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 52 no. 1 (1987), pp. 163-176. 
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Christian faith. Such an understanding causes many evangelicals to interpret all 
aspects of Christian life in relation to this central idea. Baker comments that 
Rather than seeing their individual salvation as part of a larger theme, 
like the kingdom of God, people attempt to understand the kingdom 
of God as a subcategory of individual salvation. They might only 
equate the kingdom of God with heaven or as something within the 
individual Christian. What cannot be brought into line with the 
central theme of future individual salvation is left as optional or 
secondary in the Christian life. As long as this lens is in place, much 
of the biblical holistic gospel will either be spiritualized, rejected or 
29 considered an appendix to the gospel. 
The issue is not that individualism produces a society of social hermits. On 
the contrary, communities do form, but these are communities where the individual 
is primary to the group. Theologian, C. Norman Kraus observes that in 
individualistic societies `Community is seen as a contractual association of 
independent individuals.... The group [becomes] a collection of individuals created 
by individuals for their own individual advantages'. 30 This condition creates a 
Christian culture that views the church as a community offering care for individual 
souls rather than serving the role of the visible kingdom of God in the world. 
Ronald J. Sider, President of Evangelicals for Social Action (ESA), has 
issued a number of sharp critiques against American evangelicals regarding their 
participation in social justice concerns. Sider states 
I am convinced that at the heart of our problem is a one-sided, 
unbiblical, reductionist understanding of the gospel and salvation. 
Too many evangelicals in too many ways give the impression that the 
really important part of the gospel is forgiveness of sins. If we just 
repeat the formula and say we want Jesus to forgive our sins, we are 
29 Mark D. Baker, Religious No More: Building Communities of Grace & Freedom (Downers Grove, 
Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1999), p. 57. Evangelical historian, Nathan Hatch shows the connection between American revivalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the emergence of American individualism. Hatch notes that many early American evangelical leaders saw religion as `a matter between God and individuals'. See Nathan Hatch, `Democratization of Christianity and the Character of American Politics', in Mark Noll (ed. ), Religion and American Politics: From the Colonial Period to the 1980's (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 112. 30 C. Norman Kraus, The Community of the Spirit (Scottdale, Penn.: Herald Press, 1993), p. 32. 
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Christians.... Salvation becomes, not a life-transforming experience 31 that reorients every corner of life, but a one-way ticket to heaven. 
In a helpful analysis of American Evangelicalism, James Davison Hunter 
notes the increasing methodisation and standardisation of spirituality within the 
Evangelical tradition. Although Protestantism in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries did display certain propensities for the rationalisation of spirituality, Hunter 
notes that 
What is different about contemporary American Evangelicalism is the 
intensification of this propensity to unprecedented proportions. This 
intensification comes about as an adaptation to modern rationality. 
Thus one may note the increasing tendency to translate the 
specifically religious components of the Evangelical world view, 
previously understood to be plain, self-evident, and without need of 
elaboration, into rigorously standardized prescriptions. 32 
In this way, the spiritual aspects of Evangelical life are interpreted in terms of 
`guidelines' or `laws'. The means by which one enters the Christian faith can be 
systematised in this fashion. In How To Be Born Again, Billy Graham offers the 
following `Four Steps to Peace with God': 
First, you must recognize what God did: that He loved you so much 
He gave His Son to die on the cross. Second, you must repent for 
your sins. It's not enough to be sorry; repentance is that turnabout 
from sin that is emphasized. Third, you must receive Jesus Christ as 
Savior and Lord. This means that you cease trying to save yourself 
and accept Christ without reservation. Fourth, you must confess 
Christ publicly. This confession is a sign that you have been 
converted. 33 
31 Ronald J. Sider, The Scandal of the Evangelical Conscience: Why Are Christians Living Just Like 
the Rest of the World? (Grand Rapids, Mi.: Baker Books, 2005), pp. 57-58. Furthermore, Sider 
criticises the evangelical tendency to think of persons primarily as individual souls, thus many 
evangelicals describe evangelism as `saving souls'. See pp. 69-73. 
32 James D. Hunter, American Evangelicalism: Conservative Religion and the Quandary of Modernity 
(New Brunswick, NJ.: Rutgers University Press, 1983), pp. 74-75. 
33 Billy Graham, How To Be Born Again (Waco, Tx.: Word Books, 1977), pp. 167-168. Italics added 
to emphasize the past tense `have been converted'. This is an important feature of this notion of 
conversion - it is an instantaneous event that can be connected to a single moment in time. The case 
can be made that the fourth step is Graham's way of insuring that conversion is not a solely an 
interior experience. The point that I wish to emphasize here is that the coming forward in the mass 
revivals, etc. is a way to publicly express that conversion that has already occurred. The public 
proclamation (external) is simply a witness to the completed conversion moment (internal). 
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A similar methodological presentation can be seen in the writing of Bill 
Bright. Bright claims that `just as there are physical laws that govern the material 
universe, so are there spiritual laws which govern your relationship with God' . 
34 
Conversion then occurs through acknowledging the validity of the Four Spiritual 
Laws35 and then by responding to specific instructions on how to `receive Jesus 
Christ as Saviour and Lord'. This instruction, also known as the Sinner's Prayer, is 
presented by Graham as follows: 
Lord Jesus, I need you. Thank You for dying on the cross for my sins. 
I open the door of my life and receive You as my Savior and Lord. 
Thank You for forgiving my sins and giving me eternal life. Take 
control of the throne of my life. Make me the kind of person You 
36 want me to be. 
One need not go further than Graham and Bright to uncover the widespread 
popularity of these teachings regarding Christian conversion. Graham has led 
hundreds of thousands of individuals to this conversion experience as he has 
preached to over 200 million people in 185 countries. He has written twenty-four 
books, many of which have been translated into thirty-eight languages. He has been 
awarded numerous honours and has served as advisor to several U. S. presidents. 
In a TIME magazine article, Harold Bloom writes that Graham `is the 
recognized leader of what continues to call itself American evangelical Protestantism, 
and his life and activities have sustained the self-respect of that vast entity. If there is 
an indigenous American religion - and I think there is, quite distinct from European 
Protestantism - then Graham remains its prime emblem'. 37 
34 See Four Spiritual Laws (San Bernardino, Ca.: Campus Crusade for Christ, 1965), introduction text. 
35 Law One - `God loves you, and offers a wonderful plan for your life'. Law Two - `Man is sinful 
and separated from God. Therefore, he cannot know and experience God's love and plan for his life'. 
Law Three - `Jesus Christ is God's only provision for man's sin. Through him you can know and 
experience God's love and plan for your life'. Law Four - 'We must individually receive Jesus Christ 
as Savior and Lord; then we can know and experience God's love and plan for our lives'. Ibid. 36 Graham, 'How To Be Born Again', in The Collected Works of Billy Graham (New York: 
Inspirational Press, 1993), p. 287. 
37 Harold Bloom, 'Billy Graham', TIME Magazine (14 June 1999), p. 3. 
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In similar fashion, Bill Bright has been enormously influential through his 
role as founder of the world's largest Christian ministry - Campus Crusade for 
Christ. This organisation is active in 191 countries through a staff of 26,000 full- 
time employees and more than 225,000 trained volunteers. Bright's Four Spiritual 
Laws has been written in over 200 languages and distributed to more than 2.5 billion 
people. Likewise, his Jesus Film has become the most widely viewed (5.1 billion) 
and translated (786 languages) in history. 38 
This systematisation of the gospel message and subsequent presentation of 
conversion creates a `packaged' spirituality which ultimately allows for ease of 
appropriation. Hunter asserts that this methodical presentation of the conversion 
process produces effects with parallels in market economics. Hunter states that 
In the rationalized economy, mass production allows for widespread 
distribution and consumption while maintaining a high degree of 
quality control over the product. Likewise the reduction of the gospel 
to its distilled essence and the methodization of the conversion 
process make widespread distribution of the gospel possible, while 
maintaining a cognitive uniformity in substantive quality of the 
message and an experiential uniformity in functional quality of the 
process. 39 
Beyond the popular Evangelical literature, there are substantial works of 
systematic theology which reinforce the ideas presented above. As a case study, I 
offer the Systematic Theology of Louis Berkhof. 40 For the purpose of the present 
work, I will focus on Berkhof's theological interpretation of conversion. 41 Berkhof's 
38 See http: //billbright. ccci. org/public/ (accessed on 30 May 2006). 39 Hunter, American Evangelicalism, pp. 83-84. This sentiment is echoed by Philip Lee. Lee notes 
that for many Evangelicals, conversion is a (necessary) technique for salvation. Here, the history of 
Israel as well as the life and ministry of Jesus is spiritualised beyond recognition and important only 
insofar as these concepts can be employed to bring sinners to repentance. See Philip Lee, Against the 
Protestant Gnostics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 109. 
4° Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, Mi.: William B. Eerdman's Publishing 
Company, 1941). I choose this particular work due its widespread use in Evangelical seminaries as 
well as its general popularity within theologically conservative circles (e. g. the text is in fourth edition 
and has been printed in five languages). 
11 This appears in part four of Berkhof's volume. My critique of Berkhof's interpretation of 
conversion is based on an analysis offered by Brad Kallenberg. See `Conversion Converted: A 
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soteriology is rooted in an ordo salutis (order of salvation). This logical sequence is 
the means through which God administers salvation to each individual convert42 
Conversion, which lies in the middle of Berkhof's ordo salutis, proceeds 
regeneration43 as the first act of the regenerate soul in accordance with its newly 
acquired holy disposition. Berkhof offers the following two-fold definition of 
conversion: 
Active conversion is that act of God whereby He causes the 
regenerated sinner, in his conscious life, to turn to Him in repentance 
and faith.... Passive conversion is the resulting conscious act of the 
regenerate sinner whereby he, through the grace of God, turns to God 
in repentance and faith. 44 
Kallenberg claims that Berkhof's formulation of conversion is deficient in 
three ways. 45 It suffers from: (1) metaphysical reductionism, (2) linguistic 
reductionism, and (3) epistemological absolutism 46 
Metaphysical reductionism appears in Berkhof's account as he conceives of 
the whole as nothing but the some of its parts - the Church is nothing but the sum of 
the members that make it up. Subsequently, Berkhof views conversion as a limited 
transaction between God and the individual, thus downplaying the role of 
community in the conversion process. In this sense, `true conversion' is 
characterised by a private experience with God and the Christian community 
(Church) becomes, at best, a collection of individuals that have a shared experience - 
`the individual is treated as the real center of action and the community is treated as 
Postmodern Formulation of the Doctrine of Conversion', Evangelical Quarterly 67 (1995), pp. 335- 
364. 
42 The complete order is calling, regeneration, conversion, faith, justification, sanctification, 
perseverance, and glorification. See Berkhof, Systematic Theology, pp. 415-416. It will become 
increasingly obvious that I reject Berkhof s separation of 'conversion' from 'sanctification'. 
43 Regeneration is understood to be the change in an individual soul's basic disposition resulting from 
the implantation of new life through the indwelling Holy Spirit. Ibid., p. 415. 
44 Ibid., p. 483. 
45 These deficiencies are closely connected with Berkhof's presuppositions regarding modern 
philosophy. 
6 Kallenberg, `Conversion Converted', p. 338. 
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nothing more than the sum of its individual members'. 7 The weakness of this view 
is its failure to recognise the formative or `causal' powers of the community. 
The second reductionist feature of Berkhof's account is linguistic in nature. 
Berkhof adopts a propositionalism that disregards the transformative power of 
language itself. Following Calvin, Berkhof appears to understand the regenerate 
individual in intellectualist terms. In this view, moral progress is attained by 
knowing and understanding God's truths. The strong cognitive element that appears 
in Berkhof's account emphasises the representational function of the biblical 
propositions while compromising their performative function. 
In short, for Berkhof, true saving faith cannot operate apart from knowing the 
content of biblical propositions - `the knowledge of faith consists 
in a positive 
recognition of the truth, in which man accepts as true whatsoever God says in His 
Word'. 48 Much like the metaphysical reduction discussed above, Berkhof's 
linguistic reductionism fails for what it leaves out. A preoccupation with 
propositional content fails to recognise language as a social fact within itself. In this 
sense, language has the causal power to shape experience. This is a point that should 
not be taken lightly. Edward Sapir comments that `the fact of the matter is that the 
"real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the 
group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because 
the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. 
As I will discuss in chapter four, conversion amounts to no less than the acquisition 
of a new conceptual language. 
47 Ibid., p. 339. 
48 Berkhof, Systematic Theology, p. 503. 
49 Edward Sapir, cited in Twenty Questions: An Introduction to Philosophy, G. Lee Bowie, Meredith 
W. Michaels, and Robert C. Solomon (eds. ), (Orlando, Fl.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), p. 274. 
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The final deficiency in Berkhof's account concerns his epistemological 
absolutism. For Berkhof, faith and certainty of knowledge are directly proportional 
to one another. He claims that `faith carries its own certainty with it.... It is a 
certainty that is unwavering and indestructible'. 0 Subsequently, Berkhof's view of 
conversion is based on what he conceives to be a `correct' interpretation of Scripture 
- the sole court of appeal concerning doctrinal matters 
51 
Faith derives its certainty from the existence of God; however, knowledge of 
God is mediated through Scripture, thus the Bible becomes the ultimate foundation 
for certainty. Berkhof asserts that 
The doctrine of conversion is, of course, like all other doctrines, based 
upon Scripture and should be accepted on that ground. Since 
conversion is a conscious experience in the lives of many, the 
testimony of experience can be added to that of the Word of God, but 
this testimony, however valuable it may be, does not add to the 
52 certainty of the doctrine taught in the Word of God. 
The obvious weakness of Berkhof's foundationalist view of certainty is that 
no such universal and timeless expression of the doctrine of conversion exists. He 
ignores the historical consciousness that lies behind doctrinal formulation, thus 
exposing the thoroughly modern (Enlightenment) philosophical presuppositions that 
undergird his position. 
There are those that oppose this understanding of Christian conversion. 
Lesslie Newbigin is a harsh critic of dualistic and individualistic characterisations of 
Christian life. Newbigin asserts that 
The hope set before us in the gospel is fundamentally corporate, not 
individualistic.... This purely individualistic conception of the 
50 Berkhof, Systematic Theology, p. 504. 
51 This same notion is reflected in popular Evangelical literature. Miles Stanford states that above all 
`true faith must be based solely upon scriptural facts.... Unless our faith is established on facts, it is no 
more than conjecture, superstition, speculation or presumption. Once we begin to reckon (count) on 
facts, our Father begins to build us up in the faith'. See Principles of Spiritual Growth, (Lincoln, 
Neb.: Back to the Bible Publishing, 1976), p. 7. 
52 Berkhof, Systematic Theology, p. 482. 
22 
Kingdom robs human history as a whole of its meaning. According 
to this view, the significance of life in this world is exhaustively 
defined as the training of individual souls for heaven. Thus there can 
be no connected purpose running through history as a whole, but only 
a series of disconnected purposes for each individual life. History, on 
this view, would have no goal, no telos. 53 
The model of conversion that I offer is intended to reflect Newbigin's 
sentiment and to avoid the short-comings pointed out above. I claim that the 
spirituality espoused by many contemporary Evangelicals renders a theologically 
and scientifically faulty concept of conversion. I reject the notion that conversion is 
an isolated affair of the individual `inner self'; rather, I maintain that conversion is a 
significant social reorientation commensurate with a transformation of identity. 
As I pointed out earlier, an `inner' and `outer' distinction is not the same as 
distinguishing between soul and body. It is feasible that one could be a body-soul 
dualist and avoid an excessively inward-oriented spirituality. Furthermore, it is also 
possible for one with a physicalist anthropology to ignore the responsibilities of 
`Kingdom work' by retreating to solitude, self-examination and contemplation. The 
salient point here is that a nonreductive physicalism along with the eschatological 
hope of `new creation' leads more naturally to a Christian worldview marked by 
concern for the physical world and its transformation than does a dualist 
anthropology. 
The type of conversion that I seek to describe should not be understood as 
`salvation of the soul', but as the holistic process of socio-moral transformation of a 
person within the context of the Christian community. 54 Conversion, in this sense, is 
53 Lesslie Newbigin, Signs Amid the Rubble: The Purposes of God in Human History, Geoffrey 
Wainwright (ed. ), (Grand Rapids, Mi.: William B. Eerdman's Publishing Company, 2003), p. 24. 
Newbigin understands that, as a social philosophy, individualism stresses personal morality over 
social ethics and views individual transformation as the key to social change (mission). A position 
that he is bound to reject. For more see Hollinger, Individualism and Social Ethics, p. 44. 
sa The multi-dimensional character of conversion was recognised by Catholic Theologian Bernard 
Lonergan. He spoke of the intellectual, moral, and religious dimensions of the conversion process. 
See Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990). Lonergan's concept of 
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not simply about a `correct' system of beliefs, but necessarily involves a 
transformation in socio-moral attitude and behaviour. The intimate connection 
between this claim and John Wesley's understanding of sanctification will become 
apparent throughout this work. 55 
As with any intellectual endeavour, there are a number of scientific, 
philosophical, and theological presuppositions which underlie my basic thesis. 
While I argue many of these at length in later chapters, I will point out two important 
positions at the outset which will inform my further investigation. These concern 
moral theory and theological method. 
1.3 Moral Theory 
Because my view of conversion is intrinsically and inextricably tied to moral 
transformation, I deem it necessary to say a few words regarding moral theory. All 
versions of moral theory claim to speak to what an agent ought to do; however, there 
is less agreement regarding the substance of these moral `oughts' and the subsequent 
moral psychologies that are required for effective reasoning and behaviour. Within 
the modern Western tradition there are two predominate moral theories - 
utilitarianism and deontology. In addition to these, virtue theory, having roots in 
ancient Greek thought, has risen to popularity in contemporary studies. 
conversion has been expanded by a number of scholars. For example Donald L. Gelpi adds affective 
and socio-political conversion to Lonergan's triad. See The Conversion Experience: A Reflective 
Process for RCIA Participants and Others (New York: Paulist Press, 1998). See also the addition of 
somatic conversion in Len Sperry, Transforming Self and Community: Revisioning Pastoral 
Counseling and Spiritual Direction (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 2002). The point of noting 
these is to emphasise the critical holistic understanding of conversion that I wish to espouse in this 
work. 
ss Due to its historical and doctrinal evolution, the term 'sanctification' has come to refer to a variety 
of processes and/or events. In what follows, I will argue for the process-oriented understanding of 
sanctification while formally rejecting the view of `crisis event'. 
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Utilitarianism, classically advanced by the British philosopher John Stuart 
Mill , 
S6 suggests that in the case of moral judgment one should take the action (or 
follow the rule) that maximises pleasure and minimises pain for the largest number 
of people. A popular form of this moral theory is known as `rule utilitarianism'. 
7 Here, the moral evaluation is based on the `rule' rather than a particular act. 
To make the appropriate moral judgment, utilitarianism requires that a moral 
agent is capable of recognising and computing salient utility functions. The 
utilitarian would then be moved to act on such judgments by the cultivation of 
`feelings' that are identified with `happiness' (whether they be altruistic in nature or 
involve mere self-concern). So, for the most part, a utilitarian moral psychology is 
constituted by cognitive mechanisms dedicating to learning what actions or rules 
bring about a state of happiness. 
Deontology, as emphasised in the work of Immanuel Kant , 
58 focuses less on 
the consequences of an action and more on the maxim of the action itself, that is, the 
intent-based principle that arises through a rational process of deliberation 
59 Kant 
argued that moral action is based on a standard of rationality which he called the 
`categorical imperative' 60 - moral acts are rational and immoral acts violate the 
categorical imperative and are thereby irrational. 
A Kantian moral psychology will focus on the individual's ability to `reason' 
about the demands of the categorical imperative and act accordingly. Kant insisted 
that one be moved to perform his or her `duty' by the demands of duty alone; thus, 
56 See Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002). 
57 For more see Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
s$ See Thomas E. Hill and Arnulf Zweig (eds. ), Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002). 
59 For a helpful collection of essays on deontological ethics see Stephen Darwall (ed. ), Deontology 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002). 
60 Essentially, the categorical imperative requires that an individual act only on maxims that he or she 
would want to become a universal law. 
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there is a premium placed on the rational deliberative process. Here, the influence of 
emotions or `animal nature' is seen in a negative light and to work against true moral 
behaviour. 
Virtue theory has ancient historical roots including the work of the Greek 
philosophers Plato and Aristotle. 61 This approach deemphasises rules, consequences, 
etc. and shifts the focus to the `character' of the moral agent. So, the issue is not 
primarily whether or not one follows the correct rule; rather, the salient feature of 
virtue ethics is whether the moral agent is expressing good character, or virtues 62 
William C. Spohn points out five key features of a virtue based moral theory. 63 
1. Moral evaluation focuses on the agent's character; actions are 
important because they display the agent's values and 
commitments. 
2. Good character produces practical moral judgments based on 
beliefs, experience, and sensitivity more than on (or instead of) 
rules and principles. 
3. A moral psychology gives an account of how virtues and vices 
develop. 
4. A theory of human fulfilment describes the goal towards which 
virtues lead and/or in which the virtues are components. 
5. Increasingly, attention is paid to the cultural shaping of virtues 
and what relation, if any, exists between specific historical 
manifestations of virtues and more universal human traits. 
The moral psychology implied in virtue theory is intrinsically connected to 
the moral `nature' of the agent. The virtuous person is not primarily concerned with 
61 It is interesting to note that D. Stephen Long has claimed that Wesley's public theology is best 
understood as 'moral theology' stemming from the virtue tradition, particularly the work of Thomas 
Aquinas. For more see D. Stephen Long, John Wesley's Moral Theology: The Quest for God and 
Goodness (Nashville, Tenn.: Kingswood Books, 2005). 
62 Some challenge the strict dichotomy between virtue and Kantian (deontological) ethics, claiming 
that Kantian ethics is able to promote and sustain the same sort of character as virtue theory. For 
example see John D. O'Connor, `Are Virtue Ethics and Kantian Ethics Really So Very Different? ' 
New Blackfriars 87 (2006), pp. 238-252. O'Connor's argument suffers from one central weakness - 
his supporting material for virtue theory denies the role of emotion in ethical formation and decision 
making. Such a denial is not only unnecessary, but ignores a central component of the moral life; thus, 
there may indeed be a greater divide between virtue and Kantian ethics than he proposes. 
63 William C. Spohn, `The Return of Virtue Ethics', Theological Studies 53 (1992), p. 61. 
26 
superior moral reasoning, but with becoming a particular type of person whose 
attitudes and behaviour flow from a particular holistic disposition. That is, the moral 
psychology required by virtue theory is a whole brain-body affair that involves the 
emotions and a serious consideration of the social context within which a person is 
situated. 
The importance of social context cannot be overstated. Regarding the social 
dimension of moral theory, Alasdair MacIntyre claims that 
A moral philosophy... characteristically presupposes a sociology. For 
every moral philosophy offers explicitly or implicitly at least a partial 
conceptual analysis of the relationship of an agent to his or her 
reasons, motives, intentions and actions, and in so doing generally 
presupposes some claim that these concepts arc embodied or at least 
can be in the real social world.... Thus it would generally be a 
decisive refutation of a moral philosophy to show that moral agency 
on its own account of the matter could never be socially embodied; 
and it also follows that we have not yet fully understood the claims of 
any moral philosophy until we have spelled out what its social 
embodiment would be. 
Maclntyre argues for a virtue ethic that takes seriously the social dimension 
of the moral life. Going forward I will consider virtue theory to be the most viable 
of the moral theories discussed above. Not only is this position philosophically 
defensible, I claim that a virtue based moral theory provides the best understanding 
of moral formation and transformation. 
1.4 Theological Method 
At the heart of my research is a conviction that for a phenomenon to be 
thoroughly understood, multiple levels of explanation must be considered. The 
greater the number of aspects from which a phenomenon is explained, the better our 
understanding will be of the event in question. Such a conviction necessarily recruits 
64 Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1981), p. 23. 
27 
insights from both theology and science. I am persuaded that such an integrated 
approach is not only possible, but beneficial. 65 
This persuasion is not new to theological methodology. There are a number 
of scholars who have offered theological methods that take seriously the 
multidimensional nature of theological analysis. In an effort to describe Methodist 
contributions to a theory of divine providence, David Wilkinson reminds readers of 
the distinctively Wesleyan approach to theological inquiry - the so-called Wesleyan 
Quadrilateral which consists of scripture, reason, tradition and experience. 66 
Wilkinson points out that too often philosophers and theologians develop 
doctrine in epistemic isolation. In contrast, he emphasises the importance of human 
experience, not least of which regards the insights of reason in terms of modem 
scientific discovery. In the case of understanding God's activity in the world, 
Wilkinson claims that `Chaos and quantum theory must be taken seriously. -They 
remind us also that any model of providence must reflect the varied and complex 
nature of the universe'. 67 
Also from with the Wesleyan tradition, Warren S. Brown offers a theological 
method that he refers to as the `resonance model' 68 Brown's primary concern is 
developing a model that allows for the constructive relationship between science and 
theology. Brown asserts that a helpful way of thinking about the relation between 
65 Despite the opinion depicting science and theology as adversaries, I claim that this disjuncture is far 
from insurmountable and in most cases excessively overstated. Both science and theology are in the 
business of making claims about the world and as such they necessarily share the common goal of 
describing reality. For a helpful historical overview of the relationship between science and religion 
see Gary B. Ferngren (ed. ), Science and Religion: A Historical Introduction (Baltimore, Md.: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). For a popular work on the interaction of science and 
theological issues see Ian G. Barbour, When Science Meets Religion: Enemies, Strangers, or Partners? 
(London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 2000). 
66 'The Activity of God in Methodist Perspective', in Clive Marsh, A. Shier-Jones, and H. Wareing 
(eds. ), Unmasking Methodist Theology (New York: Continuum, 2004), pp. 148-150. 
67 Ibid., p. 149. 
68 'Resonance: A Model for Relating Science, Psychology, and Faith', Journal of Psychology and 
Christianity 23 (2004), pp. 110-120. 
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theology and the sciences is to consider an auditory/acoustic metaphor involving the 
property of resonance. Here resonance refers to `the amplification or enrichment of 
sound when two or more auditory signals vibrate together synchronously or 
harmonically'. 69 
Using the Wesleyan Quadrilateral, Brown splits reason into `rationality' and 
`science', thus yielding the domains of scripture, tradition, experience, rationality 
and science. The resonance model presents the arbitration of differences between 
these domains as a process of finding `maximal resonance' between the data 
contributed by each source. Brown states that 
To seek resonance is not to look for different domains to say the same 
thing, nor is it allowing one field to trump another. Rather, it is 
presumed that if a conclusion is true within one domain, it should 
have some form of resonance with other domains... thus, the most 
reliable knowledge and understanding is to be found somewhere in 
the resonant field where information from different domains 
intersect70 
The type of approaches offered by Wilkinson and Brown exemplify the need 
for a theological method that considers multiple sources of investigation. I submit 
that Nancey Murphy has offered one of the most original and well-articulated 
approaches in contemporary theology. Murphy's theological method will serve as a 
guiding resource for the whole of my research project. In what follows, I will offer a 
brief description of this method. 
Murphy's theological method incorporates insights from philosophy of 
science, philosophy of religion, ethics, metaethics, biblical studies, and various 
scientific disciplines 71 Murphy works from a self-proclaimed postrnodern72 position 
69 Ibid., p. 113. 
70 Ibid., p. 114. 
71 For Murphy's most extensive analysis of theological methodology sec Theology in the Age of 
Scientific Reasoning (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
72 The type of 'postmodernity' espoused by Murphy is Anglo-American in nature. She is careful to 
distance herself from the strong deconstructionism found in the likes Jean-Francois Lyotard and 
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and therefore challenges many of the presuppositions found in both liberal and 
fundamentalist branches of theological thought. 73 
Murphy claims that theology has yet to recover from the philosophical 
treatises of David Hume. 4 In fact, Hume's work has led to a great divide separating 
modem from pre-modem theism. Murphy claims that 
The failure of theism to withstand the application of the new probable 
reasoning seems to give theologians a choice between two positions. 
Some accept Hume's critique as final and seek some other 
`vindication' for religion and theology outside the cognitive domain. 
Others ignore the crisis created by the epistemological changes that 
ushered in modernity, and go on about their business as though Hume 
had never written. 75 
Murphy claims that those who ignore Hume's work `pay the price of 
becoming intellectually isolated from and irrelevant to the host culture'. 6 Among 
those who accept Hume's criticism as final must either (a) `find some other 
vindication for theology (moral, aesthetic, existential), with the consequence that 
theology loses it cognitive content and becomes uninteresting'; or (b) `redefine terms 
so that theology has its own form of "rationality", with the consequence that 
theology becomes unintelligible to those who operate with the standard 
epistemology' ' 
This first response is exemplified by Immanuel Kant and later by Friedrich 
Schleiermacher. Kant by-passed objections to the cognitive certainty of religious 
faith by relegating Christian truth to the moral or ethical sphere (realm of 'practical 
Michel Foucault. For more see Anglo-American Postmodernity: Philosophical Perspectives on 
Science, Religion, and Ethics (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1997). 
73 See Nancey Murphy, Beyond Liberalism & Fundamentalism: How Modern and Postmodern 
Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda (Harrisburg, Penn.: Trinity Press International, 1996). 
74 Hume's work regarding religion took the form of an assault on any attempt to formulate a unified 
theory of theological knowledge claims. Ile provided logical arguments against revelation and the 
occurrence of miracles. In addition, Hume argued against the notion of divine creation and design. 
75 Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning, p. 12. 
76 Ibid., p. 12. 
77 Ibid., p. 14. The term 'standard epistemology' is to be equated with modern epistemology in so far 
as it refers to the determination of one's beliefs according to the weight of 'internal' (relating to the 
character of the event itself apart from the witness's personal characteristics) evidence. 
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reason'). In an effort to further insulate religion from rational criticism, Friedrich 
Schleiermacher built on Kant's work by removing religious thought from science 
and placed it in the realm of `feeling'. Schleiermacher states that 
Only by keeping quite outside the range of both science and of 
practice can [religion] maintain its proper sphere and character. Only 
when piety takes its place alongside of science and practice, as a 
necessary, an indispensable third, as their natural counterpart, not less 
in worth and splendour than either, will the common field be 
altogether occupied and human nature on the side complete. 78 
Both of these epistemological tactics, even if implicitly, conceded to Hume's 
argument and thus removed religious concerns from the domain of rational 
consideration. 
The second response is found the work of Karl Barth. Barth claimed that 
divine revelation is the sole source of any knowledge of God that human beings may 
possess. Theology, then, is an attempt to seek partial knowledge of what we already 
believe to be the case - this is what is meant by fides quaerens intellectum (faith 
seeking understanding). Although this move insulated Barth from Hume's criticisms, 
he abandoned apologetics altogether, thus requiring that one begin with an 
authoritative view of `God's word' before a legitimate rational theological inquiry 
can commence. 
Murphy offers a third alternative - `a new possibility for rational support of 
theism using the resources of postfoundationalist (postmodern) epistemology'. 79 
This alternative has similarities to a theological approach suggested by Wollhart 
78 Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, trans. John Oman (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1958), p. 36. Schleiermacher's argument avoided the reduction of religion to 
morality and thus avoided the rejection of theism on behalf of many of those that found Kant's 
arguments insufficient. 
79 Ibid., p. 13. Murphy stresses the use of postmodern epistemology over against 'modern' 
epistemologies due to the failure of the latter to resolve conflicts regarding foundational ism, 
representationalism in philosophy of language, and metaphysical reductionism (ibid., pp. 199-208). 
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Pannenberg; ß° however, Murphy's proposal differs in its basic theory of scientific 
methodology. Murphy notes contributions from Karl Popper81 and Thomas Kuhn; 82 
however, the most important figure in her view of scientific methodology is Imre 
Lakatos. 
Lakatos proposed that scientific rationality requires the specification of a 
criterion for choice between competing `research programmes'. 83 These research 
programmes consist of a set of theories and a body of data. The central theory or 
`hard core' represents the primary concern of the research programme itself. The 
auxiliary hypotheses constitute the supporting evidence by allowing data to be 
related to the central theory. These auxiliary hypotheses form a `protective belt' 
around the hard core and are modified whenever potentially falsifying data are 
discovered. 
A research programme is best understood as a series of complex theories 
whose `hard core' remains the same while the auxiliary hypotheses are modified or 
replaced in order to account for problematic data. Lakatos argued that the history of 
science is best viewed in terms of competing research programmes, some of which 
are `progressive' and others that are `degenerating'. 
A degenerating research programme is one whose central theory is preserved 
only by ad hoc modifications of the `protective belt'. Lakatos referred to these 
manoeuvres as `mere face-saving devices' or `linguistic tricks'. In contrast, Lakatos 
8° See Theology and the Philosophy of Science, translated by Francis McDonagh, (Philadelphia, Penn.: 
Westminster Press, 1976). Pannenberg claims that it is the theologian's responsibility to test the 
Christian tradition's concept of God against everything that is known today about the course of 
history and judge whether the tradition's understanding is the best available account. 
81 See primarily The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper, 1965). 
82 See The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). 
93 See Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, John Worrall and Gregory 
Currie (eds. ), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). See especially section one 
'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', pp. 8-101. 
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was greatly concerned with the justification of progressive programmes. A 
programme is said to progressive when the following conditions are met: 84 
1. each new version of the theory (core plus its auxiliaries) preserves 
the unrefuted content of its predecessor; 
2. each has excess empirical content over its predecessor; that is, it 
predicts some novel, hitherto unexpected facts; and 
3. some of these predicted facts are corroborated. 
When the first two of these conditions are met, the theory is said to be 
`theoretically progressive'. When all three are met it is `empirically progressive' as 
well. Murphy notes that 
A research program is degenerating when the change from one 
version to the next accounts at most for the one anomaly (or set of 
anomalies) for which the change was made, but does not allow for the 
prediction and discovery of any novel facts. The choice of a theory 
thus becomes a choice between two or more competing series of 
theories, and chooses the more progressive of the programs. 
Consequently, the choice depends on the programs' relative power to 
increase scientific knowledge. 85 
Murphy argues that the scientific method presented by Lakatos is a viable 
candidate for finding a way through the theological dilemma created by Hume. This 
third alternative is a middle way between attempts offered by Kant and 
Schleiermacher on one hand and Barth on the other. 
Murphy claims that in order to avoid the pitfalls fashioned by Hume, 
theology must, if it can, `substantiate its knowledge claims in the court of probable 
reasoning.... Consequently the appropriate response to Hume's arguments is to show 
that theology measures up to the best available theory of scientific method'. 86 Thus, 
Murphy demonstrates how theological arguments can be presented and tested in the 
84 Ibid., pp. 31-46. 
" Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning, p. 60. Emphasis added. 66 Ibid., p. 88. Emphasis added. This claim resonates with Pannenberg's observation that it is now 
philosophy of science that provides the definitive account of the canons of probable reasoning. See 
Theology and Philosophy of Science. 
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same manner as Lakatos suggested for theories in science. That is, first one 
establishes a 'hard core' which will serve as the central thesis of the research 
programme. Second, one appends auxiliary hypotheses that demonstrate the 
programme to be progressive rather than degenerating. 87 
It is important to note that these auxiliary hypotheses include data from 
multiple sources. For Murphy, these sources include, but are not limited to: 
historical theology, epistemological theories, research from various branches of 
science (psychology, evolutionary biology, cognitive science, etc. ), ethics, biblical 
studies, and various types of `experience'. All of these sources constitute `data' that 
can be applied toward doctrinal formulation. Thus, doctrines are heuristic (problem 
solving) devices that stem from the shared experiences of the Christian religious 
tradition. 8 
Murphy's view of theological methodology serves as a guiding resource for 
my analytical approach to conversion. I will consider data from multiple sources - 
theological, philosophical, and scientific. 
1.4.1 Evaluating a `Doctrine' of Christian Conversion 
Offering a new model of Christian conversion amounts to no less than 
suggesting a new `doctrine' of conversion. The methodology outlined in the 
previous section, together with some critical insights from Alasdair Maclnytre, 
provide a context in which I will speak of `doctrines' of conversion and how they 
may been seen as competing `research programmes' in the Lakatosian sense. To 
fully expand this idea would move beyond the scope of the present work; however, I 
87 For examples see Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning, pp. 88-129. See also `Theology and 
Science within a Lakatosian Program', Zygon 34 (1999), pp. 629-642. 
88 Likewise, doctrines have as supporting data the biblical texts, theological analysis, natural and 
social sciences, and a host of shared experiences within the Christian community itself. 
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offer this brief section in order to demonstrate how these resources provide the 
methodological and epistemological space to address my overall concerns. 
I must begin by establishing why it is desirable to offer a new doctrine (or 
`theory' as I will refer to it below) of conversion. The very concept of a theory is 
more complex than it may first appear. Following Lakatos, it must be understood 
that the evaluation of a particular theory, in reality, consists of the appraisal of a 
series of interrelated theories - this is the basis of his concept of a `research 
programme'. 
To be clear, when evaluating a particular theory, one is in fact appraising a 
history, for the set of beliefs that the theory represents stand in various complex 
relationships to each other over the course of time. In this case, a theory is never a 
static structure, but a growing and developing entity. Maclntyre offers the example 
of the development of the kinetic theory of gases. 
If we read the scientific textbooks for any period we shall find 
presented an entirely ahistorical account of the theory. But if we read 
all the successive textbooks we shall learn not only that the kinetic 
theory of 1857 was not quite that of 1845 and that the kinetic theory 
of 1901 is neither that of 1857 nor that of 1965. Yet at each stage the 
theory bears the marks of its previous history, of a series of 
encounters with confirming or anomalous evidence, with other 
theories, with metaphysical points of view, and so on. 89 
Thus, the kinetic theory not merely possesses, but is a history. To evaluate 
this history involves consideration of how it has fared in a large variety of encounters. 
Therefore, `to evaluate a theory, just as to evaluate a series of theories, one of 
Lakatos's research programs, is precisely to write that history, that narrative of 
defeats and victories '. 90 
89 Alasdair Maclntyre, `Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science', 
in Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones (eds. ), Why Narrative: Readings in Narrative Theology 
(Grand Rapids, Mi.: William B. Eerdman's Publishing Company, 1997), p. 154. 
90 Ibid., p. 154. 
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Lakatos recognised this in his paper on the `History of Science and Its 
Rational Reconstructions'. Here he claimed that theories are to be assessed by the 
extent to which they satisfy historiographical criteria. That is, the best theory is that 
one which can supply the most complete rational reconstruction of the history which 
has brought the theory to its current form 91 This rational reconstruction then enables 
us to understand precisely why a competing theory must be modified and why. It 
does so by introducing new standards for evaluation and recasts the developing 
narrative which constitutes the continuous reconstruction. 
So then, this reconstruction must be viewed in the context of a historical 
continuum. Kuhn provides a practical example of how this occurs in the natural 
sciences. He notes that `in some important respects, though by no means at all, 
Einstein's general theory of relativity is closer to Aristotle's mechanics than either of 
them is to Newton's'. 2 Therefore, Kuhn surmises that the superiority of Einstein to 
Newton is to be found in `puzzle solving' rather in an approach to a true ontology. 
Kuhn's point is that Aristotelian mechanics could never have led directly to 
special relativity - the Aristotelian paradigm will not yield the questions to which 
special relativity is the answer. Therefore, a history which moved from 
Aristotelianism directly to relativistic physics is not an imaginable history. 
The American Evangelical tradition has rendered a particular doctrine or 
`theory' of conversion that stands open to critique in the same way as the various 
scientific theories mentioned above. In essence, I am offering a competing theory of 
conversion with the presupposition that it is only from the standpoint of a newly 
evolved theory that one can characterise the inadequacy of the prior. Considering 
91 See `History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions', in Roger C. Busch and Robert C. Cohen 
(eds. ), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII! (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 91-135. 92 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 206-207. 
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the discovery of new forms of data (which are constitutive of the nonreductive 
physicalism for which I argue), it is only from the standpoint of the new theory that 
the continuities of the relevant narrative history (conversion in the Evangelical 
tradition) can be re-established. 
In the context of Murphy's theological methodology, tradition, reason, and 
revolution need not be counterposed. If traditions can be conceived of as the bearers 
of reason, then certain periods of revolution are needed for their continuance. 
Therefore, in Maclntyre's words, `Every tradition is always in danger of lapsing into 
incoherence and when a tradition does lapse it can only be recovered by a 
revolutionary reconstitution'. 3 
While I am not prepared to claim that the whole of American evangelism has 
fallen into incoherency, I do believe that the doctrine (theory) of conversion which is 
simply taken for granted among countless evangelicals has strayed from its 
traditional roots, as exemplified in Wesley. This, taken together with the new 
scientific discoveries presented in this thesis, exacerbates the need to evaluate the 
current model of conversion and offer a competing theory. 94 
1.5 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to present the context in which I seek to 
offer a new model of Christian conversion. I began by claiming that the idea of 
`spirituality' seems to defy definition. 95 The version of spirituality that I criticise is 
93 Maclntyre, `Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science', p. 146. 94 A key way in which this claim can be developed (in relation to future research building upon my 
current project) is to evaluate the American evangelical theory of conversion that I am critiquing in 
this work in light of the `results' that it has produced - i. e. how the evangelical churches in America 
compare to Jesus' image of the Kingdom of God. Without substantial empirical investigation it is 
impossible to speak to this with any authority; however, I submit that the type of 'conversion' that I 
criticise, marked by its highly interiorised and individualised character, would be found lacking. 95 Philip Sheldrake has dedicated a significant amount of academic energy toward articulating the 
notion of spirituality. He describes spirituality as `one of those subjects whose meaning everyone 
h, 
4_ 
^ý. 
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primarily Western and particularly indigenous to North America. I have claimed 
that the state of Christian spirituality in American Evangelicalism is characterised by 
a dualistic and ultimately interior form of expression. Spirituality, understood in this 
way, subsequently leads to a doctrine of conversion characterised by the rhetoric of 
`saving souls'. 
I have suggested that this condition needs to be corrected. Conversion is 
only peripherally about the adoption of a particular belief or `meaning making' 
system. Rather, I claim that Christian conversion is primarily concerned with socio- 
moral transformation - that is a transformation in moral attitude and behaviour that 
is ultimately expressed in a social context 96 
I also suggested that the way forward is to formulate a new model of 
conversion in light of Wesleyan theology and a nonreductive physicalist view of 
human nature. In order to accomplish this goal, I have listed two presuppositions 
which will inform the investigation further -a virtue based moral theory and a 
theological method best represented in the work of Nancey Murphy. In addition, I 
suggested that forming this new model or `theory' of conversion makes it possible to 
properly reflect on the doctrine of conversion predominant in American evangelical 
circles. 
Chapter two will present the relevant work of John Wesley. Wesley's work, 
as a practical theologian, possesses an inherent `telos' which, in his own terms, is 
best understood as `new creation'. At the centre of Wesley's `way of salvation' is a 
claims to know until they have to define it'. Despite this, one must struggle to articulate it for `if it 
has no conceptual limits, effectively it means nothing'. See `What Is Spirituality? ' in Kenneth J. 
Collins (ed. ), Exploring Christian Spirituality: An Ecumenical Reader (Grand Rapids, Mi.: Baker 
Books, 2000), p. 21. 96 To be clear, I reject the understanding of belief as mere mental assent. In the present context 
'belief' an be understood to be equivalent to the term 'conviction' as defined by James McClendon 
and James Smith. Here a conviction `means a persistent belief such that if X (a person or community) 
has a conviction, it will not easily be relinquished and it cannot be relinquished without making Xa 
significantly different person (or community) than before'. See Convictions: Defusing Religious 
Relativism (Valley Forge, Penn.: Trinity Press International, 1994), p. 5. 
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distinctive affectional moral psychology. Here the emphasis is placed on the 
acquisition of holy tempers; that is, the heart of religion, for Wesley, is the 
transformation of those inclinations in human nature that serve as motivators for 
moral attitude and behaviour. This insight, together with Wesley's concept of 
`sanctification' will provide a critical theological language for the observed socio- 
moral change that I call conversion. 
In chapter three, I argue that a proper view of human nature is critical to any 
cogent description of conversion. I claim that both dualism and reductive 
materialism are undesirable on philosophical and theological grounds. Instead, I 
offer a third alternative, nonreductive physicalism, as a viable theory of human 
nature. Such a theory avoids the problems of ontological substance dualism while 
preserving the causal efficacy of `higher' order capacities necessary for a proper 
theological anthropology. The theory also describes how humans possess the 
capacity for relatedness without positing the existence of an ontologically distinct 
immaterial entity representing the true 'self'. In addition, the final section of chapter 
three will include a discussion of conversion and sanctification as process or event. 
Here, I offer a corrective based on the nonreductive physicalist view of human nature. 
The purpose of chapter four is to present a new model of Christian 
conversion that synthesises the contributions from Wesley's theology and practices 
in light of nonreductive physicalism. This discussion necessarily involves scientific 
insights, including contributions from neuroscience and various branches of 
cognitive science. 
I define Christian conversion as a process involving normal human biological 
capacities. It is characterised by a change in socio-moral attitude and behaviour, and 
is best understood as the acquisition of virtues intrinsic to Christian faith. Such 
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acquisitions are facilitated through social interaction and participation in practices 
inherent to the Christian community. Furthermore, the conversion process should be 
viewed as the co-operant result of Divine grace and human participation. I spend the 
remainder of chapter four justifying this definition. 
Finally, in chapter five I will claim that the model of conversion presented 
here necessitates a theology of corporate conversion. Without seeking to offer 
systematic methods, I present an example of a `conversion community' which 
constitutes the type of space required for Christian conversion to occur. This final 
chapter is intended to highlight the practical implications of the overall project. 
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Chapter 2 
Theological Insights 
Beginning with the End 
How small a part of this great work of God is man able to understand! 
But it is our duty to contemplate what he has wrought, and to 
understand as much of it as we are able. - John Wesley' 
These words spoken by the eighteenth century theologian, John Wesley, are 
brief, but provide an example of his thinking and approach to questions about God, 
humanity, and the cosmos. The intent of this chapter is to provide theological 
insights that contribute to my ultimate goal of offering a practical understanding of 
Christian conversion. My central claim is that the theology of John Wesley provides 
a view of creation that possesses an inherent telos - aim, purpose, or ultimate end. 
Wesley's telic exposition is characterised by the redemption of the whole of creation 
through the process of new creation. At the centre of this redemption, lies the notion 
of the salvation of humankind. 
Wesley's `way of salvation' places particular emphasis on the acquisition of 
`holy tempers', this is to say that the heart of religion for Wesley was the 
transformation of those inclinations in human nature that serve as motivators for 
moral attitude and behaviour. Throughout this chapter, I will demonstrate how 
Wesley's notions of the `way of salvation', and his concept of sanctilcation in 
particular, provides a necessary language for my approach to the phenomenon of 
1 Sermon 56, `God's Approbation of His Works', in Frank Baker (ed. ), The Bicentennial Edition of 
the Works of John Wesley (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1984), vol. 2, p. 387. Further references 
from this edition will be designated as 'BE'. This designation will be followed by the respective 
volume and page number (vol: page). 
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conversion. In fact, I claim that Wesley's mature view of salvation (characterised by 
sanctification) is equivalent to my concept of Christian conversion. 
I have chosen to begin this theological investigation with Wesley because of 
his distinctive approach to theological issues. I argue that Wesley is best viewed as a 
practical theologian. 2 By this, I mean that he was concerned with the embodiment 
of theological principles. He prioritised issues of theological importance not 
according to their adherence to theological dogma, but to their ability to transform 
the lives of people. This distinctive feature is one that I wish to share with Wesley in 
my effort to describe Christian conversion. 
In addition, Wesley's articulation of salvation is vital to my effort to provide 
a theological language for moral transformation in a Christian context. It is 
important to note that I do not intend to offer an exhaustive summary of Wesley's 
theology, rather I will summarise the overall tone of his work and focus on those 
aspects that offer greater clarity to my specified goal. I admire Wesley's willingness 
to engage in theological struggles, and like him, I too am dedicated to articulating a 
theological discourse that impacts Christian life in a practical way. 
2.1 John Wesley as a Practical Theologian 
Some may consider it unusual to speak of Wesley as a theologian (or at least 
a serious one). After all, he did not produce any lengthy theological treatises or put 
forth any substantial works of systematic theology. He did, however, leave behind a 
bounty of sermons, letters, hymns, and journal entries written for the purpose of 
practical instruction. Wesley understood theology to be intrinsically related to the 
process of Christian living and mission. As a result, his writing dealt less with 
Z Here, the term `practical' denotes an object's use that extends beyond the theoretical and is 
manifested in action and purpose. 
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philosophical systematics and more with practical engagement. This is what is 
meant by Wesley's 'practical' theology - theology for the purpose of transforming 
life both in a personal and social sense. 
Wesley was keen on the challenge of interpreting life in light of theology and 
vice versa. His focus on an `experimental divinity' epitomised the goal of religion - 
the expression of true living faith. Robert E. Cushman notes Wesley's tendency to 
present doctrine as being intricately bound to Christian life. He states, `Wesley is 
saying that the character of a Methodist is (or should be) exhibitive of the 
individual's Christian doctrine; and, conversely, that essential doctrine is (or should 
be) constitutive of the Christian life'. 3 Cushman's observation is fitting in that it 
identifies Wesley's emphasis on the interdependence of doctrine and the pragmatic 
aspects of life. 
Wesley's work has been called into question by a number of scholars both 
within and without the Methodist tradition. Much of this can be attributed to the 
fact that the most significant of Wesley's theological contributions come from his 
sermons which were written within the context of his audience. As Wesley's 
audience changed so did his emphasis on various theological concerns. In addition, 
his writing reflects his own personal maturation process by demonstrating his 
evolving theological struggles. This is why contemporary Wesleyan scholars will 
refer to Wesley's `early position' on a particular issue or appeal to the `mature 
Wesley' for insight into a specific theological concept. This lack of consistency 
Robert E. Cushman, John Wesley's Experimental Divinity (Nashville, Tenn.: Kingswood Books, 
1989), p. 63. 
'` For example, E. P. Thompson criticised Wesley's Methodism as a system of thought calling it a 
'ritualized form of psychic masturbation'. See The Making of the English Working Class (New 
York: 
Vintage, 1966), p. 368. Also Paul Johnson criticised Wesley's form of Christian thought to be totally devoid of intellectual content. See A History of Christianity (New York: Atheneum, 1976), p. 
365. 
Even some within the Methodist tradition question Wesley as a 'real' theologian. For example see Rupert Davies, 'The People Called Methodists: 1. Our Doctrines, in Rupert Davies, et at. (eds. ), A History of the Methodist Church in Great Britain (London: Epworth, 1965), p. 147. 
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throughout his career and the fact that Wesley was not systematic in the arrangement 
of his doctrines `does not warrant the assumption that he was inconsistent or 
contradictory in his theological opinions'. 5 Many contemporary Wesleyan scholars 
have recognised this issue and have attempted to piece together a systematic 
theology from Wesley's writing. 6 Despite these worthy attempts, I propose a 
different approach. 
Moving forward I will espouse the view offered by Randy L. Maddox 
concerning Wesley's approach to theology as a practical discipline .7 Here Maddox 
is clear to distinguish between contemporary theology as an academic enterprise and 
the pre-university model of Wesley's day. In this model, 
The quintessential practitioner of theology was not the detached 
academic theologian; it was the pastor/theologian who was actively 
shepherding Christian disciples in the world. Likewise, the defining 
task of `real' theologians was neither developing an elaborate system 
of Christian truth-claims nor defending these claims to their `cultured 
despisers; ' it was nurturing and shaping the worldview that frames the 
temperament and practice of believers' lives in the world. Finally, the 
primary (or first order) literary forms of `real' theological activity 
were not systematic theologies or apologetics; they were carefully- 
crafted liturgies, catechisms, hymns, sermons, and the like. Judged 
on such terms, Wesley's voluminous writings emerge as serious 
theological activity indeed! 8 
5 William R. Cannon, The Theology of John Wesley, with Special Reference to the Doctrine of 
Justification (New York: Abingdon Press, 1946), pp. 7-8. For more on the consistency of Wesley's 
theological positions see Richard P. Heitzenrater, The Elusive Mr. Wesley (Nashville, Tenn.: 
Abingdon Press, 1984), vol. 1, p. 28; Robert G. Tuttle, John Wesley: His Life and Theology (Grand 
Rapids, Mi.: Zondervan, 1978), p. 10; Albert C. Outler, John Wesley (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1964), p. 27. 
6 For e. g. see Thomas C. Oden, John Wesley's Scriptural Christianity: A Plain Exposition of His 
Teaching on Christian Doctrine (Grand Rapids, Mi.: Zondervan, 1994); Allan Coppedge, John 
Wesley in Theological Debate (Wilmore, Kentucky: Wesley Heritage Press, 1987), and 'flow 
Wesleyans Do Theology' in John Woodbridge and Thomas McComiskey (eds. ), Doing Theology in 
Today's World (Grand Rapids, Mi.: Zondervan, 1994), pp. 267-289. 
Randy L. Maddox, 'John Wesley - Practical Theologian? ', Wesleyan Theological Journal 23 (1988), 
rp. 122-147. 
Randy L. Maddox, 'Reading Wesley as a Theologian', Wesleyan Theological Journal 30 (Spring 
1995), p. 12. This work resonates with the earlier work of Albert Outler. See 'Towards a Re- 
appraisal of John Wesley as a Theologian', The Perkins School of Theology Journal 14 (1961), pp. 5- 
14. 
44 
Given this understanding, the focal point of theological activity is rooted in 
the life of the Christian community. Likewise, the measure of such a practical 
theological method relies not on its establishing systematic doctrine, but on its ability 
to clearly define the nature and purpose of its own existence. 
I begin with this dimension of Wesley's life for the purpose of demonstrating 
his priority on a theology that `works'. A theological concept or doctrine would 
have been of little use to Wesley if it did not act to further the purpose of God in the 
world. If human beings were not moved or transformed for the glory of God, then it 
would have been little more that casual advice or a passing opinion. This sense of 
`purpose' rooted in Christian community was a prominent feature of Wesley's 
theology and is the topic to which we will now turn our attention. 
2.2 Wesley and the New Creation 
So if anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation: everything old has 
passed away; see, everything has become new! -2 Cor. 5: 17 
For I am about to create new heavens and a new earth; the former 
things shall not be remembered or come to mind. - Isa. 65: 17 
I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worth 
comparing with the glory about to be revealed to us. For the creation 
waits with eager longing for the revealing of the children of God; for 
the creation was subjected to futility, not of its own will but by the will 
of the one who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be set 
free from its bondage to decay and will obtain the freedom of the 
glory of the children of God. We know that the whole creation has 
been groaning in labor pains until now; and not only the creation, but 
we ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly 
while we wait for adoption, the redemption of our bodies. - Rom. 
8: 18-239 
Wesley was unquestionably a man of the Bible. It was from Scripture that 
his foundational concepts about God and humankind were formulated. A tension 
9 These Scripture references are taken from the New Revised Standard Version. 
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existed in Wesley's life between what he read in Scripture and what he observed 
both in his own life and in the lives of the Methodists. While never ceasing to 
uphold the authority of Scripture, he ever sought ways to both make sense of his own 
religious experiences and to effectively present his theological insights in an 
accessible way to those to whom he ministered. 
It can be demonstrated that despite the lack of a grand volume of systematic 
theology, Wesley's work possessed an inherent trajectory. 10 This is to say that a 
survey of his life and writing provides a path to understand both the passion of his 
theological analysis and the goals to which it led. 
Unabashedly, Wesley claims, `Ye know that the great end of religion is to 
renew our hearts in the image of God'. 11 Indeed, for Wesley this was the heart of 
Christianity. This renewal is the `axial theme of Wesley's soteriology' according to 
Wesleyan scholar, Albert Outler. 12 This concept may not seem novel on the surface; 
however, it is this claim that first sets Wesley apart from his contemporaries. He is 
convinced that we can derive God's purpose from the original creation. Wesley's 
ability to weave together scriptural passages into a narrative was key in his 
theological position on the divine purpose in creation. Citing verses from both the 
Old and New Testaments, Wesley declares: 
Suppose now the fullness of time to be come, and the prophecies to 
be accomplished - what a prospect is this!... Here is no din of arms, 
no `confused noise, ' no `garments rolled in blood'... no country or 
city divided against itself, and tearing out its own bowels.... Here is 
no oppression to `make (even) the wise man mad, ' no extortion to 
`grind the face of the poor'; no robbery or wrong; no rapine or 
injustice; for all are `content with such things as they possess. ' Thus 
10 The term 'trajectory' is borrowed from Randy L. Maddox, 'Nurturing the New Creation: 
Reflections on a Wesleyan Trajectory', in M. Douglas Meeks (ed. ), Wesleyan Perspectives on the 
New Creation (Nashville, Tenn.: Kingswood Books, 2004), pp. 21-52; and Kenneth J. Collins, 
`Reconfiguration of Power: The Basic Trajectory of John Wesley's Practical Theology', Wesleyan 
Theological Journal, 33 (1998), pp. 164.184. 1 Sermon 44, Original Sin, BE (2: 185). 
12 Albert Outler, The Bicentennial Edition of the Works of John Wesley (2: 185). 
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`righteousness and peace have kissed each other'; they have `taken 
root and filled the land'; righteousness flourishing out of the earth, 
and `peace looking down from heaven. ' 13 
Biblical passages such as these led Wesley to believe that God had indeed 
created the world with purpose and this divine intent was active and progressing. 
Likewise, Wesley understood creation to illustrate a harmony that bore witness to 
God's plan. 
Such was the state of the creation, according to the scanty ideas which 
we can now form concerning it, when its great Author, surveying the 
whole system at one view, pronounced it `very good. '... There was `a 
golden chain' (to use the expression of Plato) 'let down from the 
throne of God' - an exactly connected series of beings, from the 
highest to the lowest; from dead earth, through fossils, vegetables, 
animals, to man, created in the image of God, and designed to know, 
to love, and enjoy his Creator to all eternity. '4 
After a period of profound growth, Wesley came to express the notion that 
God is redeeming the world through the process of new creation. 15 The whole of 
this belief can be summed up into the notion that God has a purpose for the world 
and a means to see this purpose to fruition. 16 In this sense, Wesley's notion of new 
creation can be understood as a grand narrative. 17 Wesleyan scholar Joel B. Green 
13 Sermon 4, Scriptural Christianity, BE (1: 170-171). Scripture references Isa. 9: 5; Eccles. 7: 7; Isa. 
3: 15; Heb. 13: 5; Ps. 85: 10; Ps. 80: 9,14. 
14 Sermon 56, God's Approbation of His Works, BE (2: 395-397). 
15 It is obvious that from Wesley's early sermons that he found the greatest promise in life not to be a 
present reality, but a hope in that which comes after death. E. g., 'we all agree in calling life a 
burden... [and that] death is not only a haven, but an entrance into a far more desirable country' 
Sermon 133, Death and Deliverance, BE (4: 208). Wesley's mature position was dramatically 
different in that it placed the hope of salvation in the context of a present reality. 16 New Testament scholar, Greg Beale has argued that the notion of new creation should be seen as 
the controlling conception for all of eschatology and the core around which all major theological ideas 
in the New Testament revolve. See Greg K. Beale, 'The Eschatological Conception of New 
Testament Theology', in Kent E. Brower and Mark W. Elliott (eds. ), Eschatology in Bible and 
Theology (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1997), pp. 11-52. 
17 I realise that my introduction of the term 'grand narrative' opens the door to philosophical criticism. 
It is important to note here that I define 'grand narrative' as a global concept or historical story by 
which humans order their personal narratives at both the individual and communal level. The term 
was first introduced into philosophical analysis by Jean-Francois Lyotard in The Postmodern 
Condition: A Report on Knowledge, translated by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984). Despite Lyotard's claim that, 'the ideas of Western civilization 
issuing from the ancient, Christian and modern traditions are bankrupt' (Postmodern Fables 
(Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 235). I will continue to argue for the 
appropriateness of viewing Christianity and more specifically salvation as a 'grand narrative'. For 
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places new creation within the grand narrative of God's salvation of the world. 
Green relates new creation with the life of the Church - as the `Body of Christ' the 
Church is carrying on Jesus' mission by existing as the visible Kingdom of God in 
the world. 18 
Wesley's view of new creation possessed elements or dimensions that were 
intimately connected to his concerns to articulate a meaningful soteriology and 
eschatology. I follow Randy L. Maddox in identifying three salient dimensions of 
Wesley's view of new creation - the spiritual dimension, the socioeconomic 
dimension, and finally the cosmic dimension. 19 
Wesley's concern for the socioeconomic dimension of new creation led him 
to produce tracts like Thoughts on the Present Scarcity of Provisions (1773) and 
Thoughts upon Slavery (1774). Contemporary Wesleyan scholarship has produced a 
number of significant works articulating Wesley's theological perspectives as they 
apply to socioeconomic concerns. 20 In addition, the later years of Wesley's life 
brought an emphasis on the cosmic dimension of new creation. His strong 
additional supporting work see Gary Browning, Lyotard and the End of Grand Narratives (Cardiff: 
University of Wales Press, 2000); Charles R. Taber, 'The Gospel as Authentic Meta-Narrative 
Source', in Thomas F. Foust, George R. Hunsberger, J. Andrew Kirk, and Werner Ustorf (eds. ), 
Scandalous Prophet: The Way of Mission After Newbigin (Grand Rapids, Mi.: William B. Eerdman's 
Publishing Company, 2002), pp. 182-194; Merold Westphal, 'Postmodernism in Philosophy of 
Religion and Theology', Perspectives 15, no. 4 (2000), pp. 6-10; Stewart Sutherland, 'Providence and 
the Narrative Life', in Philosophical Assessment of Theology, ed. Gerald J. Hughes, (Tunbridge Wells: 
Search Press, 1987), pp. 171-185. Perhaps the most often read source on narrative and theology is 
Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones (eds. ), Why Narrative? Readings in Narrative Theology 
(Grand Rapids, Mi.: William B. Eerdman's Publishing Company, 1989). For more on salvation as 
Biblical grand narrative see N. T. Wright, The Challenge of Jesus (London: Society for Promoting 
Christian Knowledge, 2000). Here Wright expounds on the `Kingdom of God' and its connection to 
the Scriptural theme of redemption. 
18 See Joel B. Green, Beginning with Jesus: Christ in Scripture, the Church, and Discipleship 
(Nashville, Tenn.: Cokesbury, 2000), pp. 151-162. 
19 Randy L. Maddox, `Nurturing the New Creation: Reflections on a Wesleyan Trajectory', in M. 
Douglas Meeks (ed. ), Wesleyan Perspectives on the New Creation (Nashville, Tenn.: Kingswood 
Books, 2004), pp. 21-52. 
20 For a helpful example see Theodore W. Jennings, Good News to the Poor: John Wesley's 
Evangelical Economics (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1990). 
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affirmations of both a new heaven and a new earth were highlighted by inclusion of 
animals and the physical world within the scope of new creation. 21 
Wesley's preoccupation with these two dimensions of new creation fuelled 
his concerns for the third aspect which centred on spiritual renewal. This dimension 
was marked by Wesley's insistence that its primary feature was the regeneration of 
humanity in the image of God. While this phrase is as easy said as it is popular, it 
leaves several issues to expound upon. The first of these is Wesley's theological 
anthropology and it is to this issue that we will now turn. 
2.3 The Nature of Humankind - Wesley's Theological Anthropology 
Wesley's overall theology revolved around the dynamics of the God-human 
relationship. His utmost concern was to both understand and articulate the 
relationship of the creator God to divine creation, particularly humankind. As the 
result of this effort, Wesley developed a distinctive theological anthropology. At its 
core, this refers to his efforts to express an understanding of human nature that 
would describe both the essence of humanity and the ways in which we can relate to 
God22 In expounding on this matter, three distinct features emerge in regards to 
Wesley's theological anthropology. They are his: relational anthropology, holistic 
anthropology, and his emphasis on an inherent affectional moral psychology. 
23 
21 For example, Wesley assumed that, along with humans, animals suffered from the effects of sin; 
therefore, they will also participate in God's healing work. Wesley claimed that `the whole brute 
creation will undoubtedly be restored, not only to the vigour, strength, and swiftness which they had 
at their creation, but to a far higher degree of each than they ever enjoyed... . In the new earth, as well 
as in the new heavens, there will be nothing to give pain, but everything that the wisdom and 
goodness of God can create to give happiness. As a recompence for what they once suffered, while 
under the "bondage of corruption, " when God has "renewed the face of the earth, " and their 
corruptible body has put on incorruption, they shall enjoy happiness suited to their state, without alloy, 
without interruption, and without end'. See Sermon 60, The General Deliverance, BE (2: 437-450). 
22 Inherent to the exposition of human nature are issues concerning the Fall, the problem of sin, and 
how it is that humans are to overcome the sinful human condition. 23 These three aspects are introduced by Randy L. Maddox. See Maddox, Responsible Grace: John 
Wesley's Practical Theology (Nashville, Tenn.: Kingswood Books, 1994). 
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Before I address each of these features in detail, I will speak to the general 
theological climate that surrounded Wesley as he sought to work through these 
important issues. The contrasting ways in which the Eastern and Western Christian 
traditions approached the issues of human nature played a large part in Wesley's 
maturing views. The Western tradition typically assumed that humans were created 
in a state of perfection. Despite God's original will that they stay in this perfect 
condition, they never the less sinned and `fell' from this created state. 
They (Adam and Eve) were able to bring about this consequence due to a 
critical aspect of their creation - the ability for self-determination. Thus, the Fall 
brought devastating effects, primarily the loss of self-determination (henceforth 
humanity is no longer free not to sin). This condition of sin being transmitted 
through all of humanity is known as Original Sin. The West saw this fallen 
condition as the `natural' state of humankind. In short, the Western view of human 
nature is based on the Fall and humanity's inability to recover from this fallen state 
apart from the intervention of God. 
In contrast to this view, the Eastern tradition presents human nature in a 
significantly different perspective. Generally speaking, Christianity of the East and 
West differ in their assessments of original `guilt'. Following Augustine, the 
Western tradition held that all inherit the guilt of the original sin of Adam and Eve. 
The Eastern tradition differs on this point. George Cronk states that, 
We are born into a world conditioned by Adam's sin and by the 
accumulated sins of others; we are involved in and influenced by that 
world; and our lives are often shaped by the ongoing consequences of 
human sinfulness. But we are guilty of, and therefore morally and 
spiritually responsible for our own actual sins, and not the sins of 
others. The tendency to sin is `original' (or `congenital') in that it is a 
natural consequence of being born into a fallen world. In this 
restricted sense, we may be `born sinful', but we are not `born guilty'. 
The Orthodox Church has always repudiated the doctrine of `original 
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guilt' that is, the view that all men share not only the consequences of 
but also the guilt for the sin of Adam and Eve. 24 
In this view, humanity was created in a state of innocence, but not in a state 
of completeness. 25 God created humans with a dynamic nature capable of growing 
in intimacy with the divine creator. Herein rests the Eastern meaning of the `image' 
and `likeness' of God. These terms referred to both the potential and progressive 
realisation of intimate life in the Divine creator. This realisation is also referred to as 
`deification' in Eastern Orthodoxy and is made possible by participation in the 
community of God. Maddox notes that such was neither inevitable nor automatic, 
but it, `necessarily included the aspect of human freedom, though it centred in the 
larger human capacityfor communion with God'26 
Although the East and West agreed that the cause of the Fall was rooted in 
disobedience, they disagreed on the results of it. The most prominent theological 
differences are the notions of inherent guilt and the total depravity of grace. On the 
first point, those in the Eastern tradition did not believe that Adam's sin cast inherent 
guilt upon every human being to come after him. 27 From this perspective, humans 
are not born with inherent sin; we learn sin and ultimately come to imitate it 
throughout the course of our lives. 28 
As to the second issue, although the Eastern theologians did believe that the 
Fall prevented human beings from assuming the image of God on our own merit, it 
did not, however, leave humanity without access to grace. Most fundamentally, this 
24 George Cronk, The Message of the Bible: An Orthodox Christian Perspective (Crestwood, N. Y.: St. 
Vladimir's Press, 1982), p. 45. 
25 This idea is traced from the second-century theologian Theophiles and further from Gregory of 
Nyssa. See Panagiotos K. Chrestou, Partakers of God (Brookline, Mass.: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 
1984). 
26 Maddox, Responsible Grace: John Wesley's Practical Theology, p. 66. Emphasis added. 
27 For more see John Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1979), p. 145. 
28 For more see Daniel B. Clendenin, Eastern Orthodox Christianity: A Western Perspective (Grand 
Rapids, Mi.: Baker Book House, 1994), pp. 132-133. 
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means that human beings inherently possess the capacity (and responsibility) to 
respond to God's grace 29 The ultimate end of this theological view was that Eastern 
Christianity based its theological anthropology on creation rather than the Fall. The 
emphasis was on the hope in and ability of humanity to respond to God's love and 
purpose in the world. 
On the surface, Wesley's work appears to fit well within the boundaries of 
reformation thought. For instance, Wesley's exegetical method reflected that of the 
Protestant reformers who claimed that the Bible was the sole authority in matters of 
faith and practice. 30 In fact, Wesley was greatly influenced by the work of 
Augustine. Much of Wesley's understanding regarding grace can be traced back to 
Augustine's concept of gratia praeveniens. 31 
Despite Wesley's place as a theologian of the West, a close examination of 
his work also reveals theological particularities characteristic of the Eastern 
tradition. 32 The Eastern Fathers seemed to have greatly influenced Wesley's 
29 It is important to note that Wesley did not embrace this notion in its entirety. While he did believe 
that humans could respond to God, it was not through an inherent capacity, but rather through God's 
F°raceful restoration of our human faculties. I will discuss this further in the proceeding section. 
For an analysis of Wesley's exegetical method see Troy W. Martin, 'John Wesley's Exegetical Orientation: East or West? ', Wesleyan Theological Journal 26 (1991), pp. 104-138. 31 By claiming that God's grace was active in all persons, Augustine was able to conceive of the virtue and wisdom found in pagan culture as the activity of the one true God. This idea has obvious 
resonance with Wesley's notion of Prevenient Grace. For more on Augustine's influence on Wesley's theological thought see H. S. Horton-Parker, `John Wesley as the Roots of Contemporary Orthopathy: A Modest Proposal', Journal of Renewal Studies 1 (2005), pp. 1-22. 32 Maddox stresses the point that Wesley would most likely not have made a conscious distinction between these theological doctrines of the East and West. He would have dealt with this practically by struggling to affirm the faith of the early church while considering the Protestant notion of 
justification by faith which hinged on a Western conceptualisation of the Fall and Original Sin. 
(Responsible Grace, p. 286). Maddox further speculates that a likely source of Wesley's connection 
to Eastern thought was the work of the Egyptian, Macarius. For more see Hoyoung Lee, 
'Experiencing the Spirit in Wesley and Macarius', in Randy L. Maddox (ed. ), Rethinking Wesley's 
Theology for Contemporary Methodism (Nashville, Tenn.: Kingswood Books, 1998), pp. 197-212, 
245-248, and Howard A. Snyder, 'John Wesley and Macarius the Egyptian'. Asbury Theological 
Journal 45 (Fall 1990), pp. 55-60. For more on Eastern Patristic tradition see Michael J. Christensen, 
`Theosis and Sanctification: John Wesley's Reformulation of a Patristic Doctrine', Wesleyan 
Theological Journal 31 no. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 71-94; John G. Merritt, 'Dialogue within a Tradition: 
John Wesley and Gregory of Nyssa Discuss Christian Perfection', Wesleyan Theological Journal 22 
no. 2 (Fall 1987), pp. 92-116; Tomas Spidlik, The Spirituality of the Christian East (Kalamazoo: 
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understanding of soteriology. The Eastern tradition's view of salvation as having an 
explicit therapeutic nature appealed to Wesley as he sought to articulate his mature 
view of salvation. In this sense, renewal or salvation was as much about being well 
and healing from sin as it was a juridical declaration of forgiveness. 33 One cannot 
overstate the importance of soteriology in Wesley's theology - for Wesley, the Bible 
was an essentially soteriological book . 
34 
My purpose in providing this brief sketch is to point out that much of what is 
seen as distinctive in Wesley's theological views is derived from his particular 
intermingling of Eastern and Western theological ideologies. Supporting this view, 
H. S. Horton-Parker states that Wesley's great legacy is his `synthesis of Western 
and Eastern theologies, in which his answer to the question of the tension between 
faith and works was energoumene di agapes [faith filled with the energy of love]' 35 
This `synthesis' joins the Western emphasis upon justification with the Eastern 
concept of theosis. 36 With these points in mind, I will proceed to address the three 
features that emerge from Wesley's theological anthropology. 
Cistercian Publications, 1986); Chrys Saldanha, Divine Pedagogy: A Patristic View of Non-Christian 
Religions (Rome: Editrice Libreria Ateneo Salesiano, 1984). 
33 For example see Wesley's sermons, A FartherAppeal to Men of Reason and Religion, BE (11: 106); 
A Plain Account of Genuine Christianity, BE (10: 38); The Witness of Our Spirit, BE (1: 304); Original 
Sin, BE (2: 185). To be clear, Wesley did speak about humanity being created in a state of perfection. 
See Sermon 141, The Image of God, BE (4: 293) and Sermon 60, The General Deliverance, BE (2: 439) 
for examples. However, it is clear that whatever the original state of humanity might have been, 
Wesley placed a strong emphasis on the dynamic nature of present spiritual development. Maddox 
points out that Wesley apparently did not realise that there was an alternate developmental view of 
original human nature in the earlier Christian tradition (Responsible Grace, p. 67). 34 George Lyons characterises Wesley's hermeneutic as 'soteriocentric' in nature. Lyons claims that 
Wesley 'studied the Bible with one overriding question in mind: What is the way to heaven'. See 
'I ermeneutical Bases for Theology: Higher Criticism and the Wesleyan Interpreter', Wesleyan 
Theological Journal 18 (1983), p. 67. 
33 Horton-Parker, 'John Wesley and the Roots of Contemporary Orthopathy: A Modest Proposal', p. 
11. 
36 Theosis means 'deification', 'divinization', or 'making divine' (Donald K. McKim, Westminster 
Dictionary of Theological Terms (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), p. 282). 
In the Eastern Orthodox tradition, Theosis 'is a vision of human potential for perfection, anticipated in 
ancient Greece, witnessed to in both the Old and New Testaments, and developed by Patristic 
Christian theologians of the first five centuries after Christ' (Christensen, 'Theosis and Sanctification', 
p. 71). This synthesis led to Wesley's distinctive articulation of sanctification. 
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2.3.1 Wesley's Relational Anthropology 
Working from within the Wesleyan tradition, New Testament scholar, Joel B. 
Green notes that a scriptural portrayal of human nature emphasises 'the construction 
of the self as ineluctably nested in social relationships and, then, the importance of 
relational interdependence for human life and identity'. 37 It is from both scripture 
and the doctrines of the Church that Wesley would have derived his understanding of 
the relational nature of God. 
Within orthodox Christianity, God is spoken of as Trinity - three persons in 
one. 38 The very concept of `personhood' denotes the capacity for relationship. The 
Latin rendering of Yahweh is Adsurn connotes, `I shall be with you as who I am'. 
This title exemplifies God's covenantal relationship with Israel. Within the 
Christian tradition, Jesus is the culmination of God's relationship with humanity. 
Indeed, he is `Emmanuel' - God with us. 
Likewise, according to the Christian understanding of creation (both Eastern 
and Western), God, who is characterised by this deep relational nature chose to 
create humankind in God's own image thus possessing a similar relational capacity 
and subsequent need for community. Just as God is conceived of as relational in 
divine essence, humankind is subsequently characterised by this relationality. 
It is important to clearly understand what Wesley meant when he spoke of 
human nature being cast in the image of God. Unlike many others of his day, 
37 Joel B. Green, Salvation (St. Louis: Chalice Press, 2003), p. 23. 38 For more on the Trinity and the concepts of personhood and relationality see Stanley J. Grenz, The 
Social God and the Relational Self. - A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Del (Louisville, Kentucky: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2001); Colin E. Gunton, The Triune Creator. A Historical and 
Systematic Study (Grand Rapids, Mi.: William B. Eerdman's Publishing Company, 1998); The 
Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999); Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian 
Doctrine of God: One Being, Three Persons (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997); J. Moltmann, The Trinity 
and the Kingdom (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1993); Catherine M. Lacugna, God For Us: 
The Trinity and Christian Life (San Francisco, Ca.: Harper San Francisco, 1991); `The Relational God: 
Aquinas and Beyond', Theological Studies 46 (1985), pp. 647-663; Christoph Schwobel and Colin B. 
Gunton (eds. ), Persons Divine and Human (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991). 
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Wesley saw the image as rooted in relationship rather than something that humans 
inherently possess. 39 These ideals were characteristic in the work of the Eastern 
Fathers and influenced Wesley in his way of thinking about the image. In this sense, 
humanity is meant to reflect or mirror the image of God to the world. 
40 
Furthermore, it is important to note that God's image did not refer to the 
`nature' of God per se, but rather to the 'actions' of God in the world. In this way of 
understanding the image, Wesley would have been much more sympathetic to 
speaking of love being the image of God in humanity rather than reason or 
conscience. The act of love spoke more about the nature of God than intellectual 
processes. 
Theodore Runyon, in his work on Wesley's concept of the new creation, 
states the following: 
The image of God as Wesley understands it might best be described 
as a vocation or calling to which human beings are called, the 
fulfilment of which constitutes their true destiny. Because it is not 
innate, the image can be distorted, or forfeited or betrayed. It resides 
not so much in the creature as in the way the creature lives out his or 
her relation to the Creator, using whatever gifts and capacities have 
been received to be in communion with its source and to reflect that 
source in the world 41 
Here Runyon stresses Wesley's belief that we are created with a calling to 
reflect the image of God in the world. In other words, humans do not inherently 
reflect the image of God in and of themselves; instead we come to reflect that image 
in the world by being in proper relationship with God and the whole of creation. As 
stated above, Wesley viewed this calling to become the image of God as a central 
element in the purpose or `telos' of the new creation. 
39 For example, Deists saw the `image of God' as the ability to exercise reason. 
40 For more on the Eastern Fathers and their influence on Wesley's theological 
ideals see John 
Meyendorff, A Study of Gregory Palamas (London: Faith Press, 1964), p. 120. 
41 Theodore Runyon, The New Creation: John Wesley's Theology Today (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon 
Press, 1998), pp. 13-14. Emphasis added. 
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Like much of the principal doctrines of the Eastern tradition, Wesley adhered 
to this notion of human relationality as indispensable in his overall theological 
anthropology. 42 In speaking of the original state of humankind, Wesley says: 
Above all, (which was his highest excellence, far more valuable than 
all the rest put together, ) he was a creature capable of God; capable of 
knowing, loving, and obeying his Creator. And, in fact, he did know 
God, did unfeignedly love and uniformly obey him. This was the 
supreme perfection of man; (as it is of all intelligent beings; ) the 
continually seeing, and loving, and obeying the Father of the spirits of 
all flesh. From this right state and right use of all his faculties, his 
happiness naturally flowed. 43 
These words from Wesley demonstrate his notion that humankind reflects the 
glory of God in a relational sense and it is this relational integrity that he strove to 
see restored in the new creation. 
It is in the fulfilment of relational or communal life that we reach our full 
potential as human beings. 44 The ultimate example of Christian community is the 
Church - those people who exist in a particular relationship with God and each other. 
For Wesley, those that are in proper relationship with the Creator have been 
connected with the telic narrative of God in new creation, and as a result, their 
personal narratives now coexist, all the while culminating toward being the `body of 
Christ' in the world. 45 At the centre of this Christian community is to be found 
participation with God and divine purpose in new creation. 46 
42 This point is fundamental to Wesley's articulation of justification and sanctification. For more on 
relationality in the Eastern tradition see John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion (Crestwood, N. Y.: St. 
Vladimir's Press, 1985). 
43 Sermon 60, The Great Deliverance, BE (2: 439). 
44 For supporting material on the social nature of personhood see Alistair I. McFayden, The Call to 
Personhood: A Christian Theory of the Individual in Social Relationships (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). 
45 I argue that this strong metaphor offered by Paul (ICor. 12: 27. Eph. 1: 22-23, Col. 1: 18) serves an 
incredibly helpful role in understanding the mission of the Church and the end to which the 
community of God should strive. 46 This participation is marked by knowing, loving, obeying, and enjoying God eternally. An Earnest 
Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, BE (11: 62). 
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2.3.2 Wesley's Holistic Anthropology 
A further dimension of Wesley's theological anthropology dealt with the 
dichotomy between the physical and spiritual aspect of humanity. There were 
several traditional interpretations of this issue in Wesley's day. In the Greek 
philosophical tradition, it was common to speak of the body and soul as completely 
separate entities resulting in both a metaphysical and ethical dualism. Some of 
Wesley's writing reflects this point of view. Note that in his sermon on The Good 
Steward he claims: 
[God] hath entrusted us with our souls, our bodies, our goods, and 
whatever other talents we have received: But in order to impress this 
weighty truth on our hearts, it will be needful to come to particulars. 
And, first, God has entrusted us with our soul, an immortal spirit, 
made in the image of God; together with all the powers and faculties 
thereof, understanding, imagination, memory, will, and a train of 
affections, either included in it or closely dependent upon it, - love 
and hatred, joy and sorrow, respecting present good and evil; desire 
and aversion, hope and fear, respecting that which is to 
come.... Secondly, [God] entrusted us with our bodies (those 
exquisitely wrought machines, so fearfully and wonderfully made, ) 
with all the powers and members thereof. He has entrusted us with 
the organs of sense; of sight, hearing, and the rest: But none of these 
are given us as our own, to be employed according to our own will. 
None of these are lent us in such a sense as to leave us at liberty to 
use them as we please for a season. No: We have received them on 
these very terms, that, as long as they abide with us, we should 
employ them all in that very manner, and no other, which he 
appoints. 7 
In contrast to the Greek philosophical view of the body and soul, Green notes 
that the scriptural witness operates under `the assumption that a person is one's 
behaviour - that is, that one's deepest commitments are unavoidably exhibited 
in 
one's practices - so that attention focuses on "embodied life", disallowing the 
possibility that the "real" person might be relegated to one's interior life'. 
48 This 
47 Sermon 52, The Good Steward, BE (2: 284). 
48 Green, Salvation, p. 23. 
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`embodied' view of human nature depicted in scripture would have also influenced 
Wesley's thoughts on human nature. 
Although it is obvious from his writing that he existed in this tension, he did 
speak of the human person in much more holistic terms than many of his 
contemporaries. It is safe to say that Wesley considered human beings to be 
embodied souls or spirits, but he was careful to place emphasis on the particularly 
`embodied' dimension of this view. This position can be seen in his notes on 1 
Thessalonians 5: 23: 
And may the God of peace sanctify you - By the peace he works in 
you, which is a great means of sanctification. Wholly - The word 
signifies wholly and perfectly; every part and all that concerns you; 
all that is of or about you. And may the whole of you, the spirit and 
the soul and the body - Just before he said you; now he denominates 
them from their spiritual state. The spirit - Gal. vi, 8; wishing that it 
may be preserved whole and entire: then from their natural state, the 
soul and the body; (for these two make up the whole nature of man, 
Matt. X, 28; ) wishing it may be preserved blameless till the coming of 
Christ 49 
Wesley continues this theme in a sermon from 2 Corinthians 4: 7 by 
acknowledging the embodied existence of the human person. Wesley saw that `the 
soul, during its vital union with the body, cannot exert any of its operations, any 
otherwise than in union with the body'. 5° 
Wesley took further issue with any belief that separated a `spiritual life' from 
a life to be lived in the physical world. 
Many eminent men have spoken thus: Have advised us `to cease 
from all outward actions'; wholly to withdraw from the world; to 
leave the body behind us; to abstract ourselves from all sensible 
things - to have no concern at all about outward religion, but to `work 
all virtues in the will', as the far more excellent way, more perfective 
of the soul, as well as more acceptable to God. 5' 
49 From John Wesley's Notes on the Bible, 1 Thes. 5: 23. Emphasis added. 
50 Sermon 129, Heavenly Treasures in Earthen Vessels, BE (4: 165). 
51 Sermon 24, Sermon on the Mount IV, BE (1: 532). This passage from Wesley's sermon directly 
addresses the words of his former mentor, William Law. As a part of the Moravian tradition, Law's 
58 
These words, spoken by Wesley, reflect a common attitude toward religious 
expression during his day. Just as Wesley espoused the fundamentally social and 
embodied nature of Christianity, I too argue for this position. 
Green's charge that Scripture makes the critical assumption that `a person is 
one's behaviour' is an interesting and important claim. 2 This line of thinking is rich 
in the field of virtue theory. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this literature 
emphasises the notion of embodiment and its place in human nature. As a mode of 
moral philosophy, virtue theory provides a distinct place for the dimension of human 
passions or affections. 53 In the following section, I will discuss at length the 
importance that Wesley placed on the affections. 
My point in stressing this dimension of Wesley's holistic anthropology is to 
show that although Wesley used the language of `body and soul', he did not assume 
that the purpose of renewal could be separated from the life lived in the body. Not 
only do we exist as embodied persons now, but we will be `re-embodied' at the 
resurrection. This sentiment can be observed in his sermon, What is Man? (1872). 
Here he claims that `in my present state of existence, I undoubtedly consist both of 
soul and body: And so I shall again, after the resurrection, to all eternity'. 
54 To 
Wesley, the great renewal in the image of God, to which humanity was called, 
involved the soul and body in a holistic sense. 55 
advice had a quietistic and individualistic tone. This position held by Law represents the antithesis of 
my argument regarding the embodied nature of humanity and religious expression. 52 I am careful here point out that Green's claim does not represent 'behaviourism' in the classical 
sense; rather, it points toward issues of virtue and character which are intrinsically bound to an 
individual's moral life. 
33 For a wonderful example see G. Simon Harak, Virtuous Passions: The Formation of Christian 
Character (New York: Paulist Press, 1993). 
sa Sermon 116, What is Man, BE (4: 23). 
ss This dimension of theological anthropology is critical to the current project. The following chapter 
is dedicated to working out a viable view of human nature in detail. Suffice to say for now, that 
Wesley is not considered a strong `dualist' in this dimension of his theological anthropology. 
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2.3.3 Wesley's Affectional Moral Psychology 
Thus far, I have argued that Wesley can be considered a practical theologian 
in the sense that he was interested in a theological discourse that led to actual 
transformation. He was not concerned with theology for theology's sake, but rather 
advocated active religious experience in the lives of the people that he ministered to. 
We have seen that Wesley's notion of new creation reflected God's ultimate `telos' 
in the world - The renewal of creation in the image of God. 
I have presented the first two salient features of Wesley's theological 
anthropology - relational and holistic anthropologies. The time has now come to 
present the third aspect of Wesley's theological anthropology - his affectional moral 
psychology. This aspect of Wesley's thought reflects perhaps the most distinctive 
feature of his theology. His moral psychology is particularly prominent in his 
articulation of the `way of salvation'. In addition, Wesley's understanding of moral 
psychology is a critical aspect of my endeavour to describe Christian conversion. 
I will begin this section by explaining what exactly is meant by `moral 
psychology'. On the surface, such a discussion would seem to be a terrible 
anachronism; after all, psychology is a rather modern method of scientific 
investigation. I am using the term `moral psychology' to refer to the fundamental 
assumptions concerning human moral attitude and behaviour. 56 Such a psychology 
seeks to answer questions like: Are we truly free to make moral choices? If we 
answer in the affirmative, then what is it that hinders us from choosing the good? If 
such a reason can be identified, then what type of `therapy' can be enacted that 
would allow us to choose differently? It should be clear at this juncture that these 
56 For a helpful resource regarding the ancient practice of psychology see Leslie Stevenson, Ten 
Theories of Human Nature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). Stevenson claims that 
ancient psychology could be considered the `study of the soul' and as such was synonymous with 
many religious concerns. 
60 
inquires would have been of great concern to Wesley. In what follows, I intend to 
show his evolution of thought and experience that led him to propose answers to 
these questions. The application of which has come to be known as Wesley's 
affectional moral psychology. 57 
Philosophical inquiries regarding the moral life are ancient and naturally 
extend into the realm of Christian history. The initial generation of Christians did 
not appear to engage in an extended interaction with the philosophical dialogues of 
their Greek-Roman context; however, as time passed, an explicit interaction 
developed between Christians and the prominent moral psychologies of the time. 
While there is evidence of some interaction with Gnostic ideals, Clement of 
Alexandria's strong endorsement of self-determinism seemed to be a more 
commonly held idea. 58 
Clement's form of self-determination was primarily informed by Plato's 
emphasis on habitual rational control of the passions. 59 This model of moral 
psychology stresses the human ability to reason as the primary mode of self- 
determination. Here, reason maintains a polar relationship with human passion or 
emotions. Thus, it follows that the most significant obstacle to rational moral life is 
the interference that occurs in emotional reaction. So to be a truly moral person was 
to bring the emotional aspect of human life under subjection to the rational self. 
Likewise, we can increase in our aptitude to maintain such rational control through a 
process of habituation. 
S' For a further discussion of Wesley's affectional moral psychology see Gregory S. Clapper, 
'Orthokardia: The Practical Theology of John Wesley's Heart Religion', Quarterly Review 10 (1990), 
FF49-66. 
David C. Aune, 'Mastery of the Passions', in Wendy Helleman (ed. ), Hellenization Revisited 
(Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1994), pp. 125-158. 59 'Self-determinism' refers to the mediating strategy that acknowledges the significant influence of 
motivating dynamics on human attitude and behaviour, but allows for some degree of autonomy for a 
person's will to serve as the final arbitrator of moral action. 
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An opposition arose to Plato's moral psychology. The voice of St. Augustine 
brought a new perspective to understanding the moral life. Augustine's 
determination to live a moral life according to rational control failed and left him 
searching for a means to live the proper Christian life. His failure to gain habituated 
rational control over his passions led him to draw two conclusions: (1) the attempts 
to live the moral life by exhibiting rational control over the passions placed far too 
much emphasis on the human element and not enough on the possibility of divine 
intervention; and (2) that reason is more the slave of the passions than a master to 
rule over them. 
These conclusions led to the development of Augustine's moral psychology60 
which remains one of the most prominent examples of deterministic thought in 
Christian spirituality. 61 He argued that the whole of human moral choice is 
dependent upon pre-existing affections. As a result of the Fall, humans are born with 
corrupt affections that can only give rise to negative moral choice. The answer to 
this dilemma rests in the ability of God to renew these inherent affections through 
the process of regeneration. It is only through this action of God that right moral 
attitude and behaviour can proceed. 
It followed that Augustine would emphasise the state of total depravity in 
humankind - humanity is helpless to choose the good without the regenerative 
power of God. For Augustine, then, any belief in self-determination stood in direct 
opposition to the notion of salvation by grace. 
So then, we see a definite tension between the views of the moral life that 
were presented by both Plato and Augustine. The prior tradition emphasised rational 
60 For an analysis of Augustine's moral psychology see James Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of 
Virtue (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
61 `Determinism' here refers to the assumption that motivating dynamics (passions, emotions, etc. ) 
exhaustively account for human choice and action. The result is that the will eventually falls victim to 
these motivating dynamics. 
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control over the passions or affections while the latter viewed the will as being 
doomed to serve them. It is in the tension between the moral psychologies 
articulated by Plato and Augustine that Wesley found himself. A brief examination 
of Wesley's biography will prove helpful going forward. 
John Wesley was born on 17 June 1703 to the Reverend Samuel Wesley and 
Susanna (Annesley) Wesley. Both of Wesley's parents were ambitiously involved in 
the movement against the Puritan resistance and supported the prominence of the 
Anglican Church. 62 Due to Samuel's extended travels, the domestic duties were 
primarily assumed by Susanna. This included the rearing of John and his brothers. 
We have a fairly good picture of the type of discipline that Susanna exercised in the 
home. John and his brothers were taught `to fear the rod, and to cry softly, by which 
means they escaped abundance of correction which they might otherwise have 
had', 63 
Wesley's childhood was characterised by Susanna's firm dedication to raise 
her children as well-fitted Christians. In her eyes, such a `well-fitted' Christian life 
can only be achieved through the subjugation of the natural inclinations of the 
developing will. A letter from Susanna regarding her educational beliefs and 
practices makes the point well. 
As self-will is the root of all sin and misery, so whatever cherishes 
this in children insures their after-wretchedness and irreligion; 
whatever checks and mortifies it promotes their future happiness and 
piety. This is still more evident if we further consider that religion is 
nothing else than the doing the will of God and not our own: that the 
one grand impediment to our temporal and eternal happiness being 
this self-will, no indulgencies of it can be trivial, no denial 
unprofitable. Heaven or hell depends on this alone. So that the 
parent who studies to subdue it in his child works together with God 
62 For a helpful biography see Henry D. Rack, Reasonable Enthusiast: John Wesley and the Rise of 
Methodism (London: Epworth Press, 2002). pp. 45-60. See also Kenneth J. Collins, John Wesley: A 
Theological Journey (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 2003). 
63 C. Wallace (ed. ), Susanna Wesley: The Complete Writings (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997), p. 369. 
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in renewing and saving a soul. The parent who indulges it does the 
devil's work, makes religion impracticable, salvation unattainable; 
and does all that in him lies to damn his child, soul, and body 
forever. 64 
It is clear from this excerpt that Wesley was nurtured under the habituated 
rational control model of moral psychology. Indeed Platonic moral psychology was 
widely accepted in eighteenth century Anglicanism. 5 This vein of thought can be 
seen in Wesley's early sermons. A clear example is offered in his sermon on The 
Wisdom of Winning Souls. 
When due care has been used to strengthen his understanding, then tis 
time to use the other great means of winning souls, namely, the 
regulating of his affections. Indeed without doing this the other can't 
be done thoroughly - he that would well enlighten the head must 
cleanse the heart. Otherwise the disorder of the will again disorders 
the understanding. 66 
Susanna's influence rings clear in Wesley's early position on the moral life. 
This position, however, would soon change. Many Wesleyan scholars consider 
Wesley's experience at Aldersgate in 1738 to mark a significant transformation in 
his theology. While not diminishing the significance of this event in Wesley's life, I 
suggest that much of the change that he underwent was due to the `expectation' set 
by the occurrences leading up to Aldersgate. 
I propose two primary factors that served as catalysts in the transition of 
Wesley's stance on the moral life - (1) his exposure to Augustinian tradition via his 
encounter with the English Moravians; and (2) his embrace of empiricism within 
eighteenth-century British philosophy. Augustine's appeal to divine intervention in 
order to overcome the obstacles in moral life was appealing to Wesley. In addition, 
his spiritual struggle was heightened by Augustine's insistence that rational 
64 Wesley copied this letter from Susanna into his journal. The entry can be found in John Wesley. 
The Works of John Wesley vol. 1(Kansas City, Mis.: Nazarene Publishing House, 1958), p. 389. 65 For support of this point see Robin W. Lovin, `The Physics of True Virtue', in Theodore H. Runyon 
(ed. ), Wesleyan Theology Today (Nashville, Tenn.: Kingswood Books, 1985), pp. 26-272. 
66 Sermon 142, The Wisdom of Winning Souls, BE (4: 313). 
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conviction alone could not effectuate moral action. This made sense of Wesley's 
personal struggles and he was able to see the value of Augustine's position on the 
issue. However, Wesley was troubled by Augustine's claim that God infuses 
irresistible dispositions through the act of regeneration. Wesley found his way out of 
this theological quagmire by appealing to the rise of empiricist thought in British 
philosophy. 
From the seventeenth century, philosophy offered two routes for how we 
understand the acquisition of knowledge - rationalism and empiricism. 
67 The basis 
of rationalism rests on the notion that there are certain innate ideas that are accessible 
to humans through the process of rational thought. In contrast, empiricists claim that 
truth is experienced receptively by the human intellect, not pre-existent within it. I 
argue that Wesley identified himself with the empiricists over the rationalists. 68 
Although the case can be made that Wesley did exhibit some tendencies toward 
rationalist thinking, he did consciously espouse the alternate view. Perhaps, the most 
poignant example of this is found in Wesley's sermon On the Discoveries of Faith. 
Here Wesley states: 
For many ages it has been allowed by sensible men, Nihil est in 
intellectu quod non fuit prius in sensu: That is, `There is nothing in 
67 For an extensive investigation of rationalism and empiricism see Rene Descartes, Selected 
Philosophical Writings, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding [1748] (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill/Oxford University Press, 1955); Gottfried 
W. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding in Leibniz, translated and edited by Mary Morris 
and G. H. R. Parkinson, (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1973); John Locke, An Essay on Human 
Understanding [1690], Roger Woolhouse (ed. ), (London: Penguin Books, 1997). For a user friendly 
introduction to epistemological theories see Bruce A. Aune, Rationalism, Empiricism, and 
Pragmatism: An Introduction (New York: Random House, 1970). The classic articulation of the 
debate between rationalists and empiricists is articulated by Thomas Reid. For a recent reprint of his 
work see Derek R. Brookes (ed. ), Thomas Reid: An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of 
Common Sense (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001). 
68 For a discussion on Wesley's epistemological concerns see Richard E. Brantley, Locke, Wesley, and 
the Method of English Romanticism (Gainesville, Fl.: University Press of Florida, 1984); Frederick 
Dreyer, 'Faith and Experience in the Thought of John Wesley', American Historical Review 88 
(1983), pp. 12-30; Laurence Wood, `Wesley's Epistemology', Wesleyan Theological Journal 10 
(1975), pp. 48-59; and Yoshio Noro, 'Wesley's Theological Epistemology', lliffe Review 28 (1971), 
pp. 59-76. 
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the understanding which was not first perceived by some of the 
senses. ' All the knowledge which we naturally have is originally 
derived from our senses. And therefore those who want any sense 
cannot have the least knowledge or idea of the objects of that sense; 
as they that never had sight have not the least knowledge or 
conception of light or colours. Some indeed have of late years 
endeavoured to prove that we have innate ideas, not derived from any 
of the senses, but coeval with the understanding. But this point has 
been now thoroughly discussed by men of the most eminent sense and 
learning. And it is agreed by all impartial persons that, although 
some things are so plain and obvious that we can very hardly avoid 
knowing them as soon as we come to the use of our understanding, 
yet the knowledge even of these is not innate, but derived from some 
of our senses. 69 
Here Wesley is plainly rebuking the rationalist approach to knowledge. He 
was much more receptive of the Empiricist's methodology. Wesley spoke 
favourably of John Locke's work on human understanding. There was, however, a 
point of divide between Wesley and Locke. 70 Wesley's strongest point of 
divergence from the Lockean school of thought concerned how empiricists addressed 
the issue of knowledge of God. Most empiricists of Wesley's time strictly attributed 
knowledge of God to that of external experience or to inferences from Scripture 
71 
Wesley was reluctant to adopt this view because he held to the notion that 
knowledge could come directly from God. 
While adhering to the empiricist inclination that knowledge comes through 
the senses, Wesley allowed for direct knowledge through what he called the spiritual 
senses. He employed the presence of the spiritual senses most often when discussing 
69 Sermon 117, On the Discoveries of Faith, BE (4: 29). Emphasis added. This phrase, `Nihil est in 
intellectu quod non fuit prius in sensu' is quoted again by Wesley in his sermon on Walking by Sight 
and Walking by Faith, Sermon 119, BE (4: 51). 
70 Among these Maddox notes that Wesley `disputed Locke's distinction between primary qualities 
(really in external objects) and secondary qualities (only in the mind).... Ile also rejected Locke's 
suggestion that abstract classifications like 'species' are products of reasoning rather than derived 
from experience.... For Wesley, reason abstracts from experience what is truly there! ' Maddox, 
Responsible Grace, note 6, p. 262. 71 For a classic example see Peter Browne, The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of Human 
Understanding, printed for W. Innys and R. Manby (London. 1737). Also see Wesley's discussion of 
Browne's work in A Survey of the Wisdom of God in Creation or A Compendium of Natural 
Philosophy in Two Volumes, BE (5: 153). 
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the New Birth. Wesley held that it was through the New Birth that spiritual senses 
where activated by way of the prevenient grace of God. When speaking of the 
person in the pangs of new birth, he says: 
It is true he may have some faint dawnings of life, some small 
beginnings of spiritual motion; but as yet he has no spiritual senses 
capable of discerning spiritual objects; consequently, he `discerneth 
not the things of the Spirit of God; he cannot know them, because 
they are spiritually discemed. '... But when he is born of God, born of 
the Spirit, how is the manner of his existence changed! His whole 
soul is now sensible of God, and he can say, by sure experience, 
`Thou art about my bed, and about my path; ' I feel thee in all my 
ways: `Thou besettest me behind and before, and layest thy hand 
upon me. '... And by this new kind of spiritual respiration, spiritual 
life is not only sustained, but increased day by day, together with 
spiritual strength, and motion, and sensation; all the senses of the soul 
being now awake, and capable of discerning spiritual good and evil. 72 
Empiricist philosophy played a crucial role in forming Wesley's moral 
psychology because it ultimately led to the insistence that humans are motivated to 
action only as we are experientially affected. So, practically speaking, the rationally 
persuasive thought of a moral act such as loving others cannot itself move us to do 
so. It is rather in the experience of being loved ourselves that we are in turn able to 
express love toward others. According to the empiricists, the reason for this is that 
the `will' is neither a cipher for intellectual convictions nor a repository of volitional 
spontaneity, it is rather a `set of responsive holistic "affections" that must be engaged 
in order to incite us to action'. 3 
Wesley's adoption of empiricist thought together with the events leading up 
to and including his Aldersgate experience paved the way to what would become his 
mature affectional moral psychology. To articulate this view is it necessary to place 
the conversation within the bounds of Wesley's primary concern as a theologian - 
the fulfilment of new creation through God's great renewal. So then, what exactly in 
72 Sermon 19, The Great Privilege of Those That Are Born of God, BE (1: 433). 73 Randy L. Maddox, 'Reconnecting the Means to the End: A Wesleyan Prescription for the Holiness 
Movement', Wesleyan Theological Journal 33 no. 2 (1998), p. 34. 
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human nature needs renewal? What does this have to do with the previous 
discussion of moral psychology? 
To answer this question, we must return again to Wesley's theological 
anthropology. Recall that regarding the creation of humankind he says, 
Man was created in the image of God: Because he is not mere matter, 
a clod of earth, a lump of clay, without sense or understanding; but a 
spirit like his Creator, a being endued not only with sense and 
understanding, but also with a will exerting itself in various affections. 
To crown all the rest, he was endued with liberty; a power of directing 
his own affections and actions; a capacity of determining himself, or 
of choosing good or evil. Indeed, had not man been endued with this, 
all the rest would have been of no use: Had he not been a free as well 
as an intelligent being, his understanding would have been as 
incapable of holiness, or any kind of virtue, as a tree or a block of 
marble. 4 
This emphasis on understanding, will, and liberty is critical in Wesley's 
description of moral psychology and the greater end of renewal in the image of God. 
Here, `understanding' refers to the capacity for humankind to exhibit reason, and 
participate within the created order. Wesley's concept of the will is an important one 
that is worthy of closer inspection. What did Wesley mean when he spoke of the 
will? In his understanding, `will' does not refer to the rational actions that we might 
assign to it in a contemporary context. To Wesley, the will was equated with the 
terms affections and tempers. 
An affection is a `transitory feeling state' such as love or desire (because we 
feel these toward another). 75 A temper is a `habituated affection, or said differently, 
an enduring disposition to perceive/feel/think/act in a consistent manner (e. g. to be a 
loving person)'. 6 These affections (or tempers as they become primary motivators) 
74 Sermon 57, On the Fall of Man, BE (2: 400-401). Emphasis added. 7s Brad D. Strawn, and Warren S. Brown, `Wesleyan Holiness through the Eyes of Cognitive Science 
and Psychotherapy', Journal of Psychology and Christianity 23 no. 2 (2004), p. 121. 76 Ibid, p. 121. 
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are `the indispensable motivating inclinations behind human action'. 77 While 
possessing the capability of provoking human action, the affections also have a 
crucial receptive dimension as well. This is to say that the affections are not self- 
causative, but are awakened and thrive in response to the experience of external 
reality. For Wesley the primary experience of reality was to be found in God's love 
toward us. 
It is in consequence of our knowing God loves us, that we love him, 
and love our neighbour as ourselves. Gratitude towards our Creator 
cannot but produce benevolence to our fellow creatures. The love of 
Christ constrains us, not only to be harmless, to do no ill to our 
neighbour, but to be useful, to be `zealous of good works; ' `as we 
have time, to do good unto all men; ' and to be patterns to all of true, 
genuine morality; of justice, mercy, and truth. This is religion, and 
this is happiness; the happiness for which we were made. This begins 
when we begin to know God, by the teaching of his own Spirit. As 
soon as the Father of spirits reveals his Son in our hearts, and the Son 
reveals his Father, the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts; then, 
and not till then, we are happy. 78 
For Wesley, the tempers were at the heart of human motivation and it was the 
goal of salvation to transform the unholy tempers within humankind to holy tempers 
characterised by the love of God and creation. When speaking of the temper of love, 
Wesley states: 
Let love not visit you as a transient guest, but be the constant ruling 
temper of your soul. See that your heart be filled at all times and on 
all occasions with real, undissembled benevolence; not to those only 
that love you, but to every soul of man. Let it pant in your heart; let it 
sparkle in your eyes, let it shine on all your actions. Whenever you 
open your lips, let it be with love; and let there be in your tongue the 
law of kindness. Your word will then distill as the rain, and as the 
77 Randy L. Maddox, 'Reconnecting the Means to the End: A Wesleyan Prescription for the Holiness 
Movement', Wesleyan Theological Journal. 33 no. 2 (1998), p. 33. Also, it should be noted that a 
parallel could be drawn between the present use of the term 'inclinations' and Michael Polanyi's 'tacit 
knowledge'. Polanyi began from the premise that humans somehow 'know more than we can tell'. 
See Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1967), p. 4. 
Polanyi considers tacit knowledge to be the framework for moral acts and judgment. It is interesting 
that the construction of such a framework is contingent on practice. He asserts that 'true knowledge 
lies in our ability to use it.... It is not by looking at things, but by dwelling in them, that we understand 
their joint meaning' (Ibid., pp. 17-18). '$ Sermon 120, The Unity of the Divine Being, BE (4: 67). This theme permeates Wesley's latter 
works. 
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dew upon the tender herb. Be not straitened or limited in your 
affection, but let it embrace every child of man 79 
This poetic explanation of the place of love in the life of the Christian is a 
quintessential example of Wesley's practical theology. To be `saved' for Wesley 
was to have a transformed life marked by transformed attitudes and behaviours and 
such was possible only through the renewal of the tempers. Wesley stated that `true 
religion, in the very essence of it, is nothing short of holy tempers'. 80 
This grounding of moral attitude and behaviour within the affections shares 
obvious similarities with Augustine. Recall that for Augustine, the renewal of the 
passions or affections coincides with divine regeneration. These newly infused holy 
affections then take on the same irresistible nature that characterised the prior unholy 
passions. Wesley considered the notion of `irresistible' passions to be problematic 
and thereby included the concept of liberty in his moral psychology. He carefully 
distinguished `liberty' from `will', by specifying that while the `will' reflected our 
various inclinations to act; `liberty' is our limited autonomous capacity to refuse to 
enact a particular inclination. 
Having expounded on the three primary features of Wesley's theological 
anthropology - his relational anthropology, his holistic anthropology, and finally his 
affectional moral psychology, I will now discuss how these points relate to Wesley's 
understanding of salvation at large. 
2.4 Wesley's Way of Salvation 
What is salvation? The salvation which is here spoken of is not what 
is frequently understood by that word, the going to heaven, eternal 
happiness. It is not the soul's going to paradise, termed by our Lord, 
`Abraham's bosom. ' It is not a blessing which lies on the other side 
of death; or, as we usually speak, in the other world. The very words 
" Sermon 100, On Pleasing All Men, BE (3: 422). 
80 Sermon 91, On Charity, BE (3: 306). 
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of the text itself put this beyond all question: `Ye are saved. ' It is not 
something at a distance: it is a present thing; a blessing which, 
through the free mercy of God, ye are now in possession of. Nay, the 
words may be rendered, and that with equal propriety, `Ye have been 
saved': so that the salvation which is here spoken of might be 
extended to the entire work of God, from the first dawning of grace in 
the soul, till it is consummated in glory. 81 
The previous discussion of Wesley's theological anthropology has provided 
us with the critical context to develop his view of salvation. As seen from Wesley's 
affectional moral psychology, the relation between sin and salvation is based in 
human nature and as such requires not only `pardon', but `healing' - the whole of 
Wesley's soteriology revolves about this notion. 82 Maddox comments that, `Wesley 
understood human salvation in its fullest sense to include deliverance (1) 
immediately from the penalty of sin, (2) progressively from the plague of sin, and (3) 
eschatologically from the very presence of sin and its effects'. 83 It is obvious from a 
survey of Wesley's writing that he primarily focused on the second point - how is it 
that humans are to heal from the present reality and effects of sin? 84 
As mentioned above, many of Wesley's theological ideas were the result of a 
synthesis between the Eastern and Western traditions. One of the most critical of 
these ideas involved Wesley's notion of sin. It is important to note that Wesley 
stressed the notion of inbeing sin over `original sin'. Here, the emphasis is more on 
relational depravity than the transmission of Adam's sin to future generations. 85 
Maddox notes that `the most basic cause of our present infirmity for Wesley was not 
some "thing" that we inherit, but the distortion of our nature resulting from being 
81 Sermon 43, The Scripture Way of Salvation, BE (2: 156). 82 For examples of this theme in Wesley's work see Sermon 101, The Trouble and Rest of Good Men, 
BE (3: 533) and Sermon 69, The Imperfection of Human Knowledge, BE (2: 581). 83 Maddox, Responsible Grace, p. 143. 
84 It is important to note that although I am suggesting that this was Wesley's primary concern, he 
stressed that salvation proper is concerned with the intertwining of all three of these points. None was 
more important than the other in that the 'working out' of salvation was a thorough process involving 
all three. 
$S For more on Wesley's notion of 'inbeing sin' see Barry Bryant, John Wesley's Doctrine of Sin 
(PhD Dissertation: Kings College, University of London, 1992). 
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born into this world already separated from the empowering Divine Presence. 
Deprived of this essential relationship, our various faculties inevitably become 
debilitated, leaving us morally depraved'. 86 
When Wesley dealt with this notion of depravity or inbeing sin, he was 
seeking the source of sin, not a way to classify individual sins. Wesley's affectional 
moral psychology is again relevant here, because it is from the corrupted affections 
or tempers that sinful actions flow - getting Wesley closer to the root of sinful 
behaviour. Inbeing sin can then be understood as the corruption of these basic 
human motivations. Recall that from Wesley's theological anthropology, the human 
faculties of understanding, will, and liberty are critical aspects of human nature. In 
the presence of inbeing sin, our understanding is obscured, our will is hampered by 
corrupt affections and tempers, and our liberty is lost. 87 It is from this depravity that 
our actual (individual) sins emerge. 
In this sense, total depravity does not refer to the worse possible moral 
condition that a human can assume; rather, it refers to the scope in which sin affects 
human capacities. Inbeing sin pervades every human faculty, thus leaving us unable 
to save ourselves apart from the healing offered through God's grace. Thus, we see 
the prominence of a therapeutic view of salvation in Wesley. Indeed, what is needed 
is not `forgiveness' alone, but the healing of our corrupt affections and tempers. 
Wesley notes that the proper nature of religion is `therapeia psyches, God's method 
of healing a soul which is thus diseased. Hereby the great Physician of souls applies 
86 Maddox, Responsible Grace, p. 81. 
87 For Wesley's words on the effects of inbeing sin see, Sermon 141, The Image of God, BE (4: 298); 
Sermon 146, The One Thing Needful, BE (4: 354); Sermon 44, Original Sin, BE (2: 177); Sermon 40, 
Christian Perfection, BE (2: 118-119), Sermon 34, The Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the 
Law, BE (2: 7). 
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medicines to heal this sickness; to restore human nature, totally corrupted in all its 
faculties'. 88 
Wesley was careful to point out that his concept of salvation as healing was 
not restricted to the internal or spiritual life. He insisted that true salvation involved 
not only inner renewal, but outward transformation marked by moral righteousness. 
By salvation I mean, not barely (according to the vulgar notion) 
deliverance from hell, or going to heaven, but a present deliverance 
from sin, a restoration of the soul to its primitive health, its original 
purity; a recovery of the divine nature; the renewal of our souls after 
the image of God in righteousness and true holiness, in justice, mercy, 
and truth. This implies all holy and heavenly tempers, and by 
consequence all holiness of conversation'. 89 
This holistic view of salvation balances the inner holiness of our affections 
and tempers with the renewal of our actions that are marked by relationship with 
God and others. In addition, Wesley was careful to strike a balance between his 
presentation of grace as bringing both pardon and power, and he did so within the 
greater context of his understanding of salvation as God's healing of inbeing sin. 
By `the grace of God' is sometimes to be understood that free love, 
that unmerited mercy, by which Ia sinner, through the merits of 
Christ, am now reconciled to God. But in this place it rather means 
that power of God the Holy Ghost, which `worketh in us both to will 
and to do of his good pleasure'. As soon as ever the grace of God in 
the former sense, his pardoning love, is manifested to our souls, the 
grace of God in the latter sense, the power of his Spirit, takes place 
therein. And now we can perform, through God, what to man was 
impossible. Now we can order our conversation aright... [and achieve] 
holiness, a recovery of the image of God, a renewal of soul `after his 
likeness'. 90 
Given Wesley's view of salvation as healing, we can now turn to a more 
detailed account of his way of salvation. I am careful here to stress `way' over the 
term `order'. This tendency to speak about the `order of salvation' or ordo salutis 
88 Sermon 44, Original Sin, BE (2: 184). Emphasis added. 89A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, BE (11: 106). I have italicised 'conversation' in 
order to emphasise its reference to the whole of human conduct, not just spoken words. 
90 Sermon 12, The Witness of Our Own Spirit, BE (1: 309-310). Emphasis added. 
73 
was evident in both Lutheran and Reformed scholasticism. The primary feature of 
this view was the depiction of salvation as God's progressive sequence of works 
operative within the human soul. This notion would have been familiar to Wesley 
through theologians like William Perkins 91 
A number of contemporary Wesleyan scholars have noted that the gradual 
dynamics inherent in Wesley's concept of salvation is better described as a way 
rather than successive steps - thus via salutis. 
92 This suggestion seems appropriate 
given that Wesley himself used the term often in his various writings. 93 Wesley's 
sermons tended to emphasise the unfolding of God's grace in human life rather than 
abrupt transitions in an order of salvation. For Wesley (particularly in his mature 
view), salvation was more a gradual journey into the depths of God's grace. 
This is an indispensable aspect of Wesley's theology. God's grace is at work 
at all points along the course of one's life; thus; Wesley's idea of atonement was 
closely linked to participation in Christ. As a result of this theological position, 
Wesley had great resonance with the Catholic tradition of his day. Wesley's notion 
of sanctifying grace resonated with a Catholic understanding of sanctification. In 
Catholic thought, sanctification progresses in the life of a Christian by the increase of 
justice received through the grace of Christ. Grace, understood in this fashion, is co- 
operant in nature and precedes, accompanies, and follows `good works'. 94 There are 
91 See William Perkins, A Golden Chain, or the Description of Theology; Containing the Order of the 
Causes of Salvation and Damnation (London: J. Legatt, 1591). For a helpful discussion on the 
Reformed view of the order of salvation see Abraham Kuyper, The Work of the Holy Spirit (Grand 
Rapids, Mi.: William B. Eerdman's Publishing Company, 1979). 
92 For two such examples see Richard P. Heitzenrater, Mirror and Memory: Reflections on Early 
Methodism (Nashville, Tenn.: Kingswood Books, 1989), p. 109; and Theodore Runyon, 'What is 
Methodism's Theological Contribution Today? ', in Theodore Runyon (ed. ), Wesleyan Theology 
Today: A Bicentennial Theological Concentration (Nashville, Tenn.: United Methodist Publishing 
House, 1985), p. 11. 
93 For example, 'The Way to the Kingdom', 'The Scripture Way of Salvation' and 'The More 
Excellent Way'. 
94 This position was discussed during the Council of Trent's session on justification. See H. J. 
Schroeder, Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent (Rockfield, Ill.: Tan Books and Publishers, 
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obvious similarities here between the Catholic position and Wesley's understanding 
of sanctification and prevenient grace. 95 
Furthermore, this view emphasises Wesley's conviction that salvation is a 
dynamic relationship characterised by responsible grace - `Wesley was convinced 
that, while we can not attain holiness (and wholeness) apart from God's grace, God 
will not effect holiness apart from our responsive participation'. 9' There is a 
significant departure between Wesley and the Protestant Reformers (mainly Luther 
and Calvin) on this point. Wesley saw justification as the doorway to life in Christ. 
He was most concerned with holiness, thus; Wesley taught sanctification (becoming 
holy) as distinct from justification and as being processive in nature. In regards to 
the tension between Wesley and the Reformers, Ralph Del Colle states that 
As the Reformers would have it, we are always reappropriating the 
gift of justification even as Christ is formed in us through a life of 
faith and obedience, which can properly be termed sanctification. For 
Wesley, once we are justified, we enter a new stage, sanctification, 
still dependent though upon grace received through faith. We can fall 
from this stage (as opposed to Calvin) but nevertheless the focus is 
upon the reigning and indwelling Christ and not exclusively on the 
continual actualisation of justification. 7 
Wesley stressed the need for continued growth in grace. Wesley's comments 
during a 1770 conference with his preachers make this clear. 
Does not talking, without proper caution, of a justified or sanctified 
state, tend to mislead [people]; almost naturally leading them to trust 
in what was done in one moment? Whereas we are every moment 
pleasing or displeasing to God, according to our works; according to 
the whole of our present inward tempers and outward behaviour. 98 
1978). Also for a more recent discussion of the similarities between Wesley and the Catholic 
tradition see Ralph Del Colle, `John Wesley's Doctrine of Grace in Light of the Christian Tradition', 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 4 no. 2 (2002), pp. 172-189. 95 See Wesley's sermon on Circumcision of the Heart, Sermon 17 BE (1: 403). 96 Maddox, Responsible Grace, p. 148. 97 Colle, p. 183. My only criticism of Colle is his use of the term 'stage'. It seems much more 
appropriate to speak of 'dimensions' of grace in Wesley's work. 9 Point 77, BE (8: 338). 
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So for Wesley, salvation was not a series of ascending steps leading a person 
to God; rather, salvation was a growing relationship with God characterised by 
intertwining facets. Salvation was not a pinnacle from which there was no return, 
but a term designating a journey leading to peace and renewed relationship with God. 
In addition, this journey was to be understood as a gradual process. 99 Wesley 
considered it normative for all of God's providential acts to be gradual in nature; 
thus, he referred to the `gradual process of the work of God in the soul'. 1°° 
In what follows, I will summarise the `intertwining facets' that characterise 
Wesley's mature view of salvation. Again, I emphasise that, for Wesley, salvation is 
based on God's grace. Furthermore, he stressed the co-operant nature of grace; that 
is, it is the intimate relationship between God's grace and human action that brings 
transformation. So, as I move forward it is important to understand that while 
Wesley's view of salvation involved definite works of grace, appropriately 
understood, these works are to be viewed as degrees of the same divine action, rather 
than separate works in and of themselves. 
To be clear, one cannot overemphasise the place of grace in Wesley's 
theology. In fact, his distinctive view of `prevenient grace' made for a way between 
Plato and Augustine. Plato held that humankind is free to make a choice for `good' 
whenever one is ruled by his or her rational faculties. In contrast, Augustine held 
that Adam's sin left humanity unable to freely choose the good. A person must turn 
to God where this ability is infused through a work of God. It is important to notice 
that a central aim of the Reformation was to return to Augustine's position, which 
according to the reformers, had gradually declined in the Catholic Church. The 
" For examples see A Farther Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, BE (11: 107) and Sermon 85, 
On Working Out Our Own Salvation, BE (3: 203-204). 
100 Hymns and Sacred Poems, BE (14: 326). 
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reformers maintained that the Catholic Church had fallen into a state of 'Semi- 
Pelagianism'. 101 
There is an obvious resonance between this position of `Semi-Pelagianism' 
and Wesley's articulation of prevenient grace. 102 Wesley held that God's grace 
preceded any choice, thus making morally `good' actions possible. This is explicit 
in Wesley's discussion of salvation at large. I will begin this analysis with a 
discussion of Wesley's view of regeneration. 
2.4.1 Regeneration 
Wesley's departure from the Reformed notion of ordo salutis is obvious in 
his exposition of regeneration. The Reformed Scholastics equated regeneration with 
the New Birth - God's instantaneous and irresistible work in the life of sinners. 
Here God transformed humans, who are incapable of good works, to `new creatures' 
now able to operate in the realm of repentance and faith. The essential feature of this 
Reformed view was that regeneration or the New Birth must take place before 
humans can respond to God. 
Wesley's view of regeneration was quite different. This is mostly due to his 
understanding of salvation as a 'way' as opposed to an 'order'. To Wesley, 
regeneration meant `being inwardly changed by the almighty operation of the Spirit 
of God; changed from sin to holiness; [and being] renewed in the image of him who 
101 The term 'Semi-Pelagianism' is meant to denote the belief that the Fall weakened humanities will, 
but did not destroy it. In addition, humankind's nature is diseased, but not depraved; thus, humanity 
can cooperate with God's grace or reject it. 102 Wesley, on occasion, referred to Pelagius as a 'wise and holy man' (letter to Alexander Coates, 7 
July 1761. See John Telford (ed. ), The Letters of the Rev. John Wesley (London: Epworth, 1931), vol. 
4, p. 158. 
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created us'. 103 This description, which places emphasis on therapeutic and holistic 
transformation, resonates with Wesley's understanding of salvation at large. 
Wesley was careful (particularly following his Aldersgate experience) to 
differentiate between the New Birth and sanctification - the former referred to the 
renewal of the human faculties that accompanied the restored pardoning grace of 
God, while the latter designated the gradual restoration of our moral nature made 
possible by the New Birth. So in this sense, the New Birth was the beginning of 
sanctification. 104 To Wesley, regeneration was not to be strictly equated with either 
the New Birth or sanctification proper, rather; it was to be understood to describe the 
whole experience of salvation - New Birth and sanctification were seen as increasing 
degrees of a larger reality. 
This aspect of `increasing degrees' is central to Wesley's mature view of 
salvation. As noted above, this should not be understood as an `order' or ascending 
steps in the salvation experience, but should rather be characterised by its relational 
features. Thus, regeneration is `the crucial facet of God's prevenient empowering 
realized in intensifying degrees throughout human salvation as a whole'. 105 In this 
context, Wesley spoke of the various works of grace that act to transform human 
lives and thus play a role in the greater experience of regeneration. 
Within Wesley's greater theme of regeneration, he spoke of individual 
`works of grace'. Again, these are not to be seen as a sequential order through which 
one must pass, but multidimensional facets portraying the same work of God in 
human lives. Wesley saw grace as being manifested in three ways: `in our creation, 
103 Doctrine of Original Sin, BE (9: 308). 104 For examples of Wesley's view of the New Birth as the beginning of the process of sanctification 
proper see Sermon 43, The Scripture Way of Salvation, BE (2: 158); Sermon 45, The New Birth, BE 
(2: 198); Sermon 107, On God's Vineyard, BE (3: 506-507); and The Doctrine of Original Sin, BE 
(9: 310). 
105 Maddox, Responsible Grace, p. 160. 
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in God's forgiveness, and in our transformation and re-creation'. 106 It is because of 
love, the divine essence of grace, that God created the world and humankind, and it 
is this same grace that works within us to forgive and transform. Grace is intimately 
intertwined with Wesley's notion of salvation; thus, he speaks of grace as prevenient, 
justifying, and sanctifying. 
2.4.2 Prevenient Grace 
In Wesley's Collection of Fonns of Prayers, he prayed: 
O that we may all receive of [Christ's] fullness, grace upon grace; 
grace to pardon our sins, and subdue our iniquities; to justify our 
persons and to sanctify our souls; and to complete that holy change, 
that renewal of our hearts, whereby we may be transformed into that 
blessed image wherein thou didst create us. lo7 
This grace acts upon humanity in a variety of ways, some of which are subtle 
and unconscious to us. Grace can operate in a `prevenient' way turning us toward 
God and the fullness of life offered in that response. This notion of prevenient grace 
is a key Wesleyan distinctive and one that merits our understanding. 
In many ways, the development of Wesley's notion of prevenient grace was 
in response to the tension that he experienced in articulating the notion of total 
depravity. This tension existed between the Eastern understanding of depravity 
which held that God had restored an inherent capacity within human nature allowing 
us to respond to God's grace and the Western reformed notion of total depravity 
which seemed to lead to the Calvinist doctrine of Predestination. 
Seeing inherent problems in both of these traditions, Wesley sought for a way 
to affirm that all avenues to restoration, including our earliest inclinations toward 
God, were dependent upon grace. In this sense, prevenient grace is meant to affirm 
106 Runyon, The New Creation, p. 26. 107 John Wesley, 'A Collection of Forms of Prayers, "Prayers for Families"', in Thomas Jackson (ed. ), 
The Works of the Rev. John Wesley, M. A. (London: Wesleyan Methodist Book Room. 1872). 
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that every act of human virtue, from the earliest expressions of faith through 
increasing degrees of sanctification, are to be seen as grounded in the prior 
empowering of the grace of God. 
In addition to this general sense of prevenient grace, Prevenient Grace 
(proper) refers to the action of God that `comes before' justification. It is this grace 
that moves us toward God and directs us to seek the Divine will. In his sermon 
entitled On Working Out Our Own Salvation, Wesley says: 
First. God worketh in you; therefore you can work: Otherwise it 
would be impossible. If he did not work it would be impossible for 
you to work out your own salvation.... Seeing all men are by nature 
not only sick, but `dead in trespasses and sins, ' it is not possible for 
them to do anything well till God raises them from the dead. It was 
impossible for Lazarus to come forth, till the Lord had given him life. 
And it is equally impossible for us to come out of our sins, yea, or to 
make the least motion toward it, till He who hath all power in heaven 
and earth calls our dead souls into life. 
Yet this is no excuse for those who continue in sin, and lay the blame 
upon their Maker, by saying, 'It is God only that must quicken us; for 
we cannot quicken our own souls. ' For allowing that all the souls of 
men are dead in sin by nature, this excuses none, seeing there is no 
man that is in a state of mere nature; there is no man, unless he has 
quenched the Spirit, that is wholly void of the grace of God. No man 
living is entirely destitute of what is vulgarly called natural 
conscience. But this is not natural: It is more properly termed 
preventing grace. Every man has a greater or less measure of this, 
which waiteth not for the call of man. Every one has, sooner or later, 
good desires; although the generality of men stifle them before they 
can strike deep root, or produce any considerable fruit. Everyone has 
some measure of that light, some faint glimmering ray, which, sooner 
or later, more or less, enlightens every man that cometh into the 
world. 1°8 
This passage stresses two important aspects of Prevenient Grace - (1) God's 
grace `precedes' any act of goodness that humans may perform, and (2) there is no 
human being beyond the reach of Prevenient Grace - thus stressing the universal 
availability of God's grace. 109 For Wesley, God had granted to humanity the ability 
108 Sermon 85, On Working Out Our Own Salvation, BE (3: 206-207). 
109 For more on the universal availability of grace see Sermon 110, Free Grace, BE (3: 544-559). 
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to respond to divine grace and pursue further renewal. The prevenient grace of God 
is the first stage in the renewal process. 
Salvation begins with what is usually termed (and very properly) 
preventing grace; including the first wish to please God, the first 
dawn of light concerning his will, and the first slight transient 
conviction of having sinned against him. All these imply some 
tendency toward life; some degree of salvation; the beginning of a 
deliverance from a blind, unfeeling heart, quite insensible of God and 
the things of God. ' 10 
So then, according to Wesley, prevenient grace can be seen as God's initial 
move toward a restored relationship with humanity. This move is expressed in three 
ways: (1) God removes inherited guilt by virtue of Christ, thus addressing the notion 
of total depravity - God had not restored in humans an inherent ability to respond, 
rather God was continually extending prevenient grace to humanity in order to free 
them from the guilt of original sin (hence Wesley's emphasis on `inbeing sin' over 
`original sin'); (2) God brings a partial healing of the debilitated human capacities of 
understanding, will, and liberty - such a partial healing allows us the ability to sense 
and respond to God; and (3) God extends further opportunities to `grow in grace' 
through specific overtures to individuals. Because of the nature of grace, these 
overtures can either be embraced, leading to further growth in grace, or rejected. 
Prevenient grace, in its general sense, is then understood as that continual 
extension of God's grace to all of humanity. Any human moral action is to be seen 
as flowing from this expression of God's grace. Prevenient Grace (proper) was 
commonly used by Wesley to designate that specific form of grace that preceded 
justification - an equally interesting dimension of Wesley's soteriology. 
110 Sermon 85, On Working Out Our Own Salvation, BE (3: 203-204). 
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2.4.3 Justifying Grace 
Wesley seemed to substitute lengthy explanations of justification for one 
simple word - forgiveness. 
Justification is another word for pardon. It is the forgiveness of all 
our sins; and, what is necessarily implied therein, our acceptance with 
God. The price whereby this hath been procured for us (commonly 
termed `the meritorious cause of our justification'), is the blood and 
righteousness of Christ; or, to express it a little more clearly, all that 
Christ hath done and suffered for us, till He `poured out His soul for 
the transgressors. ' 111 
As discussed earlier, Wesley's understanding of justification differed from 
the Protestant reformers (particularly Luther and Calvin). 112 For the purposes of this 
chapter, it is sufficient to say that Wesley understood justification to be that act of 
forgiveness that opens the door to participation with the divine purpose. 
In Wesley's view of justification, with pardon came power. This power gives 
humanity the ability to participate actively in the process of reflecting the image of 
God. Runyon states that 
Justification is how God, to use a computer term, realigns humanity, 
restoring us to the relationship for which we were created. For 
Wesley, this realignment is made possible through God's forgiveness 
and love manifested toward us in Christ, cutting through the vicious 
circle of our self-induced alienation and estrangement and setting up a 
new relationship based on God's reconciling mercy.... Justification 
begins the process of restoring the image of God in us, for our lives 
are realigned for a purpose: not only to receive from God but to share 
what we have received with others. 3 
Although, justification can be considered an independent theological 
category in itself, it should not, as Wesley emphasised, be separated from the 
111 Sermon 43, The Scripture Way of Salvation, BE (2: 157). 112 For more on Wesley's distinctive articulation of justification see Albert C. Outlet, Place of Wesley 
in the Christian Tradition (Metuchen, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 1976); 'John Wesley as Theologian - 
Then and Now', Methodist History 12 (July 1974); and John Wesley (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1964). 
113 Runyon, The New Creation, p. 42. 
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salvation narrative at large. We are forgiven, but this forgiveness is the beginning of 
a process leading to renewal in the image of God. ' 14 
Wesley's emphasis on the connection between pardon and participation 
ushers in another feature within his way of salvation - the relationship between 
justification and sanctification. Wesley was careful to point out that salvation was 
not for forgiveness (justification) alone, but for the continuing renewal of our moral 
lives by the grace of God. 115 This continued renewal was characterised by the 
gradual therapeutic transformation of God's grace. Perhaps this characterisation is 
the most appropriate way to speak of God's sanctifying grace. 
2.4.3 Sanctifying Grace 
As I formally introduce the topic of sanctification, it is important to 
reemphasise that, for Wesley, the works of grace that I have mentioned above are not 
indicative of steps in an order, but represent intertwining dimensions of God's 
grace. 116 In this way, salvation by grace is a continual growth in grace. This 
explains the recurrent themes in Wesley's handling of the various works of grace. 
This is no less true for sanctification, in that for Wesley, it was to be understood as 
greater degrees of prevenient grace in the life of a person - salvation was from 
`grace to grace'. 
114 Wesley also used the language of adoption in reference to the restored participation in God. This idea fit within the theme of justification as pardon for the purpose of participation. For more see 
Sermon 1, Salvation by Faith, BE (1: 121-123); and Sermon 4, Scriptural Christianity, BE (1: 161). 115 See Sermon 5, Justification by Faith, BE (1: 187); Sermon 43, The Scripture Way of Salvation, BE 
(2: 158); and Sermon 85, On Working Out Our Own Salvation, BE (3: 204). 
116 This point becomes increasingly important in the following chapter where I formally argue against 
any position that considers sanctification a crisis-type stage in the conversion process. This style of 
thinking is found in the nineteenth-century holiness movement. 
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The connection between pardon, participation, and truly reflecting the image 
of God reaches its full expression in sanctification. After prevenient grace has 
worked in a person's life, Wesley goes on to say that 
we experience the proper Christian salvation; whereby, through grace, 
we `are saved by faith; ' consisting of those two grand branches, 
justification and sanctification. By justification we are saved from 
the guilt of sin, and restored to the favour of God; by sanctification 
we are saved from the power and root of sin, and restored to the 
image of God. All experience, as well as Scripture, shows this 
salvation to be both instantaneous and gradual. It begins the moment 
we are justified, in the holy, humble, gentle, patient love of God and 
man. It gradually increases from that moment, as `a grain of mustard- 
seed, which, at first, is the least of all seeds, ' but afterwards puts forth 
large branches, and becomes a great tree; till, in another instant, the 
heart is cleansed, from all sin, and filled with pure love to God and 
man. But even that love increases more and more, till we `grow up in 
all things into him that is our head; ' till we attain `the measure of the 
stature of the fullness of Christ. '117 
This passage brings to light two points that I wish to stress. First `proper 
salvation' to Wesley does not consist of justification alone. It is because of 
justification that we can begin a process of sanctification. Given this view, it cannot 
be assumed that the purpose of salvation in the Christian life is to be forgiven alone. 
Just as God created in the beginning with purpose, so the `new creation' bears this 
same sense of purpose. God forgives humanity for the prospect of becoming 
something greater. This greater image is constituted by renewed relationships with 
the divine creator and the rest of creation. 
117 Sermon 85, On Working Out Our Own Salvation, BE (3: 206). Emphasis added. Wesley's 
reference to 'another instant' where the heart is cleansed from 'all sin' is in direct reference to his 
notion of Christian perfection. His stance on this doctrine fluctuated throughout the course of his life. 
For the purposes of the present work, I will acknowledge it as a part of Wesley's theological view of 
sanctification, but will not expound upon it. For more on Wesley and Christian Perfection see W. E. 
Sangster, The Path to Perfection: An Examination of John Wesley's Doctrine of Christian Perfection 
(Norwich: Epworth Press, 1984); W. Stanley Johnson, 'Christian Perfection as Love for God'. 
Wesleyan Theological Journal 18 (1983), pp. 50-60; David L. Cubic, 'Perfection in Wesley and 
Fletcher: Inaugural or Teleological? ' Wesleyan Theological Journal 11 (1976), pp. 22-37; Orville S. 
Walters, 'Concept of Attainment in John Wesley's Christian Perfection', Methodist History 10 (1972), 
pp. 12-29; William R. Cannon, 'John Wesley's Doctrine of Sanctification and Perfection', Mennonite 
Quarterly Review 35 no. 2. (1961), pp. 91-95; William P. Harrison, 'Wesley and Christian Perfection', 
Methodist Quarterly Review 36 no. 2 (1893), pp. 396-405; and John A. Wood, Christian Perfection as 
Taught by John Wesley (Boston, Mass.: McDonald & Gill, 1885). 
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Second, and perhaps the most pertinent point, sanctification should indeed be 
considered a process. 118 It is through this process that healing occurs in all aspects of 
human life. The practical approach that Wesley took in his theology made this 
evident. Time and again he witnessed people confess Jesus as Lord and experienced 
what he considered 'justification by faith', but the ills so deeply embedded in the 
human experience healed only in the passing of time and with great attention. 
119 
This is again obvious as Wesley stresses that justification is, 'only the 
threshold of sanctification, the first entrance upon it. And as, in the natural birth, a 
man is born at once, and then grows larger and stronger by degrees; so in the 
spiritual birth, a man is born at once, and then gradually increases in spiritual stature 
and strength. The new birth, therefore, is the first point of sanctification, which may 
increase more and more unto the perfect day'. 120 
Runyon describes sanctification as, `increasing holiness, that is, life made 
more and more healthy and whole by this communion with God and others'. 
12' It is 
this goal of health and communion with God and others that is the true mark of 
sanctification, as well as, the true embodiment of new creation - the telos to which 
humanity is called. 
The end of this transformation is the reflection of God's own character or 
`holiness'. Considering insights from Wesley's relational anthropology, just as self- 
identity cannot be formed outside of a social context, so `holiness' cannot exist apart 
118 In fact, on several occasions, Wesley offered a view of the Christian life that was synonymous 
with natural human maturation from infancy through adulthood. For examples see Sermon 40, 
Christian Perfection, BE (2: 105); Sermon 13, On Sin in Believers, BE (1: 332-333); Sermon 83, On 
Patience, BE (3: 175); Sermon 107, On God's Vineyard, BE (3: 507); and Wesley's notes on the New 
Testament X or. 2: 6, and Col. 4: 12. 
119 Evidence of Wesley's concern regarding this issue is seen in his emphasis on the Methodist `class' 
and `band' meetings. For more see, D. M. Henderson, Joie: Wesley's Class Meeting: A Model for 
Making Disciples (Nappanee, Ind.: Evangel Publishing House, 1997). 
120 Sermon 108, On God's Vineyard, BE (3: 507). Emphasis added. 
121 Runyon, The New Creation, p. 82. 
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from social relationships, hence Wesley's proclamation that he `knows of no religion 
but social; no holiness but social holiness'. 122 
Theodore Runyon states that, `the social nature of holiness is not only written 
into the origins of the faith relationship but also into the ongoing direction of it as 
well'. 123 The classic description of holiness is put forward by Wesley in his sermon 
on the Great Privilege of Those that are Born of God. Here Wesley states that 
holiness 
immediately and necessarily implies the continual inspiration of 
God's Holy Spirit; God's breathing into the soul, and the soul's 
breathing back what it first receives from God; a continual action of 
God upon the soul, and a re-action of the soul upon God; an 
unceasing presence of God, the loving, pardoning God, manifested to 
the heart, and perceived by faith; and an unceasing return of love, 
praise, and prayer, offering up all the thoughts of our hearts, all the 
words of our tongues, all the works of our hands, all our body, soul, 
to be a holy sacrifice, acceptable unto God in Christ and s p24 
24 Jesus. 
In its essence, holiness is social, embodied, all encompassing, and the great 
vocation to which humanity is called. 
So what does Wesley's way of salvation have to do with my greater goal of 
offering an explanation of Christian conversion? In fact, Wesley's view of salvation 
provides an impeccable theological language for understanding the conversion 
phenomenon. In the following section, I will discuss in detail the relevance of the 
previous discussion to my overall project. 
122 John Wesley, preface to Hymns and Sacred Poems (1739). 123 Theodore Runyon, 'Holiness as the Renewal of the Image of God in the Individual and Society', in 
Samuel M. Powell and Michael E. (eds. ), Embodied Holiness: toward a Corporate Theology of 
Spiritual Growth (Downer's Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2000), p. 83. 4 BE (1: 442). 
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2.5 Conversion as Moral Transformation 
There is an important relationship between Wesley's affectional moral 
psychology and his understanding of sanctification that I want to expound upon. 
Recall that Wesley placed a premium on the renewal of the tempers as the primary 
motivator for restored holy life - that is, the restored capacity for moral behaviour. 
He recognised that a transition from corrupt to holy action did not occur naturally; 
rather, such action must be motivated by holy tempers. Thus, Wesley designated the 
recovery of holy tempers as the essential goal of religion. 125 
For Wesley, sanctification could be summed up as growth in the love of God, 
both in experience and expression. 
From the moment we are justified, till we give up our spirits to God, 
love is the fulfilling of the law; of the whole evangelical law, which 
took place of the Adamic law, when the first promise of `the seed of 
the woman' was made. Love is the sum of Christian sanctification; it 
is the one kind of holiness. 126 
Wesley saw love as the central temper through which all action hinged - 
`from the true love of God [and others] directly flows every Christian grace, every 
holy and happy temper. And from these spring uniform holiness of conversation'. 
127 
So then, Wesley could summarise God's purpose in sanctification to be a desire for 
love to become the `constant ruling temper of [our] soul'. 128 
This important connection between sanctification and the renewal of the 
tempers should be obvious. Maddox stresses that `Wesley's holy tempers would not 
simply be infused by God's sanctifying grace in instantaneous completeness; they 
would be developing realities, strengthened and shaped by our responsible 
'25 Wesley wrote that `We conclude from the whole.. . that true religion, in the very essence of 
it, is 
nothing short of holy tempers'. Sermon 91, On Charity, BE (3: 306). 126 Sermon 83, On Patience, BE (3: 174-175). Emphasis added. 12' From A Letter to the Rev. Mr. Baily of Cork, BE, (9: 309). Note that `conversation' refers to the 
whole of human life in all of its expressions. 128 Sermon 100, On Pleasing All Men, BE (3: 422). 
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participation in the empowering grace of God'. 129 In this way, the gradual renewal 
of the tempers can be understood as the core of sanctification. 
Although Wesley did not use the term `conversion', he was quite interested 
in human change or moral transformation. So, for the purposes of the present 
discussion conversion can be conceived as `moral transformation'. The term `moral' 
is intended to designate social attitudes and behaviours. In this sense, morality is 
understood as right, good, or virtuous conduct. In its most basic sense, 
transformation refers to change. This change can occur in a variety of ways 
involving any number of life dimensions. Moral transformation, when spoken of in 
a religious context, should be concerned with significant life change. Changes of 
this nature involve substantial personal and social reorientation. They are not casual, 
but refer to transformation in a human life or community that acts to significantly 
alter the way that one views his or herself in the broader context of the world around 
him or her. 
In addition to the magnitude of the change, moral transformation (conversion) 
should also be understood as a process penetrating every aspect of an individual's 
life. According to Lewis Rambo, conversion should be understood as a `total 
transformation of the person by the power of God', and is `radically striking at the 
very root of the human predicament. ' 30 This understanding of conversion as moral 
transformation presents itself as a concern in which Wesley would have expressed 
considerable interest. Likewise, it resonates with the previous discussion of 
Wesley's way of salvation, particularly his articulation of sanctification. 
Furthermore, I suggest that the process of conversion is equivalent to Wesley's 
concept of sanctification in as much as they are both concerned with the same end. 
129 Maddox, Responsible Grace, p. 179. 130 Lewis R. Rambo, Understanding Religious Conversion (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993), p. xii. 
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Both arc process oriented and both entail a significant reorientation of our basic 
human system of motivation (tempers) and are marked by their intimate connection 
to observable change. 
As discussed in the opening chapter, it is typical for the central rhetoric of 
conversion, in an American Evangelical context, to deal with interior change. I find 
such a change to be suspect if not accompanied by a transformation in attitude and 
behaviour. At the heart of the Christian faith is an inherent relationality; thus, the 
process of `becoming' a Christian is in many ways a growth in understanding how to 
relate in a particularly Christian way. This includes how we relate to God, others, 
and the world at large - learning to relate in this way is the key feature of 
conversion. 131 
I stand in agreement with Wesley that humans are inherently social creatures 
whose ultimate end is to achieve and be shaped by healthy (holy) relationships. In as 
much as this is true, morality should be concerned with the whole of the human 
experience, not just the internal state of the human heart in salvation. 
With conversion understood in this way, it becomes central to the Christian 
faith as a way of relating to God and to the world. In moving forward, I do so with 
the understanding that conversion can be likened to Wesley's concept of 
sanctification, and as such can be understood as the process of `becoming Christian', 
that is, becoming a person that relates in a particularly Christian way. 
As stressed repeatedly in this chapter, Wesley saw the potential for such a 
change to be completely dependent on the grace of God. The possibility of 
conversion exists only through this grace and it is by the means of grace that the 
change occurs. By the 'means of grace', Wesley meant the `outward signs, words, 
131 Note how Wesley's emphasis on the relational component of his theological anthropology bears 
relevance to this point. 
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or actions, ordained of God, and appointed for this end, to be the ordinary channels 
whereby he might convey to men, preventing, justifying or sanctifying grace'. 
132 
Wesley insisted that `the whole value of the means depends on their actual 
subservience to the end of religion; that, consequently, all these means, when 
separate from the end, are less than nothing and vanity; that if they do not actually 
conduce to the knowledge and love of God, they are not acceptable in his sight'. 
133 
Again we see Wesley's emphasis on the great end of religion and all that serves that 
end. Henry Knight argues that, `the means of grace form an interrelated context 
within which the Christian life is lived and through which relationships with God 
and one's neighbour are maintained'. '34 
I do not wish to offer an in-depth description of Wesley's view of the means 
of grace; however, I do want to use this point to emphasise that Wesley considered a 
multitude of ways in which God could express divine, transformative love to 
humankind. In this sense, there are countless events that can be seen as `means of 
grace'. This point is relevant to my project and one that I will return to in chapter 
four. 
In summary, Wesley's description of the way of salvation is critical to a 
theological understanding of Christian conversion. His soteriology is based on the 
features of his theological anthropology that I have mentioned above - that is his, 
relational anthropology, holistic anthropology, and his affectional moral psychology. 
All of these features have a particular relevance to Christian conversion. Wesley 
was primarily concerned with the transformation of the affections or tempers; 
because, when this transformation occurred, it gave way to holy action - moral 
132 Sermon 16, The Means of Grace, BE (5: 187). Emphasis added. 
113 Ibid, BE (5: 188). 
'34 Henry 11. Knight III, The Presence of God in the Christian Life: John Wesley and the Means of 
Grace (Metuchen, Md.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc, 1992), p. 2. 
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attitude and behaviour. This transformation of the basic motivators of human action 
is the critical feature of conversion at large. 
2.6 Summary: Moving Forward 
Recall that I began this chapter with an appeal to view Wesley as a practical 
theologian. By this, I mean that Wesley was much less concerned about formulating 
intricate volumes of systematic doctrine than he was about passionately articulating a 
theology that both described and propagated transformation in human lives. I began 
with this point for a reason. I suggest that this theological approach predisposed 
Wesley to deal with issues in a way that is particularly helpful to my overall goal of 
offering a new model of conversion. 
Wesley was uniquely positioned within the Western reformed tradition while 
having a connection with the theological ideas of the east. This connection 
influenced much of Wesley's thinking, particularly his ideas regarding the Fall, 
Original Sin, and the various dimensions of salvation. 
Wesley's emphasis on purpose in the new creation is of critical importance. 
Through original creation, God brought the world into being with a sense of purpose 
and likewise God has set forth in new creation this same divine intention. For 
Wesley, this is the renewal of creation in the image of God - this `telos' is non- 
negotiable in understanding salvation at large. Furthermore, it is the community of 
God's people that act as the agent of God' renewal in the world. 
The various features of Wesley's theological anthropology informed his 
soteriology in a fundamental fashion. His emphasis on human beings as relational 
and holistic in nature played a key role in the formation of his affectional moral 
psychology which subsequently led to his mature way of salvation. 
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Wesley considered the heart of salvation to be the 'transformation of holy 
tempers'. Keen as he was to the practical aspect of religious experience, Wesley 
observed that the forgiveness found in justification only opened the door to this 
renewal. It is through sanctification that this transformation is realised and the 
person reflects the image of God through a process of renewal that centres upon the 
human relationship to God and the whole of creation. 
My central aim for this chapter has been to establish a theological language 
for conversion understood as moral transformation. I have done this by suggesting 
that Wesley's process of sanctification is equivalent to my notion of Christian 
conversion. This is true in as much as the ultimate goal of both are the 
transformation of attitudes and behaviours. In the Wesleyan paradigm, salvation 
proper necessarily includes moral transformation. 
Recognising that one's view of human nature has a dramatic impact on his or 
her notion of conversion, the following chapter will be dedicated to providing a 
cogent description of human nature. I will return to Wesley in chapter four where I 
will offer an integrated model Christian conversion based on the theological analysis 
provided in this chapter together with the scientific and philosophical research 
covered in the next. 
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Chapter 3 
Searching for the Soul 
A Case for Nonreductive Physicalism 
Meº: go out and gaze in astonishment at high mountains, the huge 
waves of the sea, the broad reaches of rivers, the ocean that encircles 
the world, or the stars in their courses. But they pay no attention to 
themselves.... Oh Lord I am working hard in this field and the field of 
my labours is my own self. I'm not now investigating the tracts of the 
heavens or measuring the distance of the stars or trying to discover 
how the earth hangs in space. I am investigating myself, my memory, 
my mind.... What then am I my God? What is my nature? - Saint 
Augustine' 
The search to understand our nature as human beings is an age-old venture. 
Philosophers and theologians alike have struggled with questions of ultimate reality, 
purpose, meaning, and consciousness. Such issues are at home in the area of 
theological investigation, after all, the practical essence of Christianity is 
understanding who we are as human beings, identifying our relationship to God and 
the world around us, and then deciding how we are to live in such a world. 
This chapter is dedicated to addressing the particular question of human 
nature or theological anthropology - what are human beings? 
2 Of what do we 
consist - body and soul; body, soul, and spirit; or maybe just a body? These are 
intricate questions whose answers will determine not only our basic philosophies of 
human life, but also our core theological perspectives such as how we are to relate to 
God, the world, each other, and ourselves. 
t Saint Augustine, Confessions, Book X, translated by Henry Chadwick, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998). 
2 Recall from the introduction, the term 'human nature' is meant to refer to philosophical discussions 
concerning the 'substance' of humankind. That is, are humans 'made up of, aterial substance only 
or a combination of material and immaterial substance? 
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The long history of this debate has led to two widely held alternatives - (1) 
ontological substance dualism and (2) reductive materialism. The first position 
holds that human beings essentially consist of two distinct substances, material and 
immaterial. The material substance, or body, is animated by a second distinct 
immaterial substance, the soul or spirit. The second option, reductive materialism, 
can be summed up in the statement that human beings in all of our complexities are 
`nothing but' the sum of our neural activity - that is, any sense that we have of free 
will is in essence illusory. 
My central claim in this chapter is that both dualist and reductive materialist 
views of human nature are undesirable on philosophical and theological grounds. I 
offer a third alternative, nonreductive physicalism (NrP), as a viable theory of human 
nature. Such a theory avoids the problems inherent in ontological substance dualism 
while preserving the causal efficacy of `higher order' capacities necessary for a 
proper theological anthropology. This is an idea that extends well into the literature 
of philosophy of mind. For example, philosophers such as Donald Davidson and 
John Searle argue for the causal efficacy of an emergent aspect of complex systems. 
This nonreductive physicalist approach to human nature provides a critical 
first step in resolving the issues that I outlined in chapter one of this thesis. In 
3 This 'nothing buttery' terminology has been used by Malcolm Jeeves in his work concerning 
psychological science and Christian belief. See Human Nature at the Millennium: Reflections on the 
Integration of Psychology and Christianity (Grand Rapids, Mi.: Baker Books, 1997) and Science, Life, 
and Christian Belief (Grand Rapids, Mi.: Baker Books, 1998). The term originated with 
neuroscientist and Christian author Donald MacKay. MacKay states, 'according to this [reductive 
materialist) view, only where physical explanation was impossible could any other account be taken 
seriously in its own right. Otherwise, the whole thing could be explained away as "nothing but" the 
mindless motion of molecules'. Human Science and Human Dignity (Downers Grove, Ill.: 
Intervarsity Press, 1997), p. 27. 
4 See Donald Davidson, 'Mental Events', in L. Foster and J. Swanson (eds. ), Experience and Theory 
(Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970), pp. 79-101; and John Searle, The 
Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992). Searle recognizes 'causally emergent 
system features' that 'have to be explained in terms of the causal interactions among the elements' (p. 
111). Searle then explicates the notion of radical emergence as the emergent property having its own 
causal powers which cannot be explained by the causal interactions of the parts of the system. 
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addition, this view, together with the insights from Wesleyan theology discussed in 
the previous chapter, supplies the critical elements necessary to propose a new model 
of Christian conversion. 
It is worth noting at the outset of this chapter that I am not insinuating that 
the issue of reduction vs. nonreduction is settled. It is still very much an open 
debate. 5 My purposes here are not to offer a comprehensive discussion of the 
reductionist argument, but rather to show how reductionism fails in a critical case - 
the case of `top-down causation'. 
I aim to support my central thesis by first discussing the historical context 
that has led to the current popular views of human nature. Then I will provide a 
cogent account of NrP that will address two major conceptual hurdles - overcoming 
dualism and reductive materialism. Through the process, I intend to stress that from 
a theological perspective neither of these views of human nature is desirable. While 
most within the Christian tradition would gladly reject reductive materialism, I will 
also argue that is theologically reasonable to renounce dualism. Finally, my final 
section in this chapter will deal with issues related to the nature of conversion. In 
essence, I will suggest that a nonreductive physicalist view of the human person 
necessitates a process-oriented concept of conversion. By the same logic, I will 
reject the notion of crisis sanctification or `second blessing' on the basis that this 
phenomenon must adhere to process as well. 
s Jaegwon Kim offers perhaps the most widely read critique of nonreductive physicalism. See 'Can 
Supervenience and 'Non-Strict Laws' Save Anomalous Monism? ', in J. heil and A. Mele (eds. ), 
Mental Causation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 19-26; 'The Non-Reductivist's Troubles with 
Mental Causation',, in J. Beil and A. Mele (eds. ), Mental Causation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 
pp. 189-210; and The Myth of Nonreductive Physicalism', in Jaegwon Kim (cd. ), Supervenience and 
Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 265.284. 
Kim argues that mental properties will be reducible to physical properties unless some type of 
'downward causation' is applied. lie holds that all forms of downward causation necessarily suggest 
an ontological status for the mental and thus becomes dualism. 
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3.1 Human Nature in Historical Context 
The issue of human nature, as originating in Greek philosophy, has come to 
rest in the quest to define the make-up of the human person. This quest manifests 
itself as questions regarding our constituent parts - are humans made of body and 
soul? body, soul, and spirit? or simply a body? The first of these options, body and 
soul, is commonly referred to as dualism or dichotomism. The second view, claims 
that humans are made of three different substances is called trichotomism. 6 Finally 
the view holding that human beings are composed of essentially one physical 
substance is known as monism. 
As pointed out in chapter one of this thesis, many Christians consider body- 
soul dualism to be an absolute essential element of Christian teaching. A natural 
tension arises between this belief (which amounts to no less than a worldview) and 
the ever burgeoning scientific data that points to the notion that humans are physical 
creatures with no inner soul or self to serve as the `ghost in the machine'. 
8 
It is critical to understand that one cannot use the Bible as a definitive source 
for the existence of the soul as the ontological, immaterial essence of the human 
person. In fact, the Bible is silent on this issue of theological anthropology. New 
Testament scholar, James D. G. Dunn argues that questions put to the Bible 
regarding the constituent parts of the human person are foreign to biblical thought. 
Dunn distinguishes between a partitive and an aspective understanding of the 
human person - the biblical text is concerned with the latter. From this point of view, 
6 The trichotomist view has very little support in either philosophical or theological circles. The most 
popular proponent of this view is Watchman Nee. See Releasing the Spirit (Richmond, V. A.: 
Christian Fellowship Publishers, 2000). 
7 There are various types of monism. The literature will most often speak of some form of 
physicalism or materialism. 
The term 'ghost in the machine' is borrowed from Gilbert Ryle's classic work Concept of Mind 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000, original release 1949). Ryle offers a critique of the 
notion that the mind or soul is distinct from the body. He argues that the traditional (Cartesian) 
approach to the relation of mind and body represents a basic 'category-mistake'. 
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one can only speak of the whole person in a relational context. So what appears in 
the biblical text to refer to an ontologically distinct part - the body, soul or spirit - is 
meant to designate the whole person conceived from a certain angle. Dunn asserts 
that biblical anthropology is concerned about relationships - to God and creation. 
Such radically differing views certainly did not spring up in any quick 
fashion; rather, there is a long and complex history that has led us to the views of 
human nature that we have today. In what follows, I will offer a rather brief history 
of theories of human nature as they have evolved both as a philosophical thesis and a 
theological concept. I will begin this exploration in ancient Greek philosophy. 
It would be incorrect to assume any single view of human nature within the 
ancient Greco-Roman world. 10 In fact, the nature of matter itself was a contentious 
issue in ancient philosophy. For many ancient Greek philosophers, reality was 
conceived as existing in a hierarchy of beings that exhibited varying degrees of 
" See James D. G. Dunn, The Theology of the Apostle Paul (Grand Rapids, Mi.: William B. 
Eerdman's Publishing Company, 1998), pp. 51ff. Theologian, Neil Gillman echoes this position by 
asserting that although the ancient Jews had a clear sense that the person somehow continued to `be' 
after burial, 'this should in no way be interpreted to refer to the continued existence, after death, of a 
human "soul"; there is no notion of this kind of entity, independent of the body, in the Bible'. See 
Neil Gillman, The Death of Death: Resurrection and Immortality in Jewish Thought (Woodstock, 
N. Y.: Jewish Lights Publishing, 1997), p. 69. Gillman's work in particular does a fine job of tracking 
the historical emergence of the concept of body-soul duality in the Jewish faith. Louis P. Pojman 
supports the notion that this Jewish belief carried over to the writers of the New Testament. Pojman 
states that `The idea of a separate soul does not appear in the Bible, though one might read the idea 
into some passages.... In the New Testament, believers in Christ are promised eternal life (Jn. 3: 16); 
however, it is not the eternal life of a soul but of a glorified, resurrected body (1Cor. 15: 35f)'. See 
Pojman, Who Are We?, pp. 5-6. 10 For support of this claim as well as a helpful discussion of the impact of Greek thought on human 
nature in a Biblical context see Joel B. Green, 'Bodies - That Is, Human Lives: A Re-Examination of Human Nature in the Bible', in Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and H. Newton Malony (eds. ), 
Whatever Happened to the Soul: Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature (Minneapolis, 
Minn.: Fortress Press, 1998), pp. 149-173. In addition, it is worth noting that some Biblical scholars 
tend to make a sharp distinction between the `holistic' account of human nature as interpreted from 
the Hebrew Scriptures and the supposed dualism of Greek views. This is a complex issue that tends 
to be oversimplified. For an analysis emphasising a sharp contrast see, Oscar Cullmann, `Immortality 
of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? ', in Krister Stendahl (ed. ), Immortality and Resurrection 
(New York: Macmillan Press, 1958), pp. 9-53. For a more moderate and recent analysis see N. T. 
Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 
2003). 
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material existence, " Such a hierarchy would have at its base level inanimate objects, 
and from there, plants, animals, human beings, and finally various descriptions of 
divinities would extend upward. An important conflict arose as to where in the 
hierarchy the existence of the `soul' would arise. Plato and Aristotle are noted as the 
two most influential contributors to the development of hierarchical ontology. 
Plato's account is indeed dualistic in nature - he described the human person 
as an immortal soul imprisoned within a mortal body. 12 Plato's tripartite notion of 
the soul consisted of an impulsive element (that corresponded to the lowest class in 
society), an element that corresponding to the solider-police (thumos, which may be 
translated `spirit'), and finally, reason, which was considered the highest element and 
associated with the ruling class. 
Plato is well-known for his use of Forms. By this, he meant that ideas or 
concepts have real existence and are likewise eternal. He used the logic of forms to 
suggest that the rational part of the soul pre-exists the existence of the physical body 
that possesses it - thus arises the root of the immortal soul. 
Aristotle also used the language of Forms; however, he applied the concept in 
a different manner. For Aristotle the soul was not a separate entity that pre-existed 
the body, but was rather conceived of as a life principle. In this manner of speaking, 
plants and animals possess souls just as humans (albeit these were thought of as 
11 For a classic work on Plato's hierarchy of being see Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: 
A Study of the History of an Idea (New York: Harper and Row, 1960, first published 1936). For a 
recent discussion see Louis P. Pojman, Who are We? Theories of Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), see especially chapters 3 and 4 regarding Plato's and Aristotle's theory of 
human nature. 
12 For instance, in the Phaedo Plato writes `The soul whose inseparable attitude is life will never 
admit of life's opposite, death. Thus the soul is shown to be immortal, and since immortal, 
indestructible.... Do we believe there is such a thing as death? To be sure. And is this anything but 
the separation of the soul and body? And being dead is the attainment of this separation, when the 
soul exists in herself and separate from the body, and the body is parted from the soul. That is 
death.... Death is merely the separation of the soul and body'. See The Essential Plato, trans. 
Benjamin Jowett (New York: Quality Paperback Book Club, 1999), p. 600. Again in Book X of The 
Republic, Plato claims that the soul of man is immortal and imperishable. See The Republic trans. 
Desmond Lee (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), p. 440. 
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nutritive or sensitive souls which gave them the capacity to react, reproduce, etc. ). 
The capacity for rationality was reserved for humans alone. 
Aristotle's well-known analogy demonstrating the relation of the soul to the 
body is: if the eye were a complete animal, sight would be its soul. 13 In this sense, 
Aristotle ascribed to all living organisms a Psuche or the Form of a living, natural 
body. 14 The phrase `to have a psuche (or soul)', in an Aristotelian sense, does not 
signify a possessive relationship between an agent and an entity (like `I have a 
toaster'); rather, it signifies (as his analogy suggests) the form of an object as it 
extends from its inherent telos (ultimate purpose). For example, the telos (or first 
actuality) of a wrist-watch is to keep time. It can only do so based on the constituent 
matter that makes it up - tiny cogs, gears, springs, etc. So, in this sense, the soul of 
the wrist-watch is its capacity to keep time, not some single entity that exists within 
it.,, 
A relevant point that I wish to stress regarding ancient philosophies of human 
nature regards the capacities unique to human beings (such as the very act of doing 
philosophy). It proved difficult to attribute these capacities to matter alone, so 
philosophers developed theories regarding the addition of an immaterial component 
that would. account for the exercise of reason. In this context, it is easy to see how 
the soul was a relevant philosophical concern. 
Thinkers within the early Church wrestled no less with the issue of human 
nature. Tertullian (160-220) followed the Stoics in adopting the notion that the 
13 Aristotle, De Anima, trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (New York: Penguin Books, 1987). 
14 It is worth noting that that although this concept of the psuche can be translated as `soul'; for 
Aristotle, the concept did not carry with it a religious connotation. 
is This hylomorphic conception of reality distinguished Aristotle's use of forms from Plato - it is not 
a pre-existent entity within the human body, nor is it a substance that survives bodily death. Given 
these differences it is questionable whether Aristotle's view could be considered dualist at all. As this 
thesis progresses it will become increasingly obvious the importance of this Aristotelian view to my 
project at large. 
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human soul was an inextricable part of human corporeal existence and was thus 
generated with the body. 16 In contrasting fashion, Origen (185-254) held a more 
Platonic view in teaching that the soul was incorporeal and eternal, thus pre-existing 
the body. In fact, Origen reasoned that a finite number of souls exist as part of 
original creation (although he seems to claim that they were somehow created 
outside of time). Through a series of events these souls fell from heaven (taking on a 
fleshly form) with the exception of the `soul of Christ' which remained with God 
until the appropriate time. 17 
Probably the most influential Christian thinker on this issue was Saint 
Augustine of Hippo (354-430). Augustine has had substantial influence on both 
Catholic and Protestant spirituality. Essentially Augustine's concept of human 
nature is a modified Platonic view -a human being is an immortal soul with the 
body seen as a mere vehicle for this immaterial entity. Although Augustine's view 
of the soul was tripartite in nature, it differed from Plato's in that the will was viewed 
as being superior to the intellect. 
As mentioned in chapter one, Augustine was successful in combining 
Neoplatonist ideas with religious concepts thus yielding the development of the 
notion that salvation was primarily a condition of the soul. Such a move has had 
vast implications for a Christian understanding of conversion. Following Augustine, 
it would be through the cultivation of the soul that one would achieve knowledge 
16 For a detailed translation of Tertullian's work see R. E. Roberts, The Theology of Tertullian 
(London: Epworth, 1924). View this text online at http: //www. tertullian. org/articles/roberts_theology 
/roberts_00_index. htm (accessed 31 May 2006). See especially chapter 8: The Doctrine of Man and 
Sin, pp. 149-165. Tertullian's position is often referred to as traducianism. This theory states that the 
soul, along with the body, is derived from one's biological parents. 
17 For more on Origen's notion of the pre-existence of human souls see Origen's On First Principles 
(2.6.5) translated by A. Tripolitis, The Doctrine of the Soul in the Thought of Plotinus and Origen 
(New York: Libra, 1978), p. 96. 
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and relation to God. Such a 'cultivation of the soul' was often achieved by the 
denigration of the body (physical need and desire). 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) offered a view of human nature in contrast to 
Augustine's ideas. Aquinas was largely informed by Aristotle's hylomorphic 
metaphysics - which practically translated into his adoption of Aristotle's thesis that 
the soul was the form of the body. '8 Aquinas differed from Plato and Aristotle 
regarding the relationship between soul and body. This is evident in his doctrine of 
the resurrection. In his commentary on 1 Corinthians XV, Aquinas writes: 
A man naturally desires his own salvation; but the soul, since it is 
part of the body of a human being, is not a whole being, and my soul 
is not I; so even if a soul gains salvation in another life, that is not I 
or any man. 19 
His elaborate view of human nature was also marked by the development of a 
hierarchically ordered account of the capacities of the soul. For Aquinas (as with 
Aristotle), the rational capacities are distinctively human and the intellect is superior 
to the will (contra Augustine). 
The issue of human nature has been widely debated throughout the history of 
human thought. Some of our most rich resources originate in Greek philosophy - 
the most notable figures being Plato and Aristotle. The concepts set in motion by 
these ancient philosophers had a profound affect on early Christian theologians. I 
have suggested that the most notable of these thinkers is St. Augustine of Hippo. His 
formulation of Christian spirituality has deeply influenced our modern understanding 
of what it means to experience conversion. 
18 See Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Vernon J. Bourke (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1992), section 65 -That the Soul is Not the Body. 19 Thomas Aquinas, `Commentary on Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians', Translated by Matthew 
Rzeczkowski, in Benedict M. Ashley (ed. ), Thomas Aquinas, The Gifts of the Spirit: Selected 
Spiritual Writings (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), p. 67. Note that with Aquinas, the 
Christian hope of resurrection is not identical with 'immortality of the soul'. See also Anton C. Pegis, 
`The Separated Soul and Its Nature in St. Thomas', in Maurer, Armand A. (ed. ), St. Thomas Aquinas, 
1274-1974: Commemorative Studies - vol. I (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 
1974), pp. 131-158. 
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The epic of understanding human nature continues with the rise of early 
modern science. The following section will deal with some of the prominent 
thinkers related to the issue of human nature. 
3.1.1 Human Nature and the Rise of Early Modern Science 
The transition from medieval to modern science is primarily marked by the 
Copernican revolution. Inherent in this transition is the philosophical shift from 
Aristotelian hylomorphism to atomism. 20 Although Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) is 
widely known for his contributions to astronomy, he played a significant role in the 
philosophical shift to atomism21 Galileo was one of the first modem scientists to 
reject the Aristotelian notion that all things were composed of both `matter' and 
`form'. Rather, he opted for an atomic or corpuscular theory - he hypothesised 
(early in his career) that all physical processes could be explained in terms of the 
properties of atoms (size, shape, and rate of motion). 
The work of Isaac Newton (1643-1727) applied the basic philosophical 
premise of atomism put forth by Galileo. The system of physics developed by 
Newton depended on taking inertial mass as the essential property of atoms. From 
this basic assumption he explained acceleration as a concept of force rather than 
velocity, further supplanting Aristotle's views. 22 
20 Here 'hylomorphism' is meant to refer to Aristotle's basic view of human nature (body and soul) as 
being an instance of `matter-formism'. That is, the soul is the form of the body. The essence of 
atomism is the idea that all matter can be reduced to basic particles whose activity can then be 
predicted based on the laws of physics. Subsequently, Aristotle's hylomorphic intuition is nested 
within a teleological (end-oriented) view of human action where an atomic perspective focuses on an 
individualised mechanical explanation of human action. This aspect of the transition from 
hylomorphism to atomism is not often emphasised as a significant contributor to the Copernican 
revolution. This is most likely due to gradual nature of the shift - extending into nineteenth century 
biology. 
21 See Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences, trans. Henry Crew and Alfonso de Salvio (New 
York: Prometheus Books, 1991). 
u For Newton's clearest exposition of atomism see Isaac Newton: Philosophical Writings, Andrew 
Janiak (ed. ), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Querie 31 of Opticks, pp. 127-140. 
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Atomism found its way to the domain of chemistry through the work of 
Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier (1743-1794) and John Dalton (1766-1844). These two 
scientists made great headway in demonstrating that chemistry could basically be 
understood as phenomena characterised by the properties of the elements that made 
up a particular substance - atoms. The work of Lavoisier and Dalton proved to be 
not only a triumph for atomic theory, but also led to an interest in reductionism as a 
scientific strategy, that is, not only analysing a thing by looking at the parts that 
make it up, but explaining the behaviour of a thing as the sum of the behaviours of 
its constituent parts23 This concept of reductionism is an important one to which I 
will return at length in a subsequent section of this chapter. 
I have intentionally left a quite significant figure out of the chronologically 
ordered discussion above. Rene Descartes (1596-1650) is considered by many to be 
the originator of modern philosophy. His work has had far reaching effects in both 
science and theology. I suggest that not only is Descartes the father of modem 
philosophy, but the father of modem dualism as well. So important is this point that 
I will spend the following section laying out how Cartesian philosophy has 
contributed to our contemporary concept of the inner life - soul or mind. 
3.1.2 The Emergence of Cartesian Dualism 
Rene Descartes, closely connected with the atomist revolution in physics, 
distinguished two basic forms of reality - res extensa (extended substance) and res 
cogitans (thinking substance). With Descartes there was a semantic shift from `soul' 
to `mind'; nevertheless, both concepts are understood as the most basic life principle. 
23 Dalton built on the work of Lavoisier tor derive his unique view of chemical atomism. For more see 
John Dalton, A New System of Chemical Philosophy (New York: Citadel Press, 1964). 
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Descartes's work marked a dramatic upheaval in modem European thought. 
To some degree, his philosophical concepts had much in common with Aristotelian 
scholasticism, but he demonstrated a radical departure on four primary issues. 24 First, 
Descartes held that the mind is the whole soul. In contrast to Aristotle, he held the 
soul not as the principle of life, but as the principle of thought or consciousness. 
The functions of the Aristotelian nutritive soul (nutrition, growth, 
reproduction) and of the sensitive soul (perception, physiologically 
conceived, and locomotion) are not essential functions of the 
Cartesian mind, but of the body. All the essential functions of animal 
life are to be conceived in purely mechanistic terms. 25 
Second, Descartes redefined what was meant by the mental. In his view, the 
human person is essentially a res cogitans -a thinking thing. Descartes's concept of 
a `thinking thing' extended far beyond anything that Aristotle or the scholastics 
ascribed to the rational soul. Descartes conceived thought to include `everything 
which we are aware of as happening within us, in so far as we have awareness of it. 
Hence thinking is to be identified here not merely with understanding, willing, 
imagining, but also with sensory awareness. 26 
Thought, therefore, was, in a revolutionary step, defined in terms of 
consciousness - that is, as that of which we are immediately aware 
within us. And consciousness was thereby assimilated to self- 
consciousness inasmuch as it was held to be impossible to think and 
to have experiences (to feel pain, seem to perceive, feel passions, will, 
imagine, cogitate) without knowing or being aware that one does. 27 
Third, Descartes held that the union of the body and mind is constituted by 
two distinct substances. 
Contrary to scholastic thought, according to which a human being is a 
unitary substance (an ens per se), Descartes intimated that a human 
being is not an individual substance, but a composite entity. The 
24 I follow M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker in describing these four departures. For a more detailed 
account see The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Company, 
2003), pp. 25-27. 
25 Bennett and Hacker, The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, p. 26. 
26 Ren6 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. 1, trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, 
and D. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 195. 27 Ibid., p. 26. Emphasis added. 
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person (the ego), on the other hand, is an individual substance, and is 
identical with the mind.... [T]he mind, because it is united with the 
body, can bring about movements of the body through acts of will 28 
The fourth and final departure noted by Bennett and Hacker involved the 
essential property of matter. Just as Descartes considered thought to be the essential 
property of the mind, he claimed that extension was to be considered the principal 
property of physical substance. 
These four points which Bennett and Hacker claim mark Descartes's 
departure from an Aristotelian concept of human nature signify the basis of his 
thought on the human person. It was from these concepts that Descartes's ideas 
flowed. Allow me to quote Descartes at length - from Meditations on First 
Philosophy: 
It is indeed possible (or rather, as I shall say later on, it is certain) that 
I have a body closely bound up with myself; but at the same time I 
have, on the one hand, a clear and distinct idea of myself taken simply 
as a conscious, not an extended, being; and, on the other hand, a 
distinct idea of body, taken simply as an extended, not a conscious, 
being; so it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and 
could exist without it... I must begin by observing the great difference 
between mind and body. Body is of its nature always divisible; mind 
is wholly indivisible. When I consider the mind - this is, myself, in 
so far as I am merely a conscious being -I can distinguish no parts 
within myself; I understand myself to be single and complete thing. 
Although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, yet 
when a foot or an arm or any other part of the body is cut off I am not 
aware that any subtraction has been made from the mind. Nor can the 
faculties of will, feeling, understanding and so on be called its parts; 
for it is one and the same mind that wills, feels, and understands. On 
the other hand, I cannot think of any corporeal or extended object 
without being readily able to divide it in thought and therefore 
conceiving of it as divisible. This would be enough to show me the 
total difference between mind and body, even if I did not sufficiently 
know this already. 29 
28 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 29 Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach (eds. ), Descartes: Philosophical Writings (London: 
Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1970), pp. 111-115. 
105 
This shift from hylomorphism to atomism (in the context of modem science) 
and substance dualism (in the case of Cartesian philosophy) led to what is now seen 
by many to be a philosophical conundrum - the mind-body problem. 
30 
The central issue of the mind-body problem is that of mind-body interaction. 
Simply stated, if one holds the immateriality of mind, then there is no way to account 
for its causal role in physical behaviour. Even if one interprets mental force as a 
quasi-physical force, the effects of such a process should prove to be both 
measurable and quantifiable by scientific means - alas, such an option is not 
available within the realm of current science. 31 
Owen Flanagan emphasises the nature of this problem by stating: 
If Descartes is right that a mind can cause the body to move, for 
example, we decide to go to a concert and go, and then physical 
energy must increase in and around our body, since we get up and go 
to the concert. In order, however, for physical energy to increase in 
any system, it has to have been transferred from some other physical 
system. But the mind, according to Descartes, is not a physical 
system and therefore it does not have any energy to transfer. The 
mind cannot account for the fact that our body ends up at the concert. 
If we accept the principle of the conservation of energy we seem 
committed either to denying that the mind exists, or to denying that it 
could cause anything to happen, or to making some very implausible 
ad hoc adjustments in our physics. For example, we could maintain 
that the principle of conservation of energy holds, but that every time 
a mind introduces new energy into the world - thanks to some 
mysterious capacity it has - an equal amount of energy departs from 
the physical universe - thanks to some perfectly orchestrated 
mysterious capacity the universe has. 32 
30 This is essentially a problem of mental causation. Lynne Rudder Baker states that the problem of 
mental causation is insoluble. He notes that `We simply have no answer to the question "flow can 
mental events, in virtue of having mental properties, make a difference to behaviour? " because the 
very assumptions that generate the question render it unanswerable'. See `Metaphysics and Mental 
Causation', in John Heil and Alfred Mele (eds. ), Mental Causation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 
77. 
Descartes considered mental force to be mediated through the pineal gland in the brain, thus 
presenting itself as quasi-physical in nature. Z Owen Flanagan, The Science of Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), p. 21. 
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This problem regarding the law of conservation of matter and energy 
exemplifies the type of issues that arise in the mind-body problem. 33 As with most 
scientific and philosophical revolutions, there were a number of thinkers that 
challenged the Cartesian view of human nature on a number of counts. The 
culmination of atomist thinking in science and the widespread influence of Cartesian 
philosophy led to the articulation of what has come to be known as reductive 
materialism. In the following section, I will sketch the evolution of thought leading 
to this popular philosophical position. 
3.1.3 Reductive Materialism 
Descartes's contemporary, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) offered an 
alternative to the dualist view of human nature. Hobbes, a materialist, described 
thinking to be `motions about the head' and emotions to be `motions about the 
heart'. 34 Such theories of human thought and nature represent attempts to deal with 
the repercussions resulting from a dualist view of human nature. As mentioned 
33 Murphy notes that the triumph of Cartesian dualism over Aristotelian hylomorphism presents other 
issues as well, not least of which is the epistemological problems that arise. From an Aristotelian 
perspective, sensory knowledge was understood as the transference of the form of a perceived object 
to the intellect of the person perceiving it. In this view, it was possible to know the essence of a thing 
based on observation - only perceptual error needed explanation. In an atomistic world, sensory 
perception is dependent on the impinging of atoms on sensory membranes which results in 
information being transmitted to the brain, then ultimately to the mind (in Descartes's case). In this 
latter view, concepts in the mind are no longer identical to the forms of particular objects (that which 
makes them what they are), but mere representations produced through complex physical processes 
(Whatever Happened to the Soul, p. 8). The end of which is the rise of modern scepticism regarding 
sensory perception. For more see, Theo C. Meyering, Historical Roots of Cognitive Science: The Rise 
of a Cognitive Theory of Perception from Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1989). 
34 According to Hobbes, human beings are purely physical objects - highly complex machines whose 
function could be described in mechanistic terms. In this sense, thought is understood as an instance 
of the physical operation of the human body; likewise, sensation involves a series of mechanical 
processes operating within the human nervous system, by means of which the sensible features of 
material things produce ideas in the brains of the human beings who perceive them. See Thomas 
Hobbes, Leviathan, C. B. Macpherson (ed. ), (New York: Penguin Books, 1985, first published 1651), 
pp. 85-222. 
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above, the basic problem is that of causal interaction between the material (body) 
and the immaterial (soul or mind). 
A number of attempts to explain this problem arose and subsequently yielded 
an increased rigour in the area of philosophy of mind. One such attempt, 
psychophysical parallelism is the view that `physical events cause physical events, 
that mental events cause mental events, and that the appearance of causal interaction 
between the mental and the physical is an illusion created by the fact that there is a 
pre-established harmony between these two independent causal chains'. 35 Such a 
harmony is either established in the beginning by God or is the result of a constant 
chain of divine interventions. 36 
This view, however, proves to be undesirable due to its lack of ability to deal 
sufficiently with the complexities of mental causation and free will. Owen Flanagan 
argues that `to have to introduce God to explain the workings of the mind, however, 
is to introduce a big Spirit in order to get rid of the perplexities of a world of little 
spirits, and to magnify the complications one presumably set out to reduce'. 37 
A further attempt to solve the issue of mental causation is known as 
epiphenomenalism. Here, the central idea is that conscious mental life is the by- 
product of physical brain processes. Subsequently, these mental by-products lack 
any form of causal efficacy over the physical realm - behaviour. As with the case of 
pre-existent harmony, epiphenomenalism is problematic on two main counts. First, 
there are `intuitive objections' claiming that it is simply absurd that one's thoughts, 
35 Nancey Murphy, `Human Nature: Historical, Scientific, and Religious Issues', in Whatever 
Happened to the Soul?: Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature (Minneapolis, Minn.: 
Fortress Press, 1998), p. 9. 
36 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) was a proponent of such a view. See Discourse on 
Metaphysics and the Monadology, trans. George R. Montgomery (Amherst, Mass.: Prometheus 
Books, 1992). From Leibniz's point of view, no interaction or causation is necessary because, like 
two clocks that keep the same time, the behaviour of the two substances were in complete harmony. 
The main problem with pre-existent harmony is that of free will. 37 Flanagan, The Science of the Mind, p. 64. 
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feelings, emotions, etc. have no causal influence over behaviour. A second, and 
perhaps more subtle problem, occurs when one raises the question of physical-to- 
mental causality. It would seem that the same epiphenomenalist logic that disallows 
mental-to-physical causality would also by necessity not allow the physical to 
express causal efficacy over the mental. 38 
The point in discussing these attempts to reconcile the interaction between 
mind and body is to demonstrate how they naturally move from the dualist view of 
human nature to a more physicalist or materialist explanation. Such a motion is no 
less prominent in a contemporary context. 
The twentieth century brought a number of research projects aimed at 
providing a reductive view of human nature. A classic example is found in logical 
behaviourism. The behaviourists held prominence roughly between the 1930s and 
early 1960s. Logical behaviourism was in opposition to methodological 
behaviourism in that it did not deny the existence of mental states; rather, the logical 
behaviourists (the most notable being Gilbert Ryle) claimed that the talk of mental 
phenomena is a misleading way of talking about actual and potential behaviour. 
Despite Ryle's rigorous defence of the position (and notable critique of Cartesian 
dualism), it has not proved possible to successfully translate mind-language into 
language about behaviour and physical dispositions. 39 
Prior to advances in philosophical analysis, one of the most popular positions 
in the philosophy of mind was known as the mind-brain identity thesis. There are 
38 1 acknowledge that there are a number of issues to address in overcoming epiphenomenalism. The 
epiphenomenalist suggestion that cases of mental causation merely appear to be so is a difficult claim 
to counter. For a helpful resource see Robert van Gulick, `Three Bad Arguments for Intentional 
Property Epiphenomenalism', in Erkenntnis 36 no. 3 (1992), pp. 311-332. Jaegwon Kim refers to this 
issue as the `problem of Causal Exclusion'. See Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind- 
Body Problem and Mental Causation (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2000). 
39 In addition to The Concept of Mind see Gilbert Ryle, Dilemmas: The Tamer Lectures - 1953 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954). 
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two types of identity theses that have subtle, but important distinctions - token 
identity and type identity (referring to the identity of events). The token identity 
thesis holds that every particular mental event or property is identical with some 
physical event. 
The second option, type identity, is a strong version of the token identity 
thesis in that it states that every type of mental event is identical to some type of 
physical event. For example, the mental event of experiencing a particular pain is 
identical to the activation of a particular neuron assembly (or type of neuron 
assembly) corresponding to the physical realisation of the pain. Thus, type identity 
readily leads to the reduction of mental descriptions to physical descriptions. In 
response to the identity thesis, Flanagan comments: 
[I)f type-type identity theory is true then reduction of psychology to 
neuroscience will eventually be possible. It is easy to see why 
reduction requires that all the concepts of the science to be reduced be 
translatable into the concepts of the reducing science. These 
translations are called `bridge laws' and once they are in place 
reduction merely involves replacing, synonym for synonym. Type- 
type identity statements, of course, are precisely the necessary bridge 
laws. 40 
The type identity explanation does not raise much objection when dealing 
with basic physiological processes - pain response, reflexes, etc. However, more 
serious issues arise when the theory is applied to `higher-order' capacities such as 
belief. Murphy states that `when conjoined with the thesis that brain events obey 
causal laws, type identity implies not only that beliefs could be redescribed in purely 
neurological language, but also that our beliefs are caused by neurophysiological 
laws'. 41 
There are some philosophers who are comfortable with this reductive move 
and even anticipate that scientific advances will one day replace any attempt to 
40 Flanagan, The Science of the Mind, p. 218. 41 Murphy, `Human Nature: Historical, Scientific, and Religious Issues', p. 10. 
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explain human phenomena via `folk psychology'. 2 The discussion of `token' and 
`type' identity theories make it possible to better articulate an important goal of this 
chapter - clearly laying out the differences between reductive and nonreductive 
versions of materialism (or physicalism). Thus, the following discussion will present, 
in an explicit fashion, the nature of reductive materialism. 
Recall that with the rise of early modem science and the importation of 
atomist thinking, the uses of `reduction' as a scientific method gained widespread 
acceptance. In this way, much of modern science can be understood as the 
development of research programmes that are based on this metaphysical theory. 
Murphy refers to this as `the era in which Democritus has triumphed over 
Aristotle' 43 
The reductionist approach has produced a hierarchical model for the relations 
among the sciences. From about the beginning of the seventeenth-century a distinct 
hierarchy of complex systems began to form within science. 
44 The hierarchy is 
arranged according to the complexity of the entities being investigated. Physics 
appears at the base level, because it studies the smallest and most basic constituents 
of matter. The analysis of molecules or interactions between atomic particles leads 
42 'Folk psychology' refers to the psychological theory implicit in the 'everyday' descriptions of the 
actions of others. This notion addresses concepts such as belief, desire, pain, pleasure, love, hate, etc. 
Two of the most well-known philosophers advocating the identity theory in relation to higher order 
capacities are Paul and Patricia Churchland. For more see Paul M. Churchland, 'Toward a Cognitive 
Neurobiology of the Moral Virtues', Topoi 17 (1998), pp. 83-96; The Engine of Reason, the Seat of 
the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1995); 
'Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes', Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981), pp. 67-90; 
and Patricia S. Churchland, 'The Neural Mechanisms of Moral Cognition: A Multiple-Aspect 
Approach to Moral Judgment and Decision-Making', Biology and Philosophy 18 (2003), pp. 169-194; 
Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 
1990); and 'A Perspective on Mind-Brain Research', Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980), pp. 185-207. 43 Nancey Murphy, 'Supervenience and the Nonreducibility of Ethics to Biology', in Evolutionary 
and Molecular Biology: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, Robert John Russell (ed. ), (Vatican 
City: Vatican Observatory Press, 1998), p. 466. Democritus (460 - 370 BCE) was a Greek 
philosopher known most for his primitive atomic theory. Aristotle discussed his ideas at length due to 
the fact that he rejected Democritus' atomistic concepts. 
44 This hierarchy of complex systems replaced the ancient 'hierarchy of beings' that originated in 
ancient Greek thought. 
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to the next level in the hierarchy - chemistry. The next level presents biology as the 
study of complex molecular formations that result in living organisms. 45 
As we return to the general theme that led to the creation of the reductive 
thesis, mind-body causation, and consider the problem by applying the hierarchy of 
complex systems. Here, causation occurs in a bottom-up manner - `the parts of an 
entity are located one rung downward in the hierarchy of complexity, and it is the 
parts that determine the characteristics of the whole, not the other way around. So 
ultimate causal explanations are thought to be based on laws pertaining to the lowest 
levels of the hierarchy'. 46 
So then, what is needed is a framework to consider the ramifications of this 
reductive notion of causality. I follow Murphy in distinguishing six related elements 
in the reductionist programme. 7 
1. Methodological reductionism: a research strategy of analyzing 
the thing to be studied into its parts. 
2. Epistemological reductionism: the view that laws or theories 
pertaining to the higher levels of the hierarchy of the sciences 
can (and should) be shown to follow from lower-level laws, 
and ultimately from the laws of physics. 
3. Logical or definitional reductionism: the view that words and 
sentences referring to one type of entity can be translated 
without residue into language about another type of entity. 48 
4. Causal reductionism: the view that the behaviour of the parts 
of a system (ultimately, the parts studied by subatomic physics) 
is determinative of the behaviour of all higher-level entities. 
45 It is worth noting a point that will become increasingly important throughout this thesis, namely, 
the hierarchy of complex systems can be extended beyond biology to even more complex systems - 
psychology, sociology, and eventually to the realm of ethics and metaphysics. 6 Murphy, 'Supervenience and the Nonreducibility of Ethics to Biology', p. 466. 47 Ibid., pp. 466-467. Also see Francisco J. Ayala, `Introduction', in Francisco J. Ayala and 
Theodosius Dobzhansky (eds. ), Studies in the Philosophy of Biology: Reduction and Related 
Problems (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1974), pp. vii-xvi; Ian G. Barbour, Religion 
in an Age of Science (San Francisco, Ca.: Harper and Row, 1990), pp. 165-168; and Arthur Peacocke, 
God and the New Biology (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1986), see especially chapters 1 and 2. 
48 This type of reductionism is discussed at length by John R. Searle. For more see The Rediscovery 
of Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 112-114. 
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Thus, this is the thesis that all causation in the hierarchy is 
`bottom-up'. 
5. Ontological reductionism: the view that higher-level entities 
are nothing but the sum of their parts. However, this thesis is 
ambiguous; we need names here for two distinct positions. 
One is the view that as one goes up the hierarchy of levels, no 
new kinds of metaphysical `ingredients' need to be added to 
produce higher-level entities from lower. No `vital force' or 
`entelechy' must be added to get living beings from non-living 
materials; no immaterial mind or soul needed to get 
consciousness; no Zeitgeist to form individuals into a society. 
Let us reserve the term `ontological reductionism' for this 
position. 
6. Reductive materialism: I shall use this term to distinguish a 
stronger claim than the previous one, that only the entities at 
the lowest level are really real; higher-level entities - 
molecules, cells, organisms - are only composite structures 
made of atoms. It is possible to hold ontological reductionism 
without subscribing to this thesis. Thus, one might want to 
say that higher-level entities are real - as real as the entities 
that compose them - and at the same time reject all sorts of 
vitalism and dualism. 
The very nature of science is characterised by methodological reductionism 
and thus lends credence to the other types of reductionism listed above. There is a 
crucial `metaphysical' view that follows from the reductionist position - that all the 
constituent parts in a given system determine the character and behaviour of the 
whole system. Such a view necessarily disallows for causal efficacy of the whole 
system on the base constituents. I claim that one can hold ontological reductionism 
without prescribing to reductive materialism. 
49 This latter position proves to not 
only be philosophically faulty, but also theologically undesirable in that it rejects 
human uniqueness and any type of free will s0 
a9 In other words, I believe it possible to posit that higher-level capacities are real - in that they have 
the power of causal efficacy - without adopting any form of vitalism or dualism. 
50 It is worth noting that, due to the strains created by a reductive materialist view, there are those who 
call for a revival of the concept of the soul. These rightfully claim that a reductive-materialistic 
worldview yields a deterministic concept of the human person that is practically undesirable. For an 
example see Jeffrey H. Boyd, `One's Self-concept and Biblical Theology', Journal of the Evangelical 
Theological Society 40 no. 2 (1997), pp. 207-227; and Reclaiming the Soul: The Search for Meaning 
in a Self-Centered Culture (Cleveland, Ohio: Pilgrim Press, 1996). 
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Before moving forward, it will be useful to summarise recent scientific 
discoveries that challenge traditional views of human nature in various ways. There 
are a number of disciplines that offer data relevant to the present discussion 
(evolutionary biology, genetics, etc. ). After a brief discussion of the pertinent 
changes in biology, I will focus on the cognitive sciences and neuroscience in 
particular. My purpose in doing so is to offer practical examples of how advances in 
science are challenging our understanding of human nature. 
114 
3.1.4 Recent Scientific Discovery 
Darwin's theory of evolution has had a substantial impact on contemporary 
culture. This impact can be likened to that which the revolution in physics and 
astronomy brought to modern science. The primary issue raised in Darwin's theory 
is that of continuity between humans and animals; thus, there sprung a further reason 
to question body-soul (mind) dualism. 
A consequence of the rejection of Aristotelian hylomorphism and the 
adoption of modern atomism was the dismissal of the idea that plants and animals 
possessed any type of `soul' - which was understood as the substantial form of their 
bodies. From Descartes forward, it was common to conceive of plants and animals 
as purely material entities. In light of this context - Darwinian evolution and 
Cartesian philosophy - the kinship of humans to the lower animals led many to 
conclude that humans were likewise purely material in nature. 
Theologians were keenly aware of the challenges that Darwin's ideas 
presented, so many concluded that although the human body was the product of an 
evolutionary process, God instilled souls within each human person at conception. 
Such a move was intended to avoid the pitfalls that reductive materialism posed for 
human uniqueness. There are a number of problems with this view however, not 
least of which is the challenge of identifying exactly when in the evolutionary 
process human beings became distinct from their `animal' ancestors - at what point 
did the species become sufficiently human to be granted a soul? 51 If this is not the 
question to ask, that is, if the reductive materialist thesis is true and human 
51 For more on the topic of theological concerns and evolutionary biology see Francisco J. Ayala, 
`Human Nature: One Evolutionist's View', in Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and H. Newton 
Malony (eds. ), Whatever Happened to the Soul?: Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human 
Nature (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1998), pp. 31-48; and Francisco J. Ayala, `The Evolution 
of Life: An Overview', in Robert John Russell, W. R. Stoeger, and Francisco J. Ayala (eds. ), 
Evolutionary and Molecular Biology: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action (Vatican City: Vatican 
Observatory Publications, 1998), pp. 21-58. 
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distinctiveness can not be attributed to the possession of a soul, what hope have we 
for the complex relational nature of human beings that we experience? These are 
pertinent questions that I will address in the following sections. 
Probably the most significant advances in the investigation of the human 
mind have occurred in the realm of the cognitive sciences. In its essence, cognitive 
science is the science of thinking. It informs and involves several disciplines 
including artificial intelligence (AI), neuroscience, cognitive psychology, cognitive 
ethology, and philosophy of mind. The cognitive sciences focus on research 
concerning the study of language, reasoning ability, memory, perception, and the 
role of emotions in human cognition. 
Many scholars with interest in both science and theology consider the 
cognitive sciences to have great potential for advances in theological thought. 
Gregory R. Peterson suggests `that all forms of theology stand to be affected by a 
serious dialogue with the cognitive sciences. Insofar as methodology and content are 
connected, the content of the cognitive sciences can affect the way we go about 
doing theology'. 52 
Of particular interest to the present discussion are the data provided by 
neuroscience. 53 As a discipline, neuroscience focuses on three major areas of 
52 Gregory R. Peterson, Minding God: Theology and the Cognitive Sciences (Minneapolis, Minn.: 
Fortress Press, 2003), p. 12. 53 The prominence of neuroscientific explanations of human nature has led to an increased interest 
among philosophers. For examples see William Bechtel, 'Philosophy Meets the Neurosciences', in 
W. Bechtel, P. Mandik, and J. Mundale (eds. ), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001), pp. 5-22; `Epistemic Issues in Procuring Evidence about the Brain: 
The Importance of Research Instruments and Techniques' in W. Bechtel, P. Mandik, and J. Mundale 
(eds. ), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001), pp. 
55-81; Bennett and Hacker, The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience; Patricia S. Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 
1990); John G. Daugman, 'Brain Metaphor and Brain Theory', in W. Bechtel P. Mandik, and J. 
Mundale (eds. ), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 
2001), pp. 23-36; and Jennifer Mundale, `Neuroanatomical Foundations of Cognition: Connecting the Neuronal Level with the Study of Higher Brain Areas', in W. Bechtel, P. Mandik, and J. Mundale (eds. ), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001), pp. 37-54. 
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investigation: (1) neuroanatomy (mapping of brain regions), (2) neurophysiology 
(studying the functions of the various regions), and (3) neuropsychology 
(investigating how various brain processes influence behaviour). The significance of 
neuroscientific discovery should not be underestimated. One philosopher points out 
that `neuroscience has in a sense completed the Darwinian revolution, bringing not 
only the human body but the human mind as well, into the sphere of scientific 
investigation'. 54 
In short, neuroscientists are, at a rapid rate, presenting data indicating that 
many of the faculties once attributed to the mind or soul can now be explained as 
complex functions of the human brain. 55 There are a number of such examples 
available from within the field of neuroscience. I will briefly discuss two and 
expound in more detail on a third - (1) religious or spiritual experiences, (2) the 
experience and expression of love, and (3) moral attitude and behaviour. 
By `religious experience' (also referred to as `peak spiritual experiences'), I 
am referring to experiences of religious transcendence. Such experiences are marked 
by feelings of awe and divine presence. Most persons, religious and non-religious, 
would identify these religious experiences as manifestations within the soul. 
Current neuroscience is redefining how we understand religious experiences 
of this nature. At present, there is significant literature suggesting that these 
experiences are correlated to abnormal neural activity (seizure-like activity) in 
structures of the temporal lobes and limbic system. 56 Michael A. Persinger and 
sa Nancey Murphy, `Human Nature: Historical, Scientific, and Religious Issues', p. 1. ss This point rings clear in the neuroscience literature. Antonio R. Damasio states that `philosophers, 
neuroscientists and laypeople have long wondered how the conscious mind comes to be. A more 
complete understanding of the workings of the brain ought to lead to an eventual solutions'. See 'How the Brain Creates the Mind', Scientific American (December 1999), pp. 112-117. 56 This neural activity has been recorded in patients with temporal lobe epilepsy. In some cases, these 
patients report experiences similar to recorded accounts of religious experiences. For more see Ii. Naito and N. Matsui, `Temporal lobe epilepsy with ictal ecstatic state and interictal behavior of hypergraphia', Journal of Nervous and Mental Disorders 176 (1988), pp. 123-124; and A. Ogata and 
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colleagues even claim to be able to create `spiritual experiences' among volunteers 
in the laboratory by inducing electromagnetic stimulation of the temporal lobe 
57 
While there are a number of issues that need to be addressed to deal fully 
with these neuroscientific claims, the point here is to emphasise how a realm of 
experience once exclusively dealt with in terms of the soul or mind is now being 
investigated through brain sciences. The possible implications are this: if religious 
or spiritual experiences can be shown to correspond to certain types of brain activity 
(i. e. `caused' by certain types of brain activity), then what place does this leave for 
manifestations of an immaterial soul? 58 
The second area of neuroscientific investigation that I want to mention is that 
of the experience and expression of love. The feeling of love is not only an 
honoured human capacity, but theologically speaking, is a critical responsibility 
within human communities. Such a capacity has commonly been considered to be 
an internal working of the soul. 
There are documented cases of neurological impairment that results in the 
inability to experience or express love. Consider the following account of Capgras 
Syndrome: 
T. Miyakawa, 'Religious experiences in epileptic patients with a focus on ictus-related episodes', 
Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 52 (1998), pp. 321-325. Sý See Michael A. Persinger, `Neurobehavioral effects of brief exposures to weak intensity, complex 
magnetic fields within experimental and clinical settings', in M. J. Mclean, S. Engstrom, and R. 
Holocomb (eds. ), Magnetotherapy: Potential therapeutic benefits and adverse effects (New York: 
TFG Press, 2003), pp. 89-118; 'Experimental simulation of the god experience: Implications for 
religious beliefs and the future of the human species', in R. Joseph (ed), Neurotheology: Brain, 
science, spirituality, religious experience (San Jose: University Press, 2002), pp. 267-284; and C. M. 
Cook and M. A. Persinger, `Experimental induction of the "sense of presence" in normal subjects and 
an exceptional subject'. Perceptual and Motor Skills 85 (1997), pp. 683-693. It is worth noting that a 
heated debated surrounding this research is currently underway. Using the experimental setup from 
Persinger, et. al., Pehr Granqvist has attempted, and failed, to reproduce these religious experiences in 
the laboratory; thus, the legitimacy of Persinger's claims are in question. For more on this see P. 
Granqvist, M. Fredrikson, P. Unge, A. Hagenfeldt, S. Valid, D. Larhammer, and M. Larsson, 'Sensed 
presence and mystical experiences are predicted by suggestibility, not the application of transcranial 
weak complex magnetic fields', Neuroscience Letters 372 (2004). 
S8 I place the term `cause' in scare quotes to emphasise the problematic nature of the term. I will deal 
with this issue in more detail in a following section. 
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Capgras Syndrome is a disorder of the experience of familiarity and 
regard for close friends and family. In these rare cases, damage to 
particular brain areas can result in a disorder characterized by the 
individual's conviction that close and familiar persons are not real, 
but are 'doubles' and imposters... the person with Capgras Syndrome 
does not experience an accompanying feeling of familiarity and deep 
personal significance associated with the visual experience. 9 
A critical aspect of our ability to love is based on the experience of 
familiarity and relatedness produced by our history with the loved one. What 
patients with Capgras Syndrome have shown is that these feelings can be dissociated 
from visual recognition, thus lending weight to the notion that the experience of 
loving someone is a physical process able to be inhibited by neurological disorder. 
The final example involves neuroscientific research on moral attitude and 
behaviour. Human moral behaviour, that is how we relate in a social context, is a 
concern to the religious and non-religious alike. At the centre of the Christian faith, 
rests a mandate for proper relation toward God and creation. Such `spiritual' 
relationships have traditionally been viewed as faculties of the soul. This area of 
human experience, once left completely to the realm of religious thought (and later 
included within the scope of psychology proper), has now been taken under 
investigation by neuroscientists. 
Researchers are uncovering intrinsic links between biology and morality. 
60 
Research from neuroscience has demonstrated that moral reasoning and behaviour is 
dependent upon the proper function of various subsystems within the brain, 
59 Warren S. Brown, `Evolution, Cognitive Neuroscience, and the Soul', in Keith B. Miller (ed. ), 
Perspectives on an Evolving Creation (Grand Rapids, Mi.: William B. Eerdman's Publishing 
Company, 2003), p. 506. 
60 For a fascinating discussion involving evolutionary biology and the emergence of morality as a 
distinctly human phenomenon see Ursula Goodenough and Terrence W. Deacon, `From Biology to 
Consciousness to Morality', Zygon 38 no. 4 (2003), pp. 801-819. Goodenough and Deacon suggest 
that moral frames of mind emerge from primate prosocial capacities. These 'frames of mind' are then 
transfigured and valenced by the host of symbolic languages, cultures, and religions that are 
characteristic of the human species. Also see Terrence W. Deacon, The Symbolic Species: The Co- 
evolution of Language and the Brain (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1998). 
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particularly in the prefrontal cortex. 61 This aspect of human functioning, once 
inaccessible to science, can now be investigated via various experimental 
techniques. 62 Some neuroscientists believe that these new technological advances 
will unlock the deepest secrets of the human species and eventually render the 
insights gained from religion obsolete. 63 
Such discoveries have broken the barriers between research disciplines and 
new approaches are being forged. Perhaps the most notable of these is Social 
Cognitive Neuroscience. 64 Regarding this new approach to understanding the 
complexities of human behaviour, Ralph Adolphs comments: 
We are an intensely social species - it has been argued that our social 
nature defines what makes us human, what makes us conscious or 
what gave us our large brains. As a new field, the social brain 
sciences are probing the neural underpinnings of social behaviour and 
61 There is a significant amount of data now available supporting this claim. Leslie Brothers is 
credited for being a catalyst to much of the present work regarding neuroscience and social interaction. 
See 'The Social Brain: A Project for Integrating Primate Behaviour and Neurophysiology in a New 
Domain' Concepts in Neuroscience 1 (1990), pp. 27-51. For a survey of other well-known 
publications see Ralph Adolphs, 'Cognitive Neuroscience of Human Social Behavior', Neuroscience 
4 (2003), pp. 165-178; Steven W. Anderson, Antoine Bechara, Antonio Damasio, Hanna Damasio, 
and Daniel Tranel, 'Impairment of Social and Moral Behavior Related to Early Damage in Human 
Prefrontal Cortex', Nature Neuroscience 2 no. 11 (1999), pp. 1032-1037; Antoine Bechara, Daniel 
Tranel, Hanna Damasio, 'Characterization of the decision-making deficit of patients with 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions', Brain 123 (2000), pp. 2189-2202; Antoine Bechara, Hanna 
Damasio, Antonio R. Damasio, Gregory P. Lee, 'Different Contributions of the Human Amygdala 
and Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex to Decision-Making', The Journal of Neuroscience 19 no. 13 
(1999), pp. 5473-5481; Antoine Bechara, Antonio R. Damasio, Hanna Damasio, and Steven W. 
Anderson, 'Insensitivity to future consequences following damage to human prefrontal cortex', 
Cognition 50 (1994), pp. 7-15; and Paul J. Eslinger, Claire V. Flaherty-Craig, and Arthur L. Benton, 
'Developmental outcomes after early prefrontal cortex damage', Brain and Cognition 55 (2004), pp. 
84-103. 
62 Neuroscientists use a number of experimental techniques to gather relevant data. The most 
common, and reliable, techniques involve neuroimaging. The most widely utilised forms of neuro- 
imaging are Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and Functional Magnet Resonance Imaging 
(fMRI). The importance of neuroimaging can not be overstated. Dima Amso, et al. state that 
'understanding the development of pathways underlying cognition and the experiences that alter those 
pathways is imperative to the study of cognitive development'. See 'Beyond What Develops When: 
Neuroimaging May Inform How Cognition Changes With Development', Current Directions in 
Psychological Science 15: 1 (2006), p. 24. 
63 Truett Allison says that 'as we learn more about the development and operation of the system for 
social cognition... it is likely, perhaps even desirable, that the domain of understanding provided by 
neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, and cultural anthropology will expand, while the domain that 
is properly a function of ethics and religion will shrink'. See 'Neuroscience and Morality', 
Neuroscientist 7 (2001), pp. 360-364. 64 See Matthew D. Liebermann, 'Intuition: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Approach' 
Psychological Bulletin 126 (2000), pp. 109-136; and Kevin N. Ochsner, 'The Emergence of Social 
Cognitive Neuroscience', American Psychologist 56 (2001), pp. 717-734. 
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have produced a banquet of data that are both tantalizing and deeply 
puzzling. We are finding new links between emotion and reason, 
between action and perception, and between representations of other 
people and ourselves. No less important are the links that are also 
being established across disciplines to understand social behaviour, as 
neuroscientists, social psychologists, anthropologists, ethologists and 
philosophers forge new collaborations 65 
Rather than delve into the depths of the neuroscientific explanation of socio- 
moral attitude and behaviour, I wish to offer a story which is meant to exemplify the 
intimate connection between neurobiological processes and morality. Perhaps the 
most famous case study in the research toward understanding the relationship 
between brain activity and moral behaviour is that of Phineas Gage 
66 
The year was 1848. Phineas P. Gage was a twenty-five year old construction 
foreman in New England. He was employed by Rutland & Burlington Railroad. At 
that time, his assignment was supervising a group of railroad workers responsible for 
laying down new tracks for a railroad expansion across Vermont. The task was 
shaping up to be a difficult one due to the large amount of hard rock formations 
through which the workers would have to blast to lay the new track. Although a 
foreman, Gage works closely with the men, able and willing to perform every task as 
an equal. 
His interpersonal charisma was matched only by his athletic ability to work 
quickly and precisely around the work site. He was labelled by this superiors as `the 
most efficient and capable man in their employ'. 67 Gage had earned this distinction 
because of his ability to not only work the long difficult hours, but also because of 
his ability to plan, design and implement the steps necessary to complete the railroad. 
65 `Cognitive Neuroscience of Human Social Behaviour', p. 165. I also want to add here that an 
increasing number of theologians are considering these data and have equally valuable contributions 
to the discussion. Such will become obvious throughout this thesis. 
66 For a detailed account of the life of Phineas Gage see Malcolm Macmillan, An Odd Kind of Fame: 
Stories of Phineas Gage (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2000). 
67 From the journal of John Martyn Harlow (1819-1907). Quoted by Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' 
Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Avon Books, 1994), p. 4. 
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The tedious work proceeded on schedule day after day as the men under 
Gage's supervision mechanically blasted rock and laid track systematically toward 
their goal. On 13 September 1848, an accidental explosion occurred that blew a 
tamping iron through Gage's head. The tamping iron measured over three feet in 
length, one and a quarter inches in diameter, and weighed over thirteen pounds. 
Propelled by the explosion, the rod entered Gage's skull point first under his left 
cheek bone and passed completely through the top of his head, landing about twenty 
five yards behind him. 
Gage was knocked off of his feet, but onlookers claim that he did not loose 
consciousness despite the fact that he suffered extensive brain trauma. His men 
gathered him up, sat him in an ox cart and drove him to a nearby hotel where a town 
physician was immediately called. Gage arose from the cart himself with minimal 
assistance and walked to the porch where he sat awaiting the doctor. When the 
physician, Dr. John Harlow, arrived he found Gage sitting on the front porch sipping 
lemonade delivered to him by the hotel owner. Note the entry in Dr. Harlow's 
journal concerning the visit: 
I first noticed the wound upon the head before I alighted from my 
carriage, the pulsations of the brain being very distinct; there was also 
an appearance which, before I examined the head, I could not account 
for; the top of the head appeared somewhat like an inverted funnel; 
this was owing, I discovered, to the bone being fractured about the 
opening for a distance of about two inches in every direction. I ought 
to have mentioned above that the opening through the skull and 
integuments was not far from one and a half inch in diameter; the 
edges of this opening were everted, and the whole wound appeared as 
if some wedge-shaped body had passed from below upward. Mr. 
Gage, during the time I was examining this wound, was relating the 
manner in which he was injured to the bystanders; he talked so 
rationally and was so willing to answer questions, that I directed my 
inquiries to him in preference to the men who were with him at the 
time of the accident, and who were standing about at this time. Mr. G. 
then related to me some of the circumstances, as he has since done; 
and I can safely say that neither at that time nor on any subsequent 
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occasion, save once, did I consider him to be other than perfectly 
rational. 8 
To be able to survive the sheer magnitude of the injury alone was a medical 
miracle, but to be able to walk and talk coherently almost immediately following the 
accident was astounding to the onlookers. Gage's accident made many newspaper 
headlines and found its way into several medical journals. With only a few minor 
complications, Dr. Harlow pronounced Gage cured in less than two months. 
This was such an incredible case that Harlow devoted a great deal of time to 
studying Gage for the remainder of his life. He noted that Gage had regained his 
strength and dexterity and his physical recovery was outstanding. With the 
exception of the loss of vision in his left eye (the tamping iron had severed the optic 
nerve as it passed through his skull); none of his physical faculties or senses were 
hampered in any way. 
Despite this, Harlow recounts, `the equilibrium or balance, so to speak, 
between his intellectual faculty and animal propensities had been destroyed'. 69 He 
was now `fitful and irreverent, indulging at times in the grossest profanity which was 
not previously his custom, manifesting but little deference for his fellows, impatient 
of restraint or advice when it conflicts with his desires, at times pertinaciously 
obstinate, yet capricious and vacillating, devising many plans of future operation, 
which are no sooner arranged than they are abandoned'. 70 
Still having the strong stature that he possessed prior to the accident, Gage 
had taken on an entirely new personality. In fact, he displayed such a different 
personality that his friends sadly noted that `Gage was no longer Gage'. 71 As a result 
of the accident, Gage's life dramatically changed leaving him unemployed and 
68 John Martyn Harlow, as quoted by Damasio, ibid., p. 6. 69 Ibid., p. 8. 70 Ibid., p. 8. 71 Ibid., p. 8. 
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without a home. He spent a season of time as a circus attraction and as a feature 
display in Barnum's Museum in New York City. He held various positions of 
employment but was unable to carry out any meaningful responsibilities. Gage died 
in San Francisco, California on May 21,1861. 
How could this be? How could he make an apparent full recovery from such 
a tragic accident yet somehow experience a negative change in personality? 
Neuroscientists have claimed `that it was selective damage in the prefrontal cortices 
of Phineas Gage's brain that compromised his ability to plan for the future, to 
conduct himself according to the social rules he previously had learned, and to 
decide on the course of action that ultimately would be most advantageous to his 
survival'. 72 So this once responsible and esteemed individual was reduced to an 
unreliable and quick-tempered outcast through an alteration of his neurobiological 
substrate. 
The point of Gage's story is to emphasis that although we might consider 
morality or spirituality an ethereal concept only accessible through religious inquiry, 
it is becoming increasingly evident that these are emergent human capacities having 
a physical basis. So, once again, the postulation of a separate entity (the `soul') is 
deemed unnecessary to explain complex human phenomena. 
To summarise, recent scientific advances have played a significant role in 
formulating the way one conceives of human nature. From Darwin's theory of 
72 Damasio, Descartes' Error, p. 33. Also see F. G. Barker, 'Phineas among the phrenologists: the 
American crowbar case and nineteenth-century theories of cerebral localization', Journal of 
Neurosurgery 82 (1995), pp. 672-682; M. A. Cato, D. C. Delis, T. J. Abildskov, and E. Bigler, 
`Assessing the elusive cognitive deficits associated with ventromedial prefrontal damage: a case of a 
modern-day Phineas Gage', Journal for the International Neuropsychological Society 10 (2004), pp. 
453-465; H. Damasio, T. J. Grabowski, R. Frank, A. M. Galaburda, and A. Damasio, `The return of 
Phineas Gage: clues about the brain from the skull of a famous patient', Science 264 (1994), pp. 1102- 
1105; L. F. Haas, 'Phineas Gage and the science of brain localisation', Journal of Neurology, 
Neurosurgery and Psychiatry 71 (2001), p. 761; M. Macmillan, `Inhibition and the control of 
behavior. From Gall to Freud via Phineas Gage and the frontal lobes', Brain and Cognition 19 (1992), 
pp. 72-104; and B. M. Wagar, and P. Thagard, `Spiking Phineas Gage: a neurocomputational theory 
of cognitive-affective integration in deeision. making', Psychological Review 111 (2004), pp. 67-79. 
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evolution to the rise of social cognitive neuroscience,, researchers have conducted 
extensive research into areas that have traditionally been relegated to matters of 
religion. I have cited three such examples above - peak spiritual experiences, the 
experience and expression of love, and finally moral attitude and behaviour. The 
latter is of particular concern to the present work. 
To be clear, the relevance of this immediate discussion is to emphasise that, 
within the realm of science, those characteristics once attributed to a `soul' can now 
be explained in neurobiological terms. This semantic move removes the necessity to 
speak of the soul as the causal agent in human life. As I have discussed in an earlier 
chapter, this strikes at the heart of many presuppositions about the role of religion in 
human life. 
In light of these data, and the evolving views of human nature among 
scientists and philosophers, attention turns to theological notions of personhood. I 
have already mentioned some of the historical theological views regarding human 
nature; however, there is little doubt that there is a theological conundrum nigh at the 
door. 
Francis Crick has delivered what he refers to as the `astonishing hypothesis'. 
Crick says that 
`You', your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your 
ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no 
more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their 
associated molecules. As Lewis Carroll's Alice might have phrased: 
`You're nothing but a pack of neurons'. This hypothesis is so alien to 
the ideas of most people today that it can truly be called astonishing. 
3 
In Crick's view, religious life (and Christian spirituality in particular) 
consists of the cultivation of the inner world of the soul. So, it follows from Crick's 
73 Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search For The Soul (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1994), p. 3. Emphasis added. 
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hypothesis that if science can show the implausibility of the existence of the soul, 
then the Christian faith falls in one fell swoop. 
This is obviously an undesirable conclusion for the theologically oriented 
community. A number of theologians have addressed these concerns in an effort to 
preserve traditional Christian ideals, not least of which is the integrity of the human 
person. As these accounts emerge, the issue of the soul - its existence and its 
function - is a crucial theme. So we see a critical debate exacerbated over the 
question of the existence of the soul. The following section will include a discussion 
of some of the theological developments related to this issue. 
3.2 Theological Developments 
The concept of the soul has played an important role in the history of 
Christian thought, particularly in ethics. 74 It is surprising, however, that the 
metaphysical makeup of the human person appears to not have been a central topic 
in ancient Christian thought. Etienne Gilson comments that 
It would probably surprise a good many modern Christians to learn 
that in certain of the earliest Fathers the belief in the immortality of 
the soul is vague almost to non-existence. This, nevertheless, is a fact, 
and a fact to be noted, because it casts so strong a light on the point 
which Christian anthropology turns and on the course of its historical 
development. A Christianity without the immortality of the soul is 
not, in the long run, absolutely inconceivable, and the proof of it is 
that it has been conceived. What really would be absolutely 
inconceivable would be a Christianity without the resurrection of the 
Man. 75 
How is it then that the soul seems to be at the centre of so many modem 
conceptions of Christian life and spirituality? Although the issue of human nature 
74 For a helpful work on the ethical implications of theological anthropology see Stephen G. Post, 'A 
Moral Case for Nonreductive Physicalism', in Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and 11. Newton 
Malony (eds. ), Whatever Happened to the Soul?: Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human 
Nature (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998), pp. 195-212. 
75 Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, trans. A. H. C. Downes (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 172. 
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has not been a consistent theme through Christian history, it has been an issue that 
arises at various transitional points in theological thought 
76 The modern period has 
brought another such transitional period. The development of biblical criticism and 
critical church history has once again brought the nature of the human person into 
consideration. What I intend to show in the following is that the issue of human 
nature has been treated in a quite indecisive fashion in modem theology and biblical 
studies. 
How we conceive of the person has been influenced through historical 
criticism of the Bible. There was a trend among many scholars in the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries that led to doubt concerning the historical resurrection of 
Jesus. 7 This scepticism led to a revival of the treatment of the soul as the basis for 
Christian hope in the afterlife. 78 
One example of the confusion regarding the nature of the soul appears in the 
work of H. Wheeler Robinson. 9 Robinson questioned the biblical support offered to 
the notion of body-soul dualism. He concluded that the Bible presented the human 
person as an animated body rather than an incarnated or immortal soul (contra the 
Greek metaphysical explanations). Despite this claim, he goes on to posit that one of 
the most important assertions in the New Testament is the belief that person survives 
76 Nancey Murphy identifies two such transitions. The first was the adaptation of Christian teaching 
to the gentile world. In this case there were assorted Greco-Roman philosophical concepts that were 
adopted and adapted to Christian practice. The second point was the Aristotelian revival in the 
Middle Ages. The writings of Thomas Aquinas exemplify this transitional thought. 
77 A prominent source of such ideas was David Friedrich Strauss. See Strauss, The Life of Jesus 
Critically Examined ed. P. C. Hodgson (London: SCM Press, 1973 original work published in 1835). 
78 There is little doubt that Immanuel Kant's transcendental proof of the immortality of the soul 
reinforced these convictions. Kant held that we are justified in affirming that we have an 'afterlife' in 
the sense of an unending and enduring existence after death. Such exists outside the framework of 
spatio-temporal causality and its purpose was to continue the task of seeking moral perfection. See 
Norman Kemp Smith, Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (New York: Bedford Books, 1969), 
see especially the section regarding the `Transcendental Dialectic'. 
79 H. Wheeler Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man [1911] (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1929). 
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bodily death. 80 Such an argument necessarily reinserted the need for a nonmaterial 
entity that represents the true or essential 'self' such can only be conceived of as a 
soul or spirit. So, once again confusion abounded. 
Likewise, theological literature in the early twentieth century exemplified the 
same type of confusion. 81 Following World War I, there was an increase in 
theological literature that stressed the distinction between Hebraic and Hellenistic 
concepts. Karl Barth was a significant player in this regard. He stressed the 
prominence of the resurrection to a proper understanding of Christian theology. 
82 
Such an emphasis encouraged a more Hebraic interpretation of theological concerns. 
As a result, theologians began to grasp a more holistic view of the human person. 
Contributions from Rudolf Bultmann and John A. T. Robinson exemplify these 
views. 83 
A cursory survey of the literature within theology and biblical studies reveals 
a trend (throughout the twentieth century) from dualistic views of human nature to 
80 It is important to note that the debate of whether or not the essence (soul) of a person survives 
bodily death does not encompass the issue of resurrection. I hold that resurrection is a central and 
critical component of Christian theology and does not necessarily depend on the existence of an 
ontologically distinct entity such as an immaterial soul. See further below. 81 See Murphy for some interesting examples. See `Human Nature: Historical, Scientific, and 
Religious Issues', pp. 20-21. She demonstrates this confusion by pointing to various reference works 
within theology and biblical studies. For example, C. A. Beckwith claimed that `the human soul is 
indeed bound to corporeality, yet it survives death because it possesses the Spirit of God as its 
immanent principle of life ('Biblical Conceptions of Soul and Spirit' in Samuel Macauley Jackson 
(ed. ), The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge (New York: Funk and Wagnalls 
Company, 1910) pp. 11: 12-14). Yet, in a slightly earlier work J. Laidlaw claims that throughout the 
Bible the term `soul' is intended to designate the embodied life of living creatures ('Soul', in James 
Hastings (ed. ), A Dictionary of the Bible (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1902), p. 4: 608). In the same 
publication, E. R. Bernard states that resurrection is to be understood as `the clothing of the soul with 
a body which has to be reconstituted ... the only self which we know is a self constituted of a 
body as 
well as a soul' (Ibid., 4: 236). 
82 Barth claims that God is revealed in Jesus only by an event that breaks the bounds of history. 
Jesus' true identity is revealed in the act of resurrection. See Church Dogmatics Volume 4, G. W. 
Bromiley and Thomas F. Torrance (eds. ), (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1936). Also, Colin Gunton states 
that `Barth is above all a theologian of the resurrection, rather than of the incarnation or cross'. See 
`Salvation', in John Webster (ed. ), The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), pp. 143-15 8. 
83 Bultmann claims that a correct reading of Paul's use of the term soma renders a holistic view of the 
human person. See Theology of the New Testament, Volume I (New York: Scribner Press, 1951). 
Robinson's latter work reflects a similar idea. See The Body: A Study in Pauline Theology (London: 
SCM Press, 1952). 
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more holistic notions. The issue seems to revolve around concepts of the afterlife, 
where on one hand there is the immortal soul that lives beyond bodily death, and on 
the other, the hope of resurrection. 84 Murphy observes that one way of highlighting 
this shift is to note `that in The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (1909-1921) 
there is a lengthy article on "soul" and no entry for "resurrection". In The Anchor 
Bible Dictionary (1992) there is no entry for "soul" but a very long set of articles on 
"resurrection"'. 85 
So, in many ways what holds the issue of human nature in contention is the 
way one interprets the Christian notion of the after-life, particularly resurrection. 
This is a vastly unsettled issue within theological circles. 86 Paul Badham has 
performed a substantial survey of the literature regarding the Christian notion of the 
afterlife and has found that while most scholars share the view that, `I shall be "I"' at 
resurrection; such a view requires a type of `re-embodiment' that can only be 
84 My `cursory' look at this issue tends toward oversimplification. There are a number of 
complexities that I will not cover in the present work, not least of which is the fact that liberal and 
conservative (primarily Evangelical) traditions have different opinions on these issues. For example 
Robert Gundry rejects Bultmann's arguments regarding theological anthropology. See Robert H. 
Gundry, Soma in Biblical Theology with Emphasis on Pauline Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976). The idea of body-soul dualism is much more prominent in Evangelical 
scholarship. 
85 `Human Nature: Historical, Scientific, and Religious Issues', p. 21. 86 Joel B. Green claims that the Christian notion of resurrection does not require the existence of a 
ontologically distinct soul. See 'Resurrection of the body: New Testament voices concerning 
personal continuity and the afterlife', in Joel B. Green (ed. ), What about the Soul? Neuroscience and 
Christian Anthropology (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 2004); 'What Does It Mean to Be Human?: 
Another Chapter in the Ongoing Interaction of Science and Scripture', in Malcolm A. Jeeves (ed. ), 
From Cells To Souls - and Beyond: Changing Portraits of Human Nature (Grand Rapids, Mi.: 
William B. Eerdman's Publishing Company, 2004), pp. 179-198; `Restoring the Human Person: New 
Testament Voices for a Wholistic and Social Anthropology', in Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, 
Theo C. Meyering, and Michael A. Arbib (eds. ), Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives 
on Divine Action (Vatican City: Vatican Observatory Press, 2000), pp. 3-22; and "'Bodies - That Is, 
Human Lives": A Re-Examination of Human Nature in the Bible', in Warren S. Brown, Nancey 
Murphy, and H. Newton Malony (eds. ), Whatever Happened to the Soul?: Scientific and Theological 
Portraits of Human Nature (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press), pp. 149-173. For a critique of Green's work on this topic see John W. Cooper, Body, Soul & Life Everlasting: Biblical 
Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate (Grand Rapids, Mi.: William B. Eerdman's 
Publishing Company, 2000). 
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described in terms of an immaterial essence that extends beyond bodily death, thus, 
the existence of the soul is a necessary condition. 87 
Although the status of the soul is critical to many contemporary issues within 
theology and biblical studies, the debate itself has had a speckled past. While the 
issue of the `intermediate state' has kept the controversy between dualists and 
physicalists alive in contemporary eschatological debates; the Bible does not 
explicitly teach either body-soul dualism or a strict physicalism. 88 Despite the 
contention on the issue, Christian spirituality continues to be marked by an inherent 
assumption of body-soul dualism (see chapter one). 
As previously mentioned, for a number of reasons this dualist view of human 
nature does not fare well under philosophical or theological scrutiny. In addition, it 
can be argued that the assumption of an immaterial soul as being the true `self has 
led to a host of ethical issues. 89 
The historical sketch that I have provided in this chapter shows that the 
traditional alternative to dualistic thinking has been some type of materialism or 
physicalism. There are, however, problems with these positions as well - 
historically, materialism has commonly led to reductionism. This is true from both a 
philosophical and scientific perspective. 
From a theological perspective reductive materialism is a highly undesirable 
position. If human beings can be completely described in terms of the firing of 
neurons or the working of biological machinery, then it would seem that the integrity 
87 Paul Badham, Christian Beliefs about Life Death (London: Macmillan Press, 1976), p. 93. 
88 Note the previous insights from Dunn's partative and aspective views of the human person in the 
biblical text. 
89 Stephen G. Post notes that, although one cannot claim that dualism is the `cause' of poor social 
practices, history does reveal a certain affinity between dualist thought and practices such as 
patriarchy, slavery, the debasement of sex, the denial of physical pleasure, and callous speciesism. 
See `A Moral Case for Nonreductive Physicalism', pp. 203.210. 
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of the human person, which is critical to a Christian worldview, is gravely at risk. 
Murphy has described the situation as follows: 
It is undeniable that a serious theological problem awaits solution. 
Philosophers see dualism as no longer tenable; the neurosciences have 
completed the Darwinian revolution, bringing the entire human being 
under the purview of the natural sciences. Scientists and philosophers 
alike associate dualism with Christianity, and the `evangelical 
atheists' among them (such as Daniel Dennett) use these scientific 
and philosophical developments as potent apologetic tools. 9° 
There is, I claim, a third alternative to various types of dualism and reductive 
notions of materialism. 91 This position is known as nonreductive physicalism. I 
argue that the nonreductive physicalist view of human nature is able to avoid the 
problems of dualism while maintaining the integrity of the human person that is 
threatened by reductionism. The following section is dedicated to providing a 
cogent description of this view. 
3.3. A Case for Nonreductive Physicalism 
I offer the following argument: human nature should be viewed as 
intrinsically and inextricably embodied. This is to say that the human person is 
ultimately a physical being who operates on such a level of complexity as to allow 
for the emergence of human capacities such as morality and spirituality. Such 
dimensions of the human experience are capable of emerging without the addition of 
any immaterial entity such as a soul or spirit. 
90 `Human Nature: Historical, Scientific, and Religious Issues', p. 24. 
91 It is worth noting that there are various types of dualism whose proponents use holistic language to 
describe their position; however, upon analysis, these cases fall to the same criticism as those 
discussed in this text. For example, John W. Cooper's account of 'holistic dualism' (the roots of 
which he attributes to Thomas Aquinas). See Body, Soul & Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology 
and the Monism-Dualism Debate. Also William Hasker has offered an account which he calls 
Emergent Dualism. Hasker's claim is that consciousness (or soul) `emerges' from human biological 
complexity. Once such an entity exists, it has the capacity to live beyond bodily death. See The 
Emergent Self (Ithica, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999). Many proponents of reductive 
materialism hold the physical sciences will ultimately explain emotional, moral, and religious 
experiences. For an example see, Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston, Mass.: Back 
Bay Books, 1992). 
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This view of human nature clearly separates itself from any form of dualism 
that leads to a body- soul/material-immaterial dichotomy. Such dichotomies move 
away from a central argument that I wish to put forward -a person should not be 
characterised only by `interior' thoughts or beliefs, but should rather be understood 
as a holistic being whose values are inseparably bound to his or her embodied life. 
92 
Here, values are not only experienced as inner convictions, but expressed in a social 
context. In this view, the idea of an interior life at battle with material existence 
dissolves and the challenge then becomes an embodied life lived in such a way that 
reflects the values and practices inherent to the community which forms his or her 
identity. 
Furthermore, I want to be clear as to the `type' of physically embodied 
human nature that I espouse. There are a number of scholars who have engaged this 
issue from both a philosophical and a theological position. 93 In what follows, I will 
offer support for the nonreductive physicalist view of human nature. This position 
has been argued most notably by Nancey Murphy, Warren Brown, and others. 94 
92I do not deny the existence of an `interior' life. The point is that this interior life can only be 
understood as 'embodied' within the context of one's entire life narrative (i. e. one's `interior' life 
cannot be lived apart from the physical body). 93 For a helpful example see Kevin Corcoran (ed. ), Soul, Body and Survival: Essays on the 
Metaphysics of Human Persons (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. 2001). See also J. P. 
Moreland and Scott B. Rae, Body & Soul: Human Nature & the Crisis in Ethics (Downer's Grove, Ill.: 
InterVarsity Press, 2000); and Keith Ward, Defending the Soul (Oxford: One World Press. 1992). 
These latter two represent an effort to 'rescue' the soul from reductive materialism. I include these to 
show the existence of the argument; however, for reasons already mentioned, I do not deem this 
argument necessary. 
94 For examples of such work see Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and H. Newton Malony (eds. ), 
Whatever Happened to the Soul?: Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature 
(Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press. 1998); Brown, Warren S., 'Resonance: A Model for Relating 
Science, Psychology, and Faith', Journal of Psychology and Christianity 23 (2004), pp. 110-120; 
`Neurobiological Embodiment of Spirituality and Soul', in From Cells to Souls - and Beyond: 
Changing Portraits of Human Nature, Malcolm A. Jeeves (ed. ), (Grand Rapids, Mi.: William B. 
Eerdman's Publishing Company, 2004), pp. 58-76; 'Evolution, Cognitive Neuroscience, and the Soul', 
in Perspectives on an Evolving Creation, Keith B. Miller (ed. ), (Grand Rapids, Mi.: William B. 
Eerdman's Publishing Company, 2003), pp. 502-523; 'Nonreductive Physicalism and Soul: Finding 
Resonance Between Theology and Neuroscience', American Behavioral Scientist 45 (2002), pp. 
1812-1821; Joel B. Green, 'What Does it Mean to be Human?: Another Chapter in the Ongoing 
Interaction of Science and Scripture', in From Cells to Souls - and Beyond: Changing Portraits of 
Human Nature, Malcolm A. Jeeves (ed. ), (Grand Rapids, Mi.: William B. Eerdman's Publishing 
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Their extended treatment of the scientific, philosophical, and theological issues 
surrounding human nature is a worthy account and one that will inform my overall 
project. 
As discussed above, advances in evolutionary biology and the cognitive 
sciences are continually closing the gap between the material and immaterial nature 
of humankind. Indeed, nearly all of the human capacities once attributed to the mind 
or soul are now understood to be complex functions of the brain. But do these 
claims not represent an essential conflict with a Christian theological perspective? It 
is my intention to demonstrate that the nonreductive physicalist view of human 
nature, in fact, does not present such a conflict. 
There are two indispensable aspects of the nonreductive physicalist thesis. 
The first is the claim that human persons are essentially physical creatures - as such 
we can function in a fully human manner without the addition of a nonmaterial entity 
such as a soul or spirit. Second, the position is nonreductive in that it rejects any 
scientific or philosophical claim that insists that human beings are `nothing but' 
bodies. This means that the human person cannot be fully described in terms of his 
or her biology. There are a host of `higher' capacities (e. g. the experience of passion, 
morality, free will, and the many aspects of relationship) that are essential to the 
Company, 2004), pp. 179-198; Joel B. Green (ed. ), What About the Soul?: Neuroscience and 
Christian Anthropology (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press. 2004); Malcolm A. Jeeves (ed. ), From 
Cells to Souls - and Beyond (Grand Rapids, Mi.: William B. Eerdman's Publishing Company. 2004); 
Nancey C. Murphy, `Whatever Happened to the Soul?: Theological Perspectives on Neuroscience and 
the Self', New York Academy of Sciences 1001 (2003), pp. 51-64; `The Problem of Mental Causation: 
How Does Reason Get its Grip on the Brain? ', Science & Christian Belief 14 (2002), pp. 143-158; 
`Physicalism Without Reductionism: Toward a Scientifically, Philosophically, and Theologically 
Sound Portrait of Human Nature', Zygon 34 (1999), pp. 551-571; 'Supervenience and the 
Nonreducibility of Ethics to Biology', Evolutionary and Molecular Biology: Scientific Perspectives 
on Divine Action, Robert John Russell (ed. ), (Vatican City: Vatican Observatory Press, 1998); Anglo- 
American Postmodernity: Philosophical Perspectives on Science, Religion, and Ethics (Boulder, Co.: 
Westview Press, 1997); Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, Theo C. Meyering, and Michael A. 
Arbib (eds. ), Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action (Notre Dame, 
Ind.: Vatican Observatory. 1999). 
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human experience and cannot be adequately accounted for from a reductive 
materialist perspective. 
In essence, the nonreductive physicalism that I defend refers to the following 
constellation of positions: 
[T]he acceptance of ontological reductionism, but the rejection of 
causal reductionism and reductive materialism. Applied to the 
specific area of studies of consciousness, it denies the existence of a 
nonmaterial entity, the mind (or soul) but does not deny the existence 
of consciousness (a position in philosophy of mind called eliminative 
materialism) or the significance of conscious states or other mental 
(note the adjective form) phenomena. In brief, this is the view that 
the human nervous system, operating in concert with the rest of the 
body in its environment, is the seat of consciousness (and also of 
human spiritual or religious capacities). Consciousness and religious 
awareness are emergent properties and they have top-down causal 
influence on the body. 95 
In order to justify these claims, one must address two primary areas of 
concern. The first area deals with the challenges offered by a dualistic view of 
human nature. For the present purposes, I will assume that the philosophical and 
scientific challenges that I have offered above are sufficient to render dualism 
undesirable. 
The second concern is that of reductionism; unfortunately, overcoming this 
hurdle is a much more complex task. The central question, of course, is how a 
physicalist account, such as the one that I espouse, can fail to be reductive. If mental 
events can be reduced to neural activity, it seems that the notion of free will collapse 
beneath the `laws' of neurobiology. 
95 Nancey Murphy, `Nonreductive Physicalism: Philosophical Issues', in Warren S. Brown, Nancey 
Murphy, and H. Newton Malony (eds. ), Whatever Happened to the Soul?: Scientific and Theological 
Portraits of Human Nature (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1998), pp. 127 - 148. Murphy has 
arguably been the most influential Christian scholar in this particular area of interest. I follow 
Murphy throughout the process of providing a cogent description of the nonreductive physicalist view. 
For a critique of Murphy's description of Nonreductive Physicalism see Derek S. Jeffreys, `The Soul 
is Alive and Well: Non-reductive Physicalism and the Emergent Mental Properties', Theology and 
Science 2 no. 2 (2004), pp. 205-225. 
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Murphy adds, `If free will is an illusion and the highest of human intellectual 
and cultural achievements can (per impossible) be counted as the mere outworking 
of the laws of physics, this is utterly devastating to our ordinary understanding of 
ourselves, and of course to theological accounts, as well, which depend not only on a 
concept of responsibility before God, but also on the justification (not merely the 
causation) of our theories about God and God's will' 96 Avoiding reductionism will 
require the explication of three interrelated concepts - supervenience, emergence, 
and top-down causation. In the following sections, I will address each of these 
concepts 97 
3.3.1 Supervenience 
The concept of supervenience is a relatively new idea in philosophy. It is 
rather complex in its application, so for the present purposes I will explore 
supervenience only as it relates to the issues at hand - that is, demonstrating how a 
physicalist account of mental life can avoid causal reduction. 8 
96 Ibid., p. 131. 97 I wish to make an important point at the outset -just as with all philosophical claims, no amount of 
evidence will amount to a proof of the nonreductive physicalist position. For example, it is still 
possible to claim that there is a substantial mind or soul that controls the body through precisely 
correlated neural events. See John Eccles, How the Self Controls Its Brain (New York: Spring-Verlag 
Press, 1994). For this reason, I consider the epistemological status of nonreductive physicalism not as 
a mere philosophical thesis, but rather as a viable scientific theory. Just as with the justification of 
any scientific theory, data must be collected through an organized research programme. In the present 
case, I suggest that the 'hard core' of such a research programme consist of the metaphysical thesis of 
nonreductive physicalism. I am, of course, following the method of Imre Lakatos. See Imre Lakatos, 
The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1978). Lakatos' views were in reaction to Thomas Kuhn's account of science as a series of 
'paradigms'. See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1962). 
98 I will begin this section by noting that there has been a past debate as to the proper way of defining 
'supervenience'. Jaegwon Kim has argued that it is not possible to grant causal efficacy to the 
supervenience of the mental (Supervenience and Mind). The weakness of Kim's argument is that he 
ignores that a supervenient property can be multi-realizable. Never the less, Kim has won the day and 
most current literature regarding supervenience will reflect Kim's sentiments. This does not, however, 
weaken the argument that I offer in this section. 
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Recall from the discussion above, the issue concerns the relationship between 
physical brain states (B) and mental states (M). It can be assumed that every mental 
event is related to some brain event. So, considering the causal connections between 
neurological events yields something like the following: B1 -º B2 -* B3,,,; where B 1, 
B2, etc. represent brain states in a causal sequence. Now, given the relation of 
mental events to brain events, there would be a sequence of mental events: M1 -º M2 
--* M3... that corresponds to the physical brain states. 
Traditionally, the relation between these two types of events - brain (B) and 
mental (M) - have been described in terms of either identity or causation. In the first 
case, brain state (B1) is identical (in type) to mental state (M1), and so on. In the 
second case, brain state (BI) causes mental state (M1), and so on. In both cases, if 
causal connections are assumed at the physical level, causal reductionism is 
inevitable. Another way of saying this is that mental events appear as mere 
epiphenomena. The crucial issue here is not the causal sequence from M1 to M2, etc,.,, 
but the reasoned relation between the mental events that are realised by neural states. 
Murphy poses the central question this way: `How does modus ponens get its grip on 
the causal transitions between brain states'? 99 
The concept of supervenience was introduced by Richard M. Hare. 1°° He 
used the term to relate ethical judgments to descriptive situations. As an example, 
Hare states 
" `The Problem of Mental Causation: How Does Reason Get its Grip on the Brain? '. Science and 
Christian Belief, 14 no. 2 (2002), p. 146. This is a rephrasing of Colin McGinn's inquiry into how 
`modus ponens gets its grip on the causal transitions between mental events'. See 'Consciousness and 
Content' in Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Guven Guzeldere (eds. ), The Nature of Consciousness: 
Philosophical Debates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 305. 
100 Hare introduced the term `supervenience' in the context of philosophical analysis; however, G. E. 
Moore also asserted a similar thesis. Although Moore did not use the term `supervene' he did assert 
that `one of the most important facts about qualitative difference... [is that] two things cannot differ in 
quality without differing in intrinsic nature'. See G. E. Moore, Philosophical Studies (London: 
Routledge Press, 1922), p. 263. 
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First, let us take that characteristic of `good' which has been called its 
supervenience. Suppose that we say, `St. Francis was a good man'. It 
is logically impossible to say this and to maintain at the same time 
that there might have been another man placed exactly in the same 
circumstances as St. Francis, and who behaved in exactly the same 
way, but who differed from St. Francis in this respect only, that he 
was not a good man. 101 
So in this example, the ethical judgment of `goodness' supervenes on a 
collection of circumstances that formally instantiates St. Francis' character. 
Donald Davidson made a monumental move in using the concept of 
supervenience to describe the relationship between mental and physical events. 
Mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, 
on physical characteristics. Such supervenience might be taken to 
mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but 
differing in some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in 
some mental respect without altering in some physical respect. 
Dependence or supervenience of this kind does not entail reducibility 
102 through law or definition'. 
Although there is no formally agreed upon definition of supervenience, 
Terrence E. Horgan has provided a widely accepted description. He states that: 
The concept of supervenience, as a relation between properties, is 
essentially this: Properties of type A are supervenient on properties of 
type B if and only if two objects cannot differ with respect to their A- 
properties without also differing with respect to their B-properties. 
Properties that allegedly are supervenient on others are often called 
consequential properties, especially in ethics; the idea is that if 
something instantiates a moral property, then it does so in virtue of, 
i. e., as a (non-causal) consequence of, instantiating some lower-level 
property on which the moral property supervenes. ' 3 
Murphy suggests that Horgan's definition is insufficient because it overlooks 
an important dimension of the supervenience relation - the condition of 
circumstance. In Hare's example, the qualifier `placed in precisely the same 
circumstances' is critical. For instance, the judgment of St. Francis being a good 
101 The Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 145. 
102 'Mental Events', in L. Foster and J. Swanson (eds. ), Experience and Theory (Amherst, Mass.: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1970), pp. 79-101. 
103 `Supervenience', in Robert Audi (ed. ), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 778-779. 
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man is contingent upon his behaviour, namely the giving away of his possessions 
and living a life of poverty. Now, assume that his circumstances had been different 
and he had children to feed. In this particular set of circumstances, the relinquishing 
of resources to provide for his family might have very well led to him to be judged 
as not a good man. In other words, it is conceivable that in circumstance (c) St. 
Francis is a `good man' and in circumstance (c) St. Francis is `not a good man'. 
So then, Murphy redefines supervenience in the following way: 
Property S is supervenient on property B if and only if something's 
being B constitutes its being S under circumstance C. 104 
The salient feature of Murphy's revised definition is that it allows the 
supervenience relation to be multiply realisable. '05 So, with the possibility of a 
multiple supervenience, if S supervenes on B (in circumstance c), then something's 
being B entails its being S, but its being S does not entail its being B. For example, I 
can say that `St. Francis was a good man' and I could also say that `Abraham 
Lincoln was a good man'. Although both of these supervenient claims may be 
justified it does not follow that Abraham Lincoln lived as St. Francis or vice versa. 
104 'Nonreductive Physicalism: Philosophical Issues', p. 135. Murphy's intent is to stress the 
functional nature of supervenient properties. Her definition makes it possible to say that `mental 
properties supervene on brain properties and at the same time to recognize that some mental 
properties are codetermined by the way the world is'. See `Supervenience and the Downward 
Efficacy of the Mental: A Nonreductive Physicalist Account of Human Action', p. 150. 105 For a detailed account of Murphy's notion of supervenience see `The Problem of Mental Causation: 
How Does Reason Get its Grip on the Brain? ', Science & Christian Belief 14 (2002), pp. 143-158; 
'Physicalism Without Reductionism: Toward a Scientifically, Philosophically, and Theologically 
Sound Portrait of Human Nature', Zygon 34 (1999), pp. 551-571; `Supervenience and the Downward 
Efficacy of the Mental: A Nonreductive Physicalist Account of Human Action', in Robert John 
Russell, Nancey Murphy, Theo C. Meyering, and Michael A. Arbib (eds. ), Neuroscience and the 
Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action (Vatican City: Vatican Observatory Publications, 
1999), pp. 147-164; and 'Supervenience and the Nonreducibility of Ethics to Biology', in Robert John 
Russell (ed. ), Evolutionary and Molecular Biology: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action (Vatican 
City: Vatican Observatory Press, 1998). 
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The value of this application of supervenience is to show that the identity 
relationship (complete causal reduction) does not hold in all cases. The pertinent 
issues are as follows: 106 
1. whether there are multiple circumstances such that B constitutes S 
in circumstance c but is not the case that B constitutes S in 
circumstance c'; and if so 
2. whether or not c, c', etc. are describable at the subvenient level; 
3. whether S is multiply realizable; and if so 
4. whether there is a finite disjunctive set of realizands. 
Murphy's more complex definition of supervenience leads to the 
conclusion that 
Reduction will only be possible in the limiting case where B 
constitutes S under all circumstances and S is not multiply realizable. 
Reduction will not be possible when: (1) there are multiple 
circumstances that make a difference to the supervenience relation 
and these circumstances cannot be defined in terms of the subvenient 
level; or (2) when S is multiply realizable and there is no finite 
disjunctive set of realizands. 107 
Warren Brown provides a simple example applying the concept of 
supervenience as presented above. He says 
You might be able to give a complete (reductionist) neuromuscular 
description of raising your arm, but that description would miss the 
fact that raising your arm was for the purpose of casting a deciding 
vote in a meeting. The neuromuscular explanation would 
systematically miss the cognitive and social facts of the matter. Thus, 
the explanation of voting (or intention to vote) as a cause of 
subsequent effects on the ongoing social intercourse of the meeting in 
question supervenes on the physiological (neuromuscular) causal 
explanation. Or, to state it more technically, the supervenient 
property of voting allowed the lower level neuromuscular events of 
arm raising to participate in a broader, more complex causal 
process. 108 
106 Murphy, `Nonreductive Physicalism: Philosophical Issues', p. 136. 
107 Ibid., p. 136. 
108 'Nonreductive Physicalism and Soul: Finding Resonance Between Theology and Neuroscience', 
American Behavioral Scientist 45 no. 12 (2002), p. 1817. 
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In the present case, it is important to understand that the use of supervenience 
is not intended to eliminate the causal efficacy of subvenient properties or to grant 
causal efficacy to supervenient properties per se; rather, `the best account we can 
give of the causal efficacy of mental states is to assume that they supervene on 
physical states, and it is the physical states that are causally efficacious. That is, it is 
because my thought "I should take an umbrella" is realized neurobiologically that it 
is capable of initiating the chain of physical events resulting in my picking up the 
umbrella'. 109 
In this sense, it is the reasoned relation between mental states that determines 
a subsequent brain state, not the supervenient mental state itself. In order to clarify 
this notion, one must first consider two additional concepts central to the 
nonreductive physicalist thesis - emergence and top-down causation. 
3.3.2 Emergence and Top-Down Causation 
My challenge in this section will be to apply the notion of supervenience in 
the context of emergent properties that possess downward causal efficacy. It is my 
position that such a task can be achieved without compromising the physicalist 
nature of the person. Just as with the notion of supervenience suggested above, this 
section will stress the functional character of mental states. In order to properly 
discuss the concepts of emergence and top-down causation, allow me to review a bit 
of history. 
Roy Wood Sellars is noted for his description of a hierarchy of systems 
which he dubbed `emergent realism'. He argued against the notion that complex 
0 
109 Murphy, `Supervenience and the Efficacy of the Mental', p. 153-154. Emphasis added. 
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systems were mere aggregates of the particles that made them up. 
' 1' This idea of a 
hierarchy of complex systems was not a new one, but gained prominence through 
Sellar's work. In theological circles, the hierarchy has been used by Arthur 
Peacocke to demonstrate the nature of what he calls `whole-part causation'. 
"' 
The hierarchy has been further developed by Nancey Murphy and George 
Ellis. Figure 1 represents the hierarchy as will be discussed in the present work. 
112 
Murphy and Ellis expanded Peacocke's version of the hierarchy by distinguishing 
between the natural and applied human sciences. In addition, they added the level of 
ethics which they consider an essential ingredient of any adequate account of reality. 
The purpose in introducing the hierarchy of complex systems is to provide a 
visual schematic for the following discussion of emergence and top-down causation. 
Metaphysics 
(Theology) 
Cosmology Ethics 
I 
Motlvatlonal Studies 
Astrophysics 
Social & Applied Sciences 
Geology, Ecology Psychology 
Biology 
I 
Chemistry 
Physics 
Figure 1 
110 Roy Wood Sellars, The Philosophy of Physical Realism (New York: Russell and Russell 
Publishing, 1966, first published in 1932). Also see W. Preston Warren (ed. ), Principles of Emergent 
Realism: The Philosophical Essays of Roy Wood Sellars (St. Louis, Mo.: Warren H. Green Publishing, 
1970). 
111 For more on Peacocke's use of the hierarchy see 'God's Interaction with the World: The 
Implications of Deterministic "Chaos" and of Interconnected and Interdependent Complexity', in 
Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur Peacocke (eds. ), chaos and Complexity: Scientific 
Perspectives on Divine Action (Vatican City: Vatican Observatory Press, 1995), pp. 263-288; and 
Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming - Natural, Divine and Human (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1993). 
112 Figure 1 is taken from Nancey Murphy and George F. R. Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the 
Universe: Theology, Cosmology, and Ethics (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1996), p. 204. 
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The term emergence refers to the fact that complex entities can exhibit 
properties that are not present within the constituent elements that make up the 
complex entity. An emergent property is then understood to be a property whose 
existence is derived from a set of complex interactions. Such `emergent properties' 
are capable of exhibiting causal efficacy over the base elements from which they 
emerge. In the case of cognitive properties, emergence allows for the creation of 
new determinative influences with respect to thought and behaviour. Warren Brown 
states that 
A critical aspect of a truly emergent property is that the 
configurational regularities of the complex system affect the 
interactions of the more micro-level elements. So, my conscious 
thinking, as an emergent function of the configurational regularities of 
interactions between the micro-level constituents of my nervous 
system, creates determinative influences on my behaviour that cannot 
be accounted for solely on the basis of the underlying micro-level 
operations of the brain. 3 
Brown offers the following points as critical to the concept of emergence: 114 
1. New functional capacities arise from the interactions between the 
parts of a complex system. 
2. Interactions create larger dynamic patterns that bind smaller units 
into webs of interactive influences. 
3. These larger dynamic patterns operate by different rules and 
causal processes than the parts (i. e., they have emergent 
properties). 
4. What is more, the relational constraints of the larger pattern on the 
individual parts significantly increase the range of possibilities for 
the system as a whole. 
So, applying this notion of emergence to the hierarchy of complex systems 
reveals the possibility that entities belonging to higher levels in the hierarchy can 
113 `Nonreductive Physicalism and Soul: Finding Resonance Between Theology and Neuroscience', 
pp. 1817-1818. 
These points are taken from Brown's presentation at the 2005 Fuller Symposium on the Integration 
of Faith and Psychology (16-18 February 2005, Pasadena, CA), Science, Faith, and Human Nature: 
Reconciling Neuropsychology and Christian Theology. Lectures available online at 
httn: //wwwfuller edu/son/integration/Symposium/Syml2osium%202005/Sympositim2005. htmi 
(accessed on 1 June 2006). 
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have determinative effects on base levels in the hierarchy. The most relevant 
application of this concept to the present discussion concerns the cognitive processes 
(deciding, judging, etc. ) occurring at the psychological level. So then, the task is to 
demonstrate how it is that mental events (reasons) can have causal influence on 
physical brain states. This is an extension of the challenge discussed above 
concerning supervenience. The difference is that we now have the concepts of 
emergence and top-down causation to apply. 
Before proceeding, a brief excursus on the nature of `causation' is in order. 
Alicia Juarrero has compiled an impressive account of human action by applying the 
concepts of action theory and complex system dynamics. ' 15 Juarrero argues that a 
complete account of downward causation ('self-cause') has not been offered in 
contemporary theories of action due to a faulty understanding of cause and 
explanation. 
Beginning with Aristotle's claim that an entity cannot act on itself (thus 
rendering `self-cause' unintelligible), a foundation was laid concerning the nature of 
`cause' that extended to the realm of Newtonian science. ' 16 By the end of the 
seventeenth century the Newtonian worldview had reduced wholes to their 
component parts with the negative effect of rendering `whole' entities causally 
impotent by-products! 17 Juarrero comments that 
Newton's physics take place in an absolute, three-dimensional 
Euclidean space. Inhabiting this universe are material particles: tiny, 
discrete objects sometimes pictured as minuscule marbles. These 
atoms constitute the building blocks of all matter and are acted upon 
115 See Alicia Juarrero, Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System (Cambridge, 
Mass.: The MIT Press, 2002). 
116 Aristotle claims that 'in so far as [a thing] is a natural unity, nothing is acted upon by itself; 
because it is one, and not a separate thing'. See Metaphysics, Vol 1, trans. Hugh Tredennick 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933), p. 431. 117 This philosophical move was solidified by the removal of Aristotle's 'formal' and 'final' cause. 
As a result, goal-seeking (structuring) causes no longer qualified as 'cause'. This left the notion of 
causation open for the insertion of mechanistic concepts of motion typical to Newtonian physics. See 
Juarrero, Dynamics in Action, pp. 15-24 for a detailed account of this transition. 
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according to fixed laws by external forces such as gravity. According 
to the clockwork mechanism this view describes, things are related to 
each other only externally. One atom activates a second by colliding 
with it and thereby impressing an external force on the latter. 
Aristotle's ban on self-cause thus became firmly entrenched after 
Newton. 118 
Newton's physics left no room for either entities in the external world or 
particular goal states to serve as the intentional objects of action. The practical result 
of this form of atomism was the loss of context and environment as constituents of 
any theory of human action. 
Self-'cause' was subsequently reconceptualised as self-'motion. In the 
context of Descartes's dualism, a nonmaterial entity (soul or mind), distinct from the 
body became the efficient cause of human action. This immaterial entity did not 
require anything external to activate it (no goal or end-state intention). However, 
when combined with the Newtonian understanding of cause (billiard ball, A --> B -+ 
C, etc... ), a host of philosophical problems arose - namely the challenge to reconcile 
how an immaterial mind can insert itself into a causal chain of physical forces. 
The alternative, offered by the materialists, placed efficient cause within the 
physical structure of the brain. In this scenario, a base part of the brain triggers 
another part, which in turn pushes another, which eventually pushes the 
skeletomuscular system resulting in an observable action; thus, the goal becomes 
finding the most basic element in the human brain that initiates action. All the while, 
`behind these conundrums lurked both the Aristotelian understanding of cause that 
prohibited self-cause, and the modem view of cause as only collision [of individual 
atomic particles]'. ' 19 
Against the backdrop of this construal of the concept of `cause', Juarrero 
asserts that the notion of history and context have been eliminated from metaphysics 
118 Ibid., p. 21. Emphasis added. 119 Ibid., p. 23. 
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and epistemology. Thus, her project is to rescue action theory from an `inadequate, 
350-year-old model of cause and explanation'. 120 She does so by claiming that 
action theory needs an account of how the content of an intention can inform and 
flow into behaviour such that the action actualises the content of the intention. 
Juarrero recruits resources from a relatively new branch of thermodynamics referred 
to as the theory of complex adaptive systems. This theory deals with systems `far 
from equilibrium' and open to energy exchanges with the environment. 121 
Juarrero insists that `as a result of this reformulation, complex adaptive 
systems can serve as a "theory-constitutive metaphor" that allows us to rethink the 
philosophical concept of cause, particularly as it applies to causal relations between 
parts and wholes. In turn, this rethinking will radically recast our understanding of 
intentional causality and human action'. 122 Complex adaptive systems are the result 
of the emergence of relatively autonomous qualities. Within the context of system 
development, quantitative changes produce qualitative changes in the overall 
system. 123 
Once a transition point is passed in the development of a complex system, 
new modes of causal being emerge; thus, `the most essential and characteristic 
feature of a qualitative transformation is that new kinds of causal factors begin to be 
significant in a given context, or to "take control" of a certain domain of phenomena, 
with the result that there appear new laws and even new kinds of laws, which apply 
in the domain in question'. 124 This aspect of complex systems is an integral part of a 
theory of top-down causation. An important aspect of Juarrero's argument is that it 
120 Ibid., p. 3. 
121 This field was pioneered by Ilya Prigogine. See I. Prigogine and I. Stengers, Order out of Chaos: 
Man's New Dialogue with Nature (New York: Bantam, 1984). 
122 Juarrero, Dynamics in Action, p. 119. 
123 See D. Bohm, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics (Philadelphia, Penn.: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1971). 
124 Ibid., p. 53. 
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upholds the notion of self-cause that necessitates the interaction between external 
environmental inputs and 'intention' on the part of the agent. 
125 This is an important 
point to which we will return in the following chapter. 
The notion of top-down causation is not a new concept. '26 A relatively recent 
and well-known account is Donald Campbell's description of downward causation in 
the evolutionary process. The purpose of offering such an account is to demonstrate 
an instance where higher-level systems have a selective effect on lower-level entities 
and their causal effects. 
Campbell's account concerns the role of natural selection in the production of 
jaw structures in worker ants. He points out that the jaws arc designed in such a way 
that conforms to the laws of macromechanics, that is, they arc maximally efficient 
for the work required of the ant. Campbell points out that `we need the laws of 
levers, and organism-level selection ... to explain the particular 
distribution of 
proteins found in the jaw and hence the DNA templates guiding their production'. 
127 
This example is intended to illustrate the following four points: 
1. All processes at the higher levels are restrained by and act in 
conformity to the laws of lower levels, including the levels of 
subatomic physics. 
2. The telconomic achievements at higher levels require for their 
implementation specific lower-level mechanisms and processes. 
Explanation is not complete until these micromechanisms have 
been specified. 
125 'Complex adaptive systems exhibit true self-cause: parts interact to produce novel, emergent 
wholes; in turn, these distributed wholes regulate and constrain the parts that make them up' (Juarrero, 
D, namics in Action, p. 130). 
For example Austin Farrer argued that 'higher-level patterns of action.. . may 
do some real work 
and thus not be reducible to the mass effect of lower-level constituents... (IJn cellular organization the 
molecular constituents are caught up and as it were bewitched by larger patterns of action, and cells in 
their turn by the animal body'. The Freedom of the Will - The Gifford Lectures, 1957 (New 
York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 57. Although Farrer was plainly trying to suggest a type of 
downward causation, language of this sort adds to the confusion over the matter. 
127 "'Downward Causation" in Hierarchically Organised Biological Systems' in Francisco J. Ayala 
and T. Dobzhansky (eds. ), Studies in the Philosophy of Biology: Reduction and Related Problems 
(Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1974), p. 180. 
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3. The emergentist principle: Biological evolution in its meandering 
exploration of segments of the universe encounters laws, 
operating as selective systems, which are not described by the 
laws of physics and inorganic chemistry, and which will not be 
described by the future substitutes for the present approximations 
of physics and inorganic chemistry. 
4. Downward causation: Where natural selection operates through 
life and death at a higher level of organization, the laws of the 
higher-level selective system determine in part the distribution of 
lower-level events and substances. Description of an 
intermediate-level phenomenon is not completed by describing its 
possibility and implementation in lower-level terms. Its presence, 
prevalence, or distribution (all needed for a complete explanation 
of biological phenomena) will often require reference to laws at a 
higher level of organization as well. Paraphrasing Point 1, all 
processes at the lower levels of a hierarchy are restrained by an 
act in conformity to the laws of the higher levels. 128 
Campbell's account can be demonstrated by the schematic below (figure 
2): 129 
differential survival 
and reproduction 
+ 
environment 
jaw structure 
$ 
' --*---DNA -0 protein structures 
Figure 2 
The information encoded in the DNA of the worker ant contributes to the 
production of particular protein structures. The jaw structure of the ant supervenes 
on the protein formation - this is `bottom-up causation'. However, downward 
128 Ibid., p. 180. A similar account of downward causation is offered by philosopher, Robert Van 
Gulick. He adds that `we can say that the causal powers of a composite object or event are 
determined in part by its higher-order (special science) properties and not solely by the physical 
properties of its constituents and the laws of physics.... Thus the whole is not any simple function of 
its parts, since the whole at least partially determines what contributions are made by its parts'. 
`Who's in Charge Here? And Who's Doing All the Work? ', in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds. ), Mental 
Causation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 251. 
129 Figure 2 is taken from Nancey Murphy, `The Problem of Mental Causation: How Does Reason 
Get Its Grip on the Brain? ', Science and Christian Belief 14 (2002), p. 150. 
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influences from the environment (represented by the dashed line) play a role in 
encoding the DNA that lead to the protein structures upon which the jaw structure 
supervenes, etc... So we have an example of co-determination -a process of feed- 
back loops that involve both `bottom-up' and `top-down' causation. 
So how does this process relate to mental events? Perhaps it is best to ask the 
question this way: how does the brain become structured in such a way that causal 
processes realise rational processes? 130 Many researchers claim that the structuring 
of neural systems occurs through a process of random growth of synaptic 
connections. These connections are then subjected to a subsequent process of 
strengthening or weakening based on the frequency of their activation - this process 
can also be called learning. 131 Simply stated, useful neural connections that model 
various relations within the world become strengthened while the unused 
connections weaken and eventually disappear. 
In this sense, the environmental selection of neural connections and the 
subsequent fine tuning of synaptic weights - top-down causation - provides a 
plausible account of how the brain becomes structured in such a way to execute 
rational processes - the embodied person interacts with his or her environment to 
select which causal connections will be activated. As the connections among things 
in the environment come to be modelled by complex neural assemblies, free 
association becomes `rational' thought. 132 
130 For Murphy, this is the key issue. This notion of `structuring' is based on Fred Dretske's work on 
`structuring' and `triggering' causes. See `Mental Events as Structuring Causes of Behaviour', in J. 
Heil and A. Mele (eds. ), Mental Causation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 121-136. 131 Some refer to this process as `Neural Darwinism'. Gerald Edelman has argued this position in 
Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind (New York: Harper Collins, 1992). 
132 Murphy offers an example of how interactions in the social world can structure the brain in ways 
that eventually lead to rational thought. She considers the social environment of the child's classroom 
and the teaching of simple arithmetic. The mental condition of (5 X 7) supervenes on a brain state B, 
and a brain state B2 represents any number of possibilities for the answer. Feedback from the social 
environment (i. e. the teacher) strengthens the mental condition that says that 5X7= '35'. 
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To claim that the environment conditions human behaviour is certainly not a 
new idea (this was central to behaviourism), but the nonreductive physicalist will 
take this a step further in arguing that neural pathways can be organised via one's 
own mental operations. 133 By this I mean that any of the vast neural assemblies in 
the brain representing rational norms can exhibit causal efficacy upon the brain itself. 
Demonstrating this will require moving to the level of information processing. 
Donald MacKay offers a way of understanding the hierarchical structuring of 
cognitive processes. Note the feedback system below (Figure 3): 
19 
Figure 3 
Here the action of the effector system, E, in the field of action, F, is 
monitored by the receptor system, R, which provides an indication, If, 
of the state of F. This indication is compared with the goal criterion, 
Ig, in the comparator, C, which informs the organizing system, 0, of 
any mismatch. 0 selects from the repertoire of E action calculated to 
reduce the mismatch. 134 
This schematic can be used to represent simple self-governing systems such 
as a thermostat. It can also be used to demonstrate how, in a cognitive sense, 
learning becomes a self-governing process. In the case of learning, 0 can represent a 
Subsequently, the mental condition '35' supervenes on a physical brain state B2 that over time 
becomes rationally related to B,. `The Problem of Mental Causation', pp. 151-152. 133 This discrepancy with behaviourism can be understood as the difference between end states and 
goal states. The idea of `cause' inherent in behaviourist philosophy rightly emphasised environment, 
but ignored the possibility of an agent being embedded in the environment to the degree that an 
organism-context system emerges. In essence, behaviourists saw the environment as only a triggering 
mechanism and ignored that environmental influences become part of the external structure of 
complex human behavioural systems. For more see Juarrero, Dynamics in Action, pp. 63-75. 
134 Donald O. MacKay, Behind the Eye (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1991), pp. 43-44. 
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plethora of possible answer selections of which one is selected based on external 
social forces (as in rote learning), or it can represent an organising system that 
involves a skill (learning how to perform a particular operation). In the latter case, 
feedback from the environment not only reinforces `correct' answers, but trains the 
organising system itself to perform rational operations. 
Once this system has been trained it can take the place of the teacher, 
selectively reinforcing right answers and thus the neural connections 
that subserve them. So the brain becomes a self-modifying system, 
modifying its own neural structure in response to norms incorporated 
into its operations. The organizing system is trained by the 
environment and it in turn has downward causal efficacy in governing 
lower-level cognitive processes and thus the neural structures that 
3s subserve them. 
MacKay offers a second schematic that involves the internal evaluation of 
cognitive processes (Figure 4). Here MacKay incorporates a supervisory system 
(SS). This supervisory system selects from the organising system (0) parts of the 
repertoire appropriate to incoming mismatch signals from the comparator (I) and 
supervises the development, trial, and updating of the repertoire. 136 
Figure 4 
This diagram represents the internalisation of the cognitive processes 
required to both evaluate and correct performance. The addition of the supervisory 
135 Murphy, 'The Problem of Mental Causation', p. 153. 136 Behind the Eye, p. 51. 
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system allows for an additional feedback loop internal to the information flow 
system - thus, allowing for a more complex set of top-down causal properties. 
137 
MacKay provides yet another more complex schematic (Figure 5) in order to 
demonstrate the possibility of a systems adoption of `goal-directed' behaviour. This 
aspect of downward causation is important, not only to a nonreductive physicalist 
view of human nature, but also to the whole of the present work. Here, the 
supervisory system is replaced by a meta-comparator (MC) and a meta-organizing 
system (MO). Also, FF represents a `feed-forward' system with feature filters. 
Figure 5 
In the previous schematic (figure 3), the goal state (Ig) is set by some 
criterion outside the system, but the addition of a meta-organiser and meta- 
comparator allows the goal state to be set by higher-level processes within the 
system itself. MacKay says `we have drawn the meta-organizing system with a 
meta-evaluative procedure to take stock of how things are going. It adjusts and 
reselects the current goal in the light of its evaluation of the success of ongoing 
agency, and it also keeps up-to-date the organizing system to match the state of the 
137 It is worth noting here that this notion of top-down causation extends beyond the philosophical 
framework that I have discussed above. Recent neuroscientific research has demonstrated a `nested 
hierarchy of control functions within the prefrontal cortex' that bears striking similarity to MacKay's 
model. See E. Koechlin, C. Ody, and F. Kouneiher, `The Architecture of Cognitive Control in the 
Human Prefrontal Cortex', Science 302 (2003), pp. 1181-1185. 
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world indicated by the feed forward from the receptor system.... So there is a meta- 
organizing system, which organizes the activity of the organizing system in the way 
that the organizing system organizes the activity in the outside world'. 138 
The significance of this more complex schematic is that it allows for the 
possibility of `moral' reasoning, that is, higher-order reason, in the form of goal 
directed intention, can play a causal role in behaviour - thus arises the option for 
various sorts of religious and altruistic motivation in behaviour. This capacity is a 
critical component of nonreductive physicalism and is vital to my discussion of 
Christian conversion. 
In summary, what I have attempted to show in the previous section is how it 
is possible that a physicalist account of the person can fail to reductive. I have done 
so by showing how the emergence of higher-order capacities supervene on physical 
brain states. The reasoned relations between supervenient mental states exemplify a 
sort of top-down causation on base neural constituents. The work of Donald 
MacKay and Alicia Juarrero has proven to be indispensable in offering a way of 
understanding downward causation in mental processes, even in the case of moral 
reasoning. 
Many, particularly in theological circles, will take issue with the 
nonreductive physicalist view of human nature on the grounds that the human 
uniqueness is lost without the existence of an immaterial self (soul or spirit). The 
final section of this chapter will be dedicated to showing how one can espouse a 
thoroughly physicalist view of the human person without compromising theological 
integrity. 
138 McKay, Behind the Eye, pp. 141-142. 
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3.4 The Human Capacity for Relatedness 
Espousing any form of physicalism has its challenges. In addition to the 
capacities mentioned above, there are a number of dimensions within human 
experience that have great theological significance. There are properties and 
attributes of human nature that seem critical in the religious life. These aspects of 
human nature are thought to be that which makes us unique among creation. 
Concepts such as sin, redemption, grace, worship, etc. all seem to possess an aspect 
that extends beyond what can be explained from a physicalist perspective. Another 
way of posing this question is to ask how a purely physical being can be made in the 
image of God. 
I claim that nonreductive physicalism does allow for the emergence of human 
beings as unique among creation. As such, the theological integrity of the human 
person can be preserved without resorting to claims of an essential self or soul. I 
follow Warren Brown in submitting that the capacities that are considered to be 
critical to a theological portrait of the human person can be expressed as the capacity 
for personal relatedness. ' 39 This unique human capability is an emergent property 
of human cognition. '40 
Recall from chapter two I discussed Wesley's concept of being made in the 
`image of God'. While many would consider this to refer to the `rational' nature of 
139 Warren S. Brown, 'Neurobiological Embodiment of Spirituality and Soul', in Malcolm A. Jeeves 
(ed. ), From Cells to Souls - and Beyond: Changing Portraits of Human Nature (Grand 
Rapids, Mi.: 
William B. Eerdman's Publishing Company, 2004), pp. 58-76; `Evolution, Cognitive Neuroscience, 
and the Soul' in Keith B. Miller (ed. ), Perspectives on an Evolving Creation (Grand Rapids, 
Mi.: 
William B. Eerdman's Publishing Company, 2003), pp. 502-523; `Nonreductive Physicalism and Soul: 
Finding Resonance Between Theology and Neuroscience' American Behavioral Scientist 45 (2002), 
pp. 1812-1821; 'Cognitive Contributions to Soul', in Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and H. 
Newton Malony (eds. ), Whatever Happened to the Soul?: Scientific and Theological Portraits of 
Human Nature (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1998), pp. 99-125; `Conclusion: Reconciling 
Scientific and Biblical Portraits of Human Nature' in Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and 
H. 
Newton Malony (eds. ), Whatever Happened to the Soul?: Scientific and Theological Portraits of 
Human Nature (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1998), pp. 213-228; 
140 Note that this claim is consistent with the nonreductive physicalist thesis discussed above. 
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human beings, Wesley suggested that the imago Dei refers to our relational nature. 
It is then through relationship that human identity emerges. This idea resonates with 
Warren Brown's claim that the `soulish'141 nature of human beings arise from three 
dimensions of relatedness: '42 
1. The qualitative and quantitative differences between human and 
nonhuman interindividual relatedness. Differences of depth, 
scope, complexity, and range in time, space, and topic. 
2. The subjective (intrapersonal) process of self-relatedness and 
self-representation. 
3. The capacity for, and experiences of, relatedness to God. 
In this sense, our humanness emerges through the expression of relatedness. 
This emergence is manifest within the boundaries of three critical interpersonal 
aspects: (1) the complex process of an individual's relatedness to others; (2) the state 
of being related to by a human community; and (3) the act of God's relating to 
humankind. 143 This last aspect in particular can be understood as the most definitive 
of human dignity and uniqueness. 
Arnold Come supports the notion that human integrity is born from the 'God- 
man' relationship. Come says 
It should be clear by now that in defining the human `soul' we are not 
seeking some elusive, immaterial substance which is distinct from 
body even while in a body. Rather, we are trying to isolate the 
uniqueness of that configuration of life we call `human', which is 
integrally fleshly or somatic. What are its unique characteristics, 
powers, capacities, and form which make it a genus of life unlike all 
others? This uniqueness of life is what a `soul' of man consists of. 
tai Although Brown uses the language of 'soul', he is not positing the ontological existence of an 
immaterial entity. Brown comments, "'soul" (or at times "soulful" or "soulish") is used to designate 
not an essence apart from the physical self, but the net sum of those encounters in which embodied 
humans relate to and commune with God (who is spirit) or with one another in a manner that reaches 
deeply into the essence of our creaturely, historical, and communal selves'. See 'Cognitive 
Contributions to Soul', p. 101. 
142 'Evolution, Cognitive Neuroscience, and the Soul', pp. 507-508. 
143 Ibid., 508. 
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The Christian understanding of human life... derives from that God- 
man relationship. 144 
From a cognitive perspective there are a number of capacities that must be in 
order for a proper functioning sense of relatedness. Brown lists the following 
capacities: 145 
1. language: the capacity to communicate a potentially infinite 
number of propositions; to relate regarding complex, abstract 
ideas, as well as about the past and the future 
2. a theory of mind: an ability to consider the most likely thoughts 
and feelings of another person 
3. episodic memory: a conscious historical memory of events, 
persons, times, and places (i. e., more than memory for actions and 
their consequences) 
4. conscious top-down agency: conscious mental control of 
behaviour; the ability to modulate ongoing behaviour in 
relationship to the conscious process of decisionmaking 
5. future orientation: ability to run mental scenarios of the future 
implications of behaviours and events 
6. emotional modulation by complex social and contextual cognition 
that serves to guide ongoing behaviour and decisionmaking 
These cognitive capacities account for the distinctiveness of the human 
species. It is the uniquely human capacity for personal relatedness that sets us apart 
from the rest of creation. This relatedness should be understood as both multi- 
dimensional and multi-directional experiences of relationship both with God and 
creation. 
144 Arnold B. Come, Human Spirit and Holy Spirit (Philadelphia, Penn.: Westminster Press, 1959), pp. 
59-60. 
145 'Cognitive Contributions to Soul', pp. 103-104. This list is not intended to be exhaustive; rather, it 
is intended to point out the cognitive capacities to which a good deal of research has been committed. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I will simply list these and forgo a lengthy discussion of each. 
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3.5 Process or Event? -A Nonreductive Physicalist Corrective 
To reiterate an earlier point, the nonreductive physicalist view of the human 
person requires a process-oriented view of conversion. 146 In the following chapter, I 
will offer a proper definition of conversion; however, at present, I wish to address 
the issue of process or event as it relates to the concept of sanctification. 
John Wesley's notion of sanctification serves as a critical theological language 
for my understanding of conversion at large; however, his teachings have been 
subject to a degree of doctrinal evolution, particularly through the nineteenth-century 
holiness movement. In this brief section, I will offer a corrective to what I judge as a 
negative transition from Wesley's view of sanctification as a healing process to a 
crisis event. 
As I mentioned in chapter two, interpretations of Wesley's teaching on `entire 
sanctification' has remained divided to this day. The concept of being entirely 
cleansed from the `sinful nature' (entirely sanctified) held a prominent place in the 
emerging holiness movements in England and America. One of the central questions 
concerning the phenomenon was how it was to occur - whether by process or crisis 
event. As the idea of entire sanctification became increasingly nuanced, the 
tendency arose to resolve the tension between crisis and process by stressing the 
instantaneous character of a `second blessing' or a `second definite work of grace'. 
Adam Clarke, an influential biblical commentator from England, claimed that 
In no part of the Scripture are we to seek holiness gradatim. We are 
to come to God as well for an instantaneous and complete purification 
14 One could claim that a person could attain immediate holiness via God's instantaneous alteration 
of neurobiological substrates; however, to do so would be to misunderstand both the process of 
neurobiological transformation as well as the nature of holiness that I am arguing for in the present 
work. Holiness, in the present context, is not to be equated with an ethereal state of being (condition 
of the soul, etc. ), but with observable socio-moral attitude and behaviour, such a transformation is 
necessarily processive. In addition, as I will argue in the following chapter, God's activity in 
conversion should be understood as co-operant - that is, God respects the constraints of 
neurobiological systems. 
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from all sin, as for an instantaneous pardon. Neither the seriatim 
pardon, nor the gradatim purification, exists in the Bible. It is when 
the soul is purified from all sin that it can properly grow in grace, and 
in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ47 
Clarke's commentary seemingly resolved the Wesleyan tendency in favour of 
crisis event; however, it downplayed the teleological character of Wesley's practical 
theology by moving `entire' sanctification to an earlier point in the Christian 
experience - becoming the presupposition for, rather than the goal of, Christian life. 
The implicit effect of this move was a tendency to stress sanctification in terms of 
`salvation from sin' rather than `perfection in love'. 
Another key figure in the evolution of sanctification as a crisis event is the 
holiness preacher, Phoebe Palmer. Her `altar theology' stressed the immediate 
availability of the `second blessing' (entire sanctification). Palmer claimed that 
holiness was a state of grace in which every Christian should live and that all 
believers could `exercise faith' and claim entire sanctification even without 
emotional assurance. 148 
Palmer's teachings seemed to dismiss the struggle for Christian growth that 
characterised eighteenth-century Methodism and encouraged an immediate 
appropriation of the sanctification experience. This progression seems natural as 
Palmer asserts that the sanctified life `as it has been purchased for you, it is already 
147 Adam Clark, Christian Theology, Samuel Dunn (ed. ), (New York: Carlton and Porter, 1835), pp. 
207-208. Also see reference to this discussion in John Leland Peters, Christian Perfection and 
American Methodism (New York: Abingdon Press, 1956), pp. 103-107. Clarke's influential 
commentary on the Bible was published first in America between 1811 and 1825. This set became 
the exegetical standard for Methodism and the early holiness revivals. See Adam Clarke, The Holy 
Bible, containing the Old and New Testaments: the Text carefully printed from the most correct 
copies of the present authorized translation, including the marginal readings and parallel texts; with 
a Commentary, and Critical Notes, designed as a help to a better understanding of the Sacred 
Writings, 6 volumes (New York: Ezra Sargent, 1811-1825). 148 See Phoebe Palmer, The Way of Holiness, with Notes by the Way (New York: Lane and Tippett, 
1845), pp. 60ff. 
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yours. If you do not now receive it, the delay will not be on the part of God, but 
wholly with yourself'. 
149 
The final figure that I will mention is Charles G. Finney, American revival 
preacher and leader in the Second Great Awakening. Finney is known as the most 
influential of the Calvinist revivalists of his era. He advocated a `New Measures' 
style of revivalism. The emergence of this style can be understood as the permeation 
of primarily Reformed denominations (particularly Presbyterian and Congregational) 
by Methodist concepts and practices. 150 
Finney's style of evangelism retreated from the traditional Wesleyan 
understanding of Christian growth and gave increasing support to Palmer and other 
American revivalists that stressed the crisis nature of sanctification. His sense of 
immediacy and pragmatism insisted on the availability of salvation `now' and 
highlighted the place of human agency in the revival phenomenon. 
Finney's approach undercut the concern of Jonathan Edwards and his 
followers to conceive of revival more as a `work of God' and conversion as a 
`miracle' to be granted in God's own time. '5' William Warren Sweet has argued that 
`Finney made salvation the beginning of religious experience in contrast to the older 
revivalism which made conversion the end'. 152 This statement summarises the 
difference between Wesley and Clarke/Palmer/Finney and indicates the extent to 
which the evolution of thought regarding sanctification resulted from the 
contextualisation of Wesleyan thought with American revivalism. 
149 Phoebe Palmer, Faith and Its Effects (Toronto: G. R. Sanderson, 1856), p. 53. 
1S0 See Richard Carwardine, `The Second Great Awakening in the Urban Centers: An Examination of 
Methodism and the "New Measures"', Journal of American History 59 (1972), pp. 327-340. 
151 For a helpful comparison see William G. McLoughlin, Modern Revivalism (New York: Ronald 
Press, 1959), p. 85. 
152 William Warren Sweet, The American Churches: An Interpretation (New York: Abingdon- 
Cokesbury Press, 1947), p. 126. Here conversion refers to the transformation of the tempers and 
affections - Wesley's great appeal for the acquisition of `holy tempers' through a 
therapeutic 
understanding of salvation. Such an understanding is necessarily process-oriented. 
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My point in offering this summary of sanctification as a crisis event or 
`second blessing' is to demonstrate its incommensurability with the model of 
sanctification that a nonreductive physicalist view of the human person requires. If 
sanctification is indeed understood as a `cleansing of the sinful nature' or, in 
Wesley's terms, a `renewal of holy tempers', then such a renewal must occur through 
a complex process of socio-moral transformation -a transformation that is 
contextual by nature. If one adheres to the belief in an ontologically immaterial soul, 
then it is possible to conceive of such a radical and instantaneous transition - from 
unholy to holy, unsanctified to sanctified; however, the argument that I have offered 
in this chapter makes such a position implausible. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has been dedicated to addressing the issue of human nature or 
theological anthropology. The question `what are human beings? ' can be reframed 
to ask `what are humans made of? Within the context that I have presented, this 
question has been met with either dualist or reductive views of human nature. I have 
proposed that the way one answers this question has a profound impact on his or her 
view of Christian spirituality. 
If the goal of Christianity (even if an implicit goal) is to have a `saved soul' 
or for our souls to `go to heaven when we die', then the tendency exists to relegate 
the call to be the visible Kingdom of God in the world (Body of Christ/the Church) 
to secondary status. '53 To claim, as I have in this chapter, that humans do not 
153 There are many examples of this hermeneutic, not least of which is the tendency of some to 
interpret fvrbc (entos) in Luke 17: 21 - `The Kingdom of God is among you' - to read 'The Kingdom 
of God is within you'. Although the classical Greek translation literally means `within', the corporate 
nature of its use should not be ignored. When the interpretation is thought to mean `within' an 
individual subject, the Kingdom of God can be more easily construed as private and a matter of 
personal experience. Such a view vindicates itself of the mandate to be a public and political presence 
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actually possess an ontologically distinct soul - we are not `made' of separable 
material and immaterial entities - affects the way that Christians conceive of 
spirituality (a term that often is assumed to imply immateriality), conversion, and 
essential practices such as discipleship. 
I clearly reject any position that would remove the public character of the 
Christian faith -a spiritualist dichotomy that separates inner from outer to the point 
of aberration. While I do not deny the existence or value of an `inner life', it would 
be a serious misunderstanding of the Christian Gospel to ignore the central themes of 
creation, incarnation, God's action in history, and the resurrection of the body. On 
this note, William Temple, the distinguished Archbishop of Canterbury, claims that 
Christianity is 
the most avowedly materialist of all the great religions.... Its own 
most central saying is: `the Word was made flesh', where the last 
term was, no doubt, chosen because of its specifically materialist 
associations. By the very nature of its central doctrine Christianity is 
committed to a belief in the ultimate significance of the historical 
process, and in the reality of matter and its place in the divine 
scheme. 154 
My central claim in this chapter is that both dualist and reductive materialist 
views of human nature are undesirable on philosophical and theological grounds. I 
offer a third alternative, Nonreductive Physicalism (NrP), as a viable theory of 
human nature. Such a theory avoids the problems inherent in ontological substance 
dualism while preserving the causal efficacy of `higher order' capacities necessary 
for a proper theological anthropology. 
in the world - the embodiment of `new creation'. For an extended discussion see Joseph A. 
Fitzmeyer, `The Gospel According to Luke' in The Anchor Bible Dictionary, (Garden City: Double 
Day, 1985), pp. 1160-1162. For a profound work on the necessary visibility of the Church see John 
Howard Yoder, The Politics of Jesus (Grand Rapids, Mi.: William B. Eerdman's Publishing Company, 
1994). 
154 William Temple, Nature, Man and God (London: Macmillan, 1934), p. 478. See also Christus 
Veritas: An Essay (London: Macmillan, 1924); and Christianity and Social Order (New York: 
Seabury Press, 1977). 
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The nonreductive physicalist view of human nature that I have argued for in 
this chapter together with the insights from Wesleyan theology discussed in chapter 
two, supplies the critical elements necessary to propose a new model of Christian 
conversion. The following chapter will be dedicated to this task. 
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Chapter 4 
Rewired 
Re-Imagining Christian Conversion 
If perfection can be characterized only by `reference to the wholeness 
of a human life' then the language of stages is far too abstract. 
Rather, what is required is the actual depiction of lives through which 
we can be imaginatively drawn into the journey by being given the 
means to understand and test our failures and successes. That such is 
the case, moreover, reflects the kind of journey that Christians are 
asked to undertake. For the telos of the Christian life is not a goal 
that is clearly known prior to the undertaking of the journey, but 
rather we learn better the nature of the end by being slowly 
transformed by the means necessary to pursue it. Thus, the only 
means to perceive rightly the end is by attending to the lives of those 
who have been and are on the way. - Stanley Hauerwas' 
The purpose of the present chapter will be to offer a new model of Christian 
conversion based on insights gained from the previous two chapters. In chapter one, 
we discussed reasons why it is desirable to seek such a nuanced concept of 
conversion as the one that I propose. I claim that a `correct' (informed as possible) 
view of conversion and how it occurs is critical to Christian community orthopraxis. 
The way that Christians understand discipleship or spiritual development is 
conditioned by a particular view of conversion; that is, what we are as human beings 
and what we are to `become' through the Christian faith is greatly influenced by 
one's preconceived notion of how this transformation occurs. 
As the title of the thesis suggests, the proposed model of Christian conversion 
is based on insights gained from Wesleyan theology as well as from a nonreductive 
physicalist view of human nature. The application of concepts from these two areas 
'Stanley Hauerwas, Sanctify Them in the Truth: Holiness Exemplified (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1998), p. 128. 
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will necessarily involve a multidisciplinary approach; therefore, the following model 
will be informed by both theological concepts as well as relevant data from various 
scientific disciplines. As discussed in the opening chapter of this thesis, I argue that 
such an approach is not only justified, but arguably necessary to fully understand 
complex phenomena such as conversion. 2 
In chapter two, I argued that the theology of John Wesley provides a view of 
creation possessing an inherent `telos'. This ultimate end or goal is understood as 
the redemption of the whole of creation. At the centre of this redemption lies 
Wesley's notion of the `way of salvation'. This `way' is informed by Wesley's 
distinctive affectional moral psychology. Here an emphasis is placed on the 
acquisition of holy tempers; that is, the heart of religion for Wesley is the 
transformation of those inclinations in human nature that serve as motivators for 
moral attitude and behaviour. Throughout this chapter I will demonstrate how 
Wesley's notion of the `way of salvation', and his concept of sanctification in 
particular, provides a necessary language for an approach to the phenomenon of 
Christian conversion. 
I presented three key features of Wesley's theological anthropology: (1) 
relational anthropology where the emphasis is on the relational nature of humankind; 
(2) holistic anthropology where Wesley stresses holistic human nature (i. e. 
interrelatedness of body and soul); and (3) affectional moral psychology which is 
central to his mature view of salvation. 
Wesley presents salvation as constituted by God's prevenient, justifying, and 
sanctifying grace. Sanctification is understood as the process whereby the `tempers' 
2 While I do claim that the understanding of any given phenomenon increases as explanations are 
offered at new levels, my current investigation involves explanations offered by theology and the 
cognitive sciences (which special emphasis on neuropsychology). I do realize that there are 
additional levels which offer an explanation of conversion (sociological, anthropological, etc. ); 
however, I will refrain from engaging those resources here. 
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are transformed and one's motivations, attitudes, and behaviours are changed to 
reflect the image of God. Such a change is critical to the creation and cultivation of 
relationship. My central claim was that Wesley's notion of sanctification is 
equivalent to my concept of Christian conversion, and thus provides a theological 
language for the observed socio-moral change. 3 
In chapter three, I presented a cogent description of the nonreductive 
physicalist view of human nature. My central argument was that a proper view of 
human nature is critical to virtually every dimension of religious life. The traditional 
options fell victim to either dualism or reductionism; thus, I offered a third 
alternative, nonreductive physicalism, as a means to both avoid the problems of 
dualism and reductionism as well as preserve the uniqueness of the human species 
necessary for theological integrity (in terms of personal and communal 
interrelatedness). In the closing section, I argued for the human capacity for 
relatedness by demonstrating that the particularly social nature of the human species 
can be accounted for without requiring a nonmaterial essence such as the soul. 
I suggest that the nonreductive physicalist view is crucial to the present work 
not because it reflects a particular philosophical thesis, but because it represents the 
`hard core' (in the Lakatosian sense) of a research programme that seeks to explain 
human nature. As such, various philosophical concepts and scientific data are 
3 Further support for this notion of conversion can be found in Catholic theology. Jesuit theologian, 
Donald L. Gelpi, cites the 'new' theology of conversion that has developed since Vatican II. This 
theology of conversion views conversion as ongoing and synonymous with `sanctification'. The 
terminology that Gelpi cites makes it clear that conversion does not happen once and for all, but is 
rather a lifetime affair. Gelpi states that `one does not understand the meaning of any belief until one 
has grasped its practical, operational consequences. The new theology of conversion insists, therefore, 
that the experience of sanctification defines the very meaning of conversion. See The Conversion 
Experience: A Reflective Process for RCIA Participants and Others (New York: Paulist Press, 1998), 
p. 102. Similar sentiments have long been a part of Catholic practice. The process oriented nature of 
conversion is exemplified by the early practice of delaying baptism and first communion until the 
Easter after the new member had completed catechesis. 
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critiqued and applied respectively. 4 For example, 'neuroscience', as a set of data, 
offers neither support nor refutation for any particular explanation of a phenomenon. 
It is only through philosophical interpretation that such data become applicable. 
So then, the insights from chapters two and three will serve a critical role in 
my definition and explanation of Christian conversion. This synthesis will appear in 
the following sections beginning with my proposed definition of Christian 
conversion. 
4.1. Defining Christian Conversion 
The definition of Christian conversion that I offer is constituted by four 
salient features: 
I claim that (1) Christian conversion is a process involving normal human 
biological capacities. (2) It is characterised by a change in socio-moral attitude and 
behaviour, and (3) is best understood as the acquisition of virtues intrinsic to 
Christian faith. Such acquisitions are facilitated through social interaction and 
participation in practices inherent to the Christian community. (4) Furthermore, the 
conversion process should be viewed as the co-operant result of Divine grace and 
human participation. 
In the following section, I will offer justification for this definition. 
4 Nancey Murphy has applied this approach in several instances where there are multidimensional 
data sets available. Once the `hard-core' is established then a number of `auxiliary hypotheses' are 
offered to support the central claim. For example see, Murphy and Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the 
Universe. 
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4.2 Explaining Christian Conversion 
Justification of the proposed definition will involve both theological and 
scientific data. I will address each of the salient features listed above beginning with 
the notion that conversion is a process involving normal human biological capacities. 
4.2.1 Conversion as a biological process 
In chapter three, I made a case for the link between biology and morality. 
Through the process of evolution, human beings have acquired such a level of 
complexity as to allow for the emergence of `higher order' capacities such as 
morality. Ursula Goodenough and Terrence Deacon suggest that moral experience 
entails a coupling of our rich heritage of social orientation with our 
ability to represent it to ourselves symbolically. During this coupling, 
the experience of our prosocial capacities, and their role in affecting 
action, is radically transformed, and what emerges is a major 
augmentation of our social heritage. We are able to apply these 
amplified prosocial capacities to experiences, imaginings, and modes 
of action that are no longer constrained by evolutionary precedents 
and classes of phylotypic stimuli. Indeed, our capacity for conceptual 
blending allows us to synthesize moral understandings and emotional 
experiences that would otherwise be mutually exclusive. 
It is then through the evolution of symbolic interaction that our capacity for 
moral behaviour arises. 6 The evolutionary branches of biology and psychology have 
contributed a great deal of research helping us to understand complex human 
functions. As Deacon makes clear, it is the complex evolution of our brains that 
s Goodenough and Deacon, From Biology to Consciousness to Morality, p. 814. A significant 
premise follows from this claim - Goodenough and Deacon claim that humans do not acquire 
morality by means of cultural instruction alone; rather, we 'discover' morality or learn to 'see' it. 
This, of course, resonates with virtue theory and the works of Aristotle (The Nicomachean Ethics). I 
will return to this notion later in this chapter. 6 This is a complex process that I will not discuss here. For an excellent resource on the issue see 
Terrence W. Deacon, The Symbolic Species. 
7 For example, research is burgeoning in the area of neuroscience which claims that the human brain 
has evolved in such a way as to give rise to morality. For example see Jorge Moll, Ricardo de 
Oliveira-Souza, and Paul J. Eslinger, 'Morals and the human brain: a working model', in 
NeuroReport 14 no. 3 (2003), pp. 299-305. 
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leads to capacities particular to human beings. So, we see scientific disciplines 
emerging which focus on the brain and cognition. 
Various disciplines within the cognitive sciences are dedicated to 
investigating human cognition. At an increasing rate, brain sciences are permeating 
many scientific disciplines resulting in the emergence of new fields of investigation 
- such as neuropsychology, 
8 social cognitive neuroscience, 9 and even 
neurotheology. 1° These all point to the significance of the human brain in complex 
functioning. 
Recall that in chapters one and two, I argued for an understanding of 
conversion that extends beyond 'religious experience' per se. Instead, I intend for 
the term conversion to designate a significant socio-moral transformation. 
" Such a 
transformation necessarily encompasses all human attitudes and behaviours - this is 
what Wesley meant by `holiness of life'. So, properly understood, conversion entails 
a transformation of the underlying motivations that bring about attitudes and 
behaviours particular to the Christian faith. 
This claim, coupled with my call for a physicalist view of the human person 
(albeit nonreductive), leads to the claim that conversion must somehow involve our 
physical or embodied selves - that is, it must in some way be a change recognisable 
8 The aim of neuropsychology is to understand how the structure and function of the brain relates to 
specific psychological processes. It is a popular field with a rich literary history. 9 See Liebermann and Ochsner. 10 The basis of 'neurotheology' is the application of brain sciences in order to understand religious 
phenomena. There are a multitude of publications ranging from an obscure work by Laurence O. 
Mckinney (Neurotheology: Virtual Religion in the 21'' Century (Arlington, Mass.: American Institute 
for Mindfulness, 1994)) to the more scientifically oriented research offered by Andrew Newberg and 
Eugene D'Aquili. See Why God Won't Go Away (New York: Ballantine Books, 2002); 'The 
Neuropsychology of Religious and Spiritual Experience', Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (2000), 
pp. 251-266; 'The Creative Brain/The Creative Mind', Zygon 35 (2000), pp. 53-68; 'The 
Neuropsychology of Aesthetic, Spiritual, and Mystical States' Zygon 35 (2000), pp. 39-51; and 'The 
Neuropsychological Basis of Religions, or Why God Won't Go Away', Zygon 33 (1998), pp. 187-201. 
"Recall that I use the term 'socio-moral' to designate those behaviours that are necessary for the 
flourishing of human life, both individual and communal. I will also add, but not argue, that such 
behaviours are necessary for true happiness. In this vein, Wesley believed that holiness of life was 
integrally related to happiness; thus he believed that none were truly happy except the 'real inward 
Christian' (Sermon 77: Spiritual Worship, BE 3: 99). 
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at a biological level of investigation. 12 It follows, then, that we need a way to view 
conversion as a biological process. 
In order to present such a view, I will first offer a way of conceiving of moral 
sentiment and action in a biological framework. Then, I will demonstrate the way in 
which a change in these capacities is likely to occur. The purpose for doing this, I 
argue, is that given that human persons are biological beings, it follows that any 
change involving our biological substrate must respect the nature in which such 
changes occur. 13 In other words, I am suggesting that conversion be seen as 
occurring in a `normative' fashion in the sense that biological constraints must be 
considered. 
In order to present conversion as a biological process, I suggest the 
consideration of three interrelated levels: 
1. The phenomenal level which, in the present case, is the occurrence 
of conversion. 
2. The cognitive level which designates the components of a moral 
cognition. These components are constituent of a sense of moral 
responsibility; thus, any change in socio-moral attitude and 
behaviour must somehow involve these capacities. 
3. The neural level which describes the biological correlates of 
moral cognition. 14 
Here, moral cognition generally refers to what researchers in the field of 
social cognitive neuroscience refer to as social cognition. The two are equivalent is 
as much as they both deal with the neural underpinnings of human socio-moral 
12 It will be clear at this point that I reject any notion of conversion claiming that the change is due to 
an alteration in `soul' or 'spirit'. - when these terms are meant to designate an ontologically distinct 
immaterial entity. 13 I want to stress that this in no way violates my argument for a 'top-down' form of causation. At no 
point do I wish to argue that emergent properties can exert causal efficacy that leads to a violation of 
the laws existing at the lower levels. 
14 While I assume it to be true that some relationship exists between various brain areas and moral 
cognition, I am quick to point out that identifying such neural mechanisms is difficult. I hold that the 
exercise of moral sentiment and judgment in humans requires multiple cognitive processes and is 
ultimately an affair of the entire brain and body - in other words, I do not claim that moral cognition 
is 'in the head' or is the result of any particular module within the brain. 
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behaviour. Ralph Adolphs states that social (moral) cognition refers to `the 
processes that subserve behaviour in response to conspecifics (other individuals of 
the same species), and, in particular, to those higher cognitive processes subserving 
the extremely diverse and flexible social behaviours that are seen in primates'. 15 
There have been two main approaches to the study of the neural systems critical to 
moral cognition in humans. The first involves socio-moral impairments following 
brain damage to specific parts of the brain (particularly the prefrontal cortices, e. g. 
Phineas Gage) and the second concerns the social impairments observed in studies of 
autism. The importance of moral cognition to the present work is to point out the 
burgeoning evidence showing the biological links to moral behaviour. 16 
The top or phenomenal level will represent the occurrence of conversion - 
again, understood as a change in socio-moral attitude and behaviour. The cognitive 
level involves an understanding of the cognitive components which make a change 
in socio-moral attitude and behaviour possible (from a neurobiological point of 
view). I will assume that the components necessary for such a change to be the same 
15 See 'Social cognition and the human brain', Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 no. 12 (1999), pp. 469- 
479. 
16 For more see Ralph Adolphs, 'Cognitive Neuroscience of Human Social Behaviour', Nature 
Reviews: Neuroscience 4 (2003), pp. 165-178; Joseph P. Forgas (ed. ), Handbook of Effect and Social 
Cognition (Mahwah, N. J.: Lawrence Eribaum Associates, Publishers, 2001); and Ii. T. Reis and W. A. 
Collins, 'Relationships, Human Behavior, and Psychological Science', Current Directions in 
Psychological Science 13 (2004), pp. 233-237. For a helpful overview of the literature in social 
cognitive neuroscience specific to moral cognition and the prefrontal cortex see Jacqueline N. Wood, 'Social Cognition and the Prefrontal Cortex', Behaviorial and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews 2 (2003), pp. 97-114. In addition, William D. Casebeer has offered in insightful investigation into the 
relationship between moral theory and what science tells us about moral cognition. Casebeer 
concludes that the moral psychology required by virtue theory is the most neurobiologically plausible. I believe that this conclusion will be valuable to the future of research in moral cognition. For more 
see 'Moral cognition and its neural constituents' Neuroscience 4 (2003), pp. 841-846; Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionisrn, and Moral Cognition (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2003); 
and William D. Casebeer and Patricia S. Churchland, 'The Neural Mechanisms of Moral Cognition: A Multiple-Aspect Approach to Moral Judgment and Decision-Making', Biology & Philosophy 18 (2003), pp. 169-194. 
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as those constituent of a sense of moral responsibility. I will list these below, but for 
the purposes of the present work, I will only offer a brief explanation of each. 
17 
1. Self-concept - Consciousness of one's own identity. Self-concept 
does not refer to the recognition of an ontological entity within a 
human person - `There is indeed such a thing as self- 
consciousness in the philosophical sense of the term, but it is not 
consciousness of a "self'. It is a distinctively human capacity for 
reflexive thought and knowledge, wholly dependent upon 
possession of a language'. 18 Leslie Brothers has offered research 
regarding the neurobiological underpinnings of the `person 
concept'. A dimension of this concept involves the person's 
ability to locate his or herself in a social network with its various 
interrelational dynamics. 19 
2. Language - The capacity to communicate a potentially infinite 
number of propositions or abstract ideas about the past, present or 
future. 20 
3. Episodic memory -A conscious historical memory of events, 
persons, times and places - `episodic memory is our recall of the 
events of our past that are marked in our recollection by specifics 
of time and place'. 21 It is the `cumulated events of one's life, an 
individual's autobiography'. 22 In this sense, episodic memory is 
critical to our ability to reflect and make future judgments. 
17 These are adapted from a similar list offered by Nancey Murphy. See 'Who's Responsible', in 
Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown, Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?: Philosophical and 
Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, Publication forthcoming). Also, Francisco J. Ayala claims that human beings exhibit ethical 
behaviour by nature. This is due to our biological constitution which involves three necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions for moral behaviour. These conditions are 'a) the ability to anticipate the 
consequences of one's own actions; b) the ability to make value judgments; and c) the ability to 
choose between alternative courses of action'. See 'So Human an Animal: Evolution and Ethics', in 
Ted Peters (ed. ), Science and Theology: The New Consonance (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), p. 
129. Note that some of these components coincide with Brown's suggestions regarding the cognitive 
components of 'soulishness'. 
18 Bennett and Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, p. 324. 19 It is this dimension of Brother's concept of the person that I wish to relate to 'self-concept'. See 
Friday's Footprint: How Society Shapes the Human Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997). 
20 A seminal work on language and its role in the development of higher order human capacities is 
offered by Terrence W. Deacon. See The Symbolic Species. In addition Warren S. Brown offers a 
helpful discussion of language as it concerns the capacity for personal relatedness. See 'Cognitive Contributions to Soul' pp. 104-108. 21 Ibid., p. 113. 22 Larry R. Squire, Memory and Brain (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 169.1 will 
challenge Squire on one point - it seems a confusion to speak of memories as stored in the brain. 
Such conjures an image of the human brain as a massive filing cabinet. I follow Bennett and Hacker 
in understanding the capacity to remember various events as being 'causally dependent on different brain areas and on synaptic modifications in these areas'. See The Philosophical Foundations of 
Neuroscience, p. 159. 
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4. Imagination - The ability to predict outcomes in relation to goals, 
i. e. imagine the future. Brown refers to this as the capacity to 
imagine 'future orientation'. Such is meant to denote 'the ability 
to run a conscious mental simulation or scenario of future 
possibilities for the actions of oneself and others, and to evaluate 
these scenarios in such a way as to regulate behaviour and make 
decisions now with regard to desirable future events'. 23 
5. Theory of Mind (ToM) - The ability to predict the mental states of 
others. This metacognitive skill has long been researched and 
found to be a crucial aspect of a properly functional moral 
cognition. Simply stated, a theory of mind allows an individual to 
make statements such as `I think that he thinks'. 24 
6. Top-down agency - The ability of higher-order human capacities 
to exert causal efficacy over base constituents. Brown asserts that 
top-down agency designates the ability `to modulate behaviour in 
relationship to conscious thought and intention'. 25 
7. Goal formation - The ability to form goals in light of abstract 
concepts including non-embodied ideals such as truth and love. 
In the case of moral goals, the affective dimension of human 
cognition plays a critical role26 
8. Action potential - The physical ability to act on conscious or 
intuitive judgments. 
These cognitive components represent capacities that are necessary for, not 
only the state of moral responsibility, but they also designate the capacities that must 
be affected in a change in moral attitude and behaviour. To be clear, the components 
that I have listed are neither exhaustive nor are intended to represent any type of 
`one-to-one' relationship to the realisation of moral action. As stated earlier, moral 
cognition is a complex state of affairs that can only be understood in terms of whole 
body relations to dynamic environmental situations. Nevertheless, the list of 
23 `Cognitive Contributions to Soul', p. 117. 24 There is a bounty of research on ToM. For some helpful examples see Simon Baron-Cohen, Helen Tager-Flusberg, and Donald J. Cohen (eds. ), Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from 
Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); C. D. Frith and U. 
Frith, `Interacting Minds -A Biological Basis', Science's Compass: Review: Cognitive Psychology 286 (1999), pp. 1692-1695; and V. E. Stone, S. Baron-Cohen, and R. T. Knight, `Frontal Lobe Contributions to Theory of Mind', Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 10 (1998), pp. 640-656. 25 `Cognitive Contributions to Soul', p. 117. 26 Perhaps the most notable example can be seen in Antonio Damasio's Somatic Marker Hypothesis. I will address this hypothesis in detail later in this chapter. 
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cognitive components that I have offered allows one to conceive of the type of 
biological processes that undergird moral inclination and response. 
Investigation of the neural correlates of moral cognition strengthens this 
claim. By `neural correlates' I am referring to a collection of data that point to 
particular areas within the brain that appear to be `correlated' with various levels of 
socio-moral attitude and behaviour. Jorge Moll and colleagues suggest that the 
present state of neuroscientific research points to the existence of brain networks 
specialised for the generation of moral emotions. 
7 Such emotions are integral to the 
formation and implementation of moral action. 
To sum up thus far, I began this section by recalling that Wesley's 
understanding of conversion was characterised by a `holiness of life' -a change in 
both attitude and behaviour. Such a change permeates every aspect of the convert's 
life. I suggested then that such a change can (and should) be considered biological in 
nature. I then offered as a conceptual framework the three interrelated levels - 
phenomenal (the occurrence of conversion), cognitive (the cognitive capacities 
underlying moral `selfhood'), and neural (the various neural networks correlated 
with socio-moral function). 
At this juncture, I propose that conversion, seen as a change in socio-moral 
attitude and behaviour, can be understood (from a neurobiological point of view) as 
learning a new way of relating. This process of change is commensurate with a 
reorganisation of neurobiological substrate and as such can be characterised as 
27 Jorge Moll, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Paul J. Eslinger, Ivanei E. Bramati, Janaina Mouräo- 
Miranda, Pedro Angelo Andreiuolo, and Luiz Pessoa, `The Neural Correlates of Moral Sensitivity: A 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Investigation of Basic and Moral Emotions', The Journal of 
Neuroscience 22 no. 7 (2002), pp. 2730-2736. Also see Jorge Moll, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, 
Ivanei E. Bramati, and Jordan Grafman, `Functional Networks in Emotional Moral and Nonmoral 
Social Judgments', Neurolmage 16 (2002), pp. 696-703. 
172 
neuroplastic in nature. 28 In short, I am suggesting that conversion supervenes on an 
alteration of neurobiological substrate. A brief discussion of neural plasticity is in 
order. 
The ability of the brain and/or certain parts of the nervous system to respond 
and adapt to new conditions is called neural plasticity. Specifically, neural plasticity 
refers to the formation, breakdown, and re-formation of neural synapses, and the 
subsequent changes in brain function. Synapses are formed or reinforced as an 
individual experiences or performs particular actions - such actions stimulate 
simultaneous activity of the presynaptic and postsynaptic neurons. In contrast, 
synapses dissolve as neural links become less active due to the lack of corresponding 
experiences or actions. As this process of formation and breakdown occurs, 
localised subsystems within the brain change and as a result become more or less 
capable of performing certain tasks. 
Research in brain plasticity is well-known in the field of neuroscience. In 
fact, the nineteenth century scientist, Santiago Ram6n y Cajal, described the brain's 
ability to adapt to environmental change. 
When one reflects on the ability that humans display for modifying 
and refining mental activity related to a problem under serious 
examination, it is difficult to avoid concluding that the brain is plastic 
and goes through a process of anatomical and functional 
differentiation, adapting itself progressively to the problem.... In a 
certain sense, it would not be paradoxical to say that the person who 
initiates the solution to a problem is different from the one who solves 
it 29 
28 I will use the term neuroplasticity or neural plasticity in a descriptive fashion. By this I mean that I 
am characterising the change by using this term. I am thereby not implying any causal explanation. 
In other words, I am not saying that neural plasticity causes conversion nor am I saying that neural 
plasticity is conversion in the sense of a type-identity relationship. I am simply saying that a 
physicalist account of the person requires that a psychological change be commensurate with a change 
in brain state. I am using the term 'neural plasticity' to describe this relationship. 29 Santiago Ram6n y Cajal, translated by Neely Swanson and Larry W. Sanson, Advice for a Young 
Investigator (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1999), p. 35. 
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It is obvious that human beings are able to adapt to a multitude of 
environmental fluctuations. While there has long been research showing neural 
plasticity and neurogenesis in various areas of the somatosensory and visual cortices, 
hippocampus, etc., 30 little research has been done on neural plasticity and changes in 
personality. Jim Grigsby and David Stevens discuss synaptic (neural) plasticity in 
such a context. They claim that 
Personality is shaped by the interaction of constitutional processes 
and the experiences of individuals in unique environments. In other 
words, we are, at least in part, who we learn to be. As a result of 
these experiences, learning drives the acquisition and refinement of a 
wide repertoire of enduring perceptions, attitudes, thoughts, and 
behaviours. The relative permanence of learning and memory reflects 
the operation of processes that modify the microscopic structure of 
the brain, yielding changes in different aspects of functioning over 
time as a result of the individual's interactions with the world. These 
experience-dependent changes in brain structure and functioning are 
known by the general term synaptic plasticity. 
31 
The challenge then is to understand what type of experiences a person must 
have for the brain to undergo this process of plastic change. While there are obvious 
external environmental influences that shape us biologically (through the process of 
30 An example of plasticity in the somatosensory cortex is noted by V. S. Ramachandran's account of 
patients experiencing 'phantom limb syndrome'. See V. S. Ramachandran and S. Blakeslee, 
Phantoms in the Brain: Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind (New York: Quill, 1998). Changes 
in grey matter related to learning-induced plasticity have been observed by Bogdan Draganski, et al. 
See B. Draganski, C. Gaser, V. Busch, G. Schuierer, U. Bogdahn, and A. May, 'Changes in grey 
matter induced by training: Newly honed juggling skills show up as a transient feature on a brain- 
imaging scan', Nature 427 (2004), pp. 311-312. Research has shown that neurogenesis (the 
biological production of neurons) continues throughout the lifespan. These newly generated neurons 
express unique mechanisms to facilitate neural plasticity, which may be important for the formation 
of new memories. See C. Schmidt-Hieber, P. Jonas, and J. Bischofberger, 'Enhanced synaptic 
plasticity in newly generated granule cells of the adult hippocampus', Nature 429 (2004), pp. 184-187. 
Significant research has been offered by Eleanor A. Macquire demonstrating neuroplastic changes in 
the hippocampus of London taxi drivers. The increased size of the posterior hippocampi in the taxi drivers can be understood as a plastic change resulting from an increased demand for spatial memory 
and navigation skills. The taxi driver's repetitive stimulation of particular subsystems within the brain has led to the reinforcement of existing structures and the formation of new synapses that aid the drivers in their daily tasks. See E. A. Maquire, D. G. Gadian, I. S. Johnsrude, C. D. Good, J. 
Ashburner, R. S. J. Frackowiak, and C. D. Frith, 'Navigation-related structural change in the hippocampi of taxi drivers', Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 97 (2000), pp. 4398- 4403. It should be noted here that neural plasticity is not an open door to boundless biological change; the process does have its limits. For an example see Martin I. Sereno, 'Plasticity and its Limits', Nature 435 (2005), pp. 288-289. 31 Neurodynamics of Personality (New York: Guilford Press, 2000), p. 39. 
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natural selection for instance), there is reason to believe that self-induced 
neuroplastic change can occur. 
Jeffrey M. Schwartz has more than twenty years of research experience with 
patients suffering from Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). lie has noted that 
individuals suffering from OCD show increased metabolic activity in their occipital 
lobes and caudate nuclei. These brain areas along with the thalamus and cingulated 
gyrus are involved in a perpetual cycle of error detection that drives the patient to 
repeat certain actions over and over. 
Schwartz has gained significant recognition for his research demonstrating 
the effectiveness of behavioural therapy in the treatment of OCD. 32 The basic 
premise of Schwartz's therapy involves the ability of the patient to recognise the 
obsessive tendency before it is enacted as a compulsive behaviour. The individual 
then intentionally engages in an alternate physical activity while maintaining 
awareness that the obsessive feeling is `only OCD'. 
After a period of time, patients notice a reduction in obsessive tendencies 
commensurate with a reduction in metabolic activity in the brain areas involved in 
error detection. The `before and after' brain scans of OCD patients participating in 
Schwartz's behaviour therapy are striking. Schwartz attributes the success of the 
treatment to the individual's ability to exert mental force that alters 
obsessive/compulsive behaviour and ultimately changes the brain. 33 
32 See Jeffrey M. Schwartz, The Mind and the Brain: Neuroplastici y and the Power of Mental Force (New York: Regan Books, 2003); 'A Role for Volition and Attention in the Generation of New Brain Circuitry: Toward a Neurobiology of Mental Force', Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (1999), pp. 115-142; and Brain Lock: Free Yourself From Obsessive-Compulsive Behavior (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1997). 
33 For an extended discussion see Jeffrey M. Schwartz, Henry P. Stapp, and Mario Beauregard, 'The Volitional Influence of the Mind on the Brain, with Special Reference to Emotional Self-regulation', in Mario Beauregard (cd. ), Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2004), pp. 195-238. 
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In addition, Richard J. Davidson has been involved in research designed to 
examine the biological impact of meditation, particularly as it affects the central 
circuitry of emotion. Davidson and colleagues assert that the human brain along 
with various emotional tendencies can be transformed through mental training. 34 
While it is unclear precisely how neuroplastic changes occur in the brain, 35 
there is wide agreement that a structural change of some kind occurs at the synaptic 
level in response to experience. 36 The effect of such alters the probability that an 
action potential from a presynaptic neuron will lead to a discharge in a postsynaptic 
neuron. Grigsby and Stevens claim that 
On a functional level, the effect of synaptic plasticity is a change in 
probabilities. Learning induces structural changes that make it either 
more or less likely that stimulation of a given neuron or (more 
accurately) a population of neurons will cause the stimulated neurons 
to fire. -The probabilities are determined to a large extent by the 
overall state of the individual at any given time. Changing one's state 
34 H. L. Urry, J. B. Nitschke, I. Dolski, D. C. Jackson, K. M. Dalton, C. J. Mueller, M. A. Rosenkranz, 
C. D. Ryff, B. H. Singer, and R. J. Davidson, `Making a Life Worth Living: Neural Correlates of 
Well-Being' Psychological Science 15 (2004), pp. 367-372. For more regarding plasticity and its 
implications for transforming emotion and cultivating positive affect and resilience see `Toward a 
Biology of Personality and Emotion', Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 935 (2001), pp. 
191-207; 'Affective Style, Psychopathology, and Resilience: Brain Mechanisms and Plasticity', 
American Psychologist 55 (2000), pp. 1196-1214; and R. J. Davidson, D. C. Jackson, and N. H. Kalin, 
'Emotion, Plasticity, Context, and Regulation: Perspectives From Affective Neuroscience', 
Psychological Bulletin 126 (2000), pp. 890-909. It is worth noting that in addition to the `mental 
training' discussed by Davidson et al., I would add that `physical training' is imperative as well. I 
will return to this point later in this chapter. 35 One of the most popular notions of how learning (neural plasticity) occurs in the brain was offered 
a number of years ago by Donald O. Hebb. He suggested that 'the persistence or repetition of a 
reverberatory activity (or "trace") tends to induce lasting cellular changes that add to its 
stability... When an axon of cell A is near enough to excite a cell B and repeatedly or persistently 
takes part in firing it, some growth process or metabolic change takes place in one or both cells such 
that A's efficiency, as one of the cells firing B, is increased'. See The Organization of Behaviour: A 
Neuropsychological Theory (New York: Wiley Press, 1949), p. 62. For a critique of `Hebbian 
Learning', see S. J. Cruikshank and N. M. Weinberger, 'Evidence for the Hebbian hypothesis in 
experience-dependent physiological plasticity of neocortex: A critical review', Brain Research Reviews 22 (1996), pp. 191-228. 36 I recognise that much of the past research on neural plasticity involves infants or early developmental aspects. It is worth noting that there is a surge of recent work emphasising plasticity in 
the adult primate brain. This punctuates an implicit claim within the present work - learning and 
transformation (plasticity and neurogenesis) occurs throughout the life-span. For an example see 
Kozorovitskiy, et al., `Experience induces structural and biochemical changes in the adult primate brain', Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 102 no. 48 (2005), pp. 17478-17482. 
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can reset the probabilities for almost all kinds of behavioural, 
perceptual, cognitive, and mnestic activity. 37 
This means that when a person's activity is `effective', it is likely to recur in 
the future - the 
facilitation of specific behaviours is generally nonconscious and does 
not necessarily occur because an animal knows that it should behave 
in a particular manner. Instead, an activity that previously has been 
adaptive is likely to recur because the brain functions automatically, 
but probabilistically, to produce that behaviour in similar 
circumstances. 38 
In other words, each repetition of an action realised by a particular brain state 
has the effect of making the same action more likely to occur in the future. 
It should be noted that neuroplastic changes are best understood as a process 
involving complex neural networks situated within one's body and environment at 
large. Perhaps the best example of neuroplastic change is `learning'. Take for 
example, learning to play the piano or learning to ride a bicycle - both of these skills 
require the process of learning by trial and error. This is usually a slow and tedious 
task. Such exemplifies the nature of neuroplastic change - it is a gradual process of 
training resulting in the reorganisation of neurobiological substrate on which a 
particular skill supervenes. 
Given the above discussion, I claim that conversion can be understood (from 
a neurobiological point of view) as the learning of new skills characterised by a 
tendency toward a particular moral attitude and behaviour. Such learning should be 
considered a process involving neuroplastic changes in the complex neurobiological 
substrates necessary for proper socio-moral cognition. In Wesley's terms, such a 
change requires a transformation of the `tempers' or `affections'. In order to more 
37 Neurodynamics of Personality, p. 53. 38 Ibid., p. 51. This explanation introduces the potential for 'automatic behaviour'. This is an 
important concept to which I will return in the following section. 
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fully understand this claim, I will once again turn to Wesley's affcctional moral 
psychology. 
4.2.2 Conversion as a Transformation of the Tempers 
A salient feature of the analysis that I offered in chapter two was the 
emergence of a theological language for conversion as a process of the 
transformation of socio-moral attitude and behaviour. For Wesley this language was 
rooted in his theological anthropology and especially in his affectional moral 
psychology. 
A key aspect of this psychology was the place given to the `will' - here 
meant to signify the presence and actuation of 'affections'. For Wesley, these 
affections were not simply feelings, but 'indispensable motivating inclinations 
behind human action. In their ideal expression they integrate the rational and 
emotional dimensions of human life into holistic inclinations toward action (like 
love)'. 39 
So then, an affection is properly understood as 'transitory feeling state'4° _ 
e. g. feeling love for another. Another concept, perhaps more frequently applied by 
Wesley, was that of the tempers. A temper is a `habituated affection, or said 
differently, an enduring disposition to perceive/feel/think/act in a consistent manner 
(e. g. to be a loving person)' 41 
For Wesley, moral attitude and behaviour is motivated by the inclinations 
established by the affections and tempers. Wesley held that holiness of life was 
possible through the transformation of these dispositions; thus, he identified the goal 
39 Maddox, 'Reconnecting the Means to the End', p. 41. 
40 Strawn and Brown, `Wesleyan Holiness through the Eyes of Cognitive Science and Psychotherapy', 
p. 121. 
Ibid., 121. 
178 
of Christian practice as the recovery of `holy tempers'. True religion - attitude and 
behaviour marked by love - would then now from a purity of intention. In short, 
for 
Wesley, `conversion' was concerned with the transformation of unholy affections 
and tempers to those characterised by the love of God. 
Wesley recognised that such a transformation was unlikely to occur as a 
crisis event; rather, the renewal of the affections and tempers should be understood 
as a gradual process. Such a claim resonates with the discussion above regarding 
conversion as a biological `process'. This, together with the view of human nature 
offered by nonreductive physicalism, requires one to seriously consider the 
embodied nature of the conversion process. I propose, then, that science can once 
again prove to be helpful in understanding conversion at large. 
In the remainder of this section, I will offer scientific insights that help us to 
better understand what is meant by a transformation of the `tempers'. I will follow 
Brad D. Strawn and Warren S. Brown in offering four concepts from cognitive 
science that aid in this endeavour: procedural knowledge, affect memories, somatic 
markers, and automaticity. 
4.2.2.1 Procedural Knowledge 
Larry R. Squire and Daniel L. Schacter have identified two `kinds' of 
memory - declarative and nondeclarative. 
42 Both involve anatomically distinct 
neural substrates43 and contribute to different functions within the realm of human 
42 The Neuropsychology of Memory (New York: Guilford Press, 2002). 
43 Declarative memory is primarily hippocampus-based, while nondeclarative memory has 'other 
neural loci (e. g., amygdala, striatum, or cerebellum)'. See Allan Rosenblatt, 'Insight, Working 
Through, and Practice: The Role of Procedural Knowledge', Journal of the American Psychoanalytic 
Association 52 (2004), p. 202. 
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cognition. Declarative memory44is knowledge of particular facts or events that can 
be directly recalled. In contrast, nondeclarative memory designates a type of implicit 
knowledge of which is not easily accessible using language. An important type of 
implicit knowledge is known as procedural knowledge. 
Procedural knowledge deals with the learning of processes as opposed to 
facts or events. These processes include `motor skills (e. g., gymnastics), perceptual 
abilities (e. g., visual pattern recognition), cognitive skills (e. g., solving mental 
arithmetic problems), cognitive-perceptual skills (e. g., reading), and more complex 
kinds of tasks (e. g., playing music or learning social and relational processes)'. 
45 
N. J. Cohen describes procedural knowledge as a type of memory system that 
eludes verbal expression (and thus not constituting 'knowledge' in the same sense as 
declarative knowledge). As one gains procedural knowledge, `experience serves to 
influence the organisation of processes that guide performance without access to the 
knowledge that underlies the performance'. 46 Procedural knowledge is therefore 
well-learned, complex behaviours that are often elicited outside of an individual's 
conscious awareness. 7 So, actions elicited by procedural knowledge can be likened 
to `habits' in that they are formed over a sustained period of time, become 
`automatic' and are consequently `hard to break'. 48 
°d Declarative memory is generally further subdivided into episodic and semantic memory. See Jim 
Grigsby and David Stevens, Neurodynamics of Personality (New York: Guilford Press, 2000), pp. 87- 
89. 
+S Ibid., p. 91. Emphasis added. 
06 N. J. Cohen, 'Preserved learning capacity in amnesia: Evidence for multiple memory systems', in 
Larry R. Squire and N. Butters (eds. ), Neuropsychology of Memory (New York: Guilford Press, 1984), 
96. ýý 
E. J. Langer and L. G. Imber have contributed research demonstrating that with repetition, 
performance of procedurally learned processes become increasingly automatic. See 'When practice 
makes imperfect: Debilitating effects of overlearning', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
37 (1979), pp. 2014-2024. 
48 M. Mishkin et al. defined procedural knowledge as the retention of 'habits'. See M. Mishkin, B. 
Malamut, and J. Bachevalier, 'Memories and habits: Two neural systems', in G. Lynch, J. L. 
McGaugh, and N. M. Weinberger (eds. ), Neurobiology of Learning and Memory (New York: Guilford 
Press, 1984). 
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Procedural knowledge has an intimate connection to the concept of top-down 
'causation' that I discussed in chapter three. Dianne Deny and Donald Broadbent 
have provided a helpful experiment demonstrating the relationship between 
procedural knowledge and behaviour. 49 
Berry and Broadbent... asked subjects to try to control the output of a 
hypothetical sugar factory (which was simulated by a computer 
program) by manipulating the size of the workforce. Subjects would 
see the month's output... and then choose the next month's workforce. 
[The rule relating workforce and output was a complex mathematical 
formula. ].... Oxford undergraduates were given sixty trials at trying to 
control the output of the sugar factory. Over the sixty trials, they got 
quite good at controlling the output of the sugar factory. However, 
they were unable to state what the rule was and claimed they made 
their responses on the basis of `some sort of intuition' or because it 
'felt right. ' Thus, subjects were able to acquire implicit knowledge of 
how to operate such a factory without corresponding explicit 
knowledge. so 
This experiment demonstrates how system-type feedback loops relate to the 
embodied nature of mental causation. The interaction between the students and the 
computer programme represents high-order mental activity despite the fact that they 
were not able to `name' the complex process that contributed to their ability to reach 
their goal. The `knowledge' of how to successfully reach their goal exists only in the 
interaction between the students and the programme - the required knowledge was 
inaccessible apart from the activation of the relevant action-feedback loop. 
This example serves to emphasis the role of `cause' in mental `causation' (as 
discussed in the previous chapter). Brown notes that `causation' does not refer 
solely to the triggering of particular actions; rather, "`causes" of behavior are the 
processes by which a continuously active organism evaluates and modulates its 
49 Dianne C. Berry and Donald E. Broadbent, 'On the relationship between task performance and 
associated verbalizable knowledge', Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 36 (1984), pp. 
209-231. 
so As cited by John R. Anderson in Cognitive Psychology and Its implications (New York: Worth 
Publishers, 2000), pp. 236-237. 
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action. The causal role of the mental is evident in evaluative modulations of ongoing 
behavior, not in the initiation of behavior'. 51 
Strawn and Brown note that 'we are typically only conscious (usually 
somewhat after the fact) of the initiation and progression of [a] procedural sequence. 
Certain domains of our procedural knowledge, particularly those procedures that 
have to do with interpersonal interactions, go into what we call character'. 52 
suggest that a transformation of the tempers will involve a reorganisation of an 
individual's procedural knowledge. In short, conversion requires the learning of new 
'habits'. 3 In order for the formation of new habits to occur, new experiences must 
be present that result in the formation of new procedural knowledge 54 
4.2.2.2 Affect Memories 
Closely related to the concept of procedural knowledge are the formation and 
recollection of affect memories. Strawn and Brown claim that 
Affect memories are based on previous life situations. The affective 
responses that are triggered in new but similar situations are 
evaluative in that they code for us whether this situation is likely to be 
pleasant, threatening, sad, frustrating, etc. Sometimes we are aware 
of our emotional and evaluative responses, and sometimes we are not. 
If we become consciously aware of our emotional responses, it is after 
the fact. The emotion occurred automatically, then we became 
conscious of its occurrence. 55 
51 Brown, `Lecture 3: Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? ', Integration Lectures, p. 17. 52 'Wesleyan Holiness through the Eyes of Cognitive Science and Psychotherapy', p. 123. 53 The concepts of 'habits' has a long history. Aristotle considered the capacity to form habits to be a 
fundamental aspect of human nature. Likewise, his ethics were largely concerned with the formation 
of `virtuous habits'. See Nicomachean Ethics, Roger Crisp (ed. ), (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), especially Book II, Chapter 1. Within the area of modern psychology, William James 
referred to living creatures as 'bundles of habits'. See The Principles of Psychology (London: 
Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1890), p. 104. As mentioned in chapter one, the concept of habits is a key 
feature in virtue theory and one to which I will return to later in this chapter. sa This concept of new 'experiences' is a critical component of my overall argument and will be 
addressed in more detail later in this chapter. ss 'Wesleyan Holiness through the Eyes of Cognitive Science and Psychotherapy'. P. 123. 
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Despite the long history of conflict over the role of emotions in moral 
judgments6 current research in cognitive science shows that it is difficult to separate 
emotion from behaviour. 57 Strawn and Brown comment further that 'it is most often 
the case that our subconscious emotional evaluative responses frame our perception 
of a situation and govern our actions. Affective responses are among the many 
factors that influence which procedures are activated in a particular situation'. 
58 
These conclusions are supported by research indicating that socio-moral 
decision-making involves more than `reasoning'. Jonathan laidt's `social 
intuitionist' model of moral judgment represents the philosophical amalgamation of 
this research. 59 Haidt's model is `social' in that it deemphasises the private 
reasoning done by individuals and focuses on the importance of social and cultural 
influences. It is `intuitive' in that it states that socio-moral judgment is generally the 
result of quick, automatic evaluations to which `reasoning' is applied to ad hoc. 
Collaborative research between Haidt and Joshua D. Greene suggests that 
moral judgment is less concerned with deliberative reasoning and is more a matter of 
emotion and affective intuition 60 While `cognitive'61 processes do play a role in the 
56 Plato argued for the irrationality of emotions. This idea was extended by Immanuel Kant who 
characterized emotions as non-moral influences. See Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Thomas E. Hill and Arnulf Zweig (eds. ), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
57 There is an extensive amount of literature from multiple disciplines that support this claim. For a 
helpful article on the issue see David Pizarro, 'Nothing More Than Feelings?: The Role of Emotions 
in Moral Judgment', Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 30 (2000), pp. 355-375. 
58 'Wesleyan Holiness through the Eyes of Cognitive Science and Psychotherapy', p. 123. 
59 See especially 'The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral 
Judgment', Psychological Review 108 (2001), pp. 814-834. Also see "'Dialogue Between My Head 
and My Heart": Affective Influences on Moral Judgment', Psychological Inquiry 13 (2002), pp. 54-56, 
and Jonathan Haidt, S. Koller, and M. Dias, 'Affect, Culture, and Morality, or is it Wrong to Eat Your 
Dog? ' Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65 (1993), pp. 613-628. 
60 See 'How (and where) Does Moral judgment Work? ', Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (2002), pp. 
517-523. 
61 While it is uncertain how and where to draw the line between 'cognition' and 'emotion', I will 
follow Greene in maintaining some sort of distinction. Greene claims that 'one may render the 
emotion/cognition distinction in terms of a contrast between, on the one hand, representations that 
have direct motivational force and, on the other hand, representations that have no direct motivational 
force of their own, but that can be contingently connected to affective/emotional states that do have 
such force, thus producing behaviour that is both flexible and goal directed'. In this sense, the 
distinction between cognition and emotion exists as a matter of degree. See J. D. Greene, L. E. 
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outcome of socio-moral behaviour, the function of the emotions should not be 
underestimatcd. 62 
Affect memories exist as the product of an intricate weaving together of 
emotion with past life experiences. As such, they have the ability to influence socio- 
moral behaviour. 63 1 suggest, therefore, that a transformation of the tempers will 
necessarily require a change in an individual's emotional reactions encoded in 
affective memories. 
4.2.2.3 Somatic Markers 
Research regarding `somatic markers' offers further support for the role of 
emotion in the decision-making process. The Somatic Marker Hypothesis has been 
suggested by Antonio Damasio and colleagues. TM This hypothesis emerged from the 
study of individuals displaying various types of behavioural disorders due to frontal 
lobe dysfunction. Damasio and colleagues find that patients with damage to the 
prefrontal cortex (particularly the ventromedial sector) demonstrate a profound 
disruption in social behaviour. 
Like the account of Phineas Gage (offered in the previous chapter), many of 
these patients show no decrease in intellectual ability; however, they demonstrate a 
Nystrom, A. D. Engell, J. M. Darley, and J. D. Cohen, 'The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and 
Control in Moral Judgment', Neuron 44 (2004), pp. 397-398. 62 Greene and colleagues find a distinct correlation between what they call 'personal' moral 
judgments and areas of the brain associated with emotion and moral cognition. See 'From Neural "is" 
to Moral 'ought": What are the Moral Implications of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology? ', 
Neuroscience 4 (2003), pp. 847-850; and 'An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral 
Judgment', Science 293 (2001), pp. 2105-2110. For examples of additional supporting research see F. 
Bjorklund, 'Intuition and Ex-Post Facto Reasoning in Moral Judgments: Some Experimental 
Findings', Lund Philosophy Reports 2 (2004), pp. 1-15; and 11. R. Ileekeren, I. Wartenburger, H. 
Schmidt, H. P. Schwintowski, and A. Villringer, 'An fMRI study of simple ethical decision-making', 
NeuroReport 14 (2003), pp. 1215-1219. 63 For a helpful discussion of emotion and its role in social action see Joseph P. Forgas, 'Affective 
Influences on Attitudes and Judgments', in Richard J. Davidson, Klaus R. Scherer, and 11. Bill 
Goldsmith (eds. ), Handbook of Affective Sciences (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 
596-618. 
64 The hypothesis became popular with the publication of Damasio's book Descartes' Error: Eºnotion, 
Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Avon Books, 1994). 
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marked reduction in their ability to process emotion and feeling in relation to 
complex situations or events. It is from this conundrum that the somatic marker 
hypothesis was born. 
Antoine Iiechara and colleagues summarise the hypothesis as follows: 
The somatic marker hypothesis proposes that a defect in emotion and 
feeling plays an important role in impaired decision making. The 
hypothesis also specifies a number of structures and operations 
required for the normal operation of decision making. Because 
emotion is most importantly expressed through changes in the 
representation of body state, though not solely, and because the 
results of emotion are primarily represented in the brain in the form of 
transient changes in the activity pattern of Somatosensory structures, 
the emotional changes are designated under the umbrella term 
`somatic state'. The term `somatic' thus refers to internal milieu, 
visceral and musculoskeletal, of the soma rather than just to the 
musculoskeletal aspects. It should also be noted that although 
somatic signals are based on structures which represent the body and 
its states, from the brainstem and hypothalamus to the cerebral cortex, 
the `somatic' signals do not need to originate in the body in every 
instance and can be generated intracerebrally. 65 
To test the hypothesis, Damasio's team devised the now well-known 'Iowa 
Gambling Task'. In the basic version of the task, subjects are given four decks of 
cards and a loan of two-thousand dollars (play money). The goal of the game is to 
maximise profit before the researcher ends the task. The subjects are then allowed to 
draw from the decks at random. With each card selection, subjects either receive 
additional money and/or are asked to pay a penalty. 
Unknown to the test subjects, the task is rigged so that two of the decks yield 
greater monetary rewards, yet require higher and more frequent penalties. So, the 
most beneficial strategy is to draw consistently from the deck yielding the lower 
immediate monetary reward, but ending in the higher net-gain. Whereas the control 
65 A. Dechara, II. Damasio, and A. Damasio, 'Emotion, Decision Making and the Orbitofrontal 
Cortex', Cerebral Cortex 10 (2000), p. 295. There are a number of background assumptions 
concerning the hypothesis; however, for the purposes of the present work I will forgo a detailed 
discussion and simply refer to the work cited above. 
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group quickly learn this strategy and apply it, subjects with prefrontal brain damage 
are unable to successfully learn the `moral' of the task. 
The researchers have used this task to demonstrate the link between emotion 
and behaviour by recording the Skin Conductance Responses (SCRs) of the test 
subjects during the process of executing the Gambling Task. The SCRs show that 
individuals in the control group develop a negative anticipatory response (or 
negative emotion) to the action of reaching for the `bad decks'. These anticipatory 
responses quickly manifest in the control subjects as an unwillingness to draw from 
these decks. 
An interesting fact is that, in the control group, the occurrence of the negative 
anticipatory response and the subsequent avoidance of the `bad decks' developed 
prior to the conscious awareness of the game's contingencies. Strawn and Brown 
note that these anticipatory SCRs `were being triggered in early stages of learning by 
mental calculations that were not yet available to conscious awareness. What is 
more, these preconscious negative emotional responses were modulating and 
controlling successful card choosing'. 66 
In contrast, subjects with frontal lobe damage did not show anticipatory 
autonomic responses - negative emotional reactions - and thus failed to maximise 
profit by continually drawing from the `bad decks'. Researchers use these data to 
suggest that the capricious behaviour of patients with frontal lobe dysfunction is 
attributed to their lack of ability to experience emotional prompts. 67 
"'Wesleyan Holiness through the Eyes of Cognitive Science and Psychotherapy', p. 124. 67 See A. Bechara, 'The role of emotion in decision-making: Evidence from neurological patients with 
orbitofrontal damage', Brain and Cognition 55 (2004), pp. 30-40; A. Bechara, A. Damasio, D. Tranel, 
and 11. Damasio, 'Deciding advantageously before knowing the advantageous strategy', Science 275 
(1997), pp. 1293-1295; A. Bechara, D. Tranel, 11. Damasio, and A. Damasio, 'Failure to respond 
autonomically to anticipated future outcomes following damage to prefrontal cortex', Cerebral Cortex 
6 (1996), pp. 215-225; and A. Bechara, A. Damasio, H. Damasio, and S. W. Anderson, 'Insensitivity 
to future consequences following damage to human prefrontal cortex', Cognition 50 (1994), pp. 7-15. 
See also Sid Carter and M. C. S. Pasqualini, 'Stronger autonomic response accompanies better 
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This discussion is relevant to the present work because it supports the notion 
that life experiences cause individuals to develop 'anticipatory evaluative autonomic 
responses' (somatic markers) that are bound to knowledge of the world. As with 
procedural knowledge and affect memories the actuation of somatic markers is 
largely a non-conscious event that `feels' like what one might refer to as 'intuition' 
or 'gut-feelings'. 
I suggest that a transformation of the tempers will involve a change of 
`intuition' as described by the Somatic Marker Hypothesis. 
4.2.2.4 Automaticity 
The process of automaticity applies the previously discussed concepts of 
procedural knowledge, affect memories, and somatic markers. The basic premise of 
automaticity is that a great deal of human behaviour occurs `automatically' outside 
of conscious control (or at least conscious activation). In short, automaticity is 
understood as the process by which particular cognitive content, constituted by 
procedural knowledge, affective memories, and somatic markers, sets in motion 
certain goal-directed behavioural sequences. 68 While this idea is certainly not a 
novel one, 69 research has continued in the cognitive sciences shedding light on the 
extent to which this premise is true. 
learning: A test of Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis', Cognition and Emotion 18 (2004), pp. 901- 
911; and Daniel Tranel, 'Emotion, Decision Making, and the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex', in 
Donald T. Stuss and Robert T. Knight (eds. ), Principles of Frontal Lobe Function (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pp. 338-353. 
68 Note that 'goal-directed' does not imply a conscious goal. Francisco Ayala has cited three 
categories within the realm of biological phenomena where teleological explanations are pertinent. 
These are: (1) when the purpose or goal is consciously anticipated by the agent, (2) in self-regulating 
systems, and (3) when structures are anatomically and physiologically constituted to perform a certain 
function. Ayala asserts that the concept of 'goal', together with a correlative concept of function, 
become essential for understanding causal processes. See 'Teleological Explanations versus 
Teleology', History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 20 (1998), p. 46. 69 The Behaviorists claimed that free will is a mere delusion. Instead, our behaviour is under the strict 
control of our particular environments and individual historical contexts. For a prominent work in 
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Such research has shown that there arc few phenomena that do not occur at 
least in part automatically. John A. bargh and colleagues claim that `a person's 
affective reactions to another individual arc often immediate and uncontrolled: 
attitudes toward social and non-social objects alike become active without conscious 
reflection or purpose within a quarter of a second after encountering the object. And 
the emotional content of facial expressions is picked up outside conscious awareness 
and intent to influence perceptions of the target individual'. 70 
There is burgeoning evidence pointing to the fact that social behaviour, in 
general, is based on automatically activated behavioural sequences. 
" While this 
research has not ruled out the involvement of conscious processes in behaviour, 
72 it 
continues to point to new ways which we can understand human motivation. 
this vein see B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972). The 
account of automaticity that I am arguing for is understood as distinct from classical behaviourism in 
that it does allow for a mental life with determinative potential. This is exemplified by the goal- 
directed nature of automatic processes. That is, the environment is merely activating goals; the 
source of the desire for the goal remains internal - thus, we are not purely controlled 
by the 
environment. 
'° John A. Bargh, 'Automaticity in Social Psychology', in E. T. Higgins and A. W. Kruglanski (eds. ), 
Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles (New York: The Guilford Press, 1996), p. 169. 
Bargh continues that activities such as social stereotyping also become 'automatic' responses initiated 
b1+ the perception of particular features inherent to the target group (pp. 169-170). 7 For supporting research see M. Ferguson and J. Bargh, 'How Social Perception Can Automatically 
Influence Behavior', Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (2004), pp. 33-39; J. Bargh, P. M. Gollwitzer, A. 
Lee-Chai, K. Barndollar, and R. Trotschel, 'The Automated Will: Nonconscious Activation and 
Pursuit of Behavioral Goals', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81 (2001), pp. 1014-1027; 
J. Bargh and M. Ferguson, 'Beyond Behaviorism: On the Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes', 
Psychological Bulletin 126 (2000), pp. 925-945; J. Bargh and T. L. Chartrand, 'The Unbearable 
Automaticity of Being', American Psychologist 54 (1999), pp. 462-479; J. Bargh, 'The Automaticity 
of Everyday Life', in Robert S. Wyer (ed. ), The Automaticity of Everyday Life (Mahwah, N. J.: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 1997), pp. 1.62; J. Bargh and K. Barndollar, 'Automaticity 
in Action: The Unconscious as Repository of Chronic Goals and Motives' in P. M. Gollwitzer and J. 
Bargh (eds. ), The Psychology of Action: Linking Cognition and Motivation to Behavior (New York: 
The Guilford Press, 1996), pp. 457-481; and J. Bargh, 'Goal # Intent: Goal-Directed Thought and 
Behavior Are Often Unintentional', Psychological Inquiry 1 (1990), pp. 248-25 1. For supporting data from Social Cognitive Neuroscience regarding the role of 'implicit learning' in attitude change see 
Matthew D. Lieberman, K. N. Ochsner, D. T. Gilbert, and D. L. Schacter, 'Do Amnesics Exhibit 
Cognitive Dissonance Reduction?: The Role of Explicit Memory and Attention in Attitude Change', 
Psychological Science 12 (2001), pp. 135-140; and Matthew D. Lieberman, 'Intuition: A Social 
Cognitive Neuroscience Approach', Psychological Bulletin 126 (2000), pp. 109-136. 72 Augusto Blasi offers an interesting critique of automaticity and emotions in moral motivation. See 
'Emotions and Moral Motivation', Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 29 (1999), pp. 1.19. In 
addition, Josh D. Greene and colleagues have classified moral decisions as involving the competing 
systems of 'social-emotional' and 'cognitive' ('cognitive' as defined above). Brain imaging and 
response times reveal the activation of different neurobiological systems depending on whether a 
188 
Bargh points out that an automatic process will involve some dcgrcc of the 
following four qualities: intentionality, controllability, lack of awareness, and 
efficiency. 73 Accordingly, an 'automatic' process will be 'autonomous, capable of 
operating by itself without any need for conscious guidance, once put into motion' 74 
An important question then concerns what it is that puts an automatic process into 
motion. To address this inquiry, Bargh emphasises the goal-dependent nature of 
automaticity - that is, the intention that a process occur must be present, but once the 
process is set into motion it requires no conscious guidance. 
It is important to understand that it is the goal in this case that is intentional 
not necessarily the initiation of the goal-directed process itself - Bargh contends that 
environmental perception can initiate goal-directed behaviour unconsciously. 
[The] goal or intention itself - [the] complex strategy of interacting 
with the world - can be activated by or triggered by environmental 
stimuli. In other words, the environment can directly activate a goal, 
and this goal can then become operative and guide cognitive and 
behavioural processes within that environment, all without any need 
or role for conscious decision-making. Because there is no 
involvement of conscious processing at any point in the chain from 
the triggering environmental information to the enactment of goal- 
directed action, such a phenomenon can accurately be described as 
75 `unconsciously motivated' behaviour. 
This could likely explain the intentional `feeling' of our personal behaviour. 
That is, we presume that the majority of our behaviour is intentional because our 
moral judgment is 'personal' or 'impersonal'. See 'The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and 
Control in Moral Judgment'. 
73 'Automaticity in Social Psychology', pp. 171-173. It was once believed that for a process to be 
considered 'automatic' that it must be unintentional, outside of awareness, uncontrollable, and 
efficient (operates with a minimal level of cognitive attention or focus required). These qualities are 
now viewed as occurring along a continuum in any given cognitive process. In other words, it is not 
an all-or-nothing affair. 74 Ibid., p. 173. 75 Bargh, 'Automaticity in Action' p. 462. See also 'flow Social perception can automatically 
influence behaviour'. It is important to note that my use of the term 'goal' extends beyond basic 
physiological goals common to living organisms in general (nourishment, reproduction, etc. ) to a 
concept of goal formation that is unique to human beings. These types of goals are established by 
McKay's 'meta-supervisory systems' - such as moral or ethical goals (Behind the Eye). 
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automatic procedures arc, in large part, what we would have done had we performed 
the action as the result of `conscious' reflection. 
The concept of automaticity, as the process of the initiation of goal-directed 
behaviour, is critical to my current thesis. 76 If it is the case that most behaviour 
occurs as the result of automaticity 77 and that the behaviour itself is largely 
determined by previous learning (procedural knowledge, affective memories, 
somatic markers, etc. ), then one's `goals' arc critical to desired behaviour. 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that an individual cannot exert conscious 
control over his or her moral behaviour. Such a `top-down' decision is indeed 
possible and is no doubt an occurrence which most people would be familiar with; 
however, the salient point here is that the type of `conversion' that I am addressing 
in this thesis involves a change of those cognitive states that predispose one to a 
particular socio-moral response. This is in contrast to a rational deliberative process 
leading to an alternate course of action different from one's initial unconscious 
inclination. 
Such a change in motivating structures requires the transformation of the 
content of automatic cognitive processes. This transformation occurs through the 
establishment of goals conforming to `desired behaviour'. 78 In short, I am 
76 For more on goal-directed behaviour see H. Aarts and A. Dijksterhuis, 'Habits as Knowledge 
Structures: Automaticity in Goal-Directed Behavior', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
78 (2000), pp. 53-63; C. S. Dweck, 'Implicit Theories as Organizers of Goals and Behavior', in P. M. 
Gollwitzer and J. Bargh (eds. ), The Psychology of Action: Linking Cognition and Motivation to 
Behavior (New York: The Guilford Press, 1996), pp. 69-90; E. Klinger, 'Emotional Influences on 
Cognitive Processing, with Implications for Theories of Both', in P. M. Gollwitzer and J. Bargh (eds. ), 
The Psychology of Action: Linking Cognition and Motivation to Behavior (New York: The Guilford 
Press, 1996), pp. 168-189; and R. M. Ryan, K. M. Sheldon, T. Kasser, and E. L. Dcci, 'All Goals Are Not Created Equal: An Organismic Perspective on the Nature of Goals and Their Regulation', in P. M. 
Gollwitzer and J. Bargh (eds. ), The Psychology of Action: Linking Cognition and Motivation to 
Behavior (New York: The Guilford Press, 1996), pp. 7-26. 77 Strawn and Brown suggest that five percent (or less) of our moment-to-moment behaviour is 
consciously determined or regulated. See 'Wesleyan Holiness through the Eyes of Cognitive Science 
and Psychotherapy', p. 125. 78 I place 'desired behaviour' in scare quotes because I am not convinced that it is the individual's 
'desired behaviour' alone that serves as the basis for a goal. For example, the 'desired behaviour' of 
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suggesting that goals, in this sense, constitute character. Grigsby and Stevens 
comment that character 
consists of habits, to a large extent procedurally learned, in which 
people engage constantly, repeatedly, automatically, and 
nonconsciously. Character consists of those habitual behaviours that 
give people their own distinctive styles of being in the world. The 
foundations of character are acquired early in life but undergo change 
over time in association with experience and neurocognitive 
development.... Character, like psychological processes, is an 
emergent property of the brain's self-organizing activity. As such, 
expressions of character are actually the behavioural manifestations of 
the activation of neural networks with a high probability of activation. 
Thus, no matter how predictable a person's behaviour, character is not 
a thing, but rather a set of processes that show variability in the 
probability of their expression from moment to moment. 
9 
So then, to a great degree, automatic cognitive processes are constitutive of 
our character. Given this understanding, how then does a change in the content of 
automatic processes occur? I suggest that such a change occurs through `goal 
directed' practice - that is, not through cognitive understanding alone. Practice 
involves purposeful repetition commensurate with the reorganisation of frontal lobe 
systems active in planning, motor command and execution. 80 
In an analysis of moral training, John Bickle concludes that 
Ethical training in a behavioural vacuum (other than speech 
production and comprehension) is likely not to have much effect on 
people's behaviour.... Better to get people to practice planning and 
executing the specific motor sequences desired, rather than training 
them to construct more sophisticated moral narratives... One must 
perform the appropriate actions repeatedly to acquire the moral 
virtues. Theory and argument - narratives, both internal and verbally 
expressed - won't suffice. Our increased knowledge of the diverse 
neural mechanisms that underlie speech production and 
comprehension on one hand and planning and motor execution on the 
the Christian community is extended to the individual participant (via social interaction), and as such 
can be seen as a form of control or desired causation. 79 Neurodynamics of Personality, pp. 310-311. Recall that I have claimed that 'habits' are (at least) 
constituted by procedural knowledge, affect memories, and somatic markers. 80 Rosenblatt speculates that practice `shifts declarative knowledge and memory to procedural. With 
many repetitions, the synaptic weightings of a neural net become more differentiated, since extraneous activities are not repeated as often as essential ones. Thus a synaptic "groove" is worn in the net'. 'Insight, Working Through, and Practice: The Role of Procedural Knowledge', p. 203. 
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other puts us a step ahead of Aristotle81 toward understanding why 
theory and arguments (narratives) are less efficient for inculcating 
virtue than is practice (actually performing the planning and acting). 
8 
Changes in synaptic communication between neurons play a key role in 
learning and memory. The way that humans learn and retain knowledge and 
experience is critical to moral formation and transformation. In an analysis of the 
contributions of neuroscience to theories of learning, Wickliffe C. Abraham notes 
that `the fact that both memory and synaptic plasticity remain changeable, even once 
apparently consolidated, casts serious doubt on the idea that memory retention 
requires preservation of a specific set of synaptic connection strengths. Instead, 
continued bouts of neural activity and synaptic plasticity long after learning may be 
necessary to maintain information in dynamic networks'. 83 This assessment supports 
the notion that a life lived in accordance with a particular moral tradition requires 
more than `beliefs' per se - continual acting upon these beliefs or values is required. 
In sum, I am suggesting that the philosophical views and empirical evidence 
that I have presented above is resonant with the notion of conversion that I have 
proposed. That is, conversion (understood as moral transformation) is a process 
involving normal human biological capacities and is characterised by a change in 
socio-moral attitude and behaviour. Character, or the disposition to act in certain 
ways, is constituted (at least) by procedural knowledge, affect memories, and 
81 Aristotle claimed that humans could acquire virtue by doing just acts. See Nicomachean Ethics. 82 `Empirical Evidence for a Narrative Concept of Self'. in G. D. Fireman, T. E. McVay Jr., and O. 
Flanagan (eds. ), Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology, and the Brain (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 206 (emphasis added). Likewise, Herbert C. Kelman suggests that 
significant attitude change always occurs in the context of action. See Ile Role of Action in Attitude Change', in H. E. Howe Jr. and M. M. Page (eds. ), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. 1979: Attitudes, Values, and Beliefs (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1980), pp. 117-194. 83 Wickliffe C. Abraham, `Memory Maintenance: The Changing Nature of Neural Mechanisms', Current Directions in Psychological Science 15 no. 1 (2006), p. 7. I recognise that the application of neuroscience to theories of learning is a relatively new endeavour which must be approached with caution. For an account of some 'neuromyths' regarding neuroscience and learning theory see John Hall, 'Neuroscience and Education', Education Journal 84 (2005), pp. 27-29. 
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somatic markers. These cognitive features are constitutive of goals enacted through 
the unconscious process of automaticity. 
To be clear, I am not ignorant of the discussion regarding the `eventedness' 
of conversion. I have simply chosen to focus on the process aspect of the 
phenomenon. There are works that focus on moral transformation as a crisis event. 84 
In regards to this body of literature, I take issue with the idea of `quantum change' in 
that it generally ignores the tension between expectation and experience - that is to 
say that beneath one's testimony of crisis or instantaneous change there is a 
`narrative' involving various social networks that gave him or her the language to 
articulate the change. 85 
This point is also supported by Juarrero's description of system dynamics. A 
complex system can undergo an abrupt reorganisation; however, the salient point is 
that it is a sudden reorganisation of the earlier state space. That is, the 
reorganisation can be understood as a synthesis of prior historical experiences and 
intentional states. Thus Juarrero states that these transformations are explainable 
only with a `retrospective narrative'. 86 
Conceived in this way, `conversion' can be equated with Wesley's concept of 
`sanctification' and thus understood to require a transformation in the content of 
these automatic processes - such a transformation will manifest itself as a change in 
the underlying motivation for particular socio-moral attitudes and behaviour. In 
essence, this is what Wesley would have meant by a `renewal of the tempers'. What 
is needed now is a particularly Christian account of this change. 
84 For an example see William K Miller and Janet C'de Baca, Quantum Change: When Epiphanies 
and Sudden Insights Transform Ordinary Lives (New York: The Guilford Press, 2001). 
85 For a helpful resource see Eugene V. Gallagher, Expectation and Experience: Explaining Religious 
Conversion (Atlanta, G. A.: Scholars Press, 1990). See also Peter G. Stromberg, Language and Self- 
transformation: A Study of the Christian Conversion Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993). 
86 See Dynamics in Action, pp. 9,179-181. 
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4.2.3 Conversion as Acquisition of Virtues 
In this section, I will discuss the particularly Christian dimension of 
conversion. I will be describing how conversion can be understood as the 
transformation of the motivating concepts (tempers) that underlie socio-moral 
attitude and behaviour. This transformation is characterised by the acquisition of 
virtues intrinsic to the Christian faith and facilitated through social interaction and 
participation in practices inherent to the Christian community. 
In order to proceed, I must return to a concept discussed earlier in this 
chapter. I suggested that one of the cognitive components of moral cognition is a 
language-dependent self-concept. Here, I will further describe this notion of the 
`sc1C as being rooted in narratives. In this sense, I will speak of a narrative setf. 87 
The basic premise underlying the concept of the `narrative self' s the 
conviction that narratives or stories are a necessary component to understand the self, 
social groups, and their histories. It follows that our sense of morality or character 
consists less of rules or principles and more as 'collections of stories about human 
possibilities and paradigms for action'. 88 These stories allow us to orient ourselves 
in the world by disclosing who we are, where we have been, and where we arc 
going. 89 
87 The concept of 'narrative' is a principle component of a variety of academic inquiries. While each 
of these levels of investigation offers insight to the concept of a 'narrative seif, for the purposes of 
the present work, I have chosen to focus on a limited number of resources from virtue theory. Helpful 
examples from other areas include (from Narrative Psychology) Michelle I.. Crossley, 'Formulating 
Narrative Psychology: The Limitations of Contemporary Social Constructionism', Narrative Inquiry 
13 (2003), pp. 287-300; 'Narrative Psychology, Trauma and the Study of Self/Identity', Theory & 
Psychology 10 (2000), pp. 527-546; Daniel P. McAdams, 'The Psychology of Life Stories'. Review of 
General Psychology 5 (2001), pp. 100-122; Fred Vollmer, 'The Narrative Self, Journal for the 
Theory of Social Behaviour 35 (2005), pp. 189-205. 
Bß Paul Nelson, Narrative and Morality: A Theological Inquiry (University Park. Penn.: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987), p. 9. 
89 For an excellent account of how narrative (particularly religious narrative) forms the self see 
Stanley Ilauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, Ind.: 
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Despite the `liberal' tendency to regard the self as being detached from 
societies and personal history, 90 I claim that a more adequate conception of the self 
`resides in the unity of a narrative which links birth to life to death as narrative 
beginning to middle to end'. 91 In this sense, human actions are not isolated events 
independent of a person's intentions, beliefs, and historical context; rather, action 
flows from a position within particular narratives. The idea that particular actions 
derive their character from larger wholes is a necessary concept if we are to consider 
how life may be more than simply a sequence of individual actions. Alasdair 
Maclntyre claims that a `narrative history of a certain kind turns out to be the basic 
and essential genre for the characterization of human actions'. 92 
A key concept of an individual's `narrative history' is his or her ability to be 
at least a `co-author' of their own narratives. MacIntyre comments that this history 
can be understood as an 
enacted dramatic narrative in which the characters are also the authors. 
The characters of course never start literally ab initio; they plunge in 
medias res, the beginnings of their story already made for them by 
what and who has gone before ... The difference 
between imaginary 
characters and real ones is not in the narrative form of what they do; it 
is in the degree of their authorship of that form and of their own deeds. 
Of course just as they do not begin where they please, they cannot go 
on exactly as they please either; each character is constrained by the 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983). Hauerwas claims that all reason and religion is based on 
particular truth claims which are embodied in the narratives that shape various communities or 
traditions. In this sense, the Christian narrative must be embodied in the Church, if any one is ever to 
see that it is true. Thus, on an individual basis, becoming a Christian is in essence making the stories 
of Israel, Jesus and the Church our own. To do so is to make sense of our past, present and future. 90 I follow Hauerwas' objection on this issue. Hauerwas says that one of the oddities of the 
contemporary situation is that what it means to be a person, to be free and/or autonomous, is to be 
capable of creating or "choosing" our "identity". Thus, we do not think of ourselves as inheriting a 
family tradition or a group identity with which we must learn to live. Rather, our particular story is 
that we have no history and thus we can pick and choose among the many options offered by our 
culture'. See Christian Existence Today: Essays on Church, World and Living In Between (Durham, 
N. C.: The Labyrinth Press, 1988), p. 27. Hauerwas vehemently rejects this claim and asserts that 
humans are more fundamentally formed by stories that we did not create than those we have chosen. 91 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 205. I contend that Maclntyre offers the best account of the `narrative 
self' nd his or her status as a moral agent; thus, I will return to frequently return to his work. 92 Ibid., p. 208. Emphasis added. 
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actions of others and by the social settings presupposed in his and 
93 their actions. 
Subsequently, the moral legitimacy of individual narrative authorship can 
only be evaluated in the context of a larger historical narrative. MacIntyre continues: 
Man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, 
essentially a story-telling animal. He is not essentially, but becomes 
through his history, a teller of stories that aspire to truth. But the key 
question for men is not about their own authorship; I can only answer 
the question, `What am I to do? ' if I can answer the prior question, 
`Of what story or stories do I find myself a part? 994 
This sentiment is echoed by cognitive psychologist John A. Teske. Teske 
speaks of the `social construction of the human spirit' as a way to talk about the 
interdependent emergence of individual minds. He claims that `any integrity that we 
have as spiritual beings is likely also to be an achievement contingent upon the 
character of our relationships with other persons, and our memberships in larger 
communities'. 95 In this sense, if human lives are historically developed 
constructions, it is possible to realise the transformation of these lives in various 
ways by recognising relevant social interdependencies as a key source of human 
behaviour. 
Building on John Searle's `constitutive rules', Teske suggests a mode of 
social construction based on events viewed by psychologists to be intrinsic or 
`natural' properties of individuals. 96 These events include characteristics of the 
93 Ibid., p. 215. 94 Ibid., p. 216. This claim reflects Maclntyre's central argument that the 'Enlightenment project' of 
grounding morality within the individual limits of reason alone as failed miserably. He contends that 
the way out of this predicament is to return to the Aristotelian ethic of virtue with its particular 
teleological character. A key aspect of this renewal is found in Maclntyre's treatment of narrative 
(although the concept of narrative is not explicit in Aristotle's work). 95 John A. Teske, 'The Social Construction of the Human Spirit', in Niels Henrik Gregersen, Willem 
B. Drees, and Ulf Giirman (eds. ), The Human Person in Science and Theology (Grand Rapids, Mi.: 
William B. Eerdman's Publishing Company, 2000), p. 189. By 'human spirit' Teske is referring to 
'that aspect of human mental life by which we can apprehend meanings and purposes extending 
beyond our individual lives'. See Ibid., 190. 
96 Searle's 'constitutive rules' create new forms of behaviour or 'institutional facts' which would not 
exist without the rules (e. g. mating would exist based solely on biological drive, but marriage would 
not exist without relevant constitutive rules). These 'institutional facts' cannot be defined in terms of 
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human mental life which may be locatable as much in structure and operation as in 
content. This means that they can only exist socially - between persons rather than 
inside persons. 
The salient point here is that I reject any notion of the human person that 
takes the `self' to be an isolated moral automaton. The concept of the `narrative self 
suggested by Maclntyre and Teske does justice to the embodied view of human 
nature that I have espoused throughout this thesis. We are persons only in so far as 
we exist as narrative selves in complex social networks with other persons (as 
narrative selves). Likewise, our character is formed (or transformed) through 
shared narratives set within a historical framework. 97 
Additional support for intimate connectedness between character, narrative 
and learning can be found in the field of philosophy of education. Peter Kemp 
claims that `the process of formation and education, the object of philosophy of 
education, is in an of itself an art.... This art requires a talent that comes out in praxis 
and which is learned in praxis, as it is modelled in Plato's Socrates and Aristotle's 
"wise man"'. 98 Kemp uses the concept of philosophical hermeneutics to help 
illuminate the place of mimesis (creative imitation) in education 99 
any particular physio-chemical description; however, they are ontologically subjective in that they are 
(language dependent) facts only relative to the intentionality of agents. See John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1995). 9' The relevance of this dimension - character formation or 'transformation' - to the present work 
cannot be over emphasized. 
98 Peter Kemp, 'Mimesis in Educational Hermeneutics', Educational Philosophy and Theory 38 no. 2 
(2006), p. 171. 
99 The idea of 'mimesis' formally originates with Aristotle. He defines art (epos) as mimesis (creative 
imitation) and tragedy as that particular mimesis that cultivates personal fear and compassion for 
others. Aristotle develops this idea in his Poetics, trans. Stephen Halliwell (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998), see especially pp. 109-137. The concept of `mimesis' has a great degree of 
resonance with the scientific study of imitation. While I will not explore this area of research in the 
present work, it should be noted that a wide array of evidence spanning the disciplines of developmental 
psychology and cognitive neuroscience show that imitation based on mirrored neural activity ('mirror 
neurons') and reciprocal interpersonal behaviour act to scaffold human development throughout the 
lifespan. For a helpful resource see S. Hurley and N. Chater, Perspectives on Imitation: From 
Neuroscience to Social Science - Volume 2: Imitation, Human Development, and Culture (Cambridge, 
Mass.: The MIT Press, 2005). 
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The concept of mimesis plays an important role in various strands of 
pedagogical theory, particularly as it relates to the teacher-student relationship. 
From this context, Paul Ricoeur's theories of storytelling and narrative language 
have crucial significance. The key point of his work in this area is that through the 
process of narrative 100 humans mimetically appropriate educational content, thus 
shedding light on one's life story and his or her place within a larger narrative. 101 
Ricoeur describes the relation between the following three moments of an 
individual's formation: 
1) We are already formed - there is a pre-figuration of action 
and consciousness. 
2) We form narratives (plots and stories) and theories -a con- 
figuration of the language and discourse. 
3) We form and teach ourselves the moment we appropriate 
stories and ideas - which is a re-figuration. This is the actual 
mimesis, the creative representation (the putting forth) of a 
`hermeneutic identity'. '° 
The pre figuration stage refers to the pre-understanding of life in its practical 
aspects. Humans are predisposed to certain linguistic capabilities that allow them to 
interpret various occurrences in life including abstract notions such as meaning and 
values. Such an ability renders one able to construe time in general - that is, the 
relation of past, present and future. 
The con figuration aspect of narrative expresses the reason or theme of a 
story as one has followed the entire plot, recalled and retold the story. This stage 
involves extracting a coherent course of events out of a multitude of occurrences and 
then combining these into a single coherent plot (the telos of the narrative). 
100 For Ricoeur, narrative refers to a linguistic course of events from beginning to end. 
101 See Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative: Volume 1(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
102 These points are derived from Ricoeur's Time and Narrative and summarized by Kemp. See 
'Mimesis in Educational Hermeneutics', p. 175. 
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The final or re figuration stage completes the mimetic process by asserting 
that educational content (a text, etc. ) is not learned until it is experienced as narrative 
by appropriating the story in one's own context. Kemp asserts that `something 
happens to us as we follow the story line. We become "new persons". This is the 
re-figuration of our lives'. 103 In this sense, narratives reconstruct the world of 
personal and corporate action. Kemp comments further that `there is no individual 
formation without a tradition of ideas that the individual inherits, and that there is no 
individual formation without a cultural community wherein the individual 
resides'. 104 
Using Ricoeur's language, learning is the process of character formation 
through the concept of narrative. Such a concept of learning and narrative is helpful 
to the development of ideas central to the present work and our discussion of 
conversion and virtues. If, as I have suggested, Christian conversion is best 
understood as the acquisition of virtues intrinsic to the Christian faith, then I must 
articulate what is meant by `virtues' and their connection to a `narrative self'. 
Maclntyre's argument in After Virtue settles on the notion that a return to an 
Aristotelian ethic of virtue requires the concept of a `narrative self'. 
Maclntyre observes that in ancient cultures the primary means of moral 
education was through the telling of stories - morality was not something distinct 
from social structures. Those in ancient cultures recognised that `human life has a 
determinative form, the form of a certain kind of story. It is not just that poems and 
sagas narrate what happens to men and women, but that in their narrative form 
poems and sagas capture a form that was already present in the lives which they 
103 Ibid., p. 176. 1°4 Ibid., pp. 176-177. 
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relate'. los In this sense, narratives and human character are constitutive of one 
another. 
Maclntyre asserts that virtues are understood only within the context of 
particular narratives106 and types of practices. He defines a practice as 
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative 
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity 
are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of 
excellence which are appropriate to, and practically definitive of, that 
form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve 
excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, 
are systematically extended. 
'° 
Practices provide the context in which virtues can be understood. Maclntyre 
proposes that a virtue be defined as `an acquired human quality the possession and 
exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to 
practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such 
goods'. 108 
Here, virtues serve as the intentional content of practices which in turn 
constitute cooperative forms of human inter-relational activity. In other words, 
virtues can be seen as the motivational force (or skill) behind practices particular to a 
given tradition. The concept of tradition is also critical to Maclntyre's account of a 
social being (or moral agent). The story of one's life (self-identity) is inextricably 
ios Maclntyre, After Virtue, p. 124. 
106 `Every particular view of the virtues is linked to some particular notion of the narrative structure or 
structures of human life'. Ibid., p. 174. 
107 Ibid., p. 187. It is important to note that practices themselves require moral evaluation based on 
their contribution to the telos of human existence. That is, in terms of a moral theory, any practical 
`ought' is to be evaluated in light of the ultimate end to which all virtuous action is to achieve. 
Murphy says that `the original form of an ethical claim (implicitly, at least) is, "if you are to achieve 
your telos, then you ought to do (or be) x". This sort of ethical claim can be straightforwardly true or 
false; the "ought" is no more mysterious than the "ought" in "a watch ought to keep good time". 
Furthermore, it can and in fact must be derived from certain sorts of "is" statements: about the nature 
of ultimate reality, about regularities in human life regarding the achievement of ends as a result of 
adopting certain means... '. See `Supervenience and the Nonreducibility of Ethics to 
Biology', p. 485. 
108 After Virtue, p. 191. 
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embedded in a community of collective stories held together by a common 
understanding - or narrative tradition. Maclntyre claims that 
A living tradition is then an historically extended, socially embodied 
argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which 
constitute that tradition.... Hence the individual's search for his or her 
good is generally and characteristically conducted within a context 
defined by those traditions of which the individual's life is a part, and 
this is true both of those goods which are internal to practices and the 
goods of a single life.... The narrative phenomenon of embedding is 
crucial .... The history of each of our 
lives is generally and 
characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in terms of the 
larger and longer histories of a number of traditions. ' 09 
Only when we know the narrative traditions of which are we are part can we 
know what we are to do. Morality `embodies practices, and practices require virtues 
and intentions - in brief, the development of human character - that can only appear 
in lives displaying a narrative coherence'. ' 10 
I suggest that the Christian community embodies a `narrative tradition' in so 
far as it satisfies the description offered above by Maclntyre. That is, Christianity is 
a `historically extended, socially embodied argument' whose existence implies that a 
distinction cannot be made between communal beliefs and practices.  These 
practices require virtues intrinsic to the Christian faith - that is, they require that an 
individual be a particular `kind of person' characterised by these virtues that are 
subsequently enacted within the context of a particularly Christian way of relating. 
109 Ibid., p. 222. Maclntyre further describes a tradition as `an argument extended through time in 
which certain fundamental agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict: 
those with critics and enemies external to the tradition... and those internal, interpretive debates 
through which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements come to be expressed and by 
whose progress a tradition is constituted'. See Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, Ind.: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 12. In Christianity, scripture represents the communally 
recognised set of 'fundamental agreements'. 
110 McClendon, Systematic Theology: Ethics, p. 171. 111 L. Gregory Jones' analysis of moral judgment resonates with this claim. He states that moral 
judgment `is an activity through which people give form not only to actions but also to themselves. It 
is when human life is construed narratively that the inextricable interrelation between acts and agency 
becomes clear'. See Transformed Judgment: Toward a Trinitarian Account of the Moral Life (Notre 
Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), p. 21. 
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So then, in order to justify my claim that conversion is best understood as the 
acquisition of virtues intrinsic to the Christian faith, I will attempt to place the 
concept of virtues within the larger discussion of this chapter. I do so by clarifying 
the nature of virtues themselves. 
I have shown that much of socio-moral attitude and behaviour can be 
considered intuitive and occurring automatically, particularly in regards to 
underlying motivations and inclinations (tempers). The entire realm of socio-moral 
functioning is dependent upon (constrained by) our biology. In this sense, the 
formation or transformation of socio-moral attitude and behaviour should be seen as 
a process likened to learning or skill acquisition. In their commentary on Intuitive 
Ethics, Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph state that 
Virtues are social skills. To possess a virtue is to have disciplined 
one's faculties so they are fully and properly responsive to one's local 
sociomoral context. To be kind, for example, is to have a perceptual 
sensitivity to certain features of situations, including those having to 
do with the well-being of others, and to be sensitive such that those 
features have an appropriate impact on one's motivations and other 
responses.... Virtues, on this understanding, are closely connected to 
the intuitive system. A virtuous person is one who has the proper 
automatic reactions to ethically relevant events and states of affairs. 112 
So then, it can be said that a virtue (or virtuous behaviour) supervenes on a 
particular human biological or psychological (depending on the level of analysis) 
characteristic (or event). Recall that Maclntyre defines a virtue as an acquired 
human quality, thus it follows that virtues are not genetically determined traits; 
rather, they should be seen as habitually cultivated behavioural states based on 
genetically produced biological propensities. 
112 `Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions Generate Culturally Variable Virtues', 
Daedalus: Special Issue on Human Nature (2004), p. 61 (emphasis added). Likewise, Jones argues 
that people `learn to acquire and exercise the virtues ingredient in making wise decisions. Such 
learning occurs in and through social contexts of particular linguistic communities'. See Transformed 
Judgment, p. 2. 
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In this case, acquiring a virtue refers to a complex process involving the re- 
interpretation of particular biological propensities in relation to a specific tradition- 
dependent purpose or telos. In order to clarify this claim, I will offer a practical 
example involving the experience of empathy or compassion. 
Before proceeding to this example, I pause for a brief summary. I am 
suggesting that one's narrative self is formed by the stories of which he or she is a 
part, and likewise, transformed through acquisition of virtues intrinsic to a particular 
tradition, in the present case, the Christian tradition. This transformation occurs 
through social interaction and participation in practices inherent to the Christian 
community. Practices are therefore crucial for the activity of moral judgment and 
action. Maclntyre states it this way: 
The general form of the thesis which I have defended is that 
genuinely human consciousness is such that our abilities to reflect 
upon and thus to be knowledgably conscious of our inner lives - 
insofar as those inner lives are a matter of intending, doing, having 
reasons for action and believing - depends upon our abilities to interact socially with others within practices and to understand what 
they impute to us. We learn to recognize what is true about ourselves 
in this area and we learn to describe ourselves only as others 
recognize and describe us and we learn to recognize and describe 
those others precisely as beings capable of recognizing and describing 
us in the way that they do. 113 
In this vein, Stanley Hauerwas speaks of conversion itself as the acquisition 
of practices. He likens the process of Christian discipleship to the learning of a craft 
where `Christian education is not what happens in Sunday school. Rather, what is 
crucial for Christian formation is to have people engaged in activities through which 
they learn habits that shape them before they can name what the shaping is about'. 
114 
113 'The Intelligibility of Action', in J. Margolis, M. Krausz, and R. M. Burian (eds. ), Rationality, 
Relativism, and the Human Sciences (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Press, 1986), pp. 77-78. 
114 Stanley Hauerwas and William H. Willimon, Where Resident Aliens Live (Nashville, Tenn.: 
Abingdon Press, 1996), p. 82 (emphasis added). Hauerwas claims that, 'The Enlightenment tried to 
show that the mind was immediately appropriate to a factual world without training. In contrast, our 
minds are adequate to that which we come to know only by being formed by the skills and practices 
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Just as in Maclntyre's account, Hauerwas affirms the critical role that 
narrative plays in the formation of self-identity. He states that `A narrative must not 
only provide an intelligible pattern that links the contingent events of our lives; it 
must also provide us a way to go. A story of who we are must give us the power to 
make our actions consistent with our identity - it must, so to speak, shape the 
world'. 115 
Simply stated, becoming a Christian is the process of 'naturalisation' into a 
narrative tradition which has been (and is being) shaped by the story of Jesus. 116 
This `becoming' constitutes the process of conversion. The transformation requires 
an acquisition of Christian virtues which necessarily involve the learning of skills 
and language particular to the Christian narrative tradition. "? The importance of the 
relationship between conversion and language acquisition cannot be overstated. To 
of a tradition. Such training, or course, not only transforms us but transforms what it is that we think 
we need to know'. See also After Christendom: How the Church is to Behave if Freedom, Justice, 
and a Christian Nation are Bad Ideas (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1999), p. 105. It is worth 
noting here the resonance between Hauerwas' account of conversion and the research that I have 
discussed from cognitive science. The establishment of cognitive features (procedural knowledge, 
affect memories, and somatic markers) which are expressed unconsciously through the process of 
automaticity supports the notion of habits that shape us `before we can name what the shaping is 
about'. 
115 Christian Existence Today: Essays on Church, World and Living In Between (Durham, N. C.: The 
Labyrinth Press, 1988), p. 31. This idea of self-identity being shaped by narrative or goal structures is 
discussed, from a psychological point of view, at length by Robert A. Emmons. See The Psychology 
of Ultimate Concerns: Motivation and Spirituality in Personality (New York: The Guilford Press, 
1999). Emmon's work is based on the concept of `ultimate concern' offered by twentieth-century 
theologian Paul Tillich. Tillich claimed that religion itself 'is the state of being grasped by an 
ultimate concern, a concern which qualifies all other concerns as preliminary and which itself 
contains the answer to the question of the meaning of our life'. See Christianity and the Encounter of 
World Religions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 4. 116I borrow the `naturalisation' metaphor from Brad J. Kallenberg. See `Conversion Converted: A 
Postmodern Formulation of the Doctrine of Conversion', Evangelical Quarterly 67 (1995), pp. 335- 
364. See also Brad J. Kallenberg, Live to Tell: Evangelism in a Postmodern World (Grand Rapids, 
Mi.: Brazos Press, 2002), particularly pp. 38-42. '"Alasdair MacIntyre claims that any attempt to enter a narrative tradition other than ones own 
requires the acquisition of a `second first language'. See Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, pp. 
374-388. Such a consideration of language also requires insights offered by Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
For an analysis of Wittgenstein's work relevant to the current topic see Brad J. Kallenberg, Ethics as 
Grammar: Changing the Postmodem Subject (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2001); and Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein (London: Society for Promoting Christian 
Knowledge, 1997). 
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fully explicate this issue would require a volume within itself; however, at this 
juncture, it is appropriate to point out some points relative to the present discussion. 
George A. Lindbeck has delivered a seminal work regarding language and 
religious experience. 118 Lindbeck stresses the importance of cultural-linguistic forms 
in the shaping of human experience. In this paradigm, religion is not simply an array 
of beliefs or symbols that express inner attitudes or sentiments. Rather religion is a 
cultural-linguistic system that makes possible the descriptions of realities - including 
the formulation of beliefs and the ability to experience attitudes and feelings 
characteristic of the religious tradition. Lindbeck claims that just as a language is 
correlated with a particular form of life (having both cognitive and behavioural 
dimensions), so it is also in the case of a religious tradition - `Its doctrines, cosmic 
stories or myths, and ethical directives are integrally related to the rituals it practices, 
the sentiments or experiences it evokes, the actions it recommends, and the 
institutional form it develops'. ' 19 
The key feature of Lindbeck's proposal is that the inner-outer distinction of 
religious experience is switched from the traditional understanding (as supposed in 
an experiential-expressive model of religious experience). 120 In his case, inner 
religious experiences are derived from external features embodied within a particular 
religious tradition rather than vice versa. If this is the case, `there are numberless 
118 Lindbeck defines religions as `comprehensive interpretive schemes, usually embodied in myths or 
narratives and heavily ritualized, which structure human experience and understanding of self and 
world.... A religion can be viewed as a kind of cultural and/or linguistic framework or medium that 
shapes the entirety of life and thought'. See The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a 
Postliberal Age (Philadelphia, Penn.: Westminster Press, 1984), p. 32-33. 119 Ibid., 33. 
120 Lindbeck is critical of the philosophical tradition stemming from Schleiermacher (ibid., pp. 20-21). 
He offers Bernard Lonergan as the token representative of the experiential-expressive model. 
Lonergan summarises his theory of religion through theses which are characteristic of experiential- 
expressivism in general. These are 1) Different religions are diverse expressions or objectification of 
a common core experience. It is this experience which identifies them as religions; 2) The experience, 
while conscious, may be unknown on the level of self-conscious reflection; 3) It is present in all 
human beings; and 4) In most religions, the experience is the source and norm of objectifications: it is 
by reference to the experience that their adequacy or lack of adequacy is to be judged. See Bernard 
Lonergan, Method in Theology, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), pp. 101-124. 
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thoughts we cannot think, sentiments we cannot have, and realities we cannot 
perceive unless we learn to use the appropriate symbol systems'. 121 
Thus, a religion is above all an external reality that shapes one's identity 
rather than an expression of the pre-existing self or one's pre-conceptual experiences. 
So then, Lindbeck asserts that 
To become religious involves becoming skilled in the language, the 
symbol system of a given religion. To become Christian involves 
learning the story of Israel and Jesus well enough to interpret and 
experience oneself and one's world in its terms.... To become 
religious - no less than to become culturally or linguistically 
competent - is to interiorize a set of skills by practice and training. 
One learns how to feel, act, and think in conformity with a religious 
tradition that is, in its inner structure, far richer and more subtle than 
can be explicitly articulated. The primary knowledge is not about the 
religion, nor that the religion teaches such and such, but rather how to 
be religious in such and such ways.... In short, it is necessary to have 
the means for expressing an experience in order to have it, and the 
richer our expressive or linguistic system, the more subtle, varied, and 
differentiated can be our experience. 122 
This point is echoed in Murphy's exposition on soul and body and its effect 
on how we perceive spirituality. Murphy states that 
The traditional notion of spirituality has assumed that the inner 
encounter with God is the source of the external forms of religious 
observance.... Instead we need to recognize the ways in which 
language (which is necessarily public) and other social practices 
provide the individual with the resources for private, inner 
experience.... To put it quite simply, the lone individual might indeed 
have an experience of God, but without any theological language 
would have no way of knowing what the experience was. The more 
linguistic resources and expectations provided by one's tradition the 
more nuanced one's experiences will be. 123 
121 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 34. This claim is based on Ludwig Wittgenstein's contention 
that private languages are logically impossible. For a helpful summary see Robert J. Fogelin, 
Wittgenstein (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), pp. 153-171. 122 Ibid., 34-37. It should be obvious that this view stands in direct contrast with the evangelical 
conversion methods cited it chapter one. In that case, one becomes Christian solely by intellectual 
assent - by believing this or that - not by being transformed within the context of a particularly 
Christian cultural-linguistic community. 123 Nancey C. Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), p. 33. 
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The role of social context and language acquisition in the transformation 
process cannot be overstated. All of this amounts to a transformation of character 
which supervenes on a complex series of biological changes. 
124 
Recall that a key feature of Wesley's theological anthropology was his 
assertion that human identity is ineluctably nested in a network of social 
relationships. As such, a change in socio-moral attitude and behaviour -a 
transformation of self-identity or character - must occur within a social context. 
125 
It is clear from Wesley's writing that he affirmed both the transcendent and 
immanent means through which God's grace interacted with creation. That is, while 
he typically equated the work of God with the movement of the Holy Spirit, he 
firmly believed that grace was relationally mediated. 126 Maddox emphasises the 
124 For an interesting discussion of the relation between character formation and biological change see 
Harak, Virtuous Passions: The Formation of Christian Character. Harak proposes that the practice of 
virtuous behaviour actually alters biological systems making the recurrence of the same behaviour 
more susceptible to automaticity. He asserts that after prolonged interpersonal interaction 'we 
become physically disposed toward continuance of that interaction, because that interaction has, for 
better or for worse, reconfigured our bodies.... Prolonged interaction with a specific other gives a kind 
of integrating order to the self' (p. 17). 
125 This accusation has earned multidisciplinary support. For instance, from the area of educational 
psychology, Ronald Lee Zigler has offered an interesting account of 'moral impulses'. He concludes 
that one's social environment plays a crucial role in the development of morality in that these 
experiences 'shape the brain's emotional dispositions from which future actions will stem'. See `The 
Formation and Transformation of Moral Impulse', Journal of Moral Education 28 (1999), p. 456 
(emphasis added). In addition, development psychologists have long had interest in the development 
and cultivation of moral behaviour. The work of William Damon is of particular interest to the 
present discussion. He describes a change in socio-moral attitude and behaviour as 'goal 
transformation through social influence'. These are the type of goals which are established within the 
context of a particular `narrative tradition' and can change throughout the lifespan. Damon asserts 
that 'This process - the transformation of goals through social influence - is the foundation of moral 
development throughout the lifespan. This process results in a building of commitments toward 
justice, caring, truthfulness, and other concerns of rights, responsibility, and benevolence'. See 'The 
Lifelong Transformation of Moral Goals Through Social Influence', in P. B. Baltes and U. M. 
Staudinger (eds. ), Interactive Minds: Life-Span Perspectives on the social Foundation of Cognition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 202. See also William Damon and Anne Colby, 
`Social Influence and Moral Change', in W. M. Kurtines and J. L. Gewirtz (eds. ), Moral Development 
Through Social Interaction (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1987), pp. 3-19. 
126 This is particularly evident in his mature view of the 'way salvation'. For a helpful discussion of 
this issue see G. Michael Leffel, 'Prevenient Grace and the Re-Enchantment of Nature: Toward a 
Wesleyan Theology of Psychotherapy and Spiritual Formation' Journal of Psychology and 
Christianity 23 (2004), pp 130-139. Also see Bard D. Strawn and G. Michael Leffel, 'John Wesley's 
orthokardia and Harry Guntrip's "heart of the personal": convergent aims and complementary 
practices in psychotherapy and spiritual formation', Journal of Psychology and Christianity 20 (2001), 
pp. 351-359. Strawn and Leffel state that 'Wesley held that contrary dispositions of the heart might 
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ways in which Wesley's holistic anthropology informed his advice to the Methodists. 
He states that 
[Wesley's] recommendations to his followers interwove both means 
that present rational enlightenment or challenge and means designed 
to nurture our affective openness and responsiveness to God's loving 
Presence. Reflecting his appreciation for the variety of ways in which 
God's love is mediated, including particularly its mediation through 
other persons, Wesley gnade communal means of grace central to his 
movement, rejecting the solitary search for holiness. 127 
So this concept of the means of grace was critical to Wesley's view of 
Christian development. In addition to the Eucharist, prayer, corporate worship, etc. 
Wesley stressed the importance of interrelational discipleship. As the result of 
Wesley's conviction that genuine Christian faith could only be developed and 
sustained in a communal context, he established an organisational structure to 
provide such nurture - these were known as societies, classes, and bands. 
128 
The salient point is that there are a bounty of resources from both theology 
and scientific disciplines supporting the claim that significant socio-moral 
transformation (conversion in my terms) occurs within the context of social 
interaction. 129 A particularly Christian conversion occurs within the specific context 
of the Christian tradition. This claim strikes at the heart of the claim that one can 
`become Christian' in isolation or in any single moment of time. Instead, what is 
be transformed and a loving temper of heart might be developed in an interactive human community 
of character formation' (p. 354). 
127 `Reconnecting the Means to the End', p. 41. Emphasis added. 128 There is an abundance of literature regarding Wesley's `small groups'. For a few helpful examples 
see Henderson, John Wesley's Class Meeting: A Model for Making Disciples, T. Runyon, The New 
Creation: John Wesley's Theology Today (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1998), pp. 114-128; and 
D. L. Watson, The Early Methodist Class Meeting: Its Origins and Significance (Nashville, Tenn.: 
Discipleship Resources, 1985). 
129 Further support for this claim can be seen in Bargh's work on automaticity. Bargh, et at. note that 
`close relationships' play a key role in automatic behaviour. This is due to the context in which goals 
are pursued and the high frequency of interaction that one has with environmental forces that act as 
triggers for goal directed behaviour. Thus, `significant others in one's life are likely to become 
external triggers of nonconscious goal pursuits'. See John A. Bargh and Erin L. Williams, 'The 
Automaticity of Social Life', Current Directions in Psychological Science 15 no. 1 (2006), p. 2. 
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required in order to become Christian is a process of holistic change that affects 
those aspects of an individual's life that constitutes his or her character. 
As I have claimed, and will expound upon further in a subsequent section, 
this process occurs as the result of cooperation between divine grace and human 
participation. So, having claimed that conversion is best understood as a socially 
mediated process of virtue acquisition, I will now turn to the task of offering a 
practical example of what it means to `acquire a virtue'. 
4.2.3.1 Conversion and Empathetic Response 
I have proposed that the acquisition of a virtue refers to a complex process 
involving the re-interpretation of particular biological propensities in relation to a 
specific tradition-dependent purpose or telos. The basic presupposition behind this 
statement is that virtues supervene on psychological traits which are constituted by 
genetically produced capacities. While the process of conversion involves a 
multitude of biological and psychological changes, I will offer a single example in 
order to clarify my position. 
Not only is empathy130 the most studied of the moral emotions, but some 
consider it the foundation of morality itself. 131 1 claim that the cultivation of 
130 Defining 'empathy' is indeed an ongoing struggle. The term einfühlung (perhaps best understood 
as 'sympathy') was translated as 'empathy' by American psychologist Edward Titchener. For more 
see J. Gustav, 'Theodor Lipps and the shift from sympathy to empathy'. Journal of the History of the 
Behavioral Sciences 41 (2005), pp. 151-163; and L. Wisp6, 'History of the Concept of Empathy', in 
Nancy Eisenberg and J. Strayer (eds. ), Empathy and It's Development (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), pp. 17-37. Following Nancy Eisenberg et al., I will assume empathy to be 
`an emotional response that stems from another's emotional state or condition and is congruent with 
the other's emotional state or condition'. See 'Empathy-related responding and cognition: A "chicken 
and the egg" dilemma', in W. M. Kurtines and J. L. Gewirtz (eds. ), Handbook of moral behavior and 
development, Vol. 2: Research (New York: Erlbaum, 1991), p. 65. 131 Writers such as Adam Smith, David Hume, and Jean Piaget have identified empathy (or 
'sympathy' as they used the term) as the root of morality. For a helpful discussion see Jonathan Haidt, 
'The Moral Emotions', in R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, and H. H. Goldsmith (eds. ), Handbook of 
Affective Sciences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 852-870. Haidt defines a 'moral 
emotion' as 'those emotions that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at 
least of persons other than the judge or agent' (page854). 
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empathetic response is a key feature of socio-moral transformation, here referred to 
as `conversion'. In what follows, I intend to show how the Christian community, 
understood as a narrative tradition, acts to `re-interpret' empathetic reactions as 
`feelings' of compassion -a Christian virtue. 
132 
It is important to stress that I am not claming that empathy, in and of itself, is 
a virtue; rather, I submit that empathy be considered as a genetically produced 
capacity. There is multidisciplinary evidence to support this claim. For instance, 
there is extensive research showing that children develop emotional reactions to the 
suffering of others very early in life. 133 In addition, evolutionary biologists have 
shown empathetic behaviour to exist in non-human primates as well. 134 These 
findings suggest that empathy is a biologically innate capacity. 135 
From the area of developmental psychology, Martin L. Hoffman asserts that 
The brain structures required for affective involvement with objects in 
the external world, including people, were apparently present early in 
man's evolution. The more recent addition of newer brain structures 
along with the acquisition of connective neural circuits have made it 
possible for such affect to be experienced in conjunction with a 
cognitive, increasingly sophisticated social awareness or insight into 
others - and all of this appears to be independent of the neural base 
for egoistic, self-preserving behaviour. In brief, the neural basis for a 
primitive empathy was apparently present in early man's evolution. 
136 
This claim is further strengthened by research offered from the neurosciences. 
In A Biological Perspective on Empathy, Leslie Brothers states that 
132 Of course, I am not claiming that compassion is an exclusively `Christian' virtue, only that it is 
central to the Christian way of relating. 
133 For an example of such research see P. L. Harris, Children and Emotion: The Development of 
Psychological Understanding (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishing, 1989). 
134 See Frans B. M. de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other 
Animals (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
135 Goodenough and Deacon have suggested that empathy is an 'inherited pro-social capacity'. See 
'From Biology to Consciousness to Morality'. See also Ursula Goodenough, 'Religious Naturalism 
and Naturalizing Morality', Zygon 38 (2003), pp. 101-109; and U. Goodenough and P. Woodruff, 
'Mindful Virtue, Mindful Reverence', Zygon 36 (2001), pp. 585-595. 136 'Developmental Synthesis of Affect and Cognition and Its Implications for Altruistic Motivation', 
Developmental Psychology 11 (1975), p. 610. See also M. L. Hoffman, 'Empathy, Social Cognition, 
and Moral Action', in W. M. Kurtines and J. L. Gewirtz (eds. ), Handbook of Moral Behavior and 
Development: Volume 1: Theory (Hillsdale, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1991), 
pp. 275-301. 
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Evidence from comparative primatological studies suggests that 
sophisticated social communication is a hallmark of primate evolution. 
When taken to subsume somatic - including neural - events, 
empathetic processes are found to be analyzable in terms of brain 
activity.... In the absence of organic disease or social deprivation, 
primitive response systems become elaborated into mature social 
communication, by processes as yet incompletely understood. 137 
All of this points to the fact that, barring neurological disorder, empathic 
experience is indeed a biologically innate capacity. In this sense, empathy should be 
understood as an emotion, that is, it is an unlearned138 response to particular objects 
or events external or internal to the one perceiving the stimuli. In order to proceed, I 
will offer a formal definition of an `emotion'. I do so because I claim that there is a 
relevant distinction between an emotion - as an unlearned biological reaction - and 
the felt experience of an emotion and the role this feeling plays in subsequent moral 
behaviour. 139 
137 American Journal of Psychiatry 146 (1989), p. 17. In relation to Brother's work on empathy, 
Vittorio Gallese has offered a helpful discussion of mirror neurons and their role in empathy. See 
`The "Shared Manifold" Hypothesis: From Mirror Neurons To Empathy', Journal of Consciousness 
Studies 8 (2001), pp. 33-50. The role of `minor neurons' in moral development is a burgeoning area 
of research. See David Dobbs, `A Revealing Reflection', Scientific American Mind 17 no. 2 (2006), 
pp. 22-27. There are also numerous works that demonstrate the neural correlates of empathetic 
experience. For helpful examples see J. Decety, and T. Chaminade, `Neural Correlates of Feeling 
Sympathy', Neuropsychologia 41 (2003), pp. 127-138; Paul J. Eslinger, 'Neurological and 
Neuropsychological Bases of Empathy', European Neurology 39 (1998), pp. 193-199; P. L. Jackson, 
A. N. Meltzoff, and J. Decety, `How do we perceive the pain of others? A window into the neural 
processes involved in empathy', Neurolmage 24 (2005), pp. 771-779; S. G. Shamay-Tsoory, R. 
Tomer, B. D. Berger, and J. Aharon-Peretz, 'Characterization of Empathy Deficits following 
Prefrontal Brain Damage: The Role of the Right Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex', Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience 15 (2003), pp. 324-337; and T. Singer, B. Seymour. J. O'Doherty, H. Kaube, 
R. J. Dolan, and C. D. Frith, `Empathy for Pain Involves the Affective but not Sensory Components 
of Pain', Science 303 (2004), pp. 1157-1162. 138 By `unlearned', I am implying that emotions are the product of an evolutionary process and are 
thus genetically inherited capacities. 
139 Research indicates that empathetic reactions contribute to 'prosocial behaviour'. For examples of 
such research see C. Daniel Batson, J. Fultz, and P. A. Schoenrade, 'Adults' Emotional Reactions to 
the Distress of Others', in N. Eisenberg and J. Strayer (eds. ), Empathy and Its Development 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 163-184; N. Eisenberg, S. Losoya, and T. 
Spinrad, `Affect and Prosocial Responding', in R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, and Ii. H. Goldsmith 
(eds. ), Handbook of Affective Sciences (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 787-803; M. 
L. Hoffman, `The Contribution of Empathy to Justice and Moral Judgment', in A. I. Goldman (ed. ), 
Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1993), pp. 647- 
680; 'Empathy and Prosocial Activism', in N. Eisenberg, J. Reykowski and E. Staub (eds. ), Social 
and Moral Values: Individual and Societal Perspectives (Hillsdale, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Publishers, 1989), pp. 65-85; and `Interaction of affect and cognition in empathy', in C. E. 
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I am aware that defining an `emotion' is one of the most perilous tasks in 
psychological science. 140 Going forward, I will adopt the description of emotion 
offered by Antonio Damasio. He offers the following five point definition of 
emotion: 141 
1. An emotion-proper, such as happiness, sadness, embarrassment, 
or sympathy, is a complex collection of chemical and neural 
responses forming a distinctive pattern. 
2. The responses are produced by the normal brain when it detects 
an emotionally competent stimulus (an ECS), the object or event 
whose presence, actual or in mental recall, triggers the emotion. 
The responses are automatic. 
3. The brain is prepared by evolution to respond to certain ECSs 
with specific repertoires of action. However, the list of ECSs is 
not confined to those prescribed by evolution. It includes many 
others learned in a lifetime of experience. 142 
4. The immediate result of these responses is a temporary change in 
the state of the body proper, and in the state of the brain structures 
that map the body and support thinking. 
5. The ultimate result of the responses, directly or indirectly, is the 
placement of the organism in circumstances conducive to survival 
and well-being. 143 
In contrast to this understanding of emotions, Damasio defines a feeling as 
`the perception of a certain state of the body along with the perception of a certain 
mode of thinking and of thoughts with certain themes'. 144 That is, a `feeling' is a 
mental representation of an `emotion'. This `mental representation' is constituted by 
Izard, J. Kagan, and R. B. Zajonc (eds. ), Emotions, cognition, and behavior (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), pp. 103-13 1. 
140 Keith Oatley and Jennifer M. Jenkins comment that the heterogeneous nature of the literature on 
emotions makes it difficult to make sense of the data let alone establish a universal definition. See 
Understanding Emotions (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Company, 1996), p. 33. 
141 Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain (London: Heinemann, 2003), p. 53. 
142 Emphasis added. This last point resonates with the research that I have presented involving 
procedural knowledge, somatic markers, etc. 
43 I would extend this last point to include the placement of the organism in circumstances that 
predispose it (him or her) to a particular socio-moral action. 
144 Looking for Spinoza, p. 86. 
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myriad neural states which not only include various chemical and musculoskeletal 
reactions, but by the content of automatic cognitive processes. 
I submit that a feeling includes a particular attitudinal and behavioural 
predisposition. In the case of empathy, an individual experiencing an empathic 
reaction to certain stimuli will interpret the reaction (in a largely nonconscious 
fashion) in a particular way thus leading to a specific behavioural response. Note, at 
this juncture, that an empathic reaction is not a candidate for a virtue; however, an 
acquired predisposition to act in a certain way based on empathetic arousal can be 
considered a virtue. I suggest that this acquired predisposition, or virtue, is best 
understood as compassion. In short, compassion can be said to supervene on the 
biological state of affairs referred to as an empathetic emotional reaction. 
With this understanding, I offer the following claim: The Christian 
community acts as the social context for the acquisition of the virtue of compassion 
by re-interpreting empathetic responses in such a way that these experiences are felt 
as compassion and likewise manifested as moral action. The `practice' of such 
moral behaviour reinforces the content of our automatic cognitive processes, thus 
yielding a transformation of character - `conversion'. 
If one interprets automatic emotional responses in a particular way, thus 
leading to a specific action (say an action characterised by compassion), and this 
process is repeated then one becomes the `type of person' that is characterised by 
those actions - this is true because the actions become more automatic as new 
procedural knowledge is established and reinforced by continued social interaction 
and physical repetition. The view of human nature that I have espoused in this thesis 
makes it highly unlikely that such changes could occur apart from one's 
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naturalisation into a narrative tradition characterised by practices that reinforce such 
behaviour. 
In his analysis of the Christian moral life, Charles M. Shelton recognises a 
similar need for the transformation of empathetic experience. He states that `It is 
this transformation of our empathetic development that molds and shapes a response 
to the call of Jesus to "come and follow me" (Mark 10: 21)'. 145 Shelton continues by 
offering the following definition of a particularly Christian empathy: 
Christian empathy is defined as the human capacity, transformed by 
grace, that leads to experiencing to some degree on an affective level 
another's situation; meaning is given to this experiencing through a 
personal relationship with Jesus Christ, thus motivating one to offer 
willingly his or her gifts, nurtured in a believing community of faith, 
for the building of God's Reign. '46 
This particularly Christian experience then leads to the formation of `social 
compassion'. Shelton continues: 
It is this empathic arousal, nurtured by modelling and supportive 
community environments that articulate valued stances, that offers the 
optimum strategy for fostering social compassion. Moreover, it is 
precisely this empathic component of a social compassion orientation 
that enables one to respond to the question, `Lord when did we see 
you hungry and feed you or see you thirsty and give you drink? ' 
(Matthew 25: 37). It is an empathic response, nurtured in a 
relationship with Jesus and one's Christian community, that provides 
the capacity to respond to the very hunger and thirst so necessary for 
building God's Reign here and now. 147 
This development and cultivation of social compassion is precisely the type 
of transformation of socio-moral attitude and behaviour that characterises the process 
of conversion. 
In summary, I have suggested that all `normal functioning' human beings 
possess an innate capacity for the emotional response we label `empathy'. I have 
145 Morality of the Heart: A Psychology for the Christian Moral Life (New York: Crossroad, 1990), p. 
102. 
146 Ibid., p. 107. 
'47 Ibid., p. 115. 
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proposed that compassion supervenes on empathetic responses and as such can be 
considered a virtue. The acquisition of the virtue of compassion necessarily occurs 
within the context of a narrative tradition (Christianity in the present case) whose 
very existence is marked by practices that embody the telos of the tradition. 
No doubt, some may argue that this description of conversion is completely 
sociological in nature and lacks the need for any metaphysical or religious 
explanation. While I do concede that the sociological dimension of conversion is a 
necessary consideration, I nevertheless claim that the conversion process should be 
viewed as the co-operant result of divine grace and human participation. 
4.2.4 Conversion as Co-operant Grace 
United Methodists understand prevenient grace to be `the divine love that 
surrounds all humanity and precedes any and all of our conscious impulses. This 
grace prompts our first wish to please God, our first glimmer of understanding 
concerning God's will, and our "first slight transient conviction" of having sinned 
against God. God's grace also awakens in us an earnest longing for deliverance from 
sin and death and moves us toward repentance and faith'. 148 
This image of God's action in the world is a critical component of Christian 
theology. In this section, I will address the following question: While fully 
acknowledging the presence of God's grace (as defined above) in human affairs, 
how can this divine presence be understood to act - have determinative effects - in 
the world, and more specifically in the process of conversion? Although it is 
unlikely that human scholarship will ever be able to describe in detail what Austin 
Farrer calls the `causal joint' between God and matter, we are bound to accept that 
148 The Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church (Nashville, Tenn.: United Methodist 
Publishing House, 2004), Section 1: Our Doctrinal Heritage: Distinctive Wesleyan Emphases. 
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God does indeed act in the physical world. 149 In particular, this section will deal 
with the crude issue of how God changes people - how does God bring about 
conversion? 
Theologians have long claimed that the concept of divine action is central in 
the biblical texts. Such a claim necessarily raises questions as to how exactly this 
action occurs. Nicholas Saunders offers a helpful taxonomy of the different types of 
questions one should consider when conceiving of God's `action' in the world. 
These are: 
1. By what means does divine action occur? (E. g. quantum 
manipulation or overruling the laws of nature). 
2. What is the relationship between divine and finite causation? 
(E. g. complementary or mutually exclusive). 
3. How often does SDA [Special Divine Action] occur? (E. g. 
continuous, only fitful or not at all). 
4. What is the effect that SDA achieves? (E. g. to heal diseases or 
inspire an individual). 
5. What is the purpose of the action having taken place? (E. g. 
promotion of divine justice or peace). 150 
In recent years, there has been a revival of interest in understanding the 
particulars of divine action. Such interests have taken the form of both theological 
and scientific investigations. 151 David Wilkinson has offered a helpful summary 
149 See Austin Farrer, Faith and Speculation (London: A&C Black, 1967), p. 66. See also B. 
Hebblethwate and E. Henderson (eds. ), Divine Action: Studies Inspired by the Philosophical Theology 
o(Austin Farrer (Edinburgh: Clark, 1990). 
° Nicholas Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), p. 17. This list is a modified version of one presented by Owen C. Thomas. See God's 
Activity in the World: The Contemporary Problem (Chico, N. Y.: Scholars Press, 1983), pp. 234-235. 
151 Perhaps the best example of this multi-disciplinary investigation is the Divine Action Project (DAP) 
co-sponsored by the Vatican Observatory and the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences in 
Berkeley, CA. For a helpful discussion of the DAP and its results see Wesley J. Wildman, `The 
Divine Action Project, 1988-2003', Theology and Science 2 (2004), pp. 32-75. 
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concerning contemporary models of divine action. 152 He suggests the following 
seven models as the most prominent considerations: 
1. The `working in the mind' God. This position, perhaps best 
represented in the work of Rudolf Bultmann, 1S3 creates a strict 
dichotomy between the worlds of science and religion. The 
former is of an `external' nature where data can be observed 
through physical observation. Religion, in contrast, can only be 
understood through `interior' experience - `God does not act in 
the physical world in any particular physical way, but achieves his 
purposes by "acting" in the person of faith as he or she encounters 
God's Word'. 154 This view has experienced a good deal of 
opposition on several points, not least of which is its failure to 
explain how God could interact in this `interior' manner without 
engaging humanity in their embodied physical natures. 
2. The `sit back and watch' God. Maurice Wiles argues that God's 
action is limited to the initial act of creating the universe and 
establishing the `laws' which sustain its existence. '55 Likewise, 
this view allows `radical freedom to human creatures and indeed 
radical self-limitation on God's part'. 156 This view receives the 
same criticism as classical deism in that it fails to give an 
adequate account of incarnation and resurrection - vital aspects of 
Christian faith. 
3. A `persuasive' God. This position is identified with process 
theologians such as Ian G. Barbour. 157 Process theology `uses an 
analogy between God's action and our experience as agents, and 
attempts to proceed by assimilating the nature of the universe to 
our nature. Each event in the universe has a psychic pole and a 
material pole, and God works as an agent at the subjective level, 
exercising power by persuasion or lure rather than coercion'. 
158 
Despite the strength of process theology's ability to offer an 
explanation for the problem of evil, it experiences a number of 
other theological difficulties including the seemingly passive 
concept of God that it portrays. 
4. An `open' God. This view is similar to process theology in that it 
considers the world to be created by God yet with a future not 
completely settled - human action is critical in the future state of 
the world. Clark Pinnock has been a major proponent of this 
lsz 'The Activity of God in Methodist Perspective', pp. 143-147. 153 See 'The Meaning of God as Acting', in Thomas, God's Activity in the World: The Contemporary 
Problem, pp. 61-76. 
154 Wilkinson, `The Activity of God in Methodist Perspective', p. 143. 155 God's Action in the World, (London: SCM Press, 1986). 
'56 Wilkinson, 'The Activity of God in Methodist Perspective', p. 144. 
157 When Science Meets Religion: Enemies, Strangers, or Partners? (London: Society for Promoting 
Christian Knowledge, 2000). 
158 Wilkinson, 'The Activity of God in Methodist Perspective', p. 144. 
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view. 159 Pinnock argues that the traditional view of God's 
sovereignty is profoundly unbiblical. He proposes a much more 
cooperative notion of God, thus granting human action a more 
determinative role. This view has the theological advantage of 
being more `scripturally based' than process theology, which is 
typically philosophically motivated; yet, it does face many of the 
same objections as process theology. 
5. A `bodily' God. This view appears in two forms. The first is 
represented in the work of Grace Jantzen. 
160 In this view, the 
world is seen as God's body where divine action can be construed 
in the same manner as the soul working in the human body. The 
second, more popular, option appears in the work of Arthur 
Peacocke. 161 Peacocke uses the term `panentheism' to denote the 
type of relationship that God has with the world. He views the 
world as a foetus in the `womb' of God; thus, `God can act on any 
part of the world in a way similar to our action on our bodies, but 
God is also greater than the world'. 
162 This view offers a number 
of advantages, particularly in its ability to hold together 
immanence and transcendence; however, it does face its share of 
difficulty. Wilkinson suggests that panentheism can be seen to 
`threaten God's otherness and freedom while also compromising 
the world's freedom to be itself'. 163 
6. A `chaotic' God. This view's greatest proponent is John 
Polkinghorne. 164 Polkinghome argues that chaotic systems allow 
the `room' for God to work in the world. Similar to the previous 
models, the `chaos' view presents the universe as inherently open 
to the future. Polkinghome suggests that God works through the 
flexibility of these open systems. Here `providence becomes a 
subtle interaction between our freedom, the freedom inherent in 
the physical nature of the universe and God's freedom'. 
165 This 
view possesses many strengths. The objections usually relate to 
questions of necessity, that is, if God where to act in more 
bottom-up manner, would this seemingly `God of the gaps' 
approach be necessary? 
159 See Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God's Openness (Grand Rapids, Mi.: Baker Books, 2001). 
See also C. Pinnock, R. Rice, J. Sanders, W. Hasker, and D. Basinger, The Openness of God: A 
Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 
1994). 
160 God's World, God's Body (Philadelphia, Penn.: The Westminster Press, 1984). 
161 For a recent example see Paths From Science Towards God: The End of All Our Exploring 
(Oxford: One World Press, 2002). 
162 Wilkinson, "rhe Activity of God in Methodist Perspective', p. 146. 
163 Ibid., p. 146. 
164 See for example 'The Metaphysics of Divine Action', in R. J. Russell, N. Murphy, and A. 
Peacocke (eds. ), Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action (Vatican City: 
Vatican Observatory Publications, 1997), pp. 147-156. 
165 Wilkinson, `The Activity of God in Methodist Perspective', p. 147. 
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7. A `double agency' God. In opposition to scientific attempts to 
describe divine action, Austin Farrer argued that the `causal joint' 
between divine and human action will always be hidden. In his 
understanding, every event has a double description, that is an 
event can be spoken of in terms of God's action while at the same 
time having a 'full natural description in the laws of nature or the 
action of human agents'. 166 The major objection to this view is 
that it is seen as a retreat into mystery when faced with 
theologically problematic ideas. 
In addition to these models of providence presented by Wilkinson, there is 
another area that merits our attention - the relationship between divine action and 
quantum mechanics. Robert John Russell is a major proponent for understanding 
divine action at the quantum level. Russell asserts that 
If quantum mechanics is interpreted philosophically in terms of 
ontological indeterminism (as found in one form of the Copenhagen 
interpretation), one can construct a bottom-up, non-interventionist, 
objective approach to mediated direct divine action in which God's 
indirect acts of general and special providence at the macroscopic 
level arise in part, at least, from God's objective direct action at the 
quantum level both in sustaining the time-development of elementary 
processes as governed by the Schrödinger equation and in acting with 
nature to bring about irreversible interactions referred to as `quantum 
events'. 167 
In this sense, God's action at the quantum level can be seen as bringing about 
both the general law-like character of the universe as well as specific events in the 
world. We can describe these as general and special divine action respectively. The 
idea of God working at the quantum level is not a new idea. Sir Edmund Whittaker 
argued for the importance of quantum indeterminacy in a theory of agency and 
divine action. Whittaker observed that there was a tendency in `Newtonian circles' 
to conceive of the relationship of God to creation as being unnecessary and 
166 Ibid., p. 147. 167 `Divine Action and Quantum Mechanics: A Fresh Assessment', in R. J. Russell, P. Clayton, K. 
Wegter-McNelly, and J. Polkinghorne (eds. ), Quantum Mechanics: Scientific Perspectives on Divine 
Action (Vatican City: Vatican Observatory Publications, 2001), pp. 293-328. 
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detached. 168 Relying on quantum theory, Whittaker argued for the plurality of 
causes for a single given effect. He claims: 
Thus is does not warrant the view, so common among the deistic 
Newtonians of the eighteenth century, that the system of the world is 
absolutely closed and has developed according to purely mechanical 
laws.... On the contrary, the recent trend of physical thought (as will 
be evident from what has been said about the principle of causality) is 
in favour of the view that in the physical domain there is a continual 
succession of the intrusions or new creations. The universe is very far 
from being a mere mathematical consequence of the disposition of the 
particles at the Creation, and is a much more interesting and eventful 
place than any determinist imagines. 169 
There are both theological and scientific weaknesses with this view. As with 
many `non-process' related views of divine action, there are issues of theodicy to 
sort out - if a `good' God acts in every event at the quantum level, why is there evil 
in the world? This challenge does not necessarily need to be viewed as a defect in 
the theory of divine action at the quantum level. Based on the view of `causation' 
discussed in the previous chapter, together with the notion of `structural constraints' 
through which God can act, it can be seen as an asset because it helps to explain why 
a benevolent God does not act more frequently and dramatically in the face of human 
and animal suffering. 
The primary scientific challenge to a theory of quantum divine action is 
bound up with the science itself. Uncertainties at the quantum level tend to cancel 
each other out when a very large number of such events are combined to describe the 
behaviour at the macroscopic level sufficient to be relevant to what is occurring at 
the level of human perceptibility. Likewise, if microscopic quantum events are to 
have macroscopic consequences, such can occur only through an enhancement of 
168 Edmund Whittaker, Space and Spirit: Theories of the Universe and Arguments for the Existence of 
God (London: Thomas Nelson, 1946), pp. 95-96. 
69 Ibid., pp. 126-127. 
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their effect due to their being part of a much larger system which is extremely 
sensitive to the fine details of its circumstance. 
This criticism proves to not be as strong as it may first appear. For instance 
many critics of quantum divine action assume that a particular macro-level effect 
would have to be the result of God's determining the outcome of a single quantum 
event. If God's action is located at the quantum level, then the scope of God's 
control would indeed be limited. It is impossible to determine the extent of this 
limitation without a better understanding of the relation between quantum physics 
and the rest of science - the limitation itself would be inherent to the nature of the 
processes. 
The accusation that micro-level events do not give rise to macro-level 
phenomena is a disputed idea. Phillip Clayton argues that `given the billions and 
billions of such minute [quantum] interventions - the potential number would be 
limited neither by science nor by inability on the part of God - God might be able to 
effect significant changes on the macroscopic level'. 170 Clayton also asserts that 
divine interventions at the quantum level can be further amplified by `chaotic' 
dependencies to achieve macroscopic aims. 
I propose that, to date, Nancey Murphy has provided the most theologically 
coherent account of divine action at the quantum level. 171 Murphy's account is 
critical to my present purpose; thus, I will turn to a brief summary of her view. 
170 Philip Clayton, God and Contemporary Science (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), p. 
194. 
171 See primarily `Divine Action in the Natural Order: Buridan's Ass and Schrödinger's Cat', in R. J. 
Russell, N. Murphy, and A. Peacocke (eds. ), Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine 
Action (Vatican City: Vatican Observatory Publications, 1997), pp. 325-358. A basis to Murphy's 
theory can be found in the work of William Pollard. See Chance and Providence: God's Action in a 
World Governed by Scientific Law (New York: Scribner Press, 1958). There are a number of 
problems with Pollard's view of divine action at the quantum level; however, Murphy has addressed 
these issues and offers a more nuanced and theologically desirable theory. 
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Murphy's account of divine action demonstrates a high degree of resonance 
between both theological considerations and consistency with the findings of 
contemporary science. 172 Murphy asserts that `the problem of divine action is, at 
base, a metaphysical problem - one that cannot be solved by anything less radical 
than a revision of our understanding of natural causation'. 
173 Murphy's most basic 
assumption is that divine action necessarily includes a `bottom-up' approach, that is, 
if it is assumed that God is active in all events, then consideration must be given to 
divine action at the most basic level - quantum phenomena. 
174 
Theological requirements for such theory of divine action should be 
consistent with a number of general - widely accepted - tenets of the Christian 
faith. '75 Murphy suggests that the two main theological requirements for a theory of 
divine action include - (1) a way to distinguish between divine and natural (or 
human) events; 176 and (2) an account of extraordinary acts of God (miracles). 
177 In 
short, this means that an adequate account of divine action must avoid opposite poles 
of deism178 and occasionalism. 179 A theologically adequate view of divine action 
172 This account is based on the type of multi-level explanatory account discussed in chapter one. 
173 `Divine Action in the Natural Order', p. 326. By `metaphysical', Murphy is referring to 
metascientific and metatheological accounts. She asserts that such accounts are capable of solving 
problems at the interface of science and theology, thus advancing the credibility of the claim (in the 
Lakatosian sense). 174 It is worth noting that there is some debate as to what constitutes an `event' in quantum theory. 
Saunders argues that `no quantum "events" take place until the point of measurement' (Divine Action 
and Modern Science, p. 139); thus, God must act interventionistically in the form of measurement in 
order to 'cause' a particular quantum state to be realised. The result is that non-interventionist 
incompatabilist quantum divine action is impossible because approaches to measurement turn out to 
be deterministic (Ibid., p. 144). It seems, however, that Saunders objection is answered by John von 
Neumann (more on this below). 
175 For Murphy, the most basic of such tenets is the consistency of God's action which is manifest in 
the story of Jesus; thus, she claims that `the relevant feature of God's action in Christ, displayed 
analogously throughout the whole, is its non-coercive character'. See 'Divine Action in the Natural 
Order', p. 330. 
176 Murphy asserts that 'since our knowledge of a person comes primarily from the person's actions, 
including speech acts. Knowledge of God, therefore, must come primarily 
from seeing what God has 
done'. Furthermore, to assume that God is entirely responsible for every act in human history 
exacerbates the problem of evil, so there is a distinct need for discrepancy. 
Ibid., p. 331. 
177 Murphy prefers not to use the term miracle because it is often associated with the violation of the 
laws of nature. She sees no reason why divine action must occur in such a 
fashion. 
178 As discussed above - the `sit back and watch' God. 
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will provide a `picture of the relation of God's action to the world of natural causes 
that allows us to represent God's sustenance, governance, and cooperation in such a 
way that we can make sense of revelation, petitionary prayer, human responsibility, 
and of extraordinary acts such as the resurrection, without at the same time blowing 
the problem of evil up to unmanageable proportions'. 180 
A theory of divine action must also be consistent with scientific investigation. 
Murphy suggests two salient aspects of science that must be preserved - (1) the law- 
like181 behaviour of macroscopic objects and events (notwithstanding indeterminacy 
at the quantum level); and (2) the organisation of the world into a hierarchy 
consisting of levels of complexity. Furthermore, Murphy suggests that an account of 
divine action must give attention to three different `regimes' within the hierarchy - 
the quantum level, the realm of human freedom, and an intermediate regime wherein 
the behaviour of entities is describable by means of deterministic laws. 182 
Murphy submits that since the demise of the Newtonian worldview, 183 
philosophical accounts of causation have not kept pace with science - `If scientists 
after Newton are willing to do without Newton's version of Prime Mover, they must 
be assuming, contra Descartes and Newton, that matter is inherently active'. 184 So a 
number of questions arise regarding the ultimate source of the world's processes, not 
19 Occasionalism denies the causal interaction of created things, thus providing only an 'occasion' for 
divine action. In short, God is the sole cause of all events. 
180 'Divine Action and the Natural Order', p. 333. 
181 Murphy stresses the 'law-like character' of the natural world rather than the existence of `natural 
laws'. She states that while many scientists presupposed the existence of such laws, `[she does) not 
believe such a view is either a necessary prerequisite for doing science or necessarily supported by the 
findings of science'. Rather, she argues that the 'de-ontologizing' of the `laws of nature' is helpful in 
understanding divine agency. Ibid., p. 334. 
182 Ibid., p. 333. 
183 The `Newtonian worldview' to which she refers concerns the change from an Aristotelian view of 
causation rooted in primary substances to the modern view of causal analysis seen as changes in the 
motion of inert material objects. 
184 'Divine Action and the Natural Order', p. 336. 
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least of which regards the question of what `causes cause'. '85 This situation only 
enhances Murphy's claim that what is needed is a `radical revision of our 
understanding of natural causation'. 
A cogent account of divine action must make sense of God's sustaining and 
cooperative role in the universe - that is, God must somehow be involved in all 
events, but respect the law-like character of the world. In addition, a metaphysical 
account of causation that takes divine action seriously must consider the non- 
reducible hierarchy of complexity which offers two starting points for causation 
based on either a top-down or bottom-up view. 
A top-down view of causation is essential because it describes how free 
human agency is possible in a deterministic universe. While the top-down concept is 
crucial to any view of divine action, I propose that it alone does not provide a 
sufficient account of God's activity in the world. The problem occurs at the causal 
joint - that is, an explanation is needed as to how an assumed disembodied God 
exerts causal efficacy over the natural world. 186 Although Murphy acknowledges the 
value of a top-down approach to divine action, 187 she considers a bottom-up method 
to be necessary. She states her position as follows: 
In addition to creation and sustenance, God has two modes of action 
within the created order: one at the quantum level (or whatever turns 
out to be the most basic level of reality) and the other through human 
intelligence and action. The apparently random events at the quantum 
level all involve (but are not exhausted by) specific, intentional acts 
of God. God's action is at this level limited by two factors. First, 
God respects the integrity of the entities with which he cooperates - 
185 Murphy offers the following example (Ibid., p. 336). Suppose we describe an event as a change 
from one state of affairs S, to another S2. Then, is it SZ or the change from Si to S2 that requires 
causal explanation? And is S1 the cause, or merely a necessary condition? 186 Most accounts of top-down divine action are presented as an analogy of human (top-down) agency in the inanimate world. This analogy is itself unclear because human agency is brought about by 
bodily action (physical force, conservation of energy, etc. ). '87 Arthur Peacocke has offered the most helpful account to divine action through top-down processes. 
See Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming - Natural, Divine and Human (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1993). Murphy contends that Peacocke's top-down approach requires the 
supplement of a viable bottom-up account of divine causation. 
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there are some things that God can do with an electron, for instance, 
and many other things that he cannot (e. g., make it have the rest-mass 
of a proton, or a positive charge). Second, within the wider range of 
effects allowed by God's action in and through sub-atomic entities, 
God restricts his action in order to produce a world that for all we can 
tell is orderly and law-like in its operation. 188 
Having ruled out the option of God being the sole cause of action at the 
quantum level - as this is an instance of occasionalism - it is necessary to grant that 
every created entity has some measure of existence independent of God. 189 Despite 
this independent potential for particles to act at the quantum level, it is not possible 
to predict exactly when they act - is the `when' completely random or determined by 
God? 190 
Murphy claims that the better option is divine determination - `God's 
governance at the quantum level consists in activating or actualizing one or another 
of the quantum entity's innate powers at particular instants, and that these events are 
not possible without God's action'. 191 Furthermore, divine action at the macro-level 
(the level of everyday human experience) is realised through God's interaction with 
all quantum events via bottom-up causation. Murphy states that 
188 'Divine Action and the Natural Order', pp. 339-340. Murphy contends that by taking quantum 
events as the primary locus for divine action it will be possible to adequately address theological 
requirements without running into insuperable theological or scientific objections. It is worth noting 
(as in an earlier instance) that there is some debate as to how exactly quantum events influence action 
at the macroscopic level. It seems that quantum uncertainties only relate to those particular kinds of 
events that we call measurements. Since measurements only occur intermittently, agency exercised in 
this way would have a problematically sporadic character. 189 Murphy argues that although God keeps all things in existence, created entities have a measure of 
independence from God. That is `if God were completely in control of each event, there would be no- 
thing for God to keep in existence. To create something, even so lowly a thing as an electron, is to 
grant it some measure of independence and a nature of its own, including inherent powers to do some 
things rather than others... To be is to be determinate, and to be determinate is to have certain innate 
properties, including actual or potential behaviours'. Ibid., p. 341. 90 This is true by process of elimination. Theoretically speaking it could be possible for the `when' 
to be internally determined by the entity itself or externally determined by environmental forces 
outside of the entity; however, 'insofar as epistemological interpretations of quantum theory and the 
quest for hidden variables are rejected, we are left with the conclusion that there is no "sufficient 
reason" either internal or external to the entities at this level to determine behaviour' (Ibid., p. 341, 
emphasis added). The central question is what causes an entity to take a particular course of action at 
a particular time. 
19 Ibid., p. 342. 
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God is not one possible cause among the variety of natural causes; 
God's action is a necessary but not sufficient condition for every 
(post-creation) event. In addition, I claim that God's participation in 
each event is by means of his governance of the quantum events that 
constitute each macro-level event. There is no competition between 
God and natural determinants because, ex hypothesi, the efficient 
natural causes at this level are insufficient to determine all 
outcomes.... Notice that this is a radical revision of the meaning of 
`cause' as it is used in science and everyday life, since on the view 
presented here no set of natural events or states of affairs is ever a 
sufficient condition for an event. One necessary condition will 
always be an element of divine direction; nothing ever happens 
without God's direct participation. 192 
Murphy uses the analogy given by the medieval philosopher John Buridan 
(-1300-1361) to make her point. Buridan supposed that if a starving donkey were 
placed midway between two equal piles of hay it would starve to death for want of 
sufficient reason to choose one pile rather than the other. Murphy claims that 
entities at the quantum level are `miniature Buridian asses' - the asses have the 
`power' to do one thing rather than other, but the pertinent question is what induces 
them to take a particular action at a particular time. 193 
This idea resonates with John von Neumann's work regarding quantum 
measurement. The notion of wavefunction collapse was first formulated by von 
Neumann as a deduction from experiments involving the scattering of light by 
electrons. 194 Von Neumann's complex postulate has important implications for the 
relationship between quantum theory and divine action of the type that Murphy 
suggests. 
In fact, `von Neumann's... wavefunction collapse as it is known, is the only 
place in the "orthodox" theory of quantum mechanics in which true ontological 
192 Ibid., pp. 343-344. 
193 Ibid., p. 342. 
194 See John von Neumann, 'Measurement and Reversibility' and `The Measuring Process', in J. A. 
Wheeler, and W. H. Zurek (eds. ), Quantum Theory and Measurement (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1983), pp. 549-647. 
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indeterminism might be accommodated'. 195 This is true because the indeterminism 
of the quantum state arises from the fact that upon the collapse of the wavefunction 
(measurement) there is no determination of which of the various states of the 
superposition will be realised. Therefore, it is conceivable that God acts within this 
level of quantum indeterminacy in precisely the way that Murphy suggests. 
Murphy's account is consistent with a long theological history claiming that 
God acts in all things at all times rather than on rare occasions. In his sermon, On 
the Omnipresence of God, Wesley wrote 
God acts everywhere, and, therefore, is everywhere; for it is an utter 
impossibility that any being, created or uncreated, should work where 
it is not. God acts in heaven, in earth, and under the earth, throughout 
the whole compass of his creation; by sustaining all things, without 
which everything would in an instant sink into its primitive nothing; 
by governing all, every moment superintending everything that he has 
made; strongly and sweetly influencing all, and yet without 
destroying the liberty of his rational creatures. 196 
Wesley was adamant that there cannot be any place within creation that God 
is not fully and actively present. Wesleyan theologian, Michael E Lodahl, echoes 
this sentiment. Lodahl comments that `If God truly knows all things in the Hebraic 
participatory sense of the word-concept "to know", then God's knowing will indeed 
include a sharing in every creature's experience - including, again, the strange and 
mysterious world of sub-atomic processes - "from the inside". The universe of 
events, things, and relationships can occur nowhere but in God, and thus God's 
knowing must be intimate, experiential, utterly thorough and, in some analogical 
sense, bodily'. 197 
Furthermore, German theologian, Karl Heim, asserts quantum theory allows 
us to understand how God can indeed be active in all aspects of creation. Heim 
195 Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science, pp. 147-148. 
196 Sermon 111, On the Omnipresence of God, BE (4: 42). 
197 `The Cosmological Basis for Wesley's "Gradualism"', Wesleyan Theological Journal 32 (1997), p. 
25. 
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argued that fundamental assumptions in quantum theory demolished the absolute 
concept of causal necessity and provided a way of understanding causal laws as no 
longer exact, but containing `gaps' associated with bulk statistical predictions. 
Therefore when Heim speaks about God being active in the `fall of every sparrow' 
(Matthew 10: 29), he asserts 
No quantum transition occurs without your Father in Heaven.... The 
great faith ... which alone is able to give us peace and freedom 
from 
anxiety in the midst of storm-ridden world processes, is the belief that 
precisely in these smallest areas it is not an impersonal causal 
mechanism which rules, but a personal will which steers every 
elementary particle, without which no sparrow falls to the ground and 
no hair can fall from our heads. None of these smallest events, says 
Jesus, of whose interaction the world is constituted, occurs `Without 
the Father. 198 
This is a clear assertion that God is active in determining every quantum 
event. This claim supports Murphy's argument that God is active in all of creation 
from the bottom up. 
Having adopted Murphy's understanding of divine action and observed its 
resonance with both Wesley's notion of the providence of God in all of creation 
together with Heim's observations that God works in every quantum event, I make 
the following claim: The conversion process should be viewed as caused by God 
insofar as general divine action is understood as prevenient grace acting at the 
quantum level. In this case, I am equating `general divine action' with a universal 
morality understood as innate in the created order (like mathematics). 199 Not only is 
198 Karl Heim, Die Wandlung im naturwissenschaftlichen Weltbild (Wuppertal: Aussaat Verlag, 1975), 
rx. 155-157. Translated by Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science, pp. 102-103. 
For a helpful discussion of the concept of universal morality see Murphy and Ellis, On the Moral 
Nature of the Universe. Murphy and Ellis designate this morality as a kenotic ethic. Therefore. 'self- 
renunciation for the sake of the other is humankind's highest good' (p. 118). Likewise, John Hick 
states that `The function of religion in each case is to provide contexts for salvation/liberation, which 
consists in various forms of transformation of human existence from self-centeredness to Reality- 
centeredness... and the salvific transformation is most readily observed by its moral fruits, which can 
be identified by means of the ethical ideal, common to all the great traditions, of agapelkaruna 
(love/compassion)'. See An Interpretation of Religion (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 
1989), p. 14. Wesley was keen to point out that the way to holiness was to be found in the 
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God present in every quantum event, but God acts through the course of individual 
and collective history to move creation to a particular expression of relationship. 200 
To be clear, I am not claiming that God acts only at the quantum level. 
Divine action via top-down causation (Peacocke) and chaotic systems (Polkinghorne) 
provide important ways of understanding how God may act through human mental 
processes201 and in response to petitionary prayer. The great value of my claim is 
that, in a necessary supplementary role, it provides a way to understand God as 
active in all macroscopic events via God's action at the quantum level. 
My description of conversion is not complete apart from the role that human 
beings play in the process. Not only are persons the object of conversion but in an 
important sense, they are the cause - more appropriately the co-operant cause. 
What I am suggesting is consistent with Maddox's notion of responsible grace. In 
theological terms Maddox asserts that `without God's grace, we cannot be saved; 
while without our (grace-empowered, but uncoerced) participation, God's grace will 
not save'. 202 How can our `participation' be considered a `cause' in the conversion 
process? We will now turn to this important question. 
4.2.4.1 Community as `Cause' 
So far, I have argued that conversion is a complex biological process that 
occurs by way of divine grace. To put it flatly, I claim that God `causes' individual 
transformative power of God's love. This love is not only the agent of moral change, but the defining 
characteristic of human life in communion with God. For example see A Plain Account of Christian 
Perfection, BE (11: 366-446). For more on the universal experience of prevenient grace see Leffel, 
'Prevenient Grace and the Re-Enchantment of Nature'. 200 Note the resonance between this statement and Wesley's notion of new creation - both occur as 
gradual process and possess and inherent 'telos'. 
01 God acting on the human nervous system in a 'bottom-up' manner could stimulate particular 
thoughts, memories, concepts, etc. The mental representations or goal scenarios that arise from such 
action can then become part of a metasupervisory action loop that is realised in a 'top-down' manner. 
Such a process could explain the religious experience of 'revelation'. 
202 Responsible Grace, p. 19. 
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conversion to occur. The most viable way of conceiving of God's interaction with 
creation necessarily includes a bottom-up account of divine action - at the quantum 
level. The basic way of conceiving this is to suppose that God acts at the quantum 
level in order to bring about a particular quantum event among a superposition of 
possible states. God's action at an infinite number of quantum levels results in the 
realisation of particular macro-level phenomena (human level). 203 We can refer to 
this as the triggering cause of conversion. 
It is critical to note that due to the model of divine action proposed here, 
God's action is constrained by the structures through which God can operate. In the 
case of conversion (psychological phenomena), God can only bring about certain 
mental states (beliefs, actions, etc. ) if the appropriate neurobiological cell assemblies 
are present. In other words, what is needed is a structuring cause for conversion to 
occur. 
This notion is consistent with Murphy's claim that God does not 
fundamentally alter the nature of quantum entities, but merely triggers quantum 
events that underlie various aspects of behavioural potential that already exist within 
the entity's neurobiological repertoire. 204 She states that `God's governance at the 
quantum level consists in activating or actualizing one or another of the quantum 
entity's innate powers at particular instants, and that these events are not possible 
without God's action'. 205 God is constrained by the characteristic limitations 
inherent to the entities through which God acts. 
203 Without properly qualifying this note, I will add that it seems reasonable to assume that quantum 
level events could also bring about macro-level change via the amplification of 'chaotic' processes. 204 This is why Murphy can claim that humans limit the action of God to a significant degree. She 
says that `God is working at all times in all things to bring about the good, but the extent to which 
God can realize those good plans is, by divine decree, dependent upon the cooperation of all-to-often- 
recalcitrant creatures, both human and non-human'. See 'God's Nonviolent Direct Action', in Carl S. 
Helrich, Religion and Science: God, Evolution, and the Soul (Kitchener, Ontario: Pandora Press, 
2002), p. 42. 
205 Murphy, `Divine Action in the Natural Order', p. 343. 
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So, what is needed is a way to conceive of structuring causes of conversion. 
It will be obvious from my description of conversion above that the Christian 
community is a vital ingredient in the conversion process. In fact, I claim it is 
necessary for an individual to be within the context of the community to undergo the 
process of conversion. It is through the practices of the community that cognitive 
structures (neurobiological assemblies) are formed and sustained. This can be 
understood as neuro-plastic changes in areas of the brain (and body) contributing to 
the formation of procedural knowledge and affect memories. This includes the 
formation of somatic markers and the activation of various automatic, goal-directed 
repertoires. Particularly Christian virtues then supervene on these various 
neurobiological states of affairs in order to bring about the character that we call 
`Christian'. 
Understood in this way, the Christian community is the `structuring cause' of 
conversion - the community, through its respective cultural-linguistic context, makes 
possible the particular kind of agent through which God can act. It is an important 
theological truth that this community is a holy community that God brought into 
existence through the incarnation. As Christians, we do not submit to just any 
community, but the community which God initiated through Jesus -a community 
embodying the dynamic reign of God in the world (Kingdom of God). The primacy 
of the ecclesial community should be obvious in the concept of divine action that I 
have presented in this section. 
In order to explore this notion to a greater depth, we will return to Juarrero's 
account of human action as an adaptive complex system. The aim here is to 
conceive of a way that the community can have causal influence on individual 
behaviour. We can represent this challenge by asking how, at the neurobiological 
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level, the Christian community can participate in the formation or transformation of 
the character of an individual such that his or her behaviour will reflect the virtues of 
the Christian tradition. 
In Juarrero's model, the human brain can be considered a complex dynamic 
system. She equates this with an `autopoietic' system as understood to be `a 
distinguishable complex of component-producing processes and their resulting 
components, bounded as an autonomous unity within its environment, and 
characterized by a particular kind of relations among its components and component- 
producing processes: the components, through their interaction, recursively generate, 
maintain and recover the same complex of processes [the organization] which 
produced them'. 206 
Juarrero conceptualises the distributed control of complex autopoietic 
systems as the operations of constraints. Essentially, the environment in which a 
system is unified and embedded constrains the system. These constraints are 
properly understood as relational properties that parts of the system acquire in virtue 
of being unified into a systematic whole. 207 Juarrero holds that `By correlating and 
coordinating previously aggregated parts into a more complex, differentiated, 
systematic whole, contextual constraints enlarge the variety of states the system as a 
whole can access'. 208 
When this range of accessibility includes the agent's historical context, an 
entire realm of possibility emerges. In Juarrero's model, a historical event not only 
serves as a trigger for a particular action (in Newtonian `bump-and-run' fashion), but 
206 M. Zeleny, Autopoiesis, Dissipative Structures, and Spontaneous Social Orders (Boulder, Co.: 
Westview, 1980), p. 5. 
207 Juarrero, Dynamics in Action, p. 132-133. 
208 Ibid., p. 138. 
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the historical event becomes integrated into the dynamic structure of the system. 
This point requires quoting Juarrero at length: 
Once the probability that something will happen depends on and is 
altered by the presence of something else, the two have become 
systematically and therefore internally related. As a result of the 
operations of context-sensitive constraints and the conditional 
probabilities they impose, A is now part of B's external structure. 
Because A is no longer `out there' independent of B, to which it is 
only externally related, the interdependence has created a larger 
whole, the AB system. Insofar as it is part of B's new context or 
external structure, A has been imported into B. 
By making a system's current states and behaviour systematically 
dependent on its history, the feedback loops of autocatalysis also 
incorporate the effects of time into those very states and behavior 
patterns. Indeed, precisely what makes these complex systems 
dynamical is that a current state is in part dependent on a prior one. 
Feedback, that is, incorporates the past into the system's present 
`external' structure. Feedback thus threads a system through both 
time and space, thereby allowing part of the system's external 
structure to run through its 209 
The result is that by embodying these context-sensitive constraints, a system 
is constrained by its own past experiences - they `carry their history on their 
backs'. 210 The resulting system -a product of both internal and external 
interactions 
- appears as a `structured structuring structure' in which the components parts of the 
system are situated in such a way as to render a whole that changes the prior 
probability of distribution of various behavioural options. 11 
Juarrero then develops the notion of phase space which represents a system's 
potential behaviour over a given time lapse. Attractors can be understood as 
trajectories that converge on typical patterns with a system's phase space - they are 
209 Ibid., p. 139. 
210 Ibid., p., 140. Juarrero offers the example of a snowflake the very structure of which embodies the 
conditions under which it was created. 
211 Antonio Damasio has shown that various levels of neural architecture function as a `structured 
structuring structure'. See `Time-locked Multiregional Retroactivation' Cognition 33 (1989), pp. 25- 
62. 
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`representations of natural precursors of final cause'. 212 Within any give phase space, 
points located within a basin of attraction represent states with a greater than average 
probability of being realised by the system -a system's behaviour converges on its 
attractor. 213 Given this understanding of attractors, Juarrero surmises that in the 
brain 
coherent wave patterns embodying the emergent properties of 
consciousness and meaning emerge as neurons entrain and self- 
organize. These higher levels of organization impose second-order, 
context sensitive constraints on their components by carving out 
strange attractors that reset the natural, intrinsic firing frequency of 
the individual neurons, including those controlling motor processes, 
and in so doing entrain and constrain these to the attractor's dynamics. 
So, allow us to return to my example of a neurobiological predisposition 
toward empathetic response being transformed to the Christian virtue of compassion. 
In the language of system dynamics, one may say that the particular (multi-realisable) 
neural representation for the experience of compassion toward another exists as an 
attractor state for a particular complex system. The goal of transformation in this 
example is to `carve out' this particular attractor state to such a degree that one's 
prior intention for sympathetic response remains the most probable selection down- 
stream - the probability of `helping' increases while the probability of `walking 
away' decreases. 
The construction of an attractor, once again, results from interactions 
between the system's current dynamics and its structured 
environment, whether physical or social. In the case of proximate 
intentions, the dynamics involved are the meaningfully self-organized 
regions of the prior intention's belief, desire, and so forth, together 
with their logic (their dynamical pathways). These dynamics affected 
by top-down contextual constraints entering from the environment, 
and by entraining motor control, explicitly formulating a proximate 
intention restructures the agent's dynamics even further.... By further 
differentiating a cognitive state space, proximate intentions impose 
additional context-dependent constraints on that semantic and motor 
212 Juarrero, Dynamics in Action, p. 152. 
213 Attractors that describe complex patterns of behaviour are called strange attractors. These often 
characterise complex dynamic systems. See Ibid., pp. 154-155. 
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space; they thereby stack the odds that a certain behaviour will be 
performed. 214 
This process described by Juarrero has a great degree of resonance with the 
'goal-directed' automaticity discussed earlier in this chapter. In Juarrero's language, 
the inculcation of habits or skills (virtues) constitutes automated attractors that 
function as a series of initial conditions within an object's relevant phase space. 15 
This constitutes one's intent or 'inclination' to act in a particular way. 
In the context of conversion, the goal is to establish a robust system that 
yields the greatest probability for behaviours characteristic of the Christian 
community. Depending on the prior stability of the system such transformations 
require varying degrees of restructuring of the physical and social environment in 
which a person is situated. This environment constitutes the structuring cause of 
conversion referred to above. 
This discussion of system dynamics has direct relevance to the field of 
psychology. Esther Thelen and Linda B. Smith have written a volume regarding the 
relationship between nonlinear system dynamics and developmental psychology. In 
it they propose `a radical departure from current cognitive theory'. 
216 Their central 
argument is that although behaviour and development appear structured and rule- 
driven, there is in fact no such `rules', rather there is a complex and continuously 
dynamic interplay of perception and action. 
A system, by its thermodynamic nature, seeks certain stable solutions that 
emerge from relations, not from design. They assert that `When the elements of 
214 Ibid., p. 187. 
21S Ibid., pp. 199-200. 
216 E. Thelen and L. B. Smith, A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and 
Action (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1994), p. xix. See also E. Thelen, `Self-organization in 
developmental processes: Can systems approaches work? ', in M. Gunnar and E. Thelen (eds. ), 
Minnesota Symposium on Child Psychology: Systems and Development - vol. 22 (Hillsdale, N. J.: 
Erlbaum, 1989), pp. 77-117. 
235 
such complex systems cooperate, they give rise to behavior with a unitary character, 
and thus to the illusion of structure. But the order is always executory, rather than 
rule-driven, allowing for the enormous sensitivity and flexibility of behavior to 
organize and regroup around task and context'. 217 
This notion is further applied in the field of attachment theory. Using 
resources from neuroscience and developmental psychology, Daniel J. Siegel has 
argued for a way of conceiving how experience shapes the human mind. 218 He 
asserts that `Experiences can shape not only what information enters the mind, but 
the way in which the mind develops the ability to process that information'. 219 
Siegel has constructed a `neurobiology of interpersonal experience'. The three 
principles are as follows: 
1. The human mind emerges from patterns in the flow of energy 
and information within the brain and between brains. 
2. The mind is created within the interaction of internal 
neurophysiological processes and interpersonal experiences. 
3. The structure and function of the developing brain are 
determined by how experiences, especially within 
interpersonal relationships, shape the genetically programmed 
maturation of the nervous system. 22° 
In this sense, human connections actually shape the neural connections from 
which the mind emerges. This point has interesting ramifications for how we think 
about what it means for one to 'change one's mind'. In so far as we can conceive of 
this possibility (and my argument for top-down causation certainly makes this option 
217 Thelen and Smith, A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action, p. 
xix. 
218 Specific resources from neuroscience regarding the impact of experience on mental processes 
include B. Milner, M. Petrides, and E. R. Kandel, `Cognitive Neuroscience and the Study of Memory', 
Neuron 20 (1998), pp. 445-468; L. Eisenberg, `The Social Construction of the Human Brain', 
American Journal of Psychiatry 152 (1995), pp. 1563-1575; and E. R. Kandel and H. Schwartz (eds. ), 
Principles of Neural Science (New York: Elsevier, 1992). 
219 Daniel J. Siegel, The Developing Mind: How Relationships and the Brain Interact to shape Who 
We Are (New York: The Guilford Press, 1999), p. 16. 220 Ibid., p. 2. 
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plausible), such a change of mental state and behaviour will necessarily be the result 
of relational emergence. On this note, Siegel continues: 
Relationship experiences have a dominant influence on the brain 
because the circuits responsible for social perception are the same as 
or tightly linked to those that integrate the important functions 
controlling the creation of meaning, the regulation of bodily states, 
the modulation of emotion, the organization of memory, and the 
capacity for interpersonal communication. Interpersonal experience 
thus plays a special organizing role in determining the development 
of brain structure early in life and the ongoing emergence of brain 
function throughout the lifespan 221 
As we have learned from dynamic system theory, the more stable (robust) 
that a particular system becomes, the more abrupt social interrelationships must be in 
order to affect a change in behaviour. In dynamic systems language, the attractor 
states have been `carved out' to such a degree that the prior intentional states of an 
agent have become largely `automatic'. In order to change behaviour, new 
environmental conditions must be introduced in order to increase the probability that 
a new course of action will be chosen. In the context of conversion, depending on 
the initial robustness of the system, socio-moral transformation will not only involve 
experiences resulting in cognitive dissonance, but will require coordinated (repetitive) 
intentional behaviour (over time) in order to `carve out' new attractor sets 
corresponding to the new behaviour. 
I claim that this transformation can only occur through one's participation in 
the Christian narrative community. This participation literally (physically) changes 
an individual in the ways discussed above. Character transformation occurs in this 
context because, whether explicitly or implicitly, the Christian community opens 
itself to God's grace - love characterised by its specific teleological nature. 
221 Ibid., p. 21. Emphasis added. 
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4.3 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to present a new model of Christian 
conversion. I claimed that a correct understanding of conversion is critical for 
Christian community orthopraxis. As I suggested in chapter one, the current state of 
affairs calls for a new model of conversion. The present proposal is a synthesis 
based on Wesleyan theology and a nonreductive physicalist view of human nature. 
I have defined Christian conversion as a process involving normal human 
biological capacities. It is characterised by a change in socio-moral attitude and 
behaviour and is best understood as the acquisition of virtues intrinsic to Christian 
faith. Such acquisitions are facilitated through social interaction and participation in 
practices inherent to the Christian community. Furthermore, the conversion process 
should be viewed as the co-operant result of divine grace and human participation. 
In the concluding chapter, I will offer some reflections and implications by 
focusing on the community of the Church as a sanctifying community. Drawing 
from arguments presented above, I make the strong claim that individual conversion 
(sanctification) cannot occur apart from a sanctifying community. Rather than 
concluding this thesis with a systematic method for facilitating conversion, I will 
offer an example of a community in which conversion occurred in dynamic and 
interesting ways. Communities of this nature constitute a critical `space' for 
conversion to occur. I refer to this `space' as a `conversion community'. 
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Chapter 5 
A Sanctifying Community 
Reflections and Implications 
Questions of the truth or falsity of Christian convictions cannot even 
be addressed until Christians recover the church as a political 
community necessary for salvation. What Christians believe about 
the universe, the nature of human existence, or even God does not, 
cannot, and should not save. Our beliefs, or better our convictions, 
only make sense as they are embodied in a political community we 
call church.... For Christians, without the church there is no 
possibility of salvation and even less of morality and politics. - 
Stanley Hauerwas 1 
The primary goal of the present work has been to offer a new model of 
Christian conversion. I have argued that this new model can be viewed as a 
competing theory (doctrine) of conversion, or in Lakatos's terminology, a competing 
`research programme'. Maclntyre has contributed to this methodological approach 
by providing the basic framework in which to assess the theory, or perhaps more 
appropriately, doctrine of conversion that we find prominent in many American 
Evangelical churches. 
A doctrine of conversion should not be understood as a mere collection of 
propositions reflecting the beliefs of a particular group; rather, such a doctrine 
should allow members of a particular tradition to understand the narrative sequence 
in which they live and form them in such a way that they know how to move within 
their respective cultural-linguistic systems, and in the case of Christianity, know how 
to relate to those outside of their tradition. 
Understood in this way, a theory (doctrine) of conversion is fonnative (or 
transfonnative as the case may be) and not simply a statement of 'belief. The 
1 After Christendom?: How the Church is to Behave if Freedom, Justice, and a Christian Nation are 
Bad Ideas (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1991), p. 26. 
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theory of conversion that a particular tradition holds will shape the way that 
members of that tradition develop in relation to their stated telos. As stated in the 
previous chapter, conversion is properly understood as the co-operant result of divine 
grace and human participation. I indicated that in terms of divine action, there must 
be both a `triggering' and `structuring' cause of conversion. I then suggested that the 
Christian community can be understood as this structuring cause. 
This final chapter will be dedicated to providing examples of how the 
community can be understood as the structuring cause of conversion. In order to do 
this, it will be necessary to engage in a further analysis of the American Evangelical 
model of conversion that I criticise throughout this work. The focus of this criticism 
is not so much of the model itself, but of the community (church) that has inculcated 
it. Thus, a theology of corporate conversion is required. 
5.1 A Theology of Corporate Conversion 
Before delving into the discussion, allow me to clarify some terminological 
issues that will extend throughout this chapter. It will be obvious at this point that, 
in the present work, the term `conversion' is not meant to designate a particular 
religious experience, a moment in time, or a substitutionary term for justification. 
Rather conversion should be seen as a process equivalent to Wesley's notion of 
sanctification. As such, throughout this chapter the terms conversion, discipleship, 
and spiritual or faith development can be understood as synonymous. 
I will begin this section with a quote intended to set the context for the 
discussion. During an inaugural address at Fuller Theological Seminary, Dallas 
Willard commented: 
We have counted on preaching and teaching to form faith in the 
hearer, and on faith to form the inner life and ordered behavior of the 
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Christian. But for whatever reason, this strategy has not turned out 
well. The result is that we have multitudes of professing Christians 
that well may be ready to die, but obviously are not ready to live, and 
can hardly get along with themselves, much less others. 2 
Willard's proclamation not only captures the sad state of affairs in many 
American churches, it alludes to the difficulty one has in forming a theology of 
corporate conversion. The challenge extends from the issues discussed in chapter 
one regarding the highly individualised and interiorised notion of Christian 
spirituality that we observe in many evangelical churches. This culminates in what 
Rodney Clapp calls the worship of a `god of Gnostic consumerism'. 3 
Clapp observes that church members routinely depart from worship services 
with the general complaint that their `needs weren't being met' or they `weren't 
being fed'. Such sentiments lead to a God known only in terms of products -a God 
known only in terms of the desires God satisfies. This highly individualised view 
leads to a destructive understanding of God and world for `without politics - with a 
God who wrestles with a people in time and space - God and individual dissolve into 
one another'. 4 
Likewise, Darrel L. Guder laments the reduction of the Gospel to a mere 
offering of individual salvation. Guder asserts that 
As the gospel proclaimed by the church has been reduced to 
individual salvation, that salvation has itself become the purpose and 
program of the church. When the church went through the paradigm 
shift from its initial shape as a movement to its continuing shape as an 
institution, its focus was more and more upon the administration of 
salvation. Its worship centered on the message of individual salvation; 
2 Dallas Willard, Spiritual Formation in Christ: A Perspective on What it is and How it Might be 
Done, address delivered on 22 October 1993 at Fuller Theological Seminary in honour of the 
inauguration of Seminary president Richard Mouw. This passage is cited in Tod E. Bolsinger, It 
Takes a Church to Raise a Christian: How the Community of God Transforms Lives (Grand Rapids, 
Mi.: Brazos Press, 2004), p. 31. 
3 Rodney Clapp, A Peculiar People: The Church as Culture in a Post-Christian Society (Downers 
Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1996), pp. 40-42. 
4 Ibid., p. 42. 
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its sacraments established and regulated the status of salvation; its 
doctrines sought to define and delimit salvation. 5 
Questions thus arise concerning the acquisition and assurance of salvation (as 
if it were an object and not a way of life) and the subsequent administration of 
salvation by the church. The continued individualisation and privatisation of faith 
equated the gospel with the `pursuit of happiness'. Thus, in many cases, both 
worship and preaching are designed to meet the individual need for the assurance of 
salvation. 6 
What is needed, in the face of these challenges, is a proper theology of 
corporate conversion. Such a theology views the community as a necessary part of 
the conversion process. In this sense, the community develops, or is converted, 
together. At the heart of this theology is the understanding that the character of the 
church is not determined by the sum of its individual members; in contrast, the 
community determines the character of its individual members. Such an approach 
requires an active and developing community. 
In order to offer such a theology, it is necessary to establish a view of the 
Church that is not shaped by the individualism that I criticise. As Christians live 
`between the times', the Church is understood to be the visible Kingdom of God in 
the world.? The Church embodies the ministry and resurrection of Jesus. Bishop N. 
T. Wright states that 
All that we are and do as Christians is based upon the one-off unique 
achievement of Jesus. It is because he inaugurated the kingdom that 
we can live the kingdom. It is because he brought the story of God 
and Israel, and hence of God and the cosmos, to its designed climax 
s Darrell L. Guder, The Continuing Conversion of the Church (Grand Rapids, Mi.: William B. 
Eerdman's Publishing Company, 2000), p. 133. This `paradigm shift' to which Guder refers can no 
doubt be described as the `Constantinian shift' which moved Christianity from an obscure sect to a 
national religion. 
6 Ibid., p. 135. 
7 The phrase `between the times' is meant to designate the period between the resurrection of Jesus 
and the General Resurrection. See Joel B. Green, Beginning with Jesus: Christ in Scripture, the 
Church, and Discipleship (Nashville, Tenn.: Cokesbury, 2000), pp. 152-155. 
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that we can now implement that work today.... What Jesus was to 
Israel, the church must now be for the world. 8 
This claim should strike Christians as a challenge indeed. However, we 
should not read this as a challenge for individual Christians to achieve. The whole 
point of the Church is that it is precisely not a collection of individuals, but a 
community which embodies Jesus' kingdom of God ministry. 9 Individual Christians 
are subsequently formed by this community. This is in opposition to the view that 
the character of the church is established by the collective personalities of its 
individual members. 
It is obvious from this claim that the ability of persons to become Christian 
depends on the character shaping potential of the Christian community. Edward 
Farley notes that historically, the way the pastor encouraged spiritual maturity in 
believers was not to focus on their individual needs, but to form and nurture a 
distinctly Christian community. 1° In this way, conversion is rightly understood to be 
a natural result of a maturing Christian community. 
Likewise, the early church understood and taught that to be baptised into the 
Christian faith was synonymous with undergoing an `extraordinary thoroughgoing 
resocialization' so that the Christian community would become `the primary group 
for its members supplanting all other loyalties'. " This corporate attitude in the early 
8 N. T. Wright, The Challenge of Jesus: Rediscovering Who Jesus Was and Is (Downers Grove, Ill.: 
InterVarsity Press, 1999), p. 53. Emphasis added. 9 Here, Paul's language of the `body of Christ is quiet interesting. Dale B. Martin has produced an 
interesting work in this regard. Central to Martin's argument is the Corinthian misunderstanding of 
resurrection. The Apostle argues that for the Corinthians `to deny the resurrection of their bodies is to 
deny the resurrection of Christ; [and] to deny the resurrection of Christ is to render any future hope 
void. The Christian body has no meaning apart from it participation in the body of Christ'. See The 
Corinthian Body (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 131. 
10 See Edward Farley, Theologia: The Fragmentation and Unity of Theological Education 
(Philadelphia, Penn.: Fortress Press, 1983). 
11 Wayne A. Meeks, The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul (New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 78. 
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church was inextricably connected to what it meant to call oneself a Christian or a 
person of `the Way' (Acts 9: 2; 24: 14,22). 
This corporate nature of the community of God is so prominent in early 
Christian theology that Miroslav Volf claims that `Christ's presence is promised not 
to the believing individual directly, but rather to the entire congregation, and only 
through the latter to the individual. This is why no one can come to faith alone and 
live in faith alone'. 12 Likewise, New Testament scholar, Richard B. Hays asserts 
that 
The church is a countercultural community of discipleship, and this 
community is the primary addressee of God's imperatives. The 
biblical story focuses on God's design for forming a covenant people. 
Thus, the primary sphere of moral concern is not the character of the 
individual but the corporate obedience of the church. -The 
community, in its corporate life, is called to embody an alternative 
order that stands as a sign of God's redemptive purposes in the world. 
Thus, `community' is not merely a concept; as the term is used here, 
it points to the concrete social manifestation of the people of God. 
13 
Given the view of the Christian community presented above, it becomes 
imperative to conceive of God's action in conversion as not an individual and 
isolated act, but a transformative process that takes place in the context of the 
community. To overstate the point, conversion is not an achievement of individual 
belief or intellectual assent; rather, conversion is properly understood as a process 
that requires intimate interaction with the Christian community. 14 Such a declaration 
12 Miroslav Volf, After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity (Grand Rapids, Mi.: 
William B. Eerdman's Publishing Company, 1998), p. 162. 13 Richard B. Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament: Community, Cross, and New Creation 
(San Francisco, Ca.: Harper Collins, 1996), p. 196. 14 This claim is standard doctrine in the Catholic Church. The Catechism of the Catholic Church 
states that 'extra ecclesiam nulla salus' (outside the Church there is no salvation). See Catechism of 
the Catholic Church (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1994), p. 224. I deny the subsequent claim 
that it is 'absolutely necessary for the salvation of every human creature to be subject to the Roman 
Pontiff' Pope Boniface VIII, the Bull Unam Sanctam, 1302). The salient point for the present work 
is that without the Church salvation (conversion) simply makes no sense. Volf continues that 'it is 
soteriologically and ecclesiologically inappropriate to understand the church as an external aid to 
salvation. The church is not a mere training subject or training ground for the edification of pious 
individuals. 
-Salvation and the church cannot be separated'. See After Our Likeness, p. 174. 
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highlights Maclntyre's claim that `I am never able to seek for the good or exercise 
the virtues only qua individual'. '5 
When Friedrich Schleiermacher wrestled with how diverse individuality and 
social and cultural forms interact, it is interesting that he did not think in the 
typically modem direction from the individual to the environment, but from the 
environment to the individual. 16 In regards to moral action, Schleiermacher has little 
confidence that individual effort might develop the `sentiment' necessary to act in a 
benevolent matter. However, when others engage in the benevolent activity the 
sentiment is strengthened. 17 In an analysis of Schleiermacher's commentary, 
Michael Welker comments that 
Individual benevolent actions normally do little to help disadvantaged 
human beings. By contrast, a multiplicity of actions, both of one's 
own and of others, in favour of those who are weaker not only helps 
them more, but also strengthens the intensity of the sentiments of 
those performing the benevolent actions. -Complex and 
strengthening sentiments arise in me when my action is embedded in 
an interconnection with the action of other human beings, 
strengthening this interconnection and being strengthened by it. '8 
Schleiermacher's notion of helping others in need is directly tied to the 
promoting God's glorification. 19 This concept of service to those in need is not only 
at the heart of Jesus' ministry (For even the Son of Man did not come to be served, 
but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many - Mark 10: 45 (NIV)), but I 
claim that it is critical to the process of conversion. In the following section, I will 
15 Alasdair Maclntyre, 'The Virtues, the Unity of Human Life, and the Concept of a Tradition', in 
Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones (eds. ), Why Narrative: Readings in Narrative Theology 
(Eugene, O. R.: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 1997), p. 105. Stanley Hauerwas makes a similar claim in 
an extended essay entitled The Sanctified Body: Why Perfection Does Not Require a 'Self. See 
Powell and Lodahl, Embodied Holiness, pp. 19-38. 16 See Friedrick Schleiermacher, 'Notes on Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics 8-9', Theology Today 56 
no. 2 (1999), pp. 164-168. 
"Ibid., pp. 165-166. '$ Michael Welker, "'We Live Deeper Than We think": The Genius of Schiciermacher's Earliest 
Ethics', Theology Today, 56 no. 2 (1999), p. 173. 
19 Schleiermacher, 'Notes on Aristotle', p. 166. He says that in order to promote God's glorification, 
'I must structure my free actions, including their impact on others, in such a way that the perfection in 
the individual parts of the world as a whole becomes increasingly clear both to me and to others, and 
the apparent imperfections and disharmonies disappear' (p. 166). 
245 
argue that in essence the church constitutes a social order which inherently stands in 
opposition to the world. This opposition is not in any way militant or violent. On 
the contrary, the church should be marked by a kenotic ethic and concerned with 
justice and care for those in need. It is within this context that the nature of God is 
most tangible and that conversion can fully grasp its telos. I will refer to this 
relational `space' where the people of God are transformed as `conversion 
communities'. 
5.2 `Conversion Communities' 
In order to develop this notion of conversion communities, I must further 
reflect on the nature of the church. In particular, I will focus on the relationship 
between atonement and the character of the Church. On the surface this may seem 
like an odd association, after all, is not atonement an issue of individual interest? 
Does not the atonement deal with Jesus' substitution for individual sin? In what 
follows, I will argue to the contrary. Not only does the idea of atonement primarily 
refer to a social reality, it also carries with it serious ramifications for how we 
understand a community where people are transformed - conversion communities. 
For the purposes of this section, I will not engage in a comprehensive 
analysis of atonement theories, rather I will focus on one central proposal - the 
atonement theory dubbed Christus Victor. This theory, popularised by Gustav Aulen, 
is a reiteration of the classic view of atonement which described Christ's work as 
victory over Satan and thus brought liberation to humankind. 0 Specifically, Jesus 
was understood to be a ransom paid to Satan for the souls of humanity. This of 
course turned out to be a clever trick because, unknown to Satan, Jesus was in fact 
20 See Gustav Au1dn, Christus Victor [1931] (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1969). 
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God incarnate. With the resurrection, Jesus was restored and Satan was forever 
defeated. 
J. Denny Weaver presents a `demythologized' version of Christus Victor that 
is relevant to the present discussion. Weaver states that `Christus Victor is more 
than a statement about overcoming the devil. Rather, it is - at least can be 
interpreted as -a statement of the work of Christ which addresses the church in its 
minority, pre-Constantinian social context, and that it fell out of favor in the 
aftermath of the Constantinian synthesis'. 21 Such a claim necessitates a view of God 
as acting in history since the notion describes the reality of a non-Constantinian, 
minority ecclesiology. 
Weaver's concept of `demythologizing' Christus Victor resonates with 
Walter Wink's description of `powers and principalities' in the biblical narratives. 
According to Wink, these principalities, powers, demons, etc. are not personal beings 
with a physical location; rather, they reflect the `spiritual' dimension of material 
structures. All powers in the world, including state, corporate, and economic 
structures, have spiritual and material dimensions. The spiritual dimension 
constitutes the collective cultural ethos of a material structure. Thus, powers and 
principalities are `real' in the sense that they are embodied by political structures and 
can be assessed according to their relationship to the Kingdom of God. 2 
Given this view of principalities and powers, the great cosmic battle between 
the forces of God and Satan found in the classic theory of atonement can be 
understood as the confrontation that occurs between forces in the material world. 
This conflict is obvious between Jesus and the ruling powers and institutions of the 
21 J. Denny Weaver, `Atonement for the Nonconstantinian Church', Modern Theology 6 no. 4 (1990), 
pp. 307-308. 
See Walter Wink, Naming the Powers: The Language of Power in the New Testament (Philadelphia, 
Penn.: Fortress Press, 1984). 
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Roman and Jewish world. Jesus' struggle with the temporal powers of his day 
culminated in his death and resurrection. The Kingdom of God, which he initiated, 
is subsequently embodied in those that follow Jesus throughout history. The salient 
point, as Weaver notes, is that `the work of Christ - atonement - as described in this 
historical version of Christus Victor establishes a new social order which stands over 
against - in confrontation with - the structures of this world'. 
23 
This notion of the church as a `new social order' fell into disarray with the 
`Constantinian shift' - Christianity moved from an illegal and persecuted minority to 
the established religion of the empire. 24 Weaver notes that prior to Constantine, it 
was the community of the church that made God's work visible to the world. It was 
also clear that the church existed in a state of non-violent confrontation with the 
world. Once Christianity became the official religion of Rome, the life of the church 
became identified with the success of empire. The church could now sit comfortably 
within the social structure of Rome. 25 
It is worth noting that Christus Victor is an approach to atonement which 
depends on an imagery of confrontation. Weaver claims that `Christus victor fell out 
of the theological matrix with the Constantinian shift, not so much because of its 
imagery of demons or objections to tricking the devil but because the church had lost 
its sense of confrontation with the world'. 26 The church's gradual shift in social 
context thus altered its ecclesiology to the point that discussing atonement in terms 
of confrontation no longer made sense. 
23 Weaver, 'Atonement for the Nonconstantinian Church', p. 309. 24 This move was in reality a gradual transition. The term 'Constantinian shift' is used in recognition 
of Constantine who formally legalised Christianity. For an excellent resource see John Howard 
Yoder, The Priestly Kingdom: Social Ethics as Gospel (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1985), especially chapter 7: 'The Constantinian Sources of Western Social Ethics', pp. 135-150. 
Yoder cites two main dimensions of the shift - (1) the shift from church to civil government, and (2) 
the transition to empire as God's agent (p. 138). u Weaver, 'Atonement for the Nonconstantinian Church', p. 310. 26 Ibid., p. 311. 
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With lessening emphasis on social context in a theory of atonement, other 
views arose. According to Weaver, the most notable of these 'theories' are offered 
by Anselm (substitution) and Abelard (Exemplary). 27 This difference primarily 
concerns the subject of the atoning act. Weaver emphasises this difference in the 
following: 
Salvation as understood by the Anselm-Abelard axis has an inherently 
individual component, whichever side of their argument one wants to 
pursue. The satisfaction or substitutionary theory of Anselm defines 
the problem of the sinner in inherently individual terms. The sinner 
owes a debt and that debt in personal. When it is paid, the sinner is 
saved. Abelard's moral influence theory is equally individualistic. 
Upon perceiving the loving death of Christ, the rebellious sinner 
perceives his or her own alienation and rebellion and turns to God. In 
each case, the answer to sin envisions the status of the individual and 
God, and is complete at that level. One can, of course, go on to 
discuss how that saved individual may or can or should engage in 
community and be socially responsible and establish relationships 
with other saved individuals. That social component, however, is 
logically an afterthought, something to consider after one has dealt 
with the prior, fundamental and individualistic problem of personal 
guilt and penalty. 28 
This emphasis on the social component of salvation is critical to the present 
discussion regarding conversion. If, as I have argued, the community of the church 
shapes and gives expression to individual conversion, then becoming Christian 
means being part of a community that has a clear presence in the world as the agent 
of God's will for creation. To be clear, the critical aspect of the community in the 
conversion process is not being a part of just any community, but being a part of a 
community that embodies the Kingdom of God. I am claiming that the character of 
the pre-Constantinian church constitutes the transformative nature of the Christian 
27 It is worth noting that neither Anselm nor Abelard would have sought to offer a `theory' of 
atonement per se. Focus on atonement `theories' is common in Evangelical theology; however, to do 
justice to the work of Anselm and Abelard would require a much more substantial engagement than 
that offered by Weaver. 
28 Weaver, 'Atonement for the Nonconstantinian Church', p. 315. 
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community. This nature is marked by social engagement for the sake of love and 
justice. 
This is the difference between 'communities of togetherness' and 'conversion 
communities'. While communities of togetherness share affinity and culture shaping 
potential, conversion communities act as divine structuring causes of human 
transformation by providing the possibility for believers to act as agents of God's 
work in the world. In the following section, I will discuss an example of a 
conversion community. It should be noted that I do not seek to provide a specific 
method for facilitating conversion. To do so would be to participate in the very 
reductive systematisation that I have argued against. Instead, this example is meant 
to demonstrate the type of communities where Christian conversion occurs. 
5.2.1 Wesley's Methodism 
The purpose of this section is to offer John Wesley's Methodist societies as 
an example of `conversion communities'. Recall that the `axial theme' of Wesley's 
soteriology was the `renewal of the image of God'. Humanity as the image of God is 
a mirror that reflects divine love to the world. As such the imago Dci is not a quality 
that a human being possesses; rather, it is a relational capacity. Thus salvation, for 
Wesley, was a renewal in the capacity to reflect the love, grace and justice of God to 
the world. The social component of Wesley's theology and practices cannot be 
overstated. In fact, Wesley asserted that `Christianity is essentially a social religion, 
and that to turn it into a solitary religion is indeed to destroy it.... When I say 
[Christianity] is essentially a social religion, I mean not only that it cannot subsist so 
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well, but that it cannot subsist at all without society, without living and conversing 
with [others]' 29 
Wesley realised that Christian faith was initiated and flourished in a social 
context. 0 He also understood that faith itself required social expression in order to 
accomplish God's will for the world. This recognition gave birth to Wesley's 
distinctive emphasis on societies, classes, and bands. These groups provided the 
necessary social context for Christian faith to be developed. 
This aspect of Wesley's Methodism was not the product of systematic 
theological contemplation; rather, it was born of practical observation. Because of 
the masses gathering for the revivals (1746-1748), Wesley experimented with 
preaching while circumventing the formation of societies aimed at developing those 
responding to his message of salvation. The results were disastrous. In his 1748 
Conference Minutes, Wesley states that without forming the societies 
`Almost all the seed has fallen by the wayside; there is scarcely any 
fruit remaining'. The preacher had little opportunity for instructions, 
the awakened souls could not `watch over one another in love', and 
the believers could not `build up one another and bear one another's 
burdens'. 31 
The experiment had frayed the threads of connectional ism. 32 
As a result of these observations, Wesley invested a great deal of time and 
energy toward developing a social organisation that would nourish believers toward 
sanctification. It is important to understand that the transformative power of these 
29 Sermon 24, Upon our Lord's Sermon on the Mount: Discourse the Fourth BE (1: 533.534). 
30 Wesley claimed that although 'it is God only [who] changes hearts, yet he generally doch it by man'. 
Ibid., p. 546. 
31 Quoted by Richard P. Heitzenrater, Wesley and the People called Methodists (Nashville, Tenn.: 
Abingdon Press, 1995), p. 165. 
32 This emphasis on the importance of communal interaction is echoed in an empirical survey 
conducted by Thomas R. Albin. After surveying over five-hundred accounts of involvement in early 
Methodism, Albin concludes that `Methodist spirituality could be characterized as a positive process 
in which lay leadership and direction played a key role along with that of the local community rather 
than sudden experiences related to a fear of death and hell'. See `An Empirical Study of Early 
Methodist Spirituality', in Theodore Runyon (ed. ), Wesleyan Theology Today (Nashville, Tenn.: 
Kingswood Books, 1985), p. 279. 
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early Methodist societies rested not in their community of togetherness alone, but in 
the context of the actions in which they engaged as a community. 
It is crucial to the present argument to recognise that 'the purposes of God are 
only fulfilled as those who are reconciled with God serve as "channels of grace" to 
other persons'. 3 Individual conversion cannot be separated from the overall work 
that God is achieving through new creation. Jesus initiated a new world (Kingdom 
of God) constituted not by the salvation of individual souls, but by the renewal of the 
whole of creation in love, mercy and justice. Conversion, as a component of new 
creation, occurs in the overall context of God's action in the world. 
Wesley recognised that God could indeed bring renewal to the world by fiat; 
however, to do so would be to deny the very nature of God and humankind. 
Only suppose the Almighty to act irresistibly, and the thing is done; 
yea, with just the same ease as when `God said, Let there be light; and 
there was light'. But then man would be man no longer; is inmost 
nature would be changed. He would no longer be a moral agent, any 
more than the sun or the wind, as he would no longer be endued with 
liberty, a power of choosing or self-determination. Consequently he 
would no longer be capable of virtue, or vice, of reward or 
punishment. 34 
For Wesley, the transformation of individual persons is inextricably bound to 
the telos of new creation. Renewed humanity is the agent of God's grace to the 
world - `This is the great reason why the providence of God has so mingled you 
together with other men, that whatever grace you have received of God may through 
you be communicated to others'. 35 Thus, humanity is in the `image of God' insofar 
as the benevolence of God is reflected in human action toward the rest of creation. 
36 
Therefore, we must reflect on the social nature of Wesley's Methodism not 
only in relation to personal conversion or spiritual development, but also with 
33 Runyon, 'Holiness as the Renewal of the Image of God in the Individual and Society', p. 83. 
34 Sermon 63, The General Spread of the Gospel, BE (2: 488-489). 
35 Wesley, Sermon 24, Upon our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, BE (1: 537). 36 Runyon, `Holiness as the Renewal of the Image of God', p. 87. 
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serious consideration of what they accomplished in resonance with God's love and 
justice. Early Methodism was at the centre of the eighteenth-century Evangelical 
Movement in England. In a detailed historical review of the revival, John Wesley 
Bready notes that 
The movement was cradled and reared in an atmosphere of insolence, 
contempt and abuse. Yet the day was to dawn when the descendants 
of those who maligned it would acclaim it, `the moral salvation of 
England', and a mighty inspiration to all mankind. Few world 
movements, indeed, have ever emerged from the depths of slander to 
the heights of historical honour, with such consistent progress as did 
this remarkable revival of vital, practical religion. 37 
Methodism began as the `Holy Club' during Wesley's studies at Oxford. The 
group was made up of Wesley and fellow Christians who adopted a `practical 
programme' of living the Christian life. They resolved to receive Holy Communion 
on a regular basis as well as to assist in the education of marginalised adults and 
children. In addition, they were committed to visiting and befriending prisoners in 
the Oxford jails and to `give freely, according to their means, to relieve necessity 
among the poor'. 38 
Wesley's emphasis on moral righteousness was direct. In his treatise, The 
Character of a Methodist (1742), Wesley says `By salvation he means holiness of 
heart and life.... It is nonsense for a woman to fancy herself a virtuous woman only 
because she's not a prostitute; or [a man to] dream he is an hortest man merely 
because he does not rob or steal. May the Lord God of my fathers preserve me from 
such a poor, starved religion as this! Were this the mark of a Methodist I would 
sooner choose to be a sincere Jew, Turk, or pagan' 39 
37 John Wesley Bready, England Before and After Wesley: The Evangelical Revival and Social 
Reform (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938), p. 177. 38 Ibid., p. 187. It was in Oxford that they were scoffingly dubbed 'Methodists'. 39 BE (9: 35). 
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Wesley insisted that the very foundations of Methodism were ethical, 
practical and experimental as opposed to doctrinal, theoretical or metaphysical. For 
Wesley the expression of true faith was found in works of service and love. In a 
Letter to Mary Bishop (1778) he writes 
I find more profit in sermons on either good tempers, or good works, 
than in what are vulgarly called Gospel sermons. That term has now 
become a mere cant word: I wish none of our society would use it. It 
has no determinate meaning. Let but a pert, self-sufficient animal, 
that has neither sense nor grace, bawl out something about Christ, or 
his blood, or justification by faith, and his hearers cry out, `What a 
fine Gospel sermon! ' Surely Methodists have not so learned Christ! 
We know no Gospel without salvation from sin 40 
At the core of this practical approach to Christian growth were the Methodist 
societies or class communities. It was here in these communities that early 
Methodists were `schooled' in the Christian way, not merely by mental assent, but 
by discussing `reverently and prayerfully their attitude to the social, ethical and 
religious problems of their daily life' . 
41 Even more important, these discussions 
moved them to action - the convert is always transformed for a social end. 
Over the course of the revival, the Methodist communities played a vital role 
in the social reform of England. 42 Methodists were leaders in aspects of society 
ranging from education reform for the poor to the abolition of slavery. Jack Lawson, 
who served as a Member of Parliament in Durham City, wrote that `The first fighters 
and speakers for unions, C. -op. Societies, political freedom, and improved conditions, 
were Methodist preachers. That is beyond argument' 43 
It should not be assumed that the Methodists brought about this change 
without significant resistance. Even Epworth Church, where Wesley spent his youth, 
40 BE (6: 213). 
41 Bready, England Before and After Wesley, p. 217. 
42 See Luke L. Keefer, `John Wesley, the Methodists, and Social Reform in England' Wesleyan 
Theological Journal 25 no. 1 (1990), pp. 1-25. 
43 Quoted by Bready. Ibid., p. 379. 
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denied him the Sacrament claiming that he was `not fit'. `W Methodist leaders 
regularly fell under violent attack by angry mobs and Methodists often found their 
homes burned or torn-down by protestors. 
Eighteenth-century Methodism certainly possessed the counter-cultural 
quality characteristic of the pre-Constantinian church. Their relentless social 
engagement with the injustices (principalities and powers) of their day created a 
`space' in which Methodists could be transformed into a true Christian community. 
It is from within these `conversion communities' that individuals undergo the 
process of conversion. The fact that Wesley's Methodists were involved in the 
social concerns of their day is not a mere consequence of their conversion, but a 
contributor to it. 
5.3 Conclusion 
This thesis has primarily been about Christian conversion. In chapter one, I 
offered an analysis of Christian spirituality with a particular focus on the American 
Evangelical tradition. I suggested that this view of spirituality ultimately leads to a 
problematic doctrine of conversion. From this diagnosis, I set out to formulate a 
new model of conversion that is not only faithful to long-held Christian convictions, 
but also takes seriously nuances in science and philosophy. 
I constructed this model based on insights from two primary sources -a 
Wesleyan theology and a nonreductive physicalist view of human nature. Wesleyan 
theology is not only a key historical contributor to American Evangelicalism, but the 
theological insights from John Wesley provide a vital language for conversion. The 
practical nature of Wesley's work resonates with my own desire to articulate a 
44 Ibid., p. 206. 
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theology that encourages holistic transformation and promotes sound Christian 
orthopraxis. 
For Wesley, the 'way of salvation' is marked by a transformation of the 
tempers. That is, Wesley understood conversion as an alteration in the underlying 
psychological motivators that lead to particular attitudes and behaviour. Through 
both divine action and responsible human participation, human beings are 
transformed by the grace of God. This process is best represented by the notion of 
sanctification and possesses an inherent `telos' marked by Wesley's concept of `new 
creation'. 
In chapter three, I argued that one's view of human nature has significant 
repercussions for how he or she understands conversion. I suggested that the 
nonreductive physicalist view of human nature is the most viable option currently 
available. Nonreductive physicalism should not be seen as a philosophical thesis, 
but rather as a `research programme' that brings together data from multiple sources 
including historical and systematic theology as well as various scientific disciplines. 
In this way, nonreductive physicalism offers a view of human nature that no 
single resource can offer (theology, anthropology, cognitive science, etc. ). This view 
also allows a way of conceiving the distinctiveness of human nature as rooted in the 
human capacity for relatedness. This notion is not only compatible with scientific 
research, but is consistent with Wesley's concept of the imago Dci. 
The multidimensional analysis presented in chapter four leads to a model of 
conversion that supports both scientific research consistent with a nonreductive 
physicalist view of human nature as well as theological insights from John Wesley. I 
have proposed a model of conversion which takes seriously the social dimension of 
human experience as well as our inextricably embodied nature. 
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The model that I have proposed is particularly Christian in that I have 
suggested that conversion is best understood as the acquisition of virtues intrinsic to 
Christian faith. This acquisition necessarily takes place within the context of the 
Christian community. Furthermore, transformation of the type that I have discussed 
necessarily involves divine action. This is true not only in the sense that God acts 
through every quantum event to sustain the physical laws that allow for human 
functionality; but, as I have suggested, the grace of God is ever-present and ever- 
moving creation to an ultimate end. In this way, general divine action can be 
understood to be equivalent to `prevenient grace'. 
In addition, I claimed that conversion requires a `structuring cause' - that is, 
God's activity in the world is constrained by the structures through which God can 
operate. I suggested that this structuring cause can be understood as the Christian 
community. In fact, it is through one's interaction with the community that neural 
assemblies are formed through which particular attitudes and behaviours can be 
realised. 
This thesis has set out a new way of thinking about Christian conversion. Its 
uniqueness is found in the synthesis of existing work in the area of both theology and 
science. This model has serious implications for Christian community life. I have 
asserted above that the transformative power of the Christian community exists not 
in its affinity or `togetherness' alone, but in the reality which it seeks to achieve - the 
realisation of the Kingdom of God. 
The model of Christian conversion that I propose has some serious 
implications for Christian community life, not least of which includes the practices 
of evangelism and discipleship. Any model of Christian conversion will necessarily 
affect the `character' of these practices. The notion of evangelism is central to the 
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'Great Commission'. Here Christians are commanded to 'make disciples of all 
nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy 
Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything that [Jesus] commanded'? 45 Although, 
there is little doubt that these words are an integral part of the Christian faith, the 
interesting question arises when we inquire into the nature of evangelism. 
What is evangelism? Many would reply that it is the Christian call to 'save 
souls'. Conversion, as I have presented it in this thesis, requires no less than a 
conversion of evangelism -a transition from the 'saving of souls' to the 
transformation of whole persons. If the goal of the Church becomes the latter, then 
methodologies built upon the view of Christian spirituality discussed in chapter one 
must significantly change. The goal of evangelism will transition from the climactic 
confession of the `sinner's prayer' to the constant and consistent encouragement of 
holistic transformation. 
Practically, this means that the church will be involved in areas extending 
beyond `spiritual' concerns. 46 It means feeding the hungry, caring for the sick, 
supporting single parent families, providing therapy for victims of abuse; the list 
goes on indefinitely. A key feature of this type of care is that it is not to be viewed 
as `crisis management'; rather, the Christian community should seek out this type of 
human 'dis-ease' and with the love and grace of God participate in the healing of 
wounded lives. 
The social dimension of Wesley's practices is inescapable. A survey of 
Wesley's work will show minimal concern for evangelising methodology; rather, the 
Methodist movement was rich with concern to see God's love and justice expressed 
as Mat 28: 19-20, NRSV. 
46 In fact, I claim that evangelism is an imperative 'spiritual' concern (when understood as an inherently anthropological term); however. I place the term in scare quotes to emphasis that the majority view will consider 'spiritual' concerns to imply an individual and private affair. 
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to the world. The early Methodist's involvement in the social realm rendered the 
movement a `presence' in eightecnth"century England. 
According to James McClendon, this 'presence' can be seen as a critical 
virtue to the practice of evangelism. Recall from MacIntyre, that a virtue is an 
acquired trait that allows access to goods internal to practices. In the case of the 
practice of evangelism, where the 'good' internal to the practice can be understood to 
be persons being brought into the community of believers, the virtue of `presence' is 
a critical trait. 
McClendon defines `presence' as `being there for and with the other'. 47 
Presence is therefore a function of physical existence - the virtue is embodied. It is 
`being one's self for someone else; it is refusing the temptation to withdraw mentally 
and emotionally; but it is also on occasion putting our own body's weight and 
warmth alongside the neighbor, the friend, the lover in need' 48 In this sense, the 
possibility of embodying such a virtue is found only in the presence of an `other' 
whose need acts as the occasion of our ability to serve. It is through the other that 
we are able to overcome our self-absorption and be empowered by the gift of 
another's needs - `We are able to move from a self-centered narrative and enter into 
a service oriented narrative which creates in us the character God has called us to 
be, 49 
Thus, Methodist `presence' within the social context of eighteenth-century 
England cannot be separated from their practice of evangelism. In this way, the 
model of conversion that I have proposed renders an understanding of evangelism 
that makes propositional solicitation unintelligible. Evangelism is first being God's 
47 James Wm. McClendon, Ethics: Systematic Theology, Vol. 1 (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 
2002), p. 115. 
48 Ibid., p. 116. 49 Howard J. Loewen, 'Rethinking Christian Ethics: From Moral Decisions to Character Formation', 
Directions 18 no. 1 (1989), p. 63. 
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community (Church, Body of Christ, visible Kingdom of God, ctc. ) in the midst of 
need. The counter-cultural character of such a community embodies the gospel 
which it seeks to propagate. 
This new model of conversion makes evangelism not about getting people to 
`believe' this or that; rather, evangelism is characterised by graceful invitation to 
participate in a community where individuals are transformed together in a holistic 
fashion. Only then can beliefs and convictions have true meaning. 
Likewise, discipleship should be no less interested in the development of the 
whole person. The rhetoric of 'spiritual' development, when it characterises the goal 
of Christian discipleship as abstract notions such as `bringing the flesh under the 
subjection of the spirit' or `tuning the soul to more effectively communicate with 
God', is deeply rooted in a body-soul dualism that I consider problematic for true 
Christian discipleship. A person should not be characterised by `interior' thoughts or 
beliefs, but should rather be understood as a holistic being whose values are 
inseparably bound to his or her embodied life. Here, values are not only experienced 
as inner convictions, but expressed in a social context. 
Discipleship, the continued process of becoming Christian, should be 
concerned with the `means of grace'. For Wesley, these means not only included 
practices such as prayer, fasting, and worship, but extended to all forms of social 
interaction between a convert and other members of the Christian community. 
Given insights gained from a neuroscientific explanation of conversion, we 
understand discipleship to be a gradual process of change resulting from 
multidimensional experiences within the context of the Christian community. Such 
experiences include prayer, meditation, fasting, worship, participation in the 
Eucharist and any activity that acts to reinforce the Christian narrative in the life of 
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the convert. The telling of the 'story of Jesus' actively 'rewrites' the personal 
narrative of every Christian - our lives and all of the experiences therein are 
interpreted through what God has done and is doing in the world. 
A critical aspect of the type of discipleship (conversion) that I propose is that 
it must occur through active participation not just in the sacraments, but in the 
embodied content of those holy gestures. For example, in the case of the evangelical 
Protestant, the Lord's Supper is not simply about worship and remembrance. The 
act of participating in this holy sacrament is an active response to the call to be the 
Body of Christ in the world. Such a call can only be fulfilled within the context of 
the Christian community thus empowered by the Spirit of God to be the visible 
Kingdom of God in the world. 
In concluding this thesis, it is my hope that the present work will be viewed 
not as an isolated contribution to the academic discipline of philosophical theology, 
but as a sincere attempt to do philosophical theology in the therapeutic mode of those 
that have shaped me. 
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